Australian security planning in a changing strategic environment by Babbage, Ross
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 
CANBERRA ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
AUSTRALIAN SECURITY PLANNING IN A 
CHANGING STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
by 
R.E. Babbage 
Thesis Submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of International Relations, 
The Australian National University 
February 1978. 
ii 
This thesis is my own original work. 
Ross E. Babbage 
· Abstra:ct* 
During the decade from 1967 Australia's strategic 
environment altered fundamentally. This thesis explores the 
nature of the most important changes and examines their 
implications for Australia's current and future security 
policies. 
The two most significant alterations - the changed 
nature of the strategic relationship with the United States 
and the revolutionary advances in conventional military 
technology - are discussed in Part I. In Part II, the major 
implications of the changes in the strategic environment for 
Australian security policy a·re detailed. This is followed 
in Part III by an examination of the bureaucratic constraints 
on adapting Australian security policy to more closely 
satisfy the requirements of the new situation. In Part IV, 
a range of concepts is discussed which.might assist in over-
coming many of the difficulties of coherently planning 
security policy development in a highly uncertain strategic 
environment. Finally, in Part V, attention is focussed upon 
the broadened range of strategy and manpower options which 
are deserving of consideration as Australia seeks solutions 
appropriate to its new requirements. 
The overall conclusion, stated baldly, is that many 
concepts which are part of the Australian security structure 
have been outmoded by recent changes in the nature of the 
strategic environment. A th~rough process of reassessment 
is required if Australia is to be appropriately prepared to 
meet the security challenges which may arise in the 1980's 
and 90's. 
* Partly because an abstract is not a firm requirement for 
Ph.D theses from the Department of International Relations 
Abstract (cont) Page 2 
and partly because the material contained herein is repetitive 
of the discussion in the Preface and the Introduction, this 
note has not been bound into the thesis copies. This 
document has been produced simply for lodgement in the 
University Administration files, should it be required. 
· Ross Babbage 
Future needs will differ from those 
of even the quite recent past. Changes 
that have occurred in the rest of the 
world, and Australia's more independent 
stance in international affairs, require 
that Australia should have a Defence 
Force more self-reliant in military 
capability and more oriented towards the 
defence of Australia and its interests. 
Defining our future defence capability 
requirements is a large and complex task 
that embraces many types of professionalism. 
Old ideas die hard, especially when 
valued tradition surrounds them, but new 
ideas are no better than the perceptiveness, 
imagination and prudence of those who 
originate them. But ideas are what 
Australia needs in order to create a 
Defence Force and a defence policy truly 
reflecting the requirements of independent 
Australia in the decades ahead. 
Sir Arthur Tange (The Secretary 
of the Australian Department of 
Defence) in 'A Step Forward', 
Defence Force Journal, No. 1, 
November/December 1976, p. 5. 
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PREFACE 
Within the Australian security system, there is a 
general recognition that since the middle 1960s the 
strategic environment has changed. The altered regional 
role of Australia's major power allies, the post~colonial 
proliferation of nation-states, the altered nature of the 
global balance of power, the changing character of the 
world economic order and the accelerating pace of new 
technological developments are just a few of the trends 
which have been discussed in government and academic 
circles alike. Yet the consequences of these changes for 
the Australian security system have been discussed only in 
the most generalised sense. 1 For example, the altered 
nature of the relationship with the United States produces 
a requirement for increased self-reliance but exactly what 
this might mean for strategy, force structure, manpower, 
equipment, doctrine, industrial support capacity, etc., has 
not been elaborated in any detail. Similarly, the importance 
1 The absence of detailed discussion concerning the 
implications of the changing strategic environment for 
Australian security policy is one of the most notable 
omissions from the Defence White Paper. (Australian 
Defence, presented to Parliament by the Minister for 
Defence, the Hon. D.J .. Killen, 4 November 1976). This 
document is the first major governmental review of 
Australian security policy which has been made public 
since the 1960s. However, it fails to elaborate and 
discuss the ramifications of the changed strategic 
environment in any but the most superficial manner. 
Chapter 1 of the White Paper discusses briefly some'of 
the changing strategic influences. Chapter 2 elaborates 
the general state of the global and regional strategic 
situation~ However, this is followed in Chapter 3 by a 
statement of the Government's view of Australia's 
defence requirements. No attempt is made to delineate 
alternative strategic options or even to justify in 
any detail the stance adopted by referring back to 
the changed nature of Australia's strategic 
circumstances. There is thus little attempt to relate 
the military capabilities planned for the future, 
outlined in Chapter 4, to the dramatically altered 
nature of the security requirements with which the 
country is confronted. 
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of nwintuinincJ contact and tamili.J.rity with .J.dvancing 
military technologies is undisputed but, again, the major 
consequences for Australian security of recent developments 
in this field have not been delineated even in the most 
general terms. This fundamental deficiency has effectively 
retarded the processes of coherent security planning and 
system adaptation. It is thus appropriate and important 
than an effort now be made to remedy this situation. 
This thesis does not represent an attempt to develop a 
new security and defence policy for Australia. Such an ' 
undertaking would be far beyond my personal competence and 
probably beyond that of any other individual. Rather, this 
analysis is intended to clarify the nature of some of the 
more important changes in Australia's strategic environment, 
to discuss the most significant implications and to examine 
the scope for the future adaptation of Australia's security 
policy. No attempt is made to derive an optimum strategy 
and structural 'solution' to Australia's security problems, 
although alternative concepts are evaluated briefly for 
their capacity to contribute to such a goal. 
Accepting the theoretical objective of developing an 
optimising 'solution' to Australia's security problems 
implies a degree of adherence to the 'rationalist' school 
of security policy development. 2 It is appreciated that, 
because of a wide variety of unpredictabl~ variables in the 
strategic environment, it is not practicable to derive a 
single definitive conceptual or structural 'solution' which 
fully satisfies Australia~s national security requirements. 
Moreover, even if it were theoretically possible to derive 
an optimal solution, there would remain a vast array of 
practical influences constraining its implementation. 
However, these practical limits to the achievement of 
2 The 'rationalist', 'efficiency' and 'overseas model' 
approaches to defence policy development are defined and 
discussed in W.H. Smith, The Determinants of Defence 
Policy (A paper delivered to the conference on Armed 
Forces and Australian Society , Royal Military College, 
Duntroon, Canberra, 20-22 May 1977), pp. 19-23. 
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optimal solutions serve only to qualify, rather than 
invalidate, this type of planning concept. ~ecause it can be 
demonstrated that some security postures are more effective 
than others in particular situations, it is possible, and 
indeed desirable, for attempts to be made to approach the 
goal of developing an optimising 'solution'. A range of 
concepts which might be suitable for performing this 
function is elaborated in Part IV. 
This thesis should be viewed as a discussion opener rather 
than in any sense a concluding piece to the debate on 
Australian security policy. A conscious effort has been made 
to introduce a significant number of new ideas and concepts 
for serious consideration. This has been done without any 
pretensions. I have been constantly aware that most of the 
topics being discussed are the daily concern of thousands of 
other Australians - politicians, public servants, service men 
and women, industrialists, journalists, pressure groups of many 
varieties and, of course, tax pay~rs. Opinions are bound to 
differ on a wide range of issues. But if this volume serves 
to stimulate an increased level of informed debate and 
contributes to a broader understanding of the crucial issues 
at stake, the effort required for its production will have 
been well worth while. 
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1 
INTRODUC'l'lON 
There is a large degree of consistency in the history 
of Australian security policy. 1 Those who inhabited the 
first European settlements in Australia regarded themselves 
as an isolated and vulnerable outpost of western society. 
They sought to ensure their security by fostering close 
links with the Empire and encouraging the presence of 
elements of the Royal Navy. As an integral part of this 
imperial relationship, military forces from the individual 
Australian colonies, and later from the federated Commonwealth 
of Australia, were deployed abroad to support British 
commitments in a number of colonial wars. Thus, by the 
First World War, the concept of ensuring Australian security 
through an alliance maintained, in part, by the subsidiary 
2 deployment of local forces overseas was well entrenched. 
This form of close cooperation in security affairs 
continued largely unaltered until the paucity of British 
forces in the Far East during the Second World War prompted 
Prime Minister Curtin to turn to the United States as the 
primary guarantor of Australia's security. While this 
represented a major change in policy direction, the basic 
conceptual nature of Australia's security strategy remained 
1 
2 
In this thesis, the term ~ecurity polici is generaily 
favoured over that of ~efence polici. This is 
primarily because security policy can be defined in 
a broad manner to encompass a wide range of diplomatic, 
political, economic, military, social and other 
pressures and threats to which nation states are 
potentially susceptible. 
This system of alliance security, sustained in part by 
the deployment of Australian forces abroad to support 
the foreign commitments of major power al.lies, is 
termed, for the purposes of this thesis, the 'forward 
defence concept' or 'forward defence strategy'. Its 
nature and significance is elaborated in considerable 
length in 'Forward Defence and Regional Commitments', 
Chapter 3 in T.B. Millar, Australia's Defence (Melbourne, 
Melbourne University Press, 1969), pp. 44-63. 
2 
much as before. Thus, during the late 1940s and through 
the 1950s and 1960s, the United States was viewed as the 
prime source of Australian security and significant 
components of the Defence Force were again deployed 
overseas to support major allied commitments and to foster 
the relationship. 
In retrospect, it is now clear that in the middle 1960s 
Australian security policy was approaching the end of an era. 
At that time,the structure of the global strategic balance 
was essentially bi-polar with the central division being 
primarily ideological in character. Although Sino-Soviet 
frictions had developed considerably since the 1950s, these 
were regarded as being transitory by many western commentators 
and as being over-rated by others. In the South East Asian 
region, SEATO was still of some significance, at least in 
western rhetoric, and both Britain and the United States 
were engaged heavily in the regional containment of 
communism. During this period, Australia deployed ground, 
naval and air forces, first to support the British in 
Malaysia and then to support the United States in South 
Vietnam. Forward defence strategy still dominated the 
Australian national security structure. 
However, the relatively stable conceptual progression 
of Australia's security policy was not to last. In the late 
1960s and early 1970s the Sino-Soviet split developed further; 
new centres of power emerged in Japan, China, the Middle East 
and a more unified Europe; the superpowers moderated the 
ideological character of their differences and engaged in 
extensive consultations on a wide range of matters; the 
tension between the industrial and developing countries 
increased regarding the distribution of wealth and the 
terms of trade; and the world generally became more 
interdependent - the industrial states increased their 
reliance on external sources of raw materials and energy 
and the developing states in turn became increasingly reliant 
upon external sources of capital and technology. 
It also became clear during this period that a 
technological revolution was under way in conventional 
military capacities. New surveillance, long-range 
targeting, ?rdnance delivery, precision guidance and 
3 
other technologies were being developed which promised 
unprecedented enhancements to military capabilities. The 
accepted ground rules of conventional warfare, of what was 
possible and impossible on the battlefield, began to alter 
dramatically. 
Yet while all of these developments were of great 
significance for Australian security policy, it was the 
altering nature of the relationship with the country's 
traditional major power allies which was to be the strongest 
direct influence for change. In the decade from 1967, 
Britain completely withdrew its military presence from the 
Far East and the United States withdrew all its forces from 
Inda-China, all of its combat forces from Thailand and 
commenced a total withdrawal of ground combat forces from 
South Korea. During this period,the United States also took 
steps to define the form of assistance which would be made 
available to friends and allies more narrowly than had been 
understood by them in the 1950s and 1960s. Without shifting 
the focus of its attention away from Europe and the Middle 
East, the United States relegated her security interests in 
more peripheral theatres, such as South East Asia, to a much 
lower level than in the 1960s. 
It is argued in this thesis that in combination these 
developments represent a fundamental transformation of 
Australia's strategic environment. Any future force 
commitments in support of regional states would almost 
certainly need to be undertaken without the direct assistance 
and joint action of a major power ally. This type of 
deployment would represent a major and potentially perilous 
departure from the pattern of Australia's historical 
experience. Australia does not possess the military capacity 
nor the political will to undertake many types of foreign 
intervention successfully. The limited scale of the 
Australian Defence Force restricts heavily its capability 
to combat regional domestic violence, insurgency or 
conventional conflict either independently or with local 
4 
support. As a consequence, it is unlikely that significant 
components .of the Defence Force will again be deployed 
overseas, except possibly for short-term specialised 
operations such as the emergency evacuation of Australian 
citizens from a hostile environment. 3 
Thus, primarily because of the altered United States 
role in the Western Pacific, the long established basis for 
the policy of forward defence no longer exists. In the 
future, Australia's security concerns are likely to focus 
much more directly upon the continent itself and its offshore 
islands and resources. In this altered strategic environment, 
3 The prospect of significant portions of the Australian 
Defence Force being deployed abroad in the future is 
most frequently discussed in the context of a range of 
scenarios involving domestic violence, sub-national 
violence and regional interstate conflicts in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). There is undoubtedly some potential 
for each of these possibilities to arise. However, 
because the Australian Defence Force is currently 
only capable of providing up to two battalions f6r a 
protracted external commitment, its capacity to 
contribute meaningfully to the support of indigenous 
capabilities through the provision of troops is extremely 
limited. Consequently, in nearly every conceivable 
situation, the primary burden of maintaining PNG's 
security is likely to fall upon the local Police and 
Defence Forces. This is not to imply that Australia 
would fail to provide any support to PNG in a security 
crisis. In the military sphere, increased quantities 
of equipment, supplies, technical assistance and training 
might be made available. In addition, diplomatic, 
economic and other avenues of support might·be mobilised. 
However, it is important to appreciate that, in the 
context of Australia's overall security responsibilities 
in the future, those involving the dispatch of forces to 
PNG are not of overriding significance. As a consequence, 
it is unlikely that contingencies in thi$ category would 
be permitted to dominate Australia's future processes of 
security planning. These considerations are discussed 
at greater length by Robert O'Neill in 'The Defence 
Relationship: Aid - When, Where, How Much and For How 
Long?' New Guinea,Vol. 10, No. 4, December 1976, 
pp. 62-70. 
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many of the types of pressures and threats to which 
Australia might be subjected will differ substantially from 
those of t6e 1960s. In the 1980s,the basic roles and 
concerns of the Australian security system appear likely to 
be of a significantly different nature to those of the past. 
Because of the fundamental alterations in the strategic 
environment and the markedly different character of the 
demands likely to be made upon Australia's security system 
in the future, the time is ripe for a thorough process of 
policy review. It is necessary to question what really are 
the responsibilities of the national security structure in 
the new environment. What types of contingency should it 
be prepared to meet in the context of what geographical 
environment and within what timespan? What should be the 
priorities in developing capabilities to meet the types of 
pressures and threats with which the country may be 
confronted in the future? What level of independent 
capacity is required? And finally, what operational 
concepts, doctrines, technologies and force structures would 
most efficiently and economically provide the capabilities 
desired? It is time to challenge many of the basic ground 
rules long held as conventional wisdom and to institute a 
thorough reappraisal of all aspects of Australia's security 
policy. 
This thesis represents an attempt to initiate, in a 
most elementary manner, these processes of reassessment. 
Its central elements are divided into five parts. 
Part I analyses some of the major areas of change in 
Australia's strategic environment. Primarily because of the 
constraints of space, it has not been possible to survey 
comprehensively the broad range of dynamic influences which 
impact upon Australian security policy. Rather, attention 
is concentrated on elaborating the significance of two of 
the more important areas. In Chapter l,the changing nature 
of the US-Australian strategic relationship is discussed 
and the major consequences outlined. This is followed in 
Chapter 2 by a detailed description of recent developments 
in conventional military technology and an analysis of 
their implications for security policy in the decades 
ahead. 
Part II examines the implications of the changing 
strategic environment for Australia's current security 
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policy and structure. In Chapter 3, the broadened range of 
pressures and threats for which Australia may require a 
response capacity is described and the country's potential 
vulnerabilities are discussed. This review is followed in 
Chapter 4 by the identification and analysis of those aspects 
of Australia's current security system which appear to be 
challenged most directly by the changed nature of the 
strategic environment. The discussion in this part concludes 
that many of the concepts, structures, doctrines and 
procedures which have been inherited from the forward 
defence era are inappropriate for meeting the demands of 
the new strategic circumstances. Several policy areas are 
identified as requiring substantial change. 
However, there are important practical limits to change 
in the Australian security system. These are analysed in 
Part III. In Chapter 5, the primary non-bureaucratic, 
domestic and international restraints on adapting the 
security system to accord more with the demands of the new 
strategic environment are discussed. This analysis is 
followed in Chapter 6 by an elaboration of the wide range 
of bureaucratic factors which restrain change. A number 
of measures which might conceivably reduce the strength of 
these influences is discussed in the latter stages of this 
chapter. 
It is concluded from the first three parts of the 
thesis that planning independently for the security of the 
Australian continent and its vital interests is a substant-
ially different and much more demanding task than that of 
satisfying the requirements of forward defence strategy. 
Many of the difficulties to be faced in performing this 
new task are analysed more closely in Part IV. In Chapter 7, 
the most important weaknesses of the current security 
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planning concept are discussed and a series of planning 
characteristics which are desirable to meet Australia's 
new requirements are outlined. One of the major factors 
which frustrates coherent security planning in the new 
strategic circumstances is the almost imponderable nature 
of future pressures and threats. In Chapter 81 this problem 
is addressed and a potential means of managing it for 
planning purposes elaborated. Chapter 9 discusses a series 
of concepts which might conceivably provide a basis for 
determining strategies and force structures which optimise 
Australian security capacity with respect to financial 
resource allocation in both the short and long term. 
In Part V,the analysis moves from the discussion of 
the nature of the changed strategic environment, the 
possibilities and problems of change and concepts for 
evaluating optimal solutions to the elaboration of a 
broadened range of potential security options. In Chapter 10, 
a series of strategic and structural themes is discussed and 
in Chapter 11 there is an analysis of an array of new 
manpower options. 
In broad summary, this thesis is a study of the nature 
of Australia's changing strategic environment, the implications 
for current security policy and the potential for adapting 
the existing security system. Inevitably the analysis is not 
in any sense comprehensive. Many areas of strategic change, 
implications for security policy, constraints on adaption and 
new options are not mentioned at all and others only 
fleetingly. Even where attention is directed to specific 
issues, the analysis is frequently far from exhaustive. In 
one sense this is a natural result of the subject being 
discussed. Security policy is multi-disciplinary and 
inherently complex. But in another sense, this thesis is 
designed intentionally to provide an overview of a very 
extensive and complicated issue. It attempts to emphasise 
the nature of the problem and to outline an array of 
conceptual approaches to solutions rather than the solutions 
themselves. For many readers, this type of analysis may 
stimulate more questions than it resolves. Hopefully the 
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discussion may encourage others to enter the debate and 
to conduct further research Jn this vital aspect of national 
policy. 
PART I 
MAJOR CHANGES IN AUS'I'RALIA' S 
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 
9 
The strategic environment confronting Augtralia's 
security planners in the late 1970s is of a substantially 
different character to that of the middle and late 1960s. 
Many of the broader areas of change affecting Australia 
have been delineated briefly in the Introduction. 
Primarily because of the constraints of space, the detailed 
discussion in Part I is concentrated upon two of the most 
important areas of change. 
The ANZUS relationship has been the undisputed 
centrepiece of Australian security policy for over a quarter 
of a century. However, in the late 1970s, both the nature 
of the relationship as it exists and the manner in which it 
is perceived in Australia are being transformed in a 
fundamental way. The importance of these changes and their 
implications for future Australian security policy are 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
Attention is then directed towards the nature and 
consequences of recent rapid advances in conventional 
military technologies. Although extensive studies of these 
matters have been undertaken in the United States and Europe, 
their critical significance for considerations of future 
security policy is inadequately appreciated and frequently 
misunderstood. In Australia, a great deal of originality 
will be required if the potential of the new technologies 
is to be exploited fully to capitalise on the unique 
character of the local strategic environment. Yet despite 
the requirement for a major investigation of the implications 
of the new technologies for Australia's future security policy, 
very little research appears to have been initiated. As a 
consequence, the analysis of the~e developments in Chapter 2 
is undertaken in considerable detail. 
CIIAPTER 1 
'TllE CHANGING NATURE OF 'THE UNITED S'TATES-AUSTRALIAN 
STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP 
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Because of the central role played by the relationship 
with the United States in Au~tralia's post-war security 
policy, the status and likely future significance of this 
connection deserve primary attention in the consideration 
of Australia's changing strategic environment. 
It is important to a proper understanding of the 
US-Australian relationship to appreciate fully its multi-
dimensional assymetric quality. In terms of international 
power and influence, the sheer enormity of the United States' 
resources tends to overshadow Australia's contribution to 
nearly every aspect of the relationship. For instance, in 
economic affairs the United States has become Australia's 
largest source of foreign capital investment1 and is its 
second largest tradinq partner, taking 12 per cent of 
Australian exports and providing 21 per cent of her imports. 2 
By contrast, Australia supplies just over 1 per cent of US 
3 imports and receives approximately 2 per cent of its exports. 
Considering the relative scale of resources and power, 
it is perhaps not surprising that the US is of far greater 
importance to Australia than is Australia to the US. As 
Dr Siracusa points out: 
1 
2 
3 
Since the turn of the century, the United 
States could normally count on at least sixteen 
Sources of Australia's foreign investment inflows 
appear in Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official 
Yearbook of Australia 1974 (Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1975), p. 337. 
These figures are for the financial year 1973-74. 
ibid., p. 324. 
These figures are calculated from those for 1973 
appearing in Direction of Trade Annual 1969-75 
(Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1976), p. 230. 
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times the population and nineteen times 
the economic resources of Australia. This 
huge disparity in power, both real and 
potential, had thus one inevitable consequence. 
In any partnership, the United States had to 
be vastly more important to Australia than 
Australia could ever be to the United States. 
Any perusal of a documentary history or 
reader in Australian-American relations 
invariably bears ample evidence to the fact 
that Australian policymakers were necessarily 
thinking and talking about the United States 
far more than Americans were ever thinking 
and talking about Australia.4 
However, in addition, the perceptions of Australians 
concerning the relative importance of the US to Australia 
have been reinforced heavily by the very uneven flow of 
culture and sentiment across the Pacific. During and since 
the Second World War, Australian society has become very 
heavily influenced by the American mass media. Partly 
because of this, partly because of the developing US global 
role and partly because of the growing security and economic 
relationship, many Australians have tended to identify 
closely with the United States, its values, culture, products, 
policies and actions. By contrast, Americans have been 
exposed to very little Australian culture and have limited 
knowledge of the country. As Robin Boyd pointed out, 
'communication is virtually one W?Y along the Pacific axis' . 5 
Identification with the United States has been reinforced 
further by the emphasis which Australia's politicians have 
continually placed upon the broader aspects of the 
relationship when discussing national security affairs. 
For example, in his June 1976 posture statement, Mr Fraser 
said: 
4 
5 
J.M. Siracusa, 'Further Reflections on United States 
Interests in Australia' in Australian Outlook, Vol. 30, 
No. 3, December 1976, p. 475. 
Cited by F.S. Hopkins in 'The American Image of 
Australia' in N. Haiper (ed.) Pacific Orbit: Australian 
American Relations Since 1942 (Melbourne, Cheshire Ltd, 
for the Austraiian-American Association, 1968), p. 221. 
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Of all the great powers with active interests 
and capabilities in the areas of critical 
concern to Australia, the United States is 
the power with whom we have the closest links. 
These links are based not merely on known 
common interests and in commitments to a 
peaceful stable world, but on common 
traditions of democratic institutions and 
values of respect for the individual.6 
It is certainly true that both countries share similar 
democratic institutions and ideals, are predominantly white, 
English speaking and share a similar 'frontier' type history. 
But continued Australian reference to these matters and 
to the two countries' history of comradeship in arms has 
led to a very much stronger perception of the significance 
of the relationship in Australia than in the United States. 
Australia is, at best, a middle-ranking power. Although 
its interests are global in character, its effective influence 
in most policy spheres is confined to the Asia-Pacific 
region. The United States, on the other hand, is a 
superpower whose primary interests concern the world-wide 
balance of power. Its relationship with Australia represents 
merely a small portion of its overall global interests. 
From the United States' perspective, Australia is of 
some limited importance. Most notably, it occupies a 
significant position in the economic structure of the 
western world and, in particular, it plays a major part in 
supporting Japanese economic growth and stability. In 
addition, its national resources., its suitability for the 
siting of an array of military and scientific installations 
and its strategic location bordering the major transit 
routes between the South Pacific and the Indian Oceans are 
of positive value. But perhaps even more importantly from 
the US point of view, the close relationship with Australia 
effectively denies an opponent access to all of these 
features. However, while these considerations may appear 
to be of considerable significance in isolation, they are 
quite peripheral in the context of the United States' 
6 Commonhlealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Represent-
atives, Thirtieth Parliament, 1 June 1976, p. 2738. 
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overall strategic concerns. 
Few Australian descriptions of the nature of the 
relationship emphasise its limited utility to the United 
States. In a sense, this is a manifestation and direct 
consequence of the very great value which successive 
generations of Australians have placed upon alliance 
relationships. Heavy emphasis upon the maintenance of a 
close affiliation with major allies has traditionally 
been perceived as an ideal means of enhancing the country's 
security at a time when it could not realistically be 
performed independently. The enormous size, extreme 
inhospitability and relative isolation of the Australian 
continent, when considered in the light of the limited 
population and financial resources which have been available, 
has always served to make access, even if only in theory, to 
the resources of a major power ally an extremely attractive 
option. It has, for instance, meant that national 
budgetary priority could be given consistently to the 
enormous, continuing and more politically appealing 
requirements of national development, social welfare, 
education, etc. 
Over time, the reduction of Australia's long and 
deeply held feelings of isolated vulnerability through the 
employment of major power alliances has inhibited severely 
the development of strategic independence. Successive 
Australian governments have considered that the relationships 
with major allies have required continuous supportive 
activity. Apart from frequent declarations of affinity, 
the prime Australian means of establishing and maintaining 
these close security relationships has been participation 
in joint-force deployments overseas. Thus, the process of 
sending forces abroad in support of major power allies 
accounts for the nature of almost all of Australia's military 
history. In professed loyalty to the Empire, Australians 
fought in the Maori Wars, the Sudan, served in the Boxer 
Rebellion and shared the frustrations of the Boer War. 
This experience largely continued through both world wars, 
although the demonstrated weakness of the British forces in 
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the Asian region in the Second World War led Prime Minister 
Curtin to place thenation's primary reliance upon the 
security capacity of the United States. Since the Second 
World War, Australians have played further supporting 
roles in Korea, the Malayan Emergency, Indonesian 
Confrontation and Vietnam. The cultural and structural 
impact of this continuing experience upon the Australian 
population and, most particularly, .the Australian defence 
establishment can hardly be overestimated. For the 
Australian defence structure, the primary effect has been 
to direct most of the country's scarce national security 
resources away from the requirements of developing an 
independent defence capacity. This question was discussed 
briefly in a United Service Institution report on the ANZUS 
alliance: 
7 
8 
A major problem for Australia within 
the Alliance is that the global strategic 
priorities of our ally, its primary 
adversarial relationship to the military 
forces of the Soviet Union and its desire 
to see Australia 'play its full part' with 
'compatible' forces have the potential (and 
have tended) to shape Australia's forces 
into those of a 'mini-great' power. This 
has been to the detriment of acquiring 
defence capabilities required by Australia 
in meeting regional, 7 low level threats. 
This problem raises complicated issues about 
the level and type of technology, manpower 
and defence industries wh~ch we should 
possess in our defence forces and whsther or 
not we need very expensive weapons systems 
such as aircraft carriers and the 'latest 
and best' United States aircraft. The fact 
of the ANZUS Treaty has seemed to discourage 
the attainment of a greater level of self-
reliance in defence capacities relevant to 
Australian circumstances.8 
The emphasis here is in the original text. 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, The United States/Australia Alliance-Problems 
and Prospects (Syndicate Research Reports), (Canberra, 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, 19 7 6), p. 6. 
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Up until the late 1960s, the neglect of Australia's 
independent national security capacity could be justified 
by the then-perceived necessity of maintaining and 
developing an expeditionary capacity well-suited to 
participation in joint allied operations overseas. But 
during the past decade, this rationale has been undermined 
primarily as a result of a series of changes in US policy 
towards the region. 
When viewed in perspective, the trauma of the Vietnam 
experience appears to have had a very significant and 
enduring impact upon the US propensity to maintain the 
strength of forces stationed abroad and to deploy them in 
support of regional allies. 9 United States national security 
policy is now reorientated much more directly towards those 
areas of the world which are of central significance in 
supporting US interests in the global strategic balance (contin-
ental United States, Europe, the Middle East and North East Asia in 
particular) . In terms of the physical US presence in 
Australia's proximity, this global reorientation has already 
had a significant impact. President Carter has instituted 
a very broad reappraisal of US deployments in the Western 
Pacific. Al though this reassessment is still underway, its 
first fruits are apparent in the programme to withdraw all 
US ground combat forces from South Korea. It is difficult 
to predict the nature of further policy developments in this 
field. However, it is known that senior officials in the 
Carter administration have proposed additional significant 
9 In reality, a large number of influences have encouraged 
a reassessment of US commitments abroad, although most 
are related either directly or indirectly to the very 
great domestic and international political and social 
costs which were incurred during the Vietnam debacle. 
Other specific factors include the processes of 
rapprochement with China, the growing pressure to employ 
military manpower more efficiently as a result of the 
abolition of the draft, the increasing role of Congress 
in the generation and conduct of US foreign policy, etc. 
These matters are discussed at length in Leslie H. Brown, 
American Security Policy in Asia (London, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi 
Paper 132, 1977), pp. 1-9. 
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d . f . h . f. lO . b re uctions o US forces in t e Paci ic. It is y no 
means clea~ how far or how fast these processes of US 
withdrawal may proceed but it is quite apparent that the 
military presence of the United States is declining in the 
11 Western Pacific and may continue to do so for many years. 
10 
11 
There have, for instance, been reports that some senior 
officials in the Carter administration have proposed a 
wholesale 25 per cent reduction of US forces in the Pacific 
and suggested a c6mplete withdrawal from the Subic naval and 
Clark air bases in the Philippines. See the report by Ian 
Hicks, 'US Charting a New Pacific Course - Military Cuts Like] 
in The Dydney Morning ller'ald, 16 April 1977, p. 9. 
It is interesting to compare US force levels in Europe 
and Asia both before and after the major phase of the 
Vietnam war and before and after the introduction of 
all-volunteer US armed forces. 
us Force Levels in Asia and Europe (Thousands) 
1963 1973 1976 (January) 
Korea 57 42 41 
Japan ) 91 57 48 
Ryukyus) 
Philippines 14 16 14 
Taiwan 4 9 2 
Vietnam 14 
Thailand 4 42 11 
Afloat 38 32 21 
Total Asia 222 198 137 
Total Europe 380 300 303 
Source 
This table has been reproduced from Leslie H. Brown, 
American Security Policy -in Asia, p. 7 . 
Manpower is not the only determinant of military capacity 
but in this case it is the indicator concerning which 
information is most freely available. The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies first started listing 
deployment strengths for US forces in the West Pacific 
in 1974. Since that tim~ tactical fighter squadrons have 
been reduced from 11 to 9. Aircraft carriers deployed 
with the Seventh Fleet have been reduced from 3 to 2 and 
other surface combatants from 25 to 18. See The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1974-1975 (London, The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1974), p. 7 and The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 
1976-1977 (London, The International Institute for 
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In addition to a reduced US physical presence, US 
inclinations to intervene in conflicts in the region have 
also declined. Successive US presidents and a large number 
of congressional leaders have expressed their desire to 
avoid any new commitment of major land forces to the Asian 
mainland. The most coherent and enduring expression of 
this view was made by President Nixon during an informal 
meeting with reporters at Guam on 25 July, 1969. According 
to the official text, the following exchange took place: 
11 cont'd 
QUESTIONER Mr. President, sir, on the 
question of U.S. military relationships 
in Asia if I may ask a hypothetical question: 
If a leader of one of the countries with 
which we have close military relationships either 
through SEATO or in Vietnam should say, "Well, 
you are pulling out of Vietnam with your troops, 
we can read in the newspapers. How can we know 
that you will remain to play a significant 
role as you say you wish to do in security 
arrangements in Asia?" What kind of an approach 
can you take to that question? 
THE PRESIDENT I have already indicated that the 
answer to that question is not an easy one - not 
easy because we will be greatly tempted when 
that question is put to indicate that if any 
nation desires the assistance of the United 
States militarily in order to meet an internal 
or external threat, we will provide it. 
However, I believe that the time has come 
when the United States, in our relations with 
all of our Asian friends, be quite emphatic on 
two points: One, that we will keep our treaty 
commitments, our treaty commitments, for example, 
with Thailand under SEATO; but, two, that as 
far as the problems of internal security are 
concerned, as far as the problems of military 
defense, except for the threat of a major power 
involving nuclear weapons, that the United States 
is going to encourage and has the right to expect 
that this problem will be increasingly handled 
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the 
Asian nations themselves . 
... It will not be easy. But if the United 
States just continues down the road of responding 
Strategic Studies, 1976), p. 7. It could be argued 
that these numerical reductions may be at least partially 
offset by qualitative improvements. However, as is argued 
in Chapter 2, in the new technology environment, increased 
concentration of military capacities normally also implies 
increased vulnerability. 
to requests for assistance, of assuming the 
primary responsibility for defending these 
countries when they have internal problems 
or external problems, they are never going 
to take care of themselves.12 
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This heavily qualified expression of US policy towards 
the region and subsequent supporting statements and actions 
are clearly of great significance for Australia. One of 
the most important implications is that, if US ground forces 
are not to be committed to the Asian mainland again, there 
is unlikely to be a further opportunitiy for the Australian 
armed forces to be committed in their support. 13 
However, this altered US policy also impacts upon 
the future scope for cooperative or joint US-Australian 
operations in the defence of Australia itself. The Guam 
Doctrine and more detailed US elaborations of it have 
explained consistently that the level of peacetime force 
structure integration with allied regional ~owers will be 
determined primarily by the nature of the threat with which 
they are confronted. This relationship is most clearly 
illustrated in a table which summarises a large part of the 
12 
13 
'Informal Remarks with Newsmen. July 25, 1969' in 
Public Papers of the Presidents: Richard M. Nixon~ 1969 
(Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1970), 
pp. 548, 549. An almost verbatim account also appears 
in 'Excerpts from Unofficial Account of President 
Nixon's Meeting with Reporters' in The New York Times, 
26 July 1969, pp. 28 ff. 
T.B. Millar has argued that the apparent cessation of 
joint force commitments is likely to reduce greatly 
the strategic significance of the ANZUS Treaty to 
Australia. 
'It seems extremely unlikely that the United 
States will be engaged in war in Southeast 
Asia during the remainder of this c~ntury. If 
this is so, it will have little need of Australia, 
and the ANZUS Treaty will become increasingly a 
formality, an excuse for occasional rhetoric, and 
unfortunately also a specious rationalization for 
continued Australian reluctance to come to terms 
with its environment.' 
T.B. Millar, 'From Whitlam to Fraser', Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 55, No. 4, July 1977, p. 871. 
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findings of a major Rand Corporation study into the 
implications of the Guam Doctrine. 14 
Table 1 
Objective Level of Likely Degree of Assistance Conflict us involvement 
Total force Combined Attack by USSR or Greatest 
planning force PRC on us friend 
planning or ally. 
Regionalism Complemen- Attack by a minor 
tary force communist power on 
planning us friend or ally. 
Attack by a Soviet 
client on us friend 
or ally. 
Self- Supplemen- Conflict between us 
reliance tary force friends or allies. 
planning Communist-supported 
insurgency. Soviet 
client-supported 
insurgency. 
Home-grown Least 
insurgency. 
It would thus appear that under current US policy, 
unless Australia is threatened directly by the Soviet Union 
or China, the Australian Government cannot expect to receive 
unqualified US support. In the circumstances of a regional 
dispute or crisis, it is by no means clear what type of 
support the US might be prepared to supply its allies. 
Primarily as a result of these policy changes, the 
limited utility of the ANZUS relationship in US eyes has 
become much more evident to the Australian national security 
community. The high levels of ambiguity and uncertainty 
14 G.J. Pauker, S. Canby, A. Ross Johnson and W.B. Quandt, 
In Search of Self-Reliance: US Security Assistance to 
the Third World Under the Nixon Doctrine . (Santa Monica, 
Rand Corporation, R-1092-ARPA, June 1973), p. 13. 
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which characterise the alliance are now being cited more 
frequently.as an important element of the relationship. 
This is evidenced most clearly in the 1976 Defence White 
Paper: 
Remote from Europe, we now have one 
significant alliance - the ANZUS Treaty, 
with New Zealand and the US. Both countries 
are important to ~s; · but it is pruderit to 
remind ourselves that the US has many diverse 
interests and obligations .... Our alliance 
with the US gives substantial grounds for 
confidence that in the event of a fundamental 
threat to Australia's security US military 
support would be forthcoming. However, even 
.though our security may be ultimately dependent 
upon US support, we owe it to ourselves to be 
able to mount a national defence effort that 
would maximise the risks and costs of any 
aggression. 
Short of this major, and improbable 
situation, we could face a range .of other 
situations that we should expect to handle 
more independently. It is not our policy, 
nor would it be prudent, to rely on US combat 
help in all circumstances. Indeed it is 
possible to envisage a range of situations 
in which the threshold of direct US combat 
involvement could be quite high.15 
The United Service Institution report on the alliance 
also emphasised the ambiguous nature of the relationship in 
describing the formal security connection: 
15 
16 
The ANZUS Treaty makes no guarantees, it 
entails no binding obligations. It depends 
on consultation and mutual consent. In the 
event of armed aggression on one of the member 
states the character of the assistance offered 
is not stated unequivocally; rather, the 
Treaty looks to a declaration of intent. 
ANZUS like all treaties depends ultimately on 
trust. 16 By their very character treaties cannot 
b~atertight'; they depend on the actions in 
Australian Defence A White Paper presented to 
Parliament by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. 
Killen, November 1976, (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1976), pp. 2, 10. 
The emphasis here is in the original text. 
the future of governments of men in as 
yet unknown situations.17 
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The central clauses of the ANZUS Treaty state that: 
The Parties will consult together whenever 
in the opinion of any of them the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security 
of any of the Parties is threatened in the 
Pacific. 
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack 
in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and 
declares that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.18 
But in the absence of firm assurances concerning 
particular types of assistance in categories of situations, 
evaluations of the Treaty's utility are, of necessity, very 
unclear. Certainly a high level of imprecision has almost always 
been a notable feature of treaty arrangements. This 
provides a basis for each party to declare general intent 
without unduly restricting future freedom of action. The 
fact that treaties rarely usurp governmental prerogatives 
or pre-determine government actions enhances greatly their 
political acceptability. Such agreements certainly do not 
assure each partner the provision of defence resources 
from its allies in all situations. However, they do provide 
each party with a level of proxy deterrence. For while 
each partner to such a treaty may be unsure what action its 
allies may take in particular circumstances, those same 
types of doubts are also likely to arise in the minds of 
any intending adversaries. 
17 
18 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, The United States/Australia Alliance, p. 3. 
The full text of the ANZUS Security Treaty is published 
as an appendix to Claire Clark (ed.), Australian 
Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment (Melbourne, 
Cassell Australia Limited, 1973), pp. 243-245. It is 
interesting to compare the phrasing of the ANZUS Treaty 
with that of other major US written commitments. This 
is discussed at length in R.A. Paul, American Mititary 
Commitments Abroad (New Jersey, Rutgers University 
Press, 1973), pp. 14 ff. 
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For Australia, the Guam Doctrine represents the 
overlay of_ an unclear statement on top of an already 
imprecise treaty. President Nixon's briefing at Guam was 
deliberately blurred at the edges through the encoura~ement 
by journalists, politicians and members of the President's 
ff f . f . . 19 h' . sta o a variety o interpretations. T is presentation 
provided a sophisticated level of ambiguity which was 
apparently intended to keep potential aggressors uncertain 
of future US intentions while at the same time satisfying 
the demands of friends and allies. 
For Australian security planner~ the degree of 
uncertainty inherent in this type of alliance relationship 
makes long-term conceptual and structural planning of the 
Australian Defence Force extremely difficult. On the one 
hand it can be argued that the Guam Doctrine is analagous 
to, and in reality as tenuous as, Dean Acheson's perimeter 
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strategy. In other words, the case can be made that, 
re~ardless of public pronouncements of US intention~ it is 
practically impossible to pre-determine the types of force 
commitments which the US may make some time in the future. 
It is quite conceivable, although of doubtful probability, 
that, in the circumstances of some types of pressure against 
Australia, the US might abandon or waive its current 
foreign policy principles and provide massive assistance 
to meet a regional threat. On the other hand, it can also 
be argued that virtually no assistance can be guaranteed 
19 
20 
This is discussed by J.L.S. Girling in 'The Guam 
Doctrine',International Affairs, Vol. 46, No. 1, 
January 1970, p. 48. 
On 12 January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, said: 'The defensive perimeter runs along 
the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus 
.... to the Philippine Islands .... So far as the 
military security of other areas of the Pacific is 
concerned, it must be clear that no person can 
guarantee these areas against military attack'. Such 
a guarantee is, 'hardly sensible or necessary'. 
Despite the fact that Korea was clearly placed outside 
this 'defensive perimeter', within six months US 
forces were heavily committed there. This is cited by 
J.L.S.Girling, ibid., p. 48. 
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from the US under any circumstances and hence, Australia 
must be prepared to develop an independent capacity to 
meet all conceivable threat categories. It is difficult 
to resolve these alternative views. Perhaps the best 
independent formulation of likely US reactions was given 
by McGeorge Bundy, a former Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs. He stated that: 
.... the American commitment anywhere is 
only as deep as the continued conviction 
of Americans that their own interests 
require it.21 
But if this is true, can Australian policy be made to 
impact upon US evaluations of their own interests? 
Certainly, there are some factors which, in the circumstances 
of any future crisis involving Australia, would have a 
major influence upon US decision-making and which are, to 
some degree, under Australian control. The formal Treaty it-
self, the state of the diplomatic linkage, the strength of 
economic connections, the significance which the US 
Government places upon the Australian continent and 
installations upon it, the capacity of Australia to act 
in her own defence, the number of US citizens resident in 
Australia, the number of US citizens who have visited 
Australia, the state of US sentimental ties with Australia, 
etc., can all be structured to some degree from Australia 
to maximise the probability of a favourable US response. 
However, in a crisis situation, even though an Australian 
government may use its full influence to stimulate, 
encourage, cajole or even coerce a favourable US response, 
in the final analysis the decision on whether or not forces 
would be committed to support Australia can be expected to 
be made by the US government of the day in the light of 
its full range of domestic and world-wide interests. 
The nature of the problem confronting those who are 
tasked with the long term planning of Australia's security 
21 Quoted in United Service Institution of the Australian 
Capital Territory, The United States/Australia Alliance, 
p. 3. 
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capacity can be elaborated to some degree by examining 
more closely expressed US intentions in the circumstances 
of particular types of crises. For instance, the Guam 
Doctrine indicates that the level of security assistance 
which Australia can expect to receive from the US will not 
necessarily be related to the seriousness of the threat 
which arises to Australia's security. Rather, it will 
tend to be related much more closely to current US 
perceptions of the indirect threat to the US itself of 
Australia being attacked by the country concerned. Thus, 
if a major power mounts a heavy attack upon Australia, the 
US response will not be conditioned primarily by the 
severity of the assault and its implications for Australian 
security and survival but rather by US perceptions of the 
impact that the conflict and the possible outcome will have 
upon US regional and global interests. If the country which 
is attacking Australia happens to be a superpower rival of 
the US, it can be concluded that the US would almost 
certainly wish to respond vigorously. However, even in 
this relatively clear-cut situation, the desire to assist 
Australia may not automatically be converted into the 
physical provision of the level of aid which the Australian 
Government may request. Most particularly, if such an 
attack took place in the context of global superpower 
conflict, the US may be distracted by higher priority 
commitments of a pressing nature elsewhere and be unable 
to render significant assistance. 
In other circumstances, if the country attacking 
Australia happens also to be allied to the US or possibly 
non-aligned, the US may not necessarily perceive its 
interests to be best served by heavily supporting Australia. 
It may provide a minimum of supplies, it might support both 
sides, it may decide to stand aloof and mediate, or in some 
circumstances it might favour Australia's opponent. Even 
in circumstances where the US administration may in fact 
wish to assist a hard-pressed Australia and would appear 
not to be diverted elsewhere, there might still be 
significant difficulties for Australia in actually receiving 
25 
the assistance which it might desire. For instance, the 
US inventories of specialised armaments or highly critical 
spare parts might run low. Because of a heightening of 
global tensions, the US might be concerned not to run down 
its immediate supplies of some war materials for fear of 
rendering itself vulnerable to more serious attacks 
elsewhere. In addition, in some circumstances, there might 
be an impasse between the legislative and executive branches 
of the US Government which could serve to delay or even 
h . . . 22 prevent t e provision of assistance. 
These major uncertainties in the alliance relationship 
serve to make Australian national security planning extremely 
difficult. They generate a large grey area of doubt and 
uncertainty within which long term judgments must be made 
as to what Australia can plan on receiving from its great 
power ally in given situations. These assessments must 
obviously be made in a conservative manner for if, in a 
given scenario, the country plans on receiving much more 
than the United States is either willing and/or able to 
provide in those circumstances, the complete defence 
structure may be undermined. With this requirement for 
caution in mind, it is important to note that the assumptions 
which were ·made in the 1960s concerning the circumstances in 
which the US could be expected to support heavily an Australia 
under threat can no longer be considered valid. For example, 
in 1969 Dr T.B. Millar wrote: 
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Darwin remains the most vulnerable 
point. It is closer to Djakarta than it 
is to Sydney. It is a small, isolated and 
only lightly-defended base, from which any 
In recent years the US Congress has involved itself 
far more intimately with foreign and military policies. 
One of the more notable features of this development 
has been the War Powers Resolution of 1973. Its 
relation to and significance for the ANZUS Alliance 
are discussed in F.A. Mediansky, 'United States Interests 
in Australia', Australian Outlook, Vol. 30, No. 1, April 
1976, pp. 144, 145 and also in J.M. Siracusa, 'Further 
Reflections on United States Interests in Australia', 
Australian Outlook, Vol. 30, No. 3, December 1976, 
p. 479. 
air attacks, pre-emptive or retaliatory, 
on Indonesia would presumably be launched 
if coming from the Australian mainland. 
(Malaysia, where Australian bomber and 
fighter squadrons are stationed, is of 
course very much closer.) A sudden, well-
planned combined attack on Darwin might 
appear to have a good chance of success, 
especially if linked with an assault on 
Tindal. Yet strategic warning of such 
hostilities should enable extra defences 
to be located in the Northern Territory. 
And we must assume that if the ANZUS 
Treaty means anything, any attack of this 
kind would entitle Australia to invoke the 
Treaty with near-certainty that the United 
States would come to our aid, as it would 
in any of the other situations mentioned.23 
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In the late 1970s,this type of presumption can no 
longer be supported by declared US policy. It is now 
clear that, in the specific hypothetical circumstances of 
~ limited Indonesian attack upon Australia, the US expects 
Australia to provide the main forces for its own defence. 
The type of support which Australia might expect to receive 
in these circumstances would almost certainly be limited to 
military supplies, intelligence and possibly diplomatic 
support. However, as was discussed above, the provision of 
even this type of assistance could not be guaranteed under 
all circumstances. Thus, for national security planning 
purposes, this assistance would best be regarded as a 
welcome bonus to, rather than an anticipated central element 
of, Australia's response capacity. 
Attempting to perceive in advance the likely US response 
to a series of hypothetical situations is a highly speculative 
type of forecasting. As has been emphasised above, this 
question continues to be hedged about by a very large numb.er 
of imponderables. However, bearing these difficulties in 
mind, it is possible to summarise, in a very tentative fashion, 
likely US responses to a variety of threats to Australian 
security by drawing upon stated US Government intentions and 
elaborations of them made by US Government-funded research 
bodies. This is attempted in Table 2. 
23 T.B. Millar,Australia's Defence (Melbourne, Melbourne 
University Press, 1969), pp. 172, 173. 
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rl'able 2 
United.States' Expressed Intentions and Capabilities to 
Assist Australia in a Range of Hypothetical Situations 
Type of Crisis 
1. Isolated attack 
by a superpower 
rival of the US. 
2. Attack by a 
superpower rival 
of the US in the 
context of a super-
power conflict. 
.Expressed US 
Intentions 
Full support would be 
provided. 
Full support would be 
provided within 
capabilities. 
3. Heavy attack by Unclear. May supply 
a non-aligned major equipment, intellig-
power. ence and diplomatic 
support. 
4. Heavy attack by 
a major power 
which is allied to 
the US. 
5. Heavy attack by 
a neighbouring 
power. 
Unclear. May supply 
some equipment, intell-
igence and diplomatic 
support to both 
parties, may try to 
mediate, may favour 
Australia's opponent. 
Expects Australia to 
be self-sufficient. 
May assist with heavy 
equipment supplies, 
part~cularly if 
attacking neighbour 
receives heavy support 
from a superpower 
rival. 
6. Other attacks by Australia expected to 
a neighbouring be self-sufficient. 
power. 
7. Resource crises 
directed against 
Australia. 
8. The effects of 
foreign wars and 
resource conflicts. 
As above. 
As above. 
·------·----·--·----
Likely US Capability 
to Assist 
Likely that full support 
would be forthcoming. 
Unlikely to be able to 
divert significant resources 
away from the major effort. 
If this attack did not take 
place in the context of a 
major global conflict, the 
US could assist to the extent 
of its intentions. 
As above. 
As above. 
As above. 
Australia might receive priority 
treatment if the US controlled 
scarce resource supplies. 
As above. 
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From this discussio~ it is clear that the criteria to 
be cmploye~ in designing Australia's national security 
capacities to deter and meet regional pressures· and threats 
will need to be quite different to those of th~ past. 
Australian ground forces are unlikely to be deployed again 
into the South East Asian region except possibly for small-
1 . 1. d . f h d . 24 sea e specia ise operations o s ort uration. But more 
importantly, because of the reduced US commitments in the 
region, the adoption of a significantly altered declaratory 
policy and the accompanying high degree of uncertainty 
surrounding the nature of the US response which can be 
anticipated in a wide range of possible scenarios, it is 
highly desirable that the limited national security resources 
which are available to Australia now be allocated almost 
exclusively to the priority requirements of conducting 
operations independently in Australia's immediate environment. 
This represents a change of fundamental importance. 
The implications of this major shift in Australian 
national security policy for the continuing US-Australian 
relationship are difficult to determine fully. The 
re-ordering of Australia's security priorities does not, of 
itself, serve to degrade severely the importance of many of 
the broader aspects of the relationship. Certainly the 
value of the ANZUS alliance for the deterrence of proxy 
warfare is likely to remain of considerable importance to 
Australia. Very significant value is still likely to be 
placed upon cooperation and exchanges in the f~elds of 
intelligence, defence science and technology, training and 
the development of tactical doctrine and operational 
procedures. However, because Australia will be seeking a 
heightened degree of independent operational capacity and 
will be concentrating far more than in the past upon tasks 
24 As was discussed briefly in the Introduction, the 
most likely possibility in this regard would most 
probably be an operation to evacuate Australian 
citizens from a regional country which is in a 
state of chaos either as a result of internal 
' disturbances, external conflict or a natural disaster. 
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within its immediate security environment, the direct 
value of many of these areas of exchange can be expected 
to be reduced. In contrast to most of Australia's military 
history, the design criteria for the country's force 
structure and operational concepts may, in the future, 
differ much more significantly from those of its major 
power ally. Thus, Australian security policy-makers may 
need to be far more selective than in the past in their 
use of US concepts, doctrines and practices. 
There is, in addition, a further assymetric dimension 
to the US-Australian relationship which is of considerable 
significance in this context. It is important to realise 
tha~because the United States is a superpower, the bounds 
of the relationship extend beyond the local and regional 
dimension and into world-wide strategic matters. In an 
overall sense, the general mutuality of global interests 
between the two countries is well established and is likely 
to remain no matter which major political party is in power 
on each side of the Pacific. It is certain to remain in 
Australia's interests for the US to retain sufficient 
strength at least to act as a balancing counter-weight to 
the Soviet Union. In the past, Australia has been willing 
to contribute to this balance where it has been possible 
for herto do so. This basic desire to assist in the 
maintenance of the global strategic balance is likely to 
remain indefinitely. However, because of the increasingly 
dynamic nature of global strategic developments, and 
particularly of global strategic technological developments, 
the potential for Australia to lose effective control over 
activities with a global strategic significance undertaken 
within or supported from Australia under the aegis of the 
alliance is rising. The propensity for this loss of 
effective control to take place can be illustrated by 
reference to the debate concerning the presence of US and 
joint US-Australian controlled defence facilities on 
Australian territory. 
When the Australian Government originally sanctioned 
the construction of these facilities in the early 1960s, 
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the officials and politicans who were intimately involved 
appeared t~ harbour little doubt that the facilities were 
stabilising in the global sense and hence a positive 
25 
contribution to the maintenance of the superpower balance. 
As an added bonus, these facilities were also perceived, 
and still are by some commentators, to be a major means of 
binding the US to Australia, thus ensuring that a high level 
of assistance would be forthcoming to Australia should she 
be threatened by a regional power. 26 However, because of a 
large number of developments in the strategic technological 
environment, both of these assumptions, which have long been 
part of the conventional wisdom in the Australian defence 
community, are now the subject of considerable doubt. 
There are currently eleven 'scientific' and defence 
installations and facilities in Australia of which the 
27 United States has partial or complete control. Several 
critics have argued that the facilities at North West Cape, 
Pine Gap and Nurrungar not only have a capacity to support 
the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) Doctrine but, in 
addition, play a significant role in providing the US with 
1 f . h . b · 1. 28 h h h a nuc ear war ig ting capa i ity. T ey reason t at t e 
25 
26 
27 
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This case has been made in a variety of forms. See, for 
example, 'Barwick Explains Agreement on US Radio Base'in 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 1963, and also Opening 
of the US Naval Communication Station at North-West Cape~ 
Western Australia (Speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Harold 
Holt)pl6 September 1967, p. 2. 
This point is made in 'Strategic Basis of Policy' in 
Department of Defence, Defence Report 1965 (Canberra, 
Commonwealth Government Publishing Service, 1965), p. 8. 
The case is argued at greater length in Michael Leifer, 
'Living With Terror' and Ian Turner, 'The Exmouth Base: 
Opting Out' in The Bulletin, 27 April 1963, pp. 25, 26. 
This information is provided in the reply to a 
Parliamentary Question posed by Mr. w. Hayden, 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Represent-
atives, Thirtieth Parliament, 2 November 1976, 
p. 2255. 
This case is argued in detail by Desmond Ball in 'American 
Bases in Australia: The Strategic Implications', Current 
Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 51, No. 10, March 1975 and also by 
Andrew Clark in 'US Bases Here Give Pentagon a Disturbing 
Nuclear Advantage', The National Times, 4 September, 1974. 
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US ac(1ulsll:ion of this c..Jpabilil:y not only increases the 
likelihood of some types of nuclear war, but it also 
provides the US with a st+ategic advantage which the Soviet 
Union and China cannot match because of the geographical 
constraints which limit their ground station siting options. 
Thus the critics conclude that the North West Cape, Pine Gap 
and Nurrungar facilities are a destabilising influence in 
the global nuclear balance. 
The argument that the presence of the US and jointly 
controlled defence installations would serve to bind the 
United States to an Australia which is threatend by a 
regional power is also highly questionable. There is 
abundant evidence to show that the US places a very high 
value upon space-based systems generally, and those 
facilities in Australia which support space-based systems 
in particular. 29 There is little doubt that the presence of 
29 For example, the former US Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Rumsfeld,stated in his Congressional testimony that: 
'As space technology matures space-based systems 
will play an even more important role in support 
of US and Soviet military operations. In the 
future dependence on these systems may increase 
to the point where their loss could materially 
influence the outcome of a conflict'. 
See the posture statement of the Secretary of Defense, 
Donald H. Rumsfeld,in Department of Defense Appropriations 
for 1977. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 4 February 
1976, p. 311. 
One extract from what is purported to be the Australian 
Defence Department's 1975 Strategic Basis document states 
that 'the US has repeatedly made clear the value it 
attaches to the defence facilities it maintains in 
Australia'. See Alan Reid, 'Top Secret: Our Defence 
Planning', The Bulletin, 12 June 1976, p. 19. 
The Defence White Paper also raises the point briefly: 
'Our co-operation which includes the joint 
maintenance of defence related facilities on 
Australian soil, is also, despite the 
disparate strength and resources of the two 
countries, of value to the US'. 
See Australian Defence, p. 11. 
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these f u.cili Lies in l\us tru.i ia J_s s upporti vc o £ the qcncru.l 
US-Australian relu.tionship u.s u. whole. Thus, to the extent 
that their siting in this country increases US perceptions 
of the friendly relationship with Australia and strengthens 
sentimental affinity, they may be important. However, this 
should not be confused with an expectation that the presence 
of the facilities will trigger u.utomntically a fnvourablc 
US response to an Australia threatened by a regional power. 
By way of precedent, it is interesting to note that 
during the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 the presence 
of important US and NATO intelligence gathering facilities, 
especially on Mt Olympus, did not stimulate an open American 
response to ensure their security. 3° Certainly the invading 
and defending forces were both allied to the United States. 
It is quite conceivable that an understanding was reached 
at an early stage with both sides concerning the 
inviolability of the installations. But in the event of 
a non-nuclear threat to Australia, or attack upon it some 
time in the future, could not similar arrangements be made 
by the US with attacking forces? In the circumstances of a 
regional power threat, harassment or even lodgement upon 
Australian territory, the US Government may, in many circum-
stances, prefer to reach an understanding concerning the 
facilities with Australia's opponent, rather than be committed 
. 11 . 1. . h . d f 31 automatica y to assist Austra ian forces in t eir e ence. 
Hence, it does appear that at least some of the 
considerations which were cited originally to support the 
case for constructing the facilities may no longer be valid. 
This discussion is not to suggest that the impact of these 
30 
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See this discussed in 'An Eye on the Enemy Over the 
Horizon' in New Scientist,7 November 1974, pp. 420-423. 
Alternatively, the US would have the options of 
destroying and evacuating the facilities or removing 
them to another location. There were press reports that 
the administration considered the latter option late 
in 1975. See Andrew Clark, 'In a Politically 
Unstable Country (Like Australia) America's Pine Gap 
Base is a Risk', The National Times, 17 November 1975, 
p. 3 and also 'One For Rumsfeld', Boston Sunday Globe, 
28 December 1975, p. 4. 
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chanqcd tcchnoloqical and st 1·atcq ic circums t;rnccs 
necessarily renders the continued presence of these 
facilities undesirable. This is a much broader question. 
However, this illustration does serve to emphasise that 
the current pace of technological and strategic change 
appears to have already altered in a fundamental manner the 
national security significance of an established aspect of 
the alliance relationship. Moreover, there are indications 
that this phenomenon can be expected to recur more frequently 
in the future. This is primarily because both the United 
States and Australia are expanding greatly the physical 
capacities and technical sophistication of their military 
structures. Many of the new US developments have direct 
implications for and possess the potential to change 
significantly the nature of a wide range of institutionalised 
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arrangements. At the same time, Australia's acquisition of 
32 Perhap's the most notable instance in this regard is- the 
potential which modern developments in military technology 
display to alter greatly the implications of continuing 
to provide hitherto uncontroversial assistance to US 
forces in the form of aircraft staging and refuelling 
facilities. The US has conducted major exercises to test 
the concept of employing long-range land-based aircraft, 
B-52s, P-3s, F-llls, etc., with multiple in-flight 
refuelling on long-range, over-ocean, sea-control missions. 
See, for example, the testimony of General D.C. Jones, 
Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, before the Committee on 
Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and 
Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 2, 18 February 1976, p. 985. During the 
course of his testimony to Congress Admiral Gayler, the 
former US Commander in Chief in the Pacific, expressed 
strong support for the employment of this mode of operations 
in the Pacific-Indian Ocean region. See Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Committee on 
Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and 
Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 7, 1 March 1976, p. 4070. The concept of 
the long-range aerial task force has been discussed at 
length in the US. For example, see 'Navy Cool to Land-Based 
Aircraft Study' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 105, No. 15, 18 October 1976, p. 91; Major General 
W.J. Ellis, 'Air Mobility and Flexibility' in Flight 
International, Vol. 110, No. 3519, 21 August 1976, p. 432 
and W.C. Moore, 'Time for Aerial Task Forces?' in VS 
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 101, No. 112/874, 
December 1975, pp. 79, 80. 
new technological capacities, particularly involviny lony 
range surveillance systems, provides potential for the 
employment of such systems not only for national and 
32 cont'd 
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It appears that originally the US Department of Defense 
intended to deploy long-range aircraft fleets through 
the Indian Ocean from Guam or the Clark Air Base in the 
Philippines as soon as the 3658 metre runway on 
Diego Garcia was completed in October 1977. This 
strip is adequate to handle fully-loaded KC-135 
aerial tankers on a regular basis and to act as an 
emergency landing ground for B-52s. See testimony of 
Gneeral G.S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
before the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 
Disapprove Construction Projects on the Island of 
Diego Garcia, 10 June 1975, p. 61 and also The Australian, 
15 April 1977, p. 7. 
In April 1977, a decision was announced to 'shelve 
indefinitely' long-range flights into the Indian 
Ocean by B-52s. However, it is interesting to note 
that the primary cause given for this decision was 
rivalry between the Air Force and Navy, although it 
was also compatible with President Carter's proposal 
for 'mutual military restraints'. See 'America Stops 
Plan for B-52s in Indian Ocean', The Australian, 
15 April 1977, p. 7. 
The clear implication for Australia is that support for 
aerial task forces, in either the Pacific or Indian 
Oceans, through the refuelling of transiting aircraft, 
and particularly KC-135 tanker aircraft, would be a 
proposition with quite different implications to' those 
of current arrangements. The likely reactions of 
regional and other powers to such activities and their 
implications for Australian foreign policy would need 
to be examined thoroughly prior to the provision of 
diplomatic clearance for task force aircraft to land in 
Australia. 
There are, in addition, other areas where changing 
United States technological capacities offer the 
potential to alter fundamentally the nature of 
established aspects of the US-Australian relationship. 
For instance, the rapidly expanding US capacity to 
perform all its major military functions without reliance 
upon installations situated on the territory of foreign 
states may, in time, impact significantly upon the 
strategic value of Australia to the United States. 
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regional purposes but also £or y_Lol.Jal allianc(~ func Lions. 11 
In combination,thcse technological and strategic developments 
possess a very great capacity to change the whole nature of 
the alliance partnership by providing completely new 
meaning and a wide range of new ramifications to already 
established procedures, processes and agreements. 
If the Australian Government is to possess a capacity 
to affect the impact of these developments on the alliance 
relationship in anything but a limited negative sense, the 
33 There are a number of systems which, if procured by 
Australia, could have a major impact upon Australia's 
role within the alliance. For instance, if the 
experimental over-the-horizon backscatter radar system 
called JINDALEE proves to be successful and is 
operationally deployed, it is quite possible that much 
of the target tracking and regional high frequency 
signals intelligence information obtained may be 
passed to the us for use in its global strategic 
surveillance network. 
Similarly, if and when Australia deploys fixed long-
range sonar surveillance systems, the infor~ation 
gained may be used not only to support Australia's 
regional defence effort but also to feed into the 
United States' global anti-submarine surveillance 
system. The same can be said of information which 
might be gained from advanced long range towed-array 
sonar systems. The US FFG-7 Patrol Frigates will be 
fitted with the very advanced TACTAS towed array. 
Presumably the three Australian Patrol Frigates will 
also be equipped with TACTAS at some stage. But if 
so, would the information gained be passed automatically 
to the US? 
If fixed and mobile units of the Australian Defence 
Force routinely feed air, surface and undersea 
surveillance information into the United States global 
command and control network, these Australian systems 
and their support bases might well be regarded as 
legitimate and valuable targets by the Soviet Union in 
the event of some types of nuclear exchange. If this 
is so, naval and air bases within and adjacent to 
Australia's major population centres may well be 
targeted for nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. The 
statement of this possibility is not to argue that such 
intimate US-Australian cooperation should necessarily 
be avoided, but merely to point out that the alliance 
implications of current technological developments are 
far-reaching and deserve thorough examination prior to 
any such procurement decision. Technical details of 
the systems mentioned in this footnote are discussed 
in Chapter 2. 
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ch<-lll<J iny t:rcnds ln s tro. Leg _i c · tee hnolog ics o.ncl thu ir 
impact upon various aspects of the ANZUS relationship will 
need to be monitored continuously and in considerable 
detail. The relatively benign and comparatively undynamic 
strategic and technological environment of the 1950s and 
early 1960s scarcely made this necessary. 
Conclusion 
One of the major themes of this chapter is the 
assymetric nature not only of the national power of the 
ANZUS partners but also of their relative perceptions of 
the importance of the relationship. The US is far more 
important to Australia than is Australia to the US. But, 
in addition, Australians have tended to overvalue greatly 
the significance of the relationship globally and 
particularly the significance of the relationship to the 
US itself. In reality, US interests in Australia represent 
a minor portion of that country's overall global perspective. 
Primarily as a consequence of the Vietnam experience 
and the rapprochement with China, the US has instituted a 
process of reassessing thoroughly its interests in the 
Asia-Pacific region. This basic re-evaluation has 
stimulated a reduction in the strength of US forces 
stationed locally and a significant conditioning of 
declaratory policy concerning the type of support which 
might be made available to regLonal allies in future 
crisis situations. 
These changing factors have two major implications for 
Australian national security planning. First, it seems 
unlikely that there will again be the opportunity or the 
requirement for large portions of the Australian Defence 
Force to be deployed overseas in support of major power 
ally commitments. Second, primarily because of the increased 
hedging and uncertainty surrounding the assistance likely 
to be received from the US in crisis situations, there is 
a greatly strengthened requirement to allocate Australia's 
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scarce national security resources so as to maximise her 
independcn.t security in her immediate environment. 
In addition, because the US is a superpower whose 
primary strategic interests are world-wide, the ANZUS 
relationship is also influenced by much wider global 
strategic implications. These are rapidly becoming more 
complex as the pace of strategic and technological progress 
increases. The management of these developments in 
Australia's independent, as well as the alliance's mutual, 
interest will require closer scrutiny and attention than 
has been necessary in the past. 
The US-Australian relationship is likely to continue 
to be of great significance to Australi~ in the strategic, as 
well as a broad range of other, spheres. However, 
primarily as a result of changes in US policy and the 
wider international environment, it is clear that in the 
future Australia will requi-re a much more independent 
capacity to secure its national interests than has been 
the case in the past. 
CHAPTER 2 
NEW CONVENTIONAL MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR IMPACT 
UPON DEFENCE STRUCTURES, CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES 
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The nature and speed of recent technological developments 
and the i~pact which they are having upon the conventional 
military battlefield is a second area of fundamental change 
in Australia's strategic environment. In perhaps its simplest 
form, technology is merely providing new and better pieces 
of equipment. Yet because of the quantum jumps in capability 
which new systems frequently provide, even this relatively 
straightforward replacement of old equipment usually also 
involves the abandonment of traditional techniques, 
procedures and skills and the development and adoption of 
those that are new. 
A far more involved consequence of new technology is 
its provision of an ever widening array of alternative 
means of performing important military functions. Sometimes 
these new technological options serve to reinforce traditional 
means of undertaking tasks, but in other situations they 
effectively compete with the established means of task 
performance. Thus, in many environments, we now face a 
situation where a mix of new and traditional means can better 
perform a task than an improved version of an old means on 
its own. In other situations, new technology options may 
actively compete with, and even serve to replace, traditional 
options. 
In an elementary sense, these processes of technological 
development are not new. However, the speed of current 
change and the scale of its potential impact is quite 
unprecedented. Dr Heilmeier, the Director of the United 
States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
described the nature of the current situation in the 
following terms: 
I really do believe this is a unique 
time. I cannot remember a time in the last 
decade, or perhaps the decade before 
that, where there were so many technology 
initiatives on the horizon that could 
make a major difference to the national 
security. I think that in this case, the 
payoff is very, very large. We are not 
talking about incremental changes to the 
way we do things today. We are talking 
about radically different concepts, 
things that can make a big difference.l 
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As Dr Heilmeier implies, the pace of technological 
change affects much more than simply the performance of the 
items of equipment with which armed forces are supplied. 
Quantum jumps are being made in the capability of many 
types of system and in some fields completely new capacities 
are being developed. Strategies, doctrines, tactics and 
force structures are all being subjected to increasing 
pressures for change. The nature of conventional warfare 
as it has been known in the past is being altered 
fundamentally. The realms of what is possible and impossible 
on the conventional battlefield are in a state of flux which 
is unprecedented in both scale and scope. 
The discussion in this chapter is divided into two 
distinct sections. The first is an introductory description 
and discussio~ of the capabilities of the key new 
technologies. The second part of the chapter is an 
elaboration of a series of tactical and strategic impl1:cations 
which arise from their development. 
1 
'I'estimony before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal 
Year 19?? Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research 
and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 9 March 1976, 
p. 5859. 
A Review of Recent Developments in Conventional 
Military Technology 
1. Greatly Enhanced Precision Guidance Capacities 
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By using various terminal homing techniques, it is now 
possible to direct rockets, bombs, artillery rounds, mortar 
rounds and other types of ordnance to impact very accurately 
upon targets of small dimensions whether they are stationary 
or mobile. There are two broad categories of terminal 
guidance technique. Systems in the first category rely for 
homing upon those characteristics of the target which 
distinguish it from its surrounding environment. Those 
systems in the second category of teiminal guidance rely 
upon highly accurate navigation to impact upon fixed targets 
with known locations or upon mobile targets passing known 
locations. 
The vast majority of precision guidance techniques fall 
into the first category and rely upon the target's 
distinguishing characteristics. Perhaps the simplest and 
earliest examples of precision guidance employed visual 
target tracking and the radio control of a missile to close 
2 
and impact upon a target. Slightly more sophisticated 
systems were developed particularly for anti-tank usage 
which again relied upon unaided optical target tracking but 
utilised a very fine wire connection unravelled from the 
3 
missile through which guidance commands could be passed. 
The latest generation of wire guided missiles still rely 
upon visual target tracking but, as long as this is achieved 
2 
3 
Guided bombs were first developed during the Second 
World War. See D.A. Hicks, Important Technologies 
and Their Impact (Unpublished paper, Los Angeles, 
Northrop Corporation, 1975), p. 2. 
Examples of this type of system include ENTAC, 
MALKARA, MOSQUITO, SWINGFIRE, SAGGAR etc. 
through the launcher's optics, accurate weapon guidance is 
. 4 
automatic., 
Electro-optical or television-guided weapons carry a 
visual sensor on board which beams pictures of the scene 
ahead back to the weapon controller. 5 Hence, in theory at 
least, these weapons can be launched into a target area 
without a specific target having been identified first. 
Target acquisition and detailed guidance can be performed 
through the weapon's sensor once it arrives in the general 
target area. Thus, some electro-optical glide bombs, for 
instance, possess a true 'launch, leave, then aim' 
b . . 6 capa ility. 
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A very advanced development of existing optical terminal 
guidance techniques may provide a highly reliable 'fire and 
forget' capacity for a range of tactical weaponry. Current 
developments in focal point array technology are directed 
towards the development of an integral optical target 
'lock-on' system. This will involve the acquisition of a 
target through a weaporls on-board sensor, either before launch 
or during flight, and the automatic homing of that weapon upon 
the locked target image without command processing or 
4 
5 
6 
Examples of these more advanced anti-tank missile 
systems include TOW, DRAGON, MILAN, HOT etc. 
Examples of this type of system include the various 
electro-optical glide-bombs - WALLEYE, HOBO, 
electro-optical GBU-15 as well as the powered 
MAVERICK, MARTEL, CONDOR and LUZ-I etc. 
This technique is described in greater detail in 
- 'Mideast War Spurs Renewed Interest in Standoff 
Weapons' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 99, No. 24, 10 December 1973, p. 14. 
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assistance through electronics on the launcher platform. 7 
Therc·are, in addition, other types of precision 
guidance which require initial optical or optically assisted 
target tracking. For instance, laser beam riding systems 
require the direction of a low power laser beam so that 
colocated weaponry can fly down the 'pencil' beam of laser 
light to impact upon the target. 8 Laser designation systems 
also involve the direction of a low powered laser beam at 
the target. However, in this case, the ordnance can be 
launched from locations remote from the designator and need 
only be fired into the general 'basket' area of the tar9et. 
Laser designator homing ordnance is designed to guide 
itself automatically onto targets which are 'illuminated' 
by 'friendly' laser designators. 9 
7 
8 
9 
Dr Heilmeier, the Director of DARPA, discussed the 
potential of focal point array technology in his 
testimony before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services US Senate Fiscal Year 
1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research 
and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 9 March 1976, 
p. 5888. This should not be confused with optical lock-
on and weapon guidance through the electronic systems 
aboard launcher platforms. This has been deployed for 
several years in a number of systems. For example, see a 
diagramatic explanation of WALLEYE 2 guidance in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 99, No. 24, 10 December 
1973, p. 15. There is also a detailed explanation of 
this second technique as it operates in the MAVERICK 
system by John S. Phillip in 'Precision-Guided Weapons', 
Aerospace International, Vol. 13, No. 2, March/April 
1977, pp. 23,24. 
Laser beam riding weapons include the RBS-70 and SABRE 
light surface-to-air missile systems. 
An example of this type of system is the cannon launched 
guided projectile (CLGP) COPPERHEAD. For a relatively 
simple account of laser designated artillery systems 
see B.E. Blunt, 'Surface to Surface Artillery: 
Developments in Fire Support in the 1980s' in Royal 
United Services Institute Journal, Vol. 119, No. 4, 
December 1974, p. 15. 
43 
All of the precision guidance techniques so far 
described require optical target sighting and, if the targets 
are mobile, optical tracking. Thus, in their 'pure' form, 
these systems are inherently limited because darkness, r~in, 
fog, snow, smoke, smog and dust can effectively reduce 
non-assisted optical visibility to very low levels. Many of 
these difficulties can be overcome by the fitting of 
alternative imaging systems for target tracking. For 
example, image intensification systems can artificially 
enhance, in a passive manner, the light which is available 
for night viewing. Passive infra-red sensors provide an 
even more valuable capacity to see through not only 
darkness but also dust, smoke, smog and limited amounts of 
fog, snow and light camouflage. These systems develop 
images from the thermal, rather than the optical, signature 
of targets against their background environments. 10 
Infra-red technology is also being used in a non-imaging 
precision guidance technique. In those environments where 
a target's heat signature provides an obvious differential 
to its surrounding environment, infra-red 'heat seeking' 
missiles provide a valuable terminal guidance option. For 
example, the thermal contrast provided by jet aircraft 
engines against the relatively cool and uniform expanse of 
the sky has meant that infra-red homing has been employed as 
the dominant means of terminal guidance for light air-to-air 
missiles since the 1950s. 11 In recent years, infra-red 
homing heads have also been fitted to an array of ordnance 
designed for shipping and surface targets. Infra-red 
10 
11 
For details of recent developments in night vision 
equipment see D.M. Clements, 'Eyes that See in the 
Night', Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 60, No. 7, July 
1976' pp. 54 ff. 
For a detailed elaboration of the latest generation of 
infra-red homing air-to-air missiles,see the testimony 
of Captain W.H. Van Dyke, Jr~ US Navy, Infra-red 
Missiles System Project Manager, before the Subcommittee 
on Tactical Air Power, Committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 9, 11 March 1976, pp. 5019 ff. 
seekers can now be 'tuned' to discriminate in favour of 
particular.types of temperature and spacial signature. 
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Most recently, this has meant that artillery pieces, 
armoured vehicles and other ground targets which are 
frequently warm and of moderate size (but not intensely hot 
or very large) can be attacked with discriminating infra-red 
h . . h . 12 orning tee niques. 
The metallic composition of many battlefield targets 
provides the basis for distinguishing them from their 
background environments through the use of radar sensors. 
Some missiles carry small active radar sets aboard which can 
. d h . d 13 h . acquire targets an generate orning comman s. Ot ers, in 
the semi-active horning category, can home upon the radar 
signals which are beamed by the launching platform and 
which are reflected by the target. 14 
There are other features distinguishing particular 
types of targets from their s~rroundings which can be used 
for precision guidance. For instance, the United States is 
developing horning sensors which identify and home on 
agitated metal cornponents. 15 Others distinguish some types 
12 
13 
14 
15 
For details see the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, 
Director of DARPA,before the Research and Development 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement 3 Research and Developmen~ and Active Duty 3 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 11 March 1976, pp. 5781, 5782. 
Examples of this type of system include HARPOON, 
EXOCET, KORMORAN, etc. 
Semi-active radar horning missiles include SPARROW, 
MATRA R530, SKYFLASH, etc. 
General A.D. Slay, Deputy Chief of Staff for Research 
and Development, discusses this development in his 
testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Airpower of 
the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
19?? Authorization for Military Procurement 3 Research 
and Development 3 and Active Duty 3 Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part ~O, 15 March 1976, 
p. 5313. 
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f b . h . 16 o targets y acoustic tee niques. 
The final class of tar9ets which are relatively easily 
distinguished for precision guidance purposes from their 
background environments are those which emit electronic signals. 
Radar emitting targets can not only be acquired relatively 
easily but weaponry can be equipped with a guidance system to 
17 home onto the signal's source. This type of anti-radiation 
precision guidance has been developed to the point where it 
can home on the very faint emissions forthcoming from the 
back lobe or rear of an antenna and from the weak transient 
signals which remain for a short time after the radar is shut 
18 down but not isolated from its power source. 
The second major category of precision guidance really 
involves extremely accurate navigation to known fixed points 
at which targets are located or through which mobile targets 
are passing. Inertial navigation systems have been 
available for many years. However, new ring-laser and 
nuclear magnetic resonance gyro technology appears likely 
to provide greatly improved accuracy within constrained 
19 
weight, size and cost parameters. Because of their inherent 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Ibid. 
Examples of this type of weapons system include SHRIKE, HARM, 
ERAZO, etc. There are also several other anti-radiation 
weapons under consideration. One proposal is to fit a 
radiation homing head to the COPPERHEAD cannon launched 
guided projectile. Another is to fit an anti-radiation 
and a new generation infra-red seeker sensor together on 
the MAVERICK missile. See Aviation Week and Space Tech-
nology, Vol. 106, No. 19, 9 May 1977, p. 59 and Flight 
International, Vol. 110, No. 3537, 25 December 1976, p. 1834. 
This homing capacity is discussed in a Defense Marketing 
Services, Market Intelligence Report on the AGM-45 
SHRIKE, April 1976. 
Much of the applied work done on ring-laser gyros has 
been undertaken within the US Simplified Inertial Guidance 
Demonstration (SIG-D) and the Advanced Tactical Inertial 
Guiding System (ATIGS) programmes. ATIGS and microwave 
area correlation technology have now been combined by the 
US Navy to provide a new and inexpensive guidance system 
for long range air-to-ground missiles. See Flight Inter-
national, Vol. 110, No. 3537, 25 December 1976, p. 1834. 
For information on nuclear magnetic resonance gyros see 
Avid~ion Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 20, 
16 May 1977, p. 53. 
lack of complete precision, it seems probable that most 
inertially.guided conventional weapons systernswill be 
supplemented by a specialised form of terminal horning. 
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The terrain contour matching technique (TERCOM) 
provides a very precise method of long range navigation via 
. f d . 20 . a series o over-lan way points. An essential 
prerequisite of this system is for the detailed characteristics 
of the terrain at each way point and at the target's location 
to be obtained in advance either by satellite reconnaissance 
or by some other method. By using the ground elevation 
characteristics as inputs, digital terrain maps of each way 
point must be constructed and inserted into the missile 
computer memory for instant on-site recognition. Upon 
launch, the missile is directed towards the first way point 
and, as it is approached, the guidance system rapidly scans 
the terrain profile. Divergence or drift from the optimal 
course can be detected instantaneously by comparing the 
stored digital contour map with that being sensed by the 
missile's altimeters. Corrective command steering can then 
take place before the missile changes course for the next 
way point. Upon approaching the target itself, the missile 
again compares the stored digital map with its sensor's 
image of the terrain below and then automatically directs 
its impact onto the allocated portion of the ground. 
In the United States' strategic cruise missile 
programme, an alternative form of terminal guidance may be 
employed in conjunction with TERCOM for terminal target 
recognition. On-board scene matching area correlation 
(SMEAC) equipment can store a black and white negative film 
21 
of the target site instead of a digital map. When the 
missile reaches the target area, a positive image of the 
external scene is superimposed upon the stored f ilrn. The 
20 
21 
For TERCOM details see K. Tsipis, 'Digi ta.l Map-Making' 
in The Bulletin of the ALomie Swicnt1'.sl:.s, Vol. 31, No. 4, 
April 1975, p. 22. 
For details on the TERCOM-SMEAC interface see Flight 
International, Vol. 110, No. 3537, 25 December 1976, 
p. 1834. 
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missile flight path can then be adjusted until the images 
match. Obv~ously, unless image intensification or passive 
infra-red techniques are used in this process, its application 
would be limited to daylight, fair weather conditions which 
are smoke-, smog-, rain-, fog- and snow-free. In operational 
form the total system is expected to demonstrate a guidance 
accuracy.comparable to that of short range electro-optical 
missiles. 
In addition, there are long range ordnance navigation 
techniques which determine position during flight by 
extremely precise sensing of the earth's natural magnetic 
field. 22 Others use passive microwave radiometric 
technology (MICRAD) to sense the natural radiation of the 
th I f d l 1 • • • . f • 2 3 ear s sur ace an ca cu ate precision position ixes. 
Yet other forms of long range navigation such as 
TACAN, VOR, LORAN and OMEGA use active ground-based radio 
beacons. The receipt of continuous emissions from these 
radio networks makes it possible for positions to be 
determined continually through a series of rapid trigonometric 
calculations. 
There is a related ordnance navigation system of some 
significance which uses an opponent's fixed radar and jamming 
emitters and where necessary supplementary specialised emitter 
beacons to provide the basis for a complex emitter reference 
grid across the battlefield. When established, this grid can 
22 
23 
One example of this type of sys.tern is MAGCOM which operates 
in a manner similar to TERCOM except that its position 
fixing sensors are purely magnetic. 
This use of microwave radiometric technology is cited by 
Captain C.R. Bowling, Head of the Tactical Air Launched 
Weapons Section of the US Navy, in his testimony before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization 
for Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ and 
Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 10, 15 March 1976, p. 5304. See also 
Flight International, Vol. 110, No. 3537, 25 December 
1976, p. 1834. 
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be used as a source of reference, when non-emitting objects 
are acquired and targeted on the battlefield. Targets 
acquired within this system can then be attacked by ordnance 
which is fitted with distance measuring equipment (DME) 
guidance heads. Such systems can navigate precisely to given 
fixed points by referring continuously to their sensed 
position within the adopted emitter grid. The great 
advantage of DME guidance is that it can be used in all 
weather and visibility conditions and the disposable ordnance 
. . b d 1 . 1 . . 1 24 guidance units can e pro uced re ative y inexpensive y. 
Perhaps the ultimate form of beacon positioning will be 
available from the United States' NAVSTAR Global Positioning 
Satellite (GPS) system which is expected to be partially 
deployed and operating for experimental purposes in August 
1978. GPS terminals will initially weigh 13.6 kg and may 
eventually cost less than US$10,000 each. For this price, 
they should provide a wide range of weapon platforms and 
ordnance systems with highly jam-proof position-fixing with 
accuracies within 9 metres 90 per cent of the time and 
5 metres 50 per cent of the time. 25 
24 
25 
Major General K. Russell, the US Air Force Assistant Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Research and Development, discusses DME 
technology at length in his testimony on the US Precision 
Location Strike System (PLSS). See Hearings of the Sub-
committee on Tactical Airpower, Committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Developmen~ and Active Duty~ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 9, 
12 March 1976, pp. 5205 ff. See also 'Mideast War Spurs 
Renewed Interest in Standoff Weapons' in Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, Vol. 99,No. 24, 10 December 1973, p. 14. 
For details on GPS see the statement by Dr Malcolm Currie, 
then Director of Defense Research and Engineerin~ before 
the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization 
for Military Procurement~ Research and Developmen~ and 
Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 5, 5 February 1976, pp. 2124 ff. See also 
D.C. Holmes, 'NAVSTAR Global Positioning System: Navigation· 
.for the Future' in US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 103/ 
4/890, April 1977, pp. 101 ff. and N.J. Hopkins, 'A Look 
Ahead to the Land Warfare Weaponry of the Mid-Eighties, 
Part I' in Canadian Defence Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, 
Winter 1976-77, p. 22. 
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Many of these precision guidance techniques can be 
countered ~ffectively by an opponent who is well prepared. 
For instance, a range of passive measures can be employed 
to foil optical tracking. Special camouflage materials and 
a range of operational techniques, such as terrain ~asking, 
can be employed to maximise the difficulties of optical 
tracking. Ilcut suppression measures and mutcrials cun be 
employed to reduce infra-red signatures. 26 several systems 
exist to provide warning of active infra-red energy and laser 
· 11 . . 27 f l b i umination. Screens o srno(e, dust and fog can e 
generated rapidly in some tactical environments not only to 
inhibit and prevent optical tracking but also to dissipate 
laser beams employed for munition guidance and target 
. 28 f . . . b d ranging. Most types o active navigation eacons an 
radio command links can be jammed or degraded. Infra-red 
horning and anti-radiation missiles can be decoyed and magnetic 
and radiometric navigation systems spoofed. In addition, 
there are automatic countermeasure systems available for 
many applications. One notable example, which the United 
States currently has in advanced development, is an aircraft 
optical countermeasures pod which is designed to sense 
weapon flashes and automatically direct a high power laser 
beam to destroy or seriously damage the eyes of the weapon 
29 
controller. 
26 
27 
28 
29 
There is a discussion of some of these developments in 
a Defense Marketing Services,Market Intelligence Report 
on the US Army Natick· Development Centre, November 1975. 
For information on these types of passive detection 
systems see Defense Marketing Services, Market Intelligence 
Report on US Army Electronics Command (ECOM), December 
1 9 7 5 , pp . 1 , 2 ~ 
In the US, the Mobility Equipment Research and Development 
Centre (MERDC) has developed devices to produce almost 
instant smoke, fog and aerosol screens. See report on 
MERDC in the Defense Marketing Services,Market 
Intelligence Report, October 1975, p. 5. 
Details of the Advanced Optical Countermeasures System 
(AOCM) are given in a Defense Marketing Services, Market 
Intelligence Report on 'AN' Equipment, May 1976. 
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There are also precision guidance counter-counter-
measures. The security of radio command links can be 
improved; operating procedures can reduce the opportunities 
for an opponent to detect the use of laser designators; 
laser designator homing ordnance can be coded to match the 
f f h d . h. h 1° t . . d 30 d requency o t e es1gnator to w ic is assigne an 
infra-red homing weapons can be tuned to match the signature 
31 
of the target sought. 
In addition to these many refinements of precision 
guidance technology, there is a significant trend in weapon 
design which is likely to complicate further the task of 
countering the new precision guidance technologies. This 
concerns the development of multi-sensor terminal guidance. 
In the case of some light weapons systems, this can be 
expected to be manifested in the development of a modular 
character. Light SAM systems, for instance, may be designed 
for the alternative fitting of infra-red homing, passive 
radar seeking and laser beam riding guidance heads. Man-
portable anti-tank missiles may be fitted with alternate 
laser beam riding or tuned infra-red homing guid~nce heads. 
For weapons of greater size, significant advances in a series 
30 
31 
The coding of laser designated ordnance is explained by 
Mr E.A. Miller, Assistant Secretary of the US Army for 
-Research and Development, in his testimony before the 
Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization 
for Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ and 
Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 6, 25 February 1976, p. 3165. 
The problems, difficulties and potential of remotely 
launched laser designated ordnance are discussed at 
length by Steven L. Canby in Terminal Guidance on the 
Battlefield, Obtaining it~ Potential Payoff (Santa 
Monica, Technology Service Corporation, 1975). 
For details see testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, Director 
of DARPA,before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
1977 Authorization for Military Procurement 3 Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 11 March 1976, 
pp. 5781,5782. 
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of antenna designs are making it possible for a wide range 
of alternative guidance or homing systems to be accommodated 
b . d ... d 1 32 1 a oard in ivi ua weapons. There are a arge number of 
programmes currently under development which fall into this 
category. For instance, the US Army has initiated a 
programme to provide the laser designated cannon launched 
guided proj cctilc ( COPPERHP.J\D) with a scconda ry ·in fr a-red 
h . b · 1. 33 1 . d. . h om1n9 capa i ity. Severa anti-ra iation weapons t at 
1 d 1 d h . b · 1. 34 are a ready ep aye possess a ome-on-Jam capa i ity. 
The future prospects of a target which is under attack being 
able to counter effectively all potential types of missile 
guidance at once seems highly improbable. 
In summary, it can be seen that the new technologies 
are proliferating the means which are available to hit 
acquired targets and exact locations with precise accuracy. 
The overall consequence is that, if a mobile target can be 
acquired or the location of a fixed target can be determined, 
it is becoming much more likely that it will be hit by. the 
first round of ordnance which is fired. 
2. More Efficient Propulsion Systems 
The propulsion systems of most types of weapons platforms 
and weapons themselves are being improved significantly. Most 
32 
33 
34 
This significant development is discussed by Dr G.H. 
Heilmeier, Director of DARPA, in his report to the Research 
and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for 
Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active 
Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 11 March 1976, pp. 5828, 5829. 
This development is discussed in a Defense Marketing 
Services,Market Intelligence Report on Terminal Homing, 
September 1976, p. 2. 
For details of the operation of SHRIKE, STANDARD ARM and 
HARM anti-radiation missiles see R.N. Pretty (ed.), 
Jane's Weapon Systems 1977 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 
19 7 6) ' pp. 15 0' 15 8' 15 9. 
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particularly, there are several research and development 
efforts which appear to promise very much improved fuel, 
weight and space efficiencies. 
For nuclear submarines, there is great potential for 
increased efficiency and decreased weight and noise through 
the employment of superconducting and segmented magnetic 
35 
motors. For conventional submarines and torpedoes, the 
closed cycle BRAYTON gas turbine, the STIRLING engine and 
a combinatiorr of the STIRLING and WALTER engines show new 
promise. New types of batteries are also becoming available. 36 
In small and medium sized surface shipping, the trend 
towards gas turbines either on their own or in a CODOG or 
CODAG arrangement with diesels may be further strengthened 
by the proliferation of new types of naval platforms, 
surface effect ships, hydrofoils, semi-submerged hull systems, 
etc. 
In the field of aircraft engines, there has been a great 
amount of research into the use of ceramic components. Their 
introduction may make it possible for the production costs 
of some types of engine to fall dramatically. But, in 
addition, the employment of ceramic components should enable 
35 
36 
See these systems discussed by Mr H.T. Marcy, the US 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, 
in his testimony before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of the Cammi ttee on Armed Forces, US Senate, 
Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ 
Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve 
and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 6, 26 February 1976, 
p. 3348. 
For details see H. Feigl, The Impact of New Maritime 
Technologies (London, The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 122, 1976), p. 27. 
Developments with the BRAYTON closed cycle gas turbine 
are discussed by Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director of DARPA, 
in his testimony before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed Forces, US Senate, 
Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ 
Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve 
and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 11 March 1976, 
pp . 5 7 6 9, 5 7 7 0 . 
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the normal operating temperature of many engines to be 
increased ~ignificantly. This, in turn, will have a 
37 favourable impact upon fuel economy. 
In weapons themselves, new forms of high density 
propellants will give much increased speed and range to man-
portable systems. For applications where rockets of larger 
dimensions with longer sustained power and high speeds are 
required, integrated rocket/ramjet designs will greatly 
enhance the accepted norms of performance. 38 In the field of 
cruise missiles where speed is normally compromised heavily 
by the requirements of fuel efficiency, range and compact 
dimensions, small turbo-jet and turbo-fan engines can be 
expected to be improved further and to become far more common. 
In total, these developments in propulsion systems are 
providing both weapon systems and platforms with greater 
range, speed and fuel efficiency, while at the same time 
contributing to the reduction of their sound, heat, radar 
and other media signatures. On the tactical operational 
level, the new propulsion systems and terminal guidance 
technologies, when combined, provide an unprecedented 
capacity to hit accurately targets which can be acquired and 
identified, ev,en at very long range. On the strategic level, 
much of the traditional tyranny of distance, in the sense of 
isolation, is being replaced by a new tyranny of military 
accessibility. 
3. More Effective Conventional Warheads 
The destruction potential of a given conventional warhead 
volume and weight has increased greatly in recent years. A 
37 
38 
For details see the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, ibid., 
pp. 5794-5796 and also 'ARPA's Current Thrust' in Aviation 
Week .and Space Technology, Vol. 102, No. 15, 14 April 1975, p. 7. 
For details see 'Ramjet Research Payoffs Believed Near' 
in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 105, No. 11, 
13 September 1976, pp. 71 ff., and also Defense Market-
ing Services, Market Intelligence Report on the 
Supersonic Combustion Ramjet Missile (SCRAM), April 1976. 
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variety of new technology warheads have been developed to 
meet specific battlefield requirements. For instanc~, for 
the purpose of disabling, delaying and channelling 
concentrated movements of enemy forces, minelets and 
bomblets of 'fist' size have been developed. Because of 
their relative cheapness, these weapons can be laid over 
large battlefield areas by aircraft, artillery and ground 
39 based dispenser systems. 
For the neutralisation of airfield runways, hardened 
aircraft shelters and other similar structures, terminally 
accelerated penetrator bombs have been developed not only 
with a capacity to pierce and crater thick concrete but 
also to cause extensive heaving and disturbance beneath 
40 large areas of the surface. 
39 
40 
The West Germans have produced the PANDORA, MEDUSA and 
DRAGON SEED dispenser systems. They are also developing 
a new air-delivered dispenser system called STREBO which 
permits a degree of control over the bomblet or minelet 
delivery pattern. For details see Stefan Geisenh~yner, 
'Pandora, Medusa, Dragon Seed - A Defensive Weapons Mix 
for Europe' in Aerospace International, May-June 1971, 
pp. 56-58. 
The United States has a similar system called GATOR. 
See the statement of Captain G.R. Bowling, Head of the 
Tactical Air Launched Weapons Section, US Navy, before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Airpower of the Committee on 
Armed Services, US senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ and 
Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 10, 15 March 1976, pp. 5308 ff. 
For example, see the detailed description of the DURANDAL 
penetration bomb in R.T. Pretty (ed.), Jane's Weapon 
Systems 1976 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 1975), p. 502. 
This report states that concrete slabs of up to 40cm 
(approx. 16") thick can be penetrated with this weapon. 
See also the description of Thompson-Brandt's lOOmm 
tactical support bomb in NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 21, 
No. 2, April-May 1976, p. 97. It is reported that Britain 
is developing a completely new type of anti-airfield weapon 
designated JP233. For details see Flight International, 
Vol. 111, No. 3551, 2 April 1977, p. 832 and also 
Gp. Capt. Tony Mason (RAF), 'Technology and Airpower' in 
Plight International, Vol. 112, No. 3578, 8 October 1977, 
p. 1002. 
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A third major development in conventional warhead 
technology has been that of fuel air explosives. These are 
designed to spray rapidly and then ignite an aerosol cloud 
of highly volatile fuel. The effect is to exert very high 
overpressures over the immediate area of the explosion. 
In the case of a large third generation weapon, the over-
pressures generated by a strike in the immediate target area 
are comparable to those which would be produced by the 
detonation of a 20 kiloton nuclear explosion at a distance of 
less than two hundred metres. The blast wave effect is 
between 2.7 and 5 times that produced by an equivalent 
quantity of TNT. Immediate applications are for mine 
clearance, for the destruction of hard targets, bunkers, 
aircraft shelters, armoured vehicles, ships, etc., and as an 
anti-personnel weapon against units in the open and in 
entrenchments. 41 In the longer term, it may also be possible 
to mount fuel air explosive canisters on or above the sea 
bed as anti-shipping mines. Once triggered, fuel and buoyant 
detonating mechanisms could be released to the surface where 
the vaporising cloud could be ignited in a similar manner 
to that of a'surface-delivered warhead. 
41 
There are two other warhead developments of note~ One 
For details of fuel air explosive (FAE) developments 
see Desmond J. Ball and Steven J. Rosen, 'Fuel Air 
Explosives for Medium Powers' in Pacific Defence 
Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 10, April 1977, pp. 17 ff; 
G. Johannsohn, 'Fuel Air Explosives Revolutionise 
Warfare' in International Defense Review, Vol. 9, 
No. 6, December· 1976, pp. 992 ff; and also C.A. 
Robinson, Jr, 'Special Report: Fuel Air Explosives -
Services Ready Joint Development Plan' in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 98, No. 8, 19 February 
19 7 3 , pp . 4 2 ff . 
Despite FAE's obvious potential, it should be 
noted that their performance can be degraded 
significantly by rain, fog, snow, sleet and to a 
lesser extent by naturally high humidity environments. 
42 involves the use of navel shaped charge concepts. The 
other involves the use of complex multi-stage warheads. 
The most notable example of this advance is the Hard 
Structure Munition (HSM) warhead being developed by the 
US Air Force for the destruction of bunkers, aircraft 
shelters, bridge piers and other hardened targets. It is 
believed to take the form of a shaped-charge munition with 
43 
a secondary follow-through warhead. 
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The main consequence arising from these new warhead 
technologies is that, if a target can be hit, the resulting 
destruction is likely to be far greater for a given warhead 
weight than has been the case in the past. So, when the 
new conventional warheads are combined with the new precision 
guidance and propulsion technologies, it becomes clear that 
if a target can be acquired and identified there is now an 
order of magnitude increase in the probability that it can 
be destroyed quickly even if it is positioned at a distant 
location. As a consequence of these developments, it seems 
likely that target acquisition and identification, even at 
extended ranges, will become an increasingly important 
function on the conventional battlefield. 
4. Greatly Improved Long Range Surveillance and 
Target Acquisition Technologies 
The efficiency with which long range detection, 
identification and tracking systems can operate depends 
42 
43 
See the reference to this programme in the testimony of 
Dr G.H. Heilmeier, Director of DARPA,before the Research 
and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for 
Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active 
Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 9 March 1976, p. 5898. 
For details concerning the HSM programme see the testimony 
of Major General W.R. Nelson, Deputy Chief of Staff, US Air 
Forces Systems and Logistics, before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, US House of Representatives, 
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1977, Part 5, 
10 March 1976, pp. 1422, 1424. 
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heavily upon the strength of the signature contrast between 
the target and its background environment. The high level of 
contrast between a fast moving, warm or hot metallic aircraft 
against the cool and almost uniform expanse of the sky makes 
the long range detection of aircraft possible. Large, noisy, 
warm, metallic ships on the surface of the sea present a 
similar contrast signature, which renders them also susceptible 
to long range detection. On the other hand, submarines 
operating within the very dense sea environment represent 
quite a different type of long range detection problem. Yet 
despite the fact that sound and other emissions from sub-
surface craft pass in uneven patterns, there are now clear 
indications that in many environments long range detection 
and identification of submarines is possible. Small or 
moderately sized targets on the earth's surface which do not 
radiate active electronic emissions are even more diffioult 
to detect and identify at long range. The ground itself is 
an extremely dense and uneven environment which can provide 
effective masking for a wide range of targets from long-
range detection by nearly every type of sensor. 
Satellites currently carry an array of optical photographic, 
infra-red; radar and electronic intelligence sensors for the 
detection, location, identification and tracking of objects 
of military significance on the ground and on the surface 
of the sea. 44 The specific capabilities of each type of 
sensor are highly classified but one expert in the field has 
calculated that the resolution of current US optical 
photographic sensors is at least 35 centimetres and may be 
44 For details of current capacities and recent developments 
in satellite-borne sensors see 'Military Satellites' 
in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977 
(Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 1977), pp. 103-179; 'Reconnaissance 
Satellites' in Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, World Armaments and Disamament SIPRI Yearbook 
1975 (Stockholm, Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute, 1975), pp. 378-404; Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, Vol. 104, No. 6, 9 February 1976, 
p. 15. 
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45 
significantly lower. It is also known that a new type of 
sensor system is under development which will permit flying 
aircraft and large cruise missiles to be detected and 
46 tracked from space. 
However, satellite surveillance sensors do suffer from 
a number of significant weaknesses. If the ground support 
facilities are highly concentrated and positioned in 
obvious locations, in some types of conflict they may be 
vulnerable to early destruction. In addition, it should be 
noted that satellites themselves can be intercepted and 
47 destroyed, at least by the superpowers. Hence, unless a 
state has the capacity to incorporate a series of extremely 
expensive countermeasures, their survivability cannot be 
assured under all circumstances. Another difficulty arises 
from the fact that in order to be effective many satellite 
sensor systems have to be launched into low altitude orbits. 
This effectively reduces satellite lifespan, necessitating system 
45 
46 
47 
These calculations are made by Ted Greenwood in 
'Reconnaissance and Arms Control', Scientific 
American, Vol. 228, No. 2, February 1973, pp. 14, 15. 
See the reports on the High Altitude Large Optics 
(HALO) and the TEAL RUBY programmes in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 9, 28 
February 1977, p. 13 and Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 106, No. 13, 28 March 1977, p. 11. 
For more substantial articles on this subject see 
Barry Miller, 'Advances in Missile Surveillance 
Pushed' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 105, No. 2, 12 July 1976, pp. 17 ff. and 
Barry Miller, 'Aircraft Detection System Advances', 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, 
No. 25, 20 June 1977, pp. 22, 23. 
This capacity is discussed fully by Barry Miller 
in 'USAF Pushes Satellite Survivability', 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, 
No. 13, 28 March 1977, pp. 52 ff. and also in 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
World Armaments and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1977, 
pp. 121, 122, 129, 130. 
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1 f . 1 48 rep acement at requent interva s. As a consequence, 
it appears that some types of satellite-borne military 
sensors are likely to remain exclusively in the hands of a 
small number of major powers. The technology involved is 
extremely complex and the costs of developing, procuring and 
actually positioning sensor packages in space are likely to 
deter the active involvement of most states. 
A most promising method of detecting aircraft, large 
cruise missiles and some types of surface shipping at long 
range is over-the-horizon backscatter radar (OTH-B radar) . 
The development of the JINDALEE OTH radar system was discussed 
briefly in footnote 33 in Chapter 1. Essentiall~ these 
systems consist of an advanced active phased-array radar 
transmitter which emits high frequency, high powered signals 
which are frequently adjusted to minimise the degrading 
effects of natural or man-made ionospheric disturbances. 
This type of signal harmony is important because the objective 
is to bounce the signals off the ionosphere to detect targets 
at ranges between 800 and 3,200 km or even further around the 
curvature of the earth. 49 The efficiency with which this 
can be done varies greatly according to the matching of 
frequencies to the current state of the ionosphere. Signals 
beaming off the ionosphere impact upon targets and return 
again via the ionospheric 'mirror' to a separately located 
receiver station. The filtering of targets from the enormous 
amount of 'noise' and clutter created by the signal's 
reflection off the earth's surface and by the ambient 
electro-magnetic activity deriving from the earth and 
extra- terrestial sources is an extremely difficult process 
48 
49 
The advantages and disadvantages of various types of 
reconnaissance satellite orbits are discussed in Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments 
and Disarmament SIPRI Yearbook 1975, pp. 378-394. 
These range figures are cited in Air Force Magazine, 
Vol. 59, No. 7, July 1976, p. 56. They are slightly in 
excess of those which have been released officially in 
Australia. See, for instance, 'Schematic of Operation of 
Over the Horizon Radar' in Triad, No. 2. p. 7. 
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and can be done only by using the DOPPLER principle. This 
involves the detection of objects which move against the 
relatively stabl~ background environment. 50 Hence, in the 
d . . f 1 . . · 1 51 etection of aircra t, arge cruise missi es and large 
11 . . h. . 52 h. f b meta · ic fast-moving s ipping t is type o system can e 
ff . . . 53 e ective in most environments. 
As a long range detection system,OTH radar displays 
obvious potential. There are strong indications that 
refinements to this type of system may provide accuracies 
h . h k d. . f . . f . bl 54 w ic ma e irect vectoring o intercept aircra t possi e. 
50 
51 
52 
53 
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The technical operation of OTH-B radar is described 
fully by Desmond J. Ball in 'Jindalee - Over-the-Horizon 
Radar in the Defence of Australia', Pacific Defence 
Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 8, February 1977, pp. 17 ff. 
The question of whether OTH-B radar systems are 
capable of detecting the very small radar signatures 
of modern long range cruise missiles is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
The expectation that JINDALEE would have a capacity to 
detect and track shipping was raised by Dr J.L. Farrands 
(Australia's former Chief Defence Scientist) in his 
address to the National Press Club on 6 October 1976. 
Imagine how many (conventional radars) 
would be needed to cover the Australian 
coastline and imagine the increased 
difficulty of locating ships out to the 
margin of the (320 km) economic zone. 
Cited in 'Out of Sight Radar! Whee!' in The Australian, 
7 October 1976, p. 11. 
It is worth noting that OTH-B radar operation in 
regions subject to auroral disturbances can cause 
significant problems. This has been a major difficulty 
in the US 414L OTH-B programme. See James R. ·schlesinger 
(Secretary of Defense) , Annual· Defense Department Report 
FY1976 and FY197T, US Department of Defense, 1976, 
p. II-44. 
The possible employment of OTH-B radar for the 
vectoring of aircraft defences is discussed by 
Desmond J. Bal·l in 'Jindalee - Over-the-Horizon Radar 
in the Defence of Australia', Pacific Defence Reporter, 
Vol. 3, No. 8, February 1977, pp. 17 ff. 
However, when difficult ionospheric conditions are 
experienceq or when an opponent attempts to jam the 
system, it may be necessary to dispatch an airborne warning 
and control aircraft system (AWACS) to the target's 
vicinity to vector intercept aircraft more precisely.SS 
An integral and obvious part of all OTH radar systems 
is their extremely elaborate high frequency receivers. In 
this connection, it is notable that a very large proportion 
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of civil and military communication is also undertaken within 
this frequency spectrum. Thus, in the words of Philip J. 
Klass, the avionics editor of Aviation Week and Space 
Technology: 
any type of OTH radar is also 
potentially a means for eavesdropping 
on high frequency radio communications 
that might otherwise be too weak for 
ordinary radio communication receivers.S6 
General Gould of the United States Air Force has supported 
this view by stating in his Congressional testimony that: 
'It is clear from what we know that this system will have 
S7 intelligence value'. It is by no means clear whether use 
of an OTH system for these purposes would require the shut-
down of the radar transmitter. It may well be possible to 
modulate the receiver at microsecond intervals to permit 
both functions to be performed simultaneously.SB 
Further development of the OTH backscatter radar 
principle may provide additional capabilities of great value. 
SS 
S6 
S7 
SB 
This requirement for OTH-B radar and AWACS interaction 
is suggested by Philip J. Klass in 'HF Radar Detects 
Soviet ICBM' s', ·Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 9S, No. 23, 6 December 1971, p. 40. 
Ibid. 
General Gould is quoted by Philip J. Klass, ibid. 
Dr Desmond Ball suggests that the OTH radar transmitter 
could be shut down completely for periods of up to 30 minutes 
if this was necessary. See Desmond J. Ball, 'Some Further 
Thoughts on Jindalee', Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, 
No. 11, May 1977, p. S7. 
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Most importantly, it may be possible to employ BISTATIC or 
59 SANCTUARY c.oncepts to OTH radar. This would involve the 
construction of multiple OTH radar receivers at forward 
sites, most probably several hundred or even thousands of 
kilometres distant from the centrally located transmitter. 
These forward receivers would not necessarily need to be 
as large or complex as the current base sites and certainly 
would not be expected to be prohibitively expensive. Some 
might be mobile, perhaps mounted aboard heavy trucks, ships 
or even large aircraft. 60 The development of SANCTUARY OTH 
radar concepts would of fer two major advances in system 
capability. Firstly, the reception of the transmitter 
signals which return from targets to receivers at multiple 
locations would make target tracking far more accurate 
through the use of multiple triangulation techniques. 
Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, the forward 
receivers would be able to detect and track aircraft, large 
cruise missiles and metallic fast-moving ships in their 
vicinity in a completely passive manner. This capacity would 
facilitate command and control and perhaps even ordnance 
targeting without a requirement to emit active signals from 
forward positions or to conduct active airborne reconnaissance. 
The tactical and strategic significance of this type of 
capability might be of crucial importance in many environments. 
59 
60 
The potential exists for an even more refined capacity 
This concept is outlined in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 105, No. 8, 23 August 1976, p. 61. 
See also the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, Director of 
DARPA, before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal 
Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research 
and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 9 March 1976, 
pp. 5898, 5899. Dr Heilmeier is also quoted on this 
subject in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, 
No. 10, 7 March 1977, p. 171. 
The possibility of employing mobile OTH radar receivers 
is raised by Desmond J. Ball in 'Some Further Thoughts 
on Jindalee', Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 11, 
May 1977, p. 57. 
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if more than one OTH radar transmitter is deployed. By 
using variable frequency techniques,the United States has 
apparently demonstrated a capacity not only to detect 
and track aircraft targets but to identify them positively 
as well. According to Flight International: 
Tests have showed that - provided the 
frequencies used are such that the 
wavelength is longer than the largest 
dimension of the target, and that two 
or three different frequencies are used 
- examination of the amplitude, phase 
and polarization of the reflected signal 
gives each target a recognizable 
signature. During trials with models 
it has proved possible to differentiate 
the Mig-19, Mig-21, F-104 and F-4.61 
The further development and deployment of OTH radar 
systems would appear not to be excessively expensive and 
hence their acquisition by a number of large and medium 
powers can be anticipated during the 1980s. 62 
Of complementary significance in this field is the 
newest generation of airborne warning and control aircraft 
(AWACS) . Aircraft of this type are equipped with powerful 
radar and carry very advanced computer processing and 
communications systems. Their overall tasks are many and 
their capabilities extend beyond that of long range 
surveillance. However, in the context of this discussion, 
it should be noted that by utilising the altitude at which 
61 
62 
'USSR Develops Anti-B-1 Radar?' in Flight International, 
Vol. 111, No. 3539, 8 January 1977, p. 50. 
Dr J.L. Farrands, Australia's former Chief Defence 
Scientist, indicated that he expected the total development 
cost (excluding final system installation costs) of JINDALEE 
to be about A$20m., The Australian, 7 October 1976, p. 11. 
This contrasts markedly with the US expenditure levels at 
approximately US$50m. by 1976. See testimony of Secretary 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Annual Department of Defense Report 
for FY 1977, US Department of Defense, 1976, p. 90. One 
of the major reasons for this disparity was cited by 
Mr Killen, 'Costs have been kept down by borrowing special 
electronic equipment from the United States', Common~ealth 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Thirtieth 
Parliament, 4 June 1976, p. 3115. However, a second and 
possibly equally important reason is that the Australian 
programme has not had to solve the difficult problem of 
auroral interference. See DMS Tntel l1:gence, Vol. 5, No. 5, 
January 1977, pp. 3, 4. 
64 
they patrol for long periods, these systems can detect air, 
naval and some ground movements far beyond the horizon-
imposed constraints of conventional radar installations on 
the earth's surface. Aircraft or cruise missiles flying at 
altitudes from ground level to 30,000 metres can be detected 
and tracked readily from AWACS aircraft, if they fly within 
a radius of approximately 600 kilometres. If necessary, the 
electronic systems on board can be used to vector friendly 
. f f . . 63 aircra t or interception.· 
The problems and difficulties of acquiring comprehensive 
long range underwater surveillance have, until recently, 
appeared intractable. However a number of important 
technological developments are altering dramatically the 
potential for reliable submarine and surface ship detection, 
identification and tracking. As Dr Heilmeier explained to 
Congress: 
Through DARPA sponsored experiments, 
the ocean has been found to be a far 
more tractable underwater sound 
environment than we had previously 
thought. Improved detection ranges 
appear to be achievable. These 
techniques were previously thought to 
be impossible with acoustic undersea 
arrays. We are now attempting to 
demonstrate a revolutionary capability 
for detecting submarines.6~ 
Much of the progress to which Dr Heilmeier refers is 
attributable to the multi-sensor integration programme 
63 
64 
For background on AWACS see D. Boyle and R.D.M. Furlong, 
'NATO AWACS - Now or Never?' in International Defense 
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, February 1977, pp. 43 ff. and 
R.D.M. Furlong 'Can NATO Afford AWACS?'; N. Cherikow, 
'Moss-AWACS with a Red Star'; and J.P. Geddes, 'Airborne 
Early Warning for the US Navy'; all in International 
Defense Review, Vol. 8, No. 5, October 1975, pp. 667-682; 
and also 'Grumman Still Pushing E-2C in Europe' in 
Flight International, Vol. 111, No. 3559, 28 May 1977, 
pp. 1474, 1475. 
Testimony before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal 
Yea~ 19?? Authorization for Military ProcurementJ Research 
and DevelopmentJ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 11 March 1976, 
p. 5747. 
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called SEAGUARD, which is the subject of discussion later 
in this chapter. But individual sensor techniques have 
also advanced significantly as a result of a number of very 
important developments. Most notable in this regard is the 
new generation of long range passive sonar sensors which 
possess a capacity to detect and track both surface and 
submarine movements in large parts of the world's oceans. 
Since the early 1950s, the United States and her NATO allies 
have deployed hydrophone sensors on or just above the sea 
bed of the Atlantic. The original SOSUS (Sonar Surveillance 
System - for area use) and CAESAR (for barrier use) systems 
have been enhanced since that time through five distinct 
65 development phases. The latest generation upgrades these 
systems and supplements them with three new types of passive 
surveillance sensor. 
Currently the United States is deploying a greatly 
66 improved Towed Array Surveillance System (TASS). This 
is a linear sensor which is towed for several miles behind 
naval shipping so that it can detect the 'noise' of 
submarines and ships through the multiple salinity and 
temperature layers of the surrounding ocean. This system is 
to be partially replaced in the early 1980s by an even 
longer and more sensitive Strategic Surveillance Towed Array 
Sensor called SURTAS. This system will require a specialised 
ocean-going tug, called T-AGOS,and it may employ very 
65 
66 
These developments are described at length in 
Larry L. Booda, 'ASW - Challenges and Bold Solutions' 
in Sea Technology, Vol. 14, No. 11, November 1973, 
pp. 24-27. 
In November 1975,there were reported to be six 
different models of TASS. The original system was 
developed by the Chesapeake Instruments Division of 
Gauld Incorporated in 1968. See Defense Marketing 
Services, Market Intelligence Report on TASS dated 
June 1976 and another on the Naval Undersea Centre 
dated November 1975, p. 3. 
advanced sonar array techniques with an aperture in two 
d . . 67 imensions .. 
The third new type of long range passive sonar system 
is called the Moored Surveillance System (MSS). This is a 
self-mooring sonobuoy system which can be dropped by 
aircraft, ships or submarines and which is designed to 
act as a semi-permanent listening barrier. MSS systems 
66 
are capable of being monitored by aircraft, ships or coastal 
installations in the vicinity. 68 
The sounds which are detected by these passive sonar 
systems are processed in large computer banks either on 
shore ·or aboard ships. This permits the detection, 
generalised locating and tracking of particular ships and 
submarines with a high degree of reliability. In addition, 
particular classes of ship and even, in some cases, individual 
ships of a class can be identified by their sound signatures. 
The inherent sophistication of these systems' discriminatory 
capacity makes decoying or spoofing with specialised 
noise-making torpedoes and other false targets extremely 
'ff' 1 69 . . 'bl . di icu t. However, to some extent, it is possi e to Jam 
actively a proportion of their capacity by overwhelming them 
with generated noise. Yet, as with the jamming of OTH radar 
and other long range surveillance sensors, this action by its 
67 
68 
69 
See the testimony of Vice Admiral J.H. Doyle, Jr, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,before the 
Research and Development Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
19?? Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research 
and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve. 
and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 12, 7 April 
1976, p. 7062. See also the testimony of Dr G.H. 
Heilmeier, the Director of DARPA,before the same 
Subcommittee under the same volume title, Part 11, 
11 March 1976, p. 5774. 
See the details given by Larry L. Booda in 'ASW -
Challenges and Bold Solutions', Sea Technology, 
Vol. 14, No. 11, November 1973, pp. 24-27 and also 
see Washington Letter of Oceanography, Vol. 9, 
No. 19, 22 September 1975, pp. 3, 4. 
Vice Admiral D. Murphy, Director of US Antisubmarine 
Warfare and Ocean Surveillance Programs, gave a clear 
indication of the sophistication and sensitivity of 
these systems when replying to a Congressional question 
67 
very nature would serve to prevent surprise and to alert 
. f 70 opposing orces. 
It is clear that new technologies for long range 
target detection and identification are providing greatly 
enhanced capacities. In the ~ir, satellite sensors and OTH 
radar may be sufficient to direct intercept aircraft at 
long range on their own in some environments. However, in 
many situations, supporting AWACS aircraft and conventional 
ground-based radar systems may also be required. In the 
maritime environment, satellite sensors as well as OTH and 
advanced AWACS radar systems are likely to provide a 
supplementary capacity to long range passive sonar sensors 
in the detection and tracking of surface shipping. In the 
more difficult undersea environment, it now appears that a 
mix of passive sonar arrays can provide a detection and 
identification capability and a more generalised locating 
and tracking capacity. In the land environment, 
no comparable long range surveillance capacity appears to 
69 cont'd 
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concerning their vulnerability to decoys: 
Decoys such as you have described 
(deleted) however, the more experienced 
the operator and the more sophisticated 
the sonar, the less effective the decoy 
becomes. Exact duplication of the target 
is not possible due to cost and size 
considerations - difficult tradeoffs are 
involved. This is an area where intelligence 
is a key factor. How sophisticated a system 
do you design against? Likewise, intelligence 
on decoys assists the operator in distinguishing 
between real and false targets. 
See hearings of the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
19?? Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian 
Personnel Strengths, Part 5, 11 December 1975, p. 2015. 
This subject is discussed briefly by US Air Force 
General G.T. Gould in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 95, No. 23, 6 December 1971, p. 40. 
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be available for the detection of targets which do not 
radiate significant quantities of electro-magnetic 
71 
energy. 
5. A Proliferation of Battlefield Target Acquisition 
and Identification Systems 
For objects on the battlefield to be targetable, they 
must be identified and located precisely. As has been 
discussed above, in the air environment these functions can 
be performed by satellite sensors or OTH radars on their 
own in many situations. However, in some circumstances, 
AWACS aircraft and ground control intercept radars are 
likely to be required in addition. 
The precise location of surface shipping can also be 
performed by OTH radars, AWACS and conventional ground 
based radars. Satellite-borne optical, radar, infra-red 
and electronic sensors are available to the superpowers and 
may also be procured by other major powers. For undersea 
and also some surface locating applications, active and 
passive sonar systems have been employed extensively since 
the Second World War. Great advances have been made in all 
types of sonar systems during the past thirty years, 
particularly in signal processing and computer techniques. 
In specific applications,air delivered sonobuoys have 
acquired a directional and multi-level detection capability. 72 
Wide aperture submarine hull-mounted sonar arrays are being 
71 
72 
It is possible that the HALO satellite sensor 
programme will expand greatly US capacities to detect, 
classify and track small tactical objects on the earth's 
surface. Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director of DARPA, 
expressed the hope that this programme would 'achieve 
the sensitivity to detect dim t~rgets from high 
altitude~. See this cited by Barry Miller in 'Aircraft 
Detection System Advances', Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 106, No. 25, 20 June 1977, p. 23. 
See, for example, the account of the DIFAR sonobuoy's 
capabilities in Larry L. Booda, 'Restocking the ASW 
Arsenal', Undersea Technology, Vol. 13, No. 11, 
November 1972, p. 20. 
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deployed to provide a long range surface ship targeting 
capacity, thus facilitating cruise missile attacks from 
submerged l.ocations. 7 3 In addition, a new specialised type 
of sonar is being developed to detect water disturbances 
as they are produced by submerged vessels rather than the 
74 
noise generated within submarines themselves. There are 
also indications that a new extremely sensitive type of 
sonar is under development which will provide warning to 
b d b . f fl . . f 75 su merge su marines o over y1ng aircra t. 
In surface ships, hull-mounted sonar systems are being 
encased in rubber domes in an effort to reduce ambient 
noise. 76 However, this and other advances in surface ship 
hull-mounted sonars do not overcome the basic difficulties 
of penetrating oceanic temperature and salinity layers. 
73 
74 
75 
76 
See the testimony of Mr G. Cann from the Off ice of the US 
Defense Research and Engineer, Ocean Control, before the 
Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military ProcurementJ Research and Developmen~ and 
Active DutyJ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strength0 Part 4, 11 December 1975, p. 2005. For details 
of the very advanced MICROPUFFS system being developed 
for the Royal Australian Navy's OBERON class submarines, 
see J.P. Geddes, 'Advanced Fire Control for Oberon 
Submarines', International Defense Reviehl, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
April 1977, pp. 296-299. 
For details of this system see Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 106, No. 10, 10 March 1976, p. 17. 
See the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, Director of 
DARPA,before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal 
Year 19?? Authorization for Military ProcurementJ 
Research and DevelopmentJ and Active DutyJ Selected 
Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 
9 March 1976, p. 5898. 
This is discussed at length by Vice Admiral D. Murphy, 
US Navy, Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare and Oceans 
Surveillance Programs, in his testimony before the Research 
and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for 
Military ProcurementJ Research and DevelopmentJ and Active 
DutyJ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 5, 11 December 1975, p. 2014. 
70 
Thus, although hull-mounted sonars are now extremely 
powerful and highly refined, the newest systems have been 
described as being the 'ultimate ox-cart' . 77 Towed passive 
array sonar systems overcome most of the difficulties of 
hull-mounted systems because they can be trailed in such 
a manner that they penetrate and operate within the layers 
78 
of the ocean between which submarines normally operate. 
In addition to the towed array systems which have been 
designed primarily for large area strategic purposes, there 
are others which have been designed primarily for precise 
targeting within more limited areas. For instance, the 
United States has developed a Tactical Towed Array Sensor 
(TACTAS) which is intended to provide frigate, destroyer 
and cruiser size ships with a capacity to detect, classify 
and target a submarine for attack before it itself can be 
d db h b . 79 . . b . l' d etecte _ y t e su marine. A similar ut specia ise 
towed array is being fitted to POSEIDON SSBN submarines in 
refit as part of the integrated UNIQUE system. This will 
probably be towed by deep-diving submarines in such a manner 
that it floats up through the salinity and temperature layers 
towards the sea's surface,providing a capacity to detect the 
approach of hostile submarines and surface ships from long 
80 
ranges. 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Experiments are also underway with an airborne towed 
This was the description of the powerful AN/SQ553 
hull-borne sonar given by the crew of the USS Forster, 
the second of the new SPRUANCE class destroyers to be 
built. See J.P. Geddes, 'Operational Assessment of a 
Spruance Class Destroyer' in International Defense 
Review, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1976, p. 944. 
Ibid. 
TACTAS is described in a Defense Marketing Services, 
Market Intelligence Report under 'AN' Equipment, 
September 1976. 
For details see Defense Marketing Services, Market 
Intelligence Report on the BQR-15 Towed Array Sonar 
under 'AN' Equipment, february 1976. 
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81 
array system (IA IR TASS) primarily for helicopter usage. 
This type o.f sensor may find much expanded applicc:ition as 
the US Navy moves towards multipurpose V/STOL aircraft and 
considers lighter-than-air vehicles for some categories of 
82 ASW duty. 
Because of its inherently dense and complex nature, 
battlefield acquisition, identification and targeting is a 
much more complicated process in the land environment. Natural 
undulations in terrain and variations in natural vegetation, 
geology, fauna and many other factors greatly complicate the 
efficient operation of nearly every type of sensor system. 
As a consequence, there are a very wide range of complementary 
target acquisition systems being developed, each of which 
will have a capacity to perform only part of the total 
function. 
Perhaps the simplest type of target acquisition sensor 
used in the ground environment extends the capabilities of 
the human eye and normal optical and electro-optical 
systems. 'I'he most important objective in this field has 
been to provide an effective vision capacity at night, in 
periods of bad weather, fog, sleet, rain, snow and through 
smog, dust and smoke. Inexpensive active infra-red systems 
were first introduced in the 1950s but these had a limited 
range capacity and were readily detectable. 83 In the 
mid-1960s,passive image intensification systems were 
developed. Howeve~ these possessed a very limited capacity 
81 
82 
83 
This system is mentioned by Larry L. Booda in 1 ASW -
Challenges and Bold Solutions' in Sea Technology, 
Vol. 14, No. 11, November 1973, p. 27. 
Towed array ocean surveillance conducted from rigid 
airships is discussed by B. Levitt, 'The Rigid Airship 
in the Sea Control Mission', US Naval Institute 
Proceedings, Vol. 103/1/887, January 1977, p. 114. 
see the testimony of Major General P.R. Feir, Assistant 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and 
Acquisition,before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropri~tions, US House of Representatives, Department 
of Defense Appropriations for 1977, Part 5, 10 March 
_1976, p. 1074. 
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in poor weather and became temporarily ineffective if 
subjected t? bright light sources, tracer rounds, flares, 
h 1 . h 84 . f . s ell bursts or spot ig ts. Passive or ar infra-red 
devices were then developed with a capacity to permit target 
acquisition at night, through smoke, smog and moderate 
f . 1 d 85 . amounts o fog, rain, s eet, snow an dust. This technology 
has now been applied to a very large number of specific 
applications. For instance, night vision goggles have been 
developed weighing less than one kilogram and possessing a 
night vision range of 100 metres. 86 One particular night 
sight for crew-served weapons weighs 4 kilograms and 
possesses a range of at least 1,200 metres but more probably 
87 3,700 metres. A long range observation and target 
acquisition device weighing approximately 30 kilograms has 
been produced with an even greater capacity. 88 Several 
airborne forward looking infra-red (FLIR) systems have been 
developed for reconnaissance, target acquisition and 
designation. Some of these, such as PAVE TACK, are podded 
systems using slaved low powered laser designators for 
weapons guidance. 89 Others, such as the extremely powerful 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Ibid. 
Ibid. , p. 10 8 0 . 
Ibid., p. 1083. The unit cost of this system was 
US$9,917 in March 1976. 
The shorter range figure is given by General Feir in 
his testimony, ibid., p. 1083. However, earlier in 
his testimony, he stated that that same night sight 
would 
... give (deleted) metres for TOW and 
enable us to take full advantage of 
TOW's range capability at night. We 
consider this a tremendous breakthrough and 
a tremendous tactical advantage for our side. 
Ibid., p. 1079. TOW's maximum range capability is 
3,750 metres. The cost for this particular night sight 
was given as US$5,180 in March 1976. 
Ibid., p. 1083. The unit cost for this system was given 
as US$39,726 in March 1976. 
For details of PAVE TACK and other related systems see 
Barry Miller, 'Tests Set for Attack/Surveillance System' 
in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, No. 5, 
2 February 1976, pp. 47 ff. 
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TRAM system, have been integrated into aircraft structures 
. '] f . 90 to perform .s1m1 _ar -unctions. 
An important and relatively new application of passive 
imaging infra-red technology has been in the partial 
repl~cement of radar and other sensors for ground-and sea-
based aerial surveillance and target acquisition. Most 
notably, the Swedish IRS-700 system has been designed 
primarily for passive aircraft and missile detection and 
tracking. 91 The United States has a similar infra-red 
scanning system under development which is designed to stare 
at the horizon to detect the rise of warm mortar or rocket 
projectiles. When slaved with a laser radar, these projectiles 
can be accurately tracked and enemy firing points targeted 
92 promptly and accurately. These infra-red scanning systems 
possess a very great advantage over comparable radar systems 
because their non-emitting passive nature greatly complicates 
93 
enemy attempts to acquire them as targets. 
Many types of radar systems are employed for ground 
target acquisition. For instance, there are man-pack 
systems which can detect ground troops at 5,000 metres and 
90 
91 
92 
93 
For details see J.R.W. Taylor (ed.), Jane's All the 
World's Aircraft 1975-76 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 
1975), p. 348. 
For details of IRS-700 see Stefan J. Geisenheyner, 
'Optronics for Gun-Laying and Surveillance' in Asian 
Defence Journal, January 1977, p. 14. 
For details see the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, 
Director of DARPA,before the Research and Development 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 11 March 1976, p. 5781. 
The possible employment of infra-red scanning systems 
to replace radar installations in tactical fighter 
aircraft is discussed by Stefan J. Geisenheyner and 
Mark E. Berent in 'Tactical Fighter For Tomorrow (Part 
Two)~ Aerospace International, Vol. 13, No. 2, 
.March-April 1977, p. 12. 
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vehicles at 10,000 metres. There are small and inexpensive 
phased array radars, laser infra-red radars and millimetre 
radar systems which are suitable for fitting to small 
remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and which, in many 
1 . . 1 . bl 9 5 h 1 d. app ications, are near y unJamma e. T ere are a so me ium 
range moving target indicator systems, such as SOTAS, which 
can be stationed between 1,000-2,000 metres altitude, 15-20 
kilometres behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) , 
to locate moving targets beyond the enemy's FEBA. The 
targeting information acquired by this system can be relayed 
to firing points or strike aircraft in real time to permit 
timely and efficient attacks. 96 
There are, in addition, longer range side-looking 
airborne radar systems which can be orbited further behind 
the FEBA. For instance, the United States AIDATS system 
can acquire ground targets more than 330 kilometres away and 
also beam the information in real time to ground and air 
. 97 locations for both command and control and targeting purposes. 
94 
95 
96 
97 
For details of PPS-SA see Defense Marketing Services, 
Market Intelligence Report on the Tactical Manpack 
Radar under 'AN' equipment, March 1976. 
For example, General Electric have developed a miniature 
phased array radar with six operating modes under the 
Hostile Weapons Location System (HOWLS) programme. This 
programme has also been known as ULTRA (Ultra Lightweight 
Transmissive Array). See Flight International, Vol. 111, 
No. 3538, 1 January 1977, p. 15. 
For details of the US SOTAS programme see the testimony 
of Major A. Johnson from the Office of the Deputy Chief 
of Staff for Research, Development and Acquisition before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Airpower of the Committee on 
Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and 
Active Duty, Selected R~serve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 9, 8 March 1976, pp. 4724, 4725. 
A similar but much older, less sophisticated and 
effective.system is currently operational in OV-1 MOHAWK 
aircraft. ~or details see testimony of Major J. Goldtrap 
from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, ibid., pp. 4722-4724. 
For details see Defense Marketing Services, Market Intelligence 
Report on USQ-49 Army In-Flight Data Transmission System 
(AIDATS) under 'AN' equipment, June 1975. 
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In addition, there is potential for a new generation of 
synthetic aperture radar which may provide some types of 
tactical strike aircraft with an autonomous medium range 
ground target acquisition capacity or large stand-off 
aircraft with a ground target vectoring capacity. 98 
There is a host of other ground target acquisition 
sensor technologies under development to locate radars, 
radio emitters, jamming systems, gun flashes and the sounds 
Some of these technologies are being f · 11 99 o arti ery. 
developed for ground based, aircraft and RPV applications. 
But many are also being developed for sensor 'packages' 
which can be fired, dropped or launched to operate 
autonomously in areas occupied by the enemy. The main 
United States' unattended ground sensor effort is directed 
through the Remotely Emplaced Battlefield Se~sor System 
(REMBASS) programme. There are seismic, magnetic, optical, 
infra-red and acoustic sensors of various types which are 
designed not only to detect targets autonomously, but also 
to classify them and provide bearings for accurate target 
location. These systems will then possess the capacity to 
communicate targeting information either directly or through 
a high flying data link to aircraft and ground-based fire 
. 100 
units. 
98 
99 
100 
For tactical fighter applications see 'SAR Exposes 
Tactical Targets' in Eagle Flight Leader, Vol. 3, No. 2, 
September 1976, p. 3. 
For the use of synthetic aperture radar for ground 
target vectoring from large aircraft at stand-off range, 
see Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 8, 
21 February 19i7, p. 49. 
For a comprehensive summary of US efforts in this field 
see Defense Marketing Services, Market Intelligence 
Report on Army Electronics Command (ECOM) under 
'Aerospace Agencies' dated December 1975. 
For REMBASS details see E.H. Kolcum, 'New Sensors 
Evaluated in Sinai Buffer' in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 105, No. 7, 23 August 1976, pp. 40 ff. 
See also Paul Dickson, The Electronic Battlefield, 
(Ontario, Fitzhenry and Whiteside Ltd, 1976), pp. 130-132 
and in addition Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 105, No. 6, 9 August 1976, p. 49. 
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Certainly many of these battlefield target acquisition 
systems can be spoofed, decoyed and jammed. 
environment, remotely emplaced sensors can be 
In the ground 
spoofed with 
infra-red . 1 d. 101 f . . mis ea ing contacts, some types o imaging 
sensors can be decoyed with spurious heat sources and many 
types of radar can be jammed or destroyed with radar-homing 
102 
weapons. At sea, some types of passive sonar systems can 
also be decoyed and in some circumstances jammed. Active 
OTH radars, AWACS or ground based surveillance and intercept 
radars can also be jammed, decoyed and spoofed through the 
employment of a variety of expendable and re-usable 
electronic warfare equipments. 
However, there is a second major countermeasure trend 
which is confronting the expanding array of battlefield 
target acquisition technologies. This concerns the widespread 
development and application of stealth technologies to reduce 
weapon system and weapon platform signatures. The heightened 
demand for these has developed not only from the realisation 
that area surveillance and battlefield target acquisition 
technologies have made very great advances but also from 
the fact that the new precision guidance, propulsion and 
warhead technologies increase greatly the probability of 
rapid destruction once a target is acquired. Thus, in the 
air, there is a move towards relatively inexpensive unmanned 
aircraft (drones and RPV s) to perform some of the more 
dangerous tasks. In addition, new materials and design 
technologies are being applied in an effort to reduce the 
. . 
optical, radar, acoustic and infra-red signature of aircraft. 
101 
102 
For an account of some of the sensor countermeasures 
employed in the Vietnam War, see Paul Dickson, The 
Electronic Battlefield, pp. 95 ff. 
For details of infra-red and radar countermeasures 
see G.S. Sundaram, 'Expendables in Electronic Warfare -
Proven Decoys for Survival' in International Defense 
Review, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1976, pp.· 1045 ff.and 
also G.S. Sundaram, 'EW-Dedicated Aircraft - the EA-6B 
and EF-lllA Systems' in International Defense Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, February 1977, pp. 54 ff. 
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At sea, there have been extensive and continuing 
efforts to ·reduce the noise, heat and magnetic signatures 
of both submarines and surface craft. 103 The naturally 
non-magnetic characteristics of plastic hulls have stimulated 
their introduction for counter-mine operations. In 
addition, because of their capacity to absorb more sound than 
they reflect, advanced reinforced plastics are also likely to be 
introduced for a range of submarine applications. 104 
In the ground environment, many new camouflage 
techniques are being employed which extend far beyond 
conventional counter-optical systems. Infra-red absorbing 
and reflecting paints, netting and clothing have been 
produced. 105 Anti-radar netting is widely deployed and 
many new types of optical, radar and infra-red decoys are 
·1 bl 106 h 1 1 avai a e. T ere are a so programmes to deve op new 
types of dust-, smoke- and aerosol-generation equipments. 107 
6. Increasingly Sophisticated Communications, Command 
and Control (C3) Systems 
One of the major consequences of new technology 
developments has been the proliferation of nearly every 
category of military system. Area surveillance, target 
acquisition, classification and locating systems as well as 
weapons systems themselves have all multiplied in different 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
For an account of these developments see H. Feigl, 
The Impact of New Maritime Technologies, p. 27. 
Ibid. See also a report of a British developed 
plastic submarine,'St~aling a Maritime March' in 
The Australian, 15 April 1977, p. 7. 
For details see S.W. Miller, 'Camouflage and Deception' 
in Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 59, No. 12, December 1975, 
pp. 25 ff. 
Ibid., pp. 27 ff. 
Ibid., pp. 2~ 29 and also see the Defense Marketing 
Services, Market Intelligence Report on the Mobility 
Equipment Research and Development Centre (MERDC) under 
'Aerospace Agencies' dated October 1975, p. 5. 
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forms. However, while in most cases there are more systems 
of differen~ types and the capabilities of individual systems 
have risen greatly, the overall effectiveness of military 
structures as a whole in performing their prime functions 
has not been enhanced automatically by a comparable increase 
in efficiency. Total structural effectiveness is dependent 
heavily upon the manner in which the numerous individual 
systems are coordinated and directed. If this coordination, 
command and control function is performed with maximum 
efficiency, in many environments the potential for overall 
task performance will exceed the sum of maximum individual 
system capacities. It is this 'force multiplier' capacity 
of c3 which stimulated Dr Currie, the former United States 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, to emphasise 
its importance in his Congressional testimony: 
I believe that development of integrated 
intelligence and target engagement systems 
represents the great challenge and opportunity 
of the next decade for DOD. These systems will 
integrate high-altitude sensors, stand-off 
airborne radars and other sensors, secure 
communications, computers capable of real-time 
processing and fusing of sensor data, and 
surgically accurate weapons. We are approaching 
this capability.108 
The most basic requirement in this type of development 
is reliable, secure and speedy communication links for both 
weapon control and military unit c9mmand and control. In 
both areas, reliability, speed and security must be traded 
off against the costs involved in providing the most 
technically advanced communications for each particular task. 
For instance, the costs of obtaining high security for line-
of-sight data links for air-to-ground weapons systems are 
very great indeed. Thus the highly secure link for the 
CONDOR weapon is extremely expensive whereas that for the 
108, Testimony before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active 
Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 5, 5 February 1976, p. 2044. 
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modular guided glide bombs, while being far less secure, is 
1 1 t . 1 . . 10 9 1 . . d 'f a so re a ive y inexpensive. Qua ity-quantity tra e-of s 
between these two extremes are necessarily a central element 
of communications decision-making. 
There have, however, been several breakthroughs in 
communications technologies, which promise high security and 
high data rates at a much reduced cost. Of relevance to 
precision guided weapon and RPV links are developments in 
optical fibres, permitting multi-channel, high quality 
transmission through fibres which have the appearance of 
1 . h f. h. l" llO 1 f . d. . ig t is ing ine; nove wave orms provi ing processing 
gain; 111 the 'chopped chirp' technique which provides an 
inexpensive quantum jump in data link security; 112 a 
video bandwidth compression device which permits spreading 
. 113 d 1 . h" h 1 gains; an an antenna contro unit w ic not on y 
. b . h. b 1 . 11 . 114 provides earn switc ing ut a so uses automatic nu steering. 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
See the testimony of Captain Z.J. Kowalskey, CONDOR/ 
WALLEYE Project Manager, US Navy, before the Subcommittee 
on Tactical Air Power of the Committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement Research and Development, and Active Duty, 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 10, 15 March 1976, p. 5282. 
See the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director of 
DARPA, before the Research and Development Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
19?? Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and 
Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 9 March 1976, 
pp . 5 8 9 0 , 5 8 91 . 
Ibid., pp. 5845, 5846. 
For details of this technique see Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 105, No~ 6, 9 August 1976, p. 49. 
See the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director of 
DARPA,before the Research and Development Subcommittee of 
the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
19?? Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and 
Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 9 March 1976, 
p. 5845. 
Ibid. 
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General purpose communication links are also being 
transforme~ through the application of high data rate, jam 
resistent and highly secure time-synchronised frequency-~gile 
techniques. This technology will be applied very broadly 
with the deployment of the United States' Joint Tactical 
115 Information Distribution System (JTIDS)., For the United 
States, this system will provide the vital communications 
links with which a wide range of individual command, control 
and weapons systems will be tied together. 
One notable addition to command and control capacity is 
being provided by the deployment of AWACS aircraft. These 
possess the coordination capacity to expand greatly the 
battlefield potential of a wide range of other systems. For 
example, the Boeing E-3A system can not only detect naval and 
air movements and control interceptions and countermeasures, 
but can also track and take messages in a passive manner 
from friendly ground units which are equipped with simple 
116 transponders. The E-3A can guide friendly attack aircraft 
along corridors which it 'sees' are free of the enemy's 
radar emitting anti-aircraft installations. It can also 
give friendly anti-aircraft units details of approaching 
enemy aircraft, thus forestalling a need to identify them-
selves electronically by turning on their own radar sets. 117 
However, perhaps most importantly, AWACS aircraft can provide 
a reasonably comprehensive real time overview of the air, 
sea and ground battlefield for the command structure. 
115 
116 
117 
For details of the technologies employed in this system 
see Defense Marketing Services, Market Intelligence 
Report on JTIDS under 'Electronic Systems' dated 
January 1977 and also D. Boyle, 'The Problem of Identif-
ication' in International Defense Review, Vol. 10, No. 4, 
August 1977, pp. 676-680. · · 
See the narration of a film on AWACS E3A by General 
R.T. Dixon, Commander, US Tactical Air Command, before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Airpower of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977~ 
Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strength~ Part 9, 10 March 1976, 
pp. 4 9 5 3, 4 9 5 4. 
See the details given by R.D.M. Furlong in 'Can NATO 
Afford AWACS?' in International Defense Review, Vol. 8,. 
No. 5, October 1975, p. 667. 
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At sea, a comparable effort to multiply overall 
capacity by multiple system integration is under way under 
the United States code name SEAGUARD. Much of this effort 
.is designed to exploit fully the technology advances in long 
range passive sonar array.s. Dr Currie, the former US 
Director of Defense Research and Engineering, indicated 
the direction of the programme in his Congressional testimony: 
It is interesting - even astounding - that 
one can hear for thousands of miles under 
water and this phenomenon offers several 
advantages for detecting and locating ' 
submarines. Signals from a distant source 
are necessarily faint and suffer by confusion 
with the noise created by many intervening 
sound sources. If the same signals can be 
detected at several different times and 
places, however, these separate representations 
can be combined mathematically in ways that 
remove the unwanted sounds and leave the 
desired information in a usable form.118 
Dr Heilmeier, the Director of DARPA, elaborated on 
this multiple detection localisation capacity by referring 
to some experiments conducted in 1972: 
The experiments demonstrated, among other 
things, that, while underwater sound conditions 
are constantly changing, they do remain 
relatively fixed or coherent for brief 
periods. Thus, if the whole problem can 
be worked in a series of shorter time slices, 
the ocean appears to be a much more benign 
acoustic medium than was previously thought.119 
In order to acquire, collate and process incoming 
multi-sensor material within these shorter 'time slices', one 
of the largest computer systems in the world, the TLLIAC IV 
118 
119 
Testimony before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Developmen~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian 
Personnel Strengths, Part 4, 5 February 1976, p. 2299. 
Testimony before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 
1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian 
Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 11 March 1976, p. 5772. 
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system, has been mobilised un a full-time basis. 120 The 
potential returns from this effort have been identified 
and quantified in a series of US Joint Chi~fs of Staff 
studies, code named NARAC-G, SEAMIX I, CAPLOC and CAPSTONE. 121 
Vice Admiral Murphy, the US Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare 
and Ocean Surveillance Programs, alluded to the results of 
these studies in his Congressional testimony: 
All I can say with certainty is that ASW 
operational personnel feel strongly that 
coordinated operations enhance the 
effectiveness of each platform. In the 
case of undersea surveillance, the 
probability of detection of a (deleted) 
SSN in the mid-North Atlantic by a single 
P-3C aircraft is: 
(deleted) when unaided by other sensors 
or platforms about (deleted) as great when 
assisted by (deleted) in a vectored-type 
search about (deleted) as great when 
assisted by a (deleted) about (deleted) 
as great when assisted by a (deleted) . 
It is obvious that, when patrol aircraft 
are provided positional information from 
a surveillance system, their effectivenss 
becomes multiplied significantly. This 
force multiplier effect of undersea 
surveillance is also applicable to other 
tactical platforms such as our SSNs. 122 
Larry Booda, editor of Sea 'l'echnology magazine, 
described the force multiplier impact of these developments 
120 
121 
122 
Ibid. I p. 5773. 
See the testimony of Mr A. Pennington of the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and 
Evaluation, before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 
Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ 
Research and Development~and Active Duty~ Selected 
Reserve. and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 5, 
11 December 1975, pp. 1996, 1997. 
Testimony before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 
Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ 
Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected 
Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 5, 
10 December 1975, p. 1945. 
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in very clear terms: 
Here is a hypothetical case. In a fleet 
~nti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercise, that 
fleet has x number of sensors available to it 
for submarine detection and tracking. With them 
it can make y number of contacts and process 
them through its command and control network. 
In this exercise all of the fleet's data 
is rclayc~d L1shon~ viL! SL! l:('l lite. 'l'IH'l~c ;i 
command and control centre which integrates it 
with all other detection data from a variety 
of sources including: Air Force aircraft and 
satellites, and Navy aircraft equipped with 
photographic infrared and electronic sensors; 
Navy land-based aircraft similarly equipped; 
and Navy and allied fixed bottom listening 
sensors. 
There the information would be digested 
and analysed in near real time by already 
operational computers and the results sent back 
to the fleet. 
Such an exercise has already been conducted. 
With the meld of detection elements described 
above, the number of contacts was 3y1 - three 
times the number made by the fleet alone, 
depending on its ship and aircraft capabilities.123 
In the light of these developments, it was perhaps not 
surprising that 'Dr Currie could report to Congress that:· 
We are on the threshold of vastly 
improved ASW capability to counter the 
growing number of Soviet nuclear attack 
and fleet ballistic missile submarines.124 
The requirement for advanced c3 capabilities is probably 
most pronounced in the ground environment because it is here 
that system and unit proliferation has been most pronounced. 
In addition, there is a need for a large number of ground 
123 
124 
See Larry L. Booda, 
Ocean Surveillance' 
August 1975, p. 43. 
'Navy Approaches Ideal Goal in 
in Sea Technology, Vol. 16, No. 8, 
Statement before the Research and Development Subcommittee 
of the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal 
Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research 
and Development 3 and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 5, 5 February 1976, 
p. 2046. 
Supplementary Annexe to the Thesis bv Ross Babbage 
~ Brief Note on International Experience with 
Systems Analysis in the Processes of Security Planning. 
Systems analysis involves a rigorous process of 
defining and evaluating options. One of the.best 
definitions is that of D. B. Bradley: 
Systems analysis is an orderly study aimed 
at identifying a preferred course of action 
from among possible alternatives. As 
applied to complex problems of choice today, 
however, it includes a variety of disciplines 
and methods ranging from marginal economics and 
mathematics to the systematic collection and 
synthesis of expert opinion.l 
There are several characteristics of systems 
analysis which make its employment attractive in the 
defence planning field. 
First, it can provide a mea~s of clarifying and 
managing extremely complex problems so that an overview 
or synthesis can be provided to senior management. 
Secondly, by its very nature, the technique is 
heavily goal-oriented and, as a consequence, can be 
employed flexibly to perform ~idely dissimilar functions. 2 
Thirdly, systems analysis effectively brings together 
the three most significant dimensions of decision-making 
- cost, time and effectiveness - in such a manner that it 
is possible for each of these variables to be traded 
against one another. 
Fourthly, and finally, because an implicit component 
of systems analysis is the explication of all assumptions 
and supporting data, these processes can provide an 
1 D. B. Bradley, PPogPam Budgeting (Santa Monica, 
RAND Corporation, P-3859, 1968), p.5. 
2 Many of the problems of adequately defining the real 
goals or objectives of studies are elaborated in the 
Introduction to E. S. Quade (ed.) Analysis foP MilitaPy 
Decisions (Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, R-387-PR, 
1964)' pp. 1-7 
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important means of reducing uncertainty in decision 
. k" 3 ma ii;ig. 
The actual processes of systems analysis normally 
4 involve a progression through four separate stages: 
The first is the definition of clear 
objectives for the study. 
In the second stage, a wide range of options 
is elaborated, each of which could conceivably meet the 
stated objectives. 
Thirdly, the implications of each of the options 
are examined. This, in itself, is normally a complex 
multi-stage process. It firstly involves an identification 
and detailing of the direct and indirect costs of each 
option. 5 To this is added an evaluation of the 
effectiveness of each option - normally determined 
through the employment of a variety of simulation and 
operational gaming techniques. 6 Finally, in the third 
3 This point is emphasised by K. J. Foley, in.A Methodological 
Prescription for Examining the Question of Changing the 
Organisational Structure of the Australian Defence Force: 
A Systems Approach, (Canberra, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Department of International Relations, The Australian 
National University, 1972), pp. 116 ff. 
4 Th~se stages of analysis appear in the literature in 
several different forms. See, for example, C. J. Hitch 
'Analysis for Air Force Decisions' and E. S. Quade, 'Methods 
and Procedures', both in E. S. Quade (ed.) Analysis for 
Military Decisions, pp.13-23, and 153-176, and also 
S. H. Dole, G. H. Fisher, E. D. Harris and J. String (Jr.) 
Establishment of a Long Range Planning Capability, (Santa 
Monica, RAND Corporation, RM-6151-NASA, 1969), p.7. 
5 The management of cost factors in systems analysis is 
discussed fully by Malcolm W. Hoagi 'The Relevance of 
Costs', in E. S. Quade (ed.)Analysis for Military 
Decisions, pp.92-102. 
6 The possibilities and problems of operational simulation 
and gaming are detailed at length by M. G. Weiner in 
'Gaming', and N. c. Dalkey in 'Simulation', both published 
as chapters in E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher (eds.) 
Systems Analysis and Policy Planning: Applications in 
Defense (New York, American Elsevier Publishing Company Inc., 
1968) . A full range of evaluation techniques is 
described by M. Shubik, G. D. Brewer and E. Savage in 
Models, Simulations and Games - A Survey (Santa Monica, 
RAND Corporation, R-1060-ARPA/RC, 1972). 
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stage, the time limitations of the various options may 
be p~obed through network analysis techniques. 7 
In the fourth major stage of the systems analysis 
process, a series of criteria (and possibly models} is 
derived to be used as a basis for ranking the various 
elaborated options. 8 
This type of analytical progression was first 
developed in Britain during the Second World War, largely 
to resolve the pressing tactical dilemmas which arose from 
the introduction of a number of new technologies onto the 
battlefield. 9 Among the earliest studies were those 
to determine the most efficient methods for employing 
anti-aircraft radar and the optimum anti-submarine search 
10 pattern for convoy escorts. 
Because the objectives of these studies were clearly 
defined and the level of uncertainty limited, systems 
analysis techniques proved to be not only highly 
successful but also relatively simple to use. 
Since that time, most developed countries have 
employed these techniques to resolve a variety of 
tactical operational dilemmas and to provide guidance in 
th f . t 1 . 11 s f h _e processes o equ1pmen se ect1on. ome o t_e most 
7 For an excellent elaboration of alternative processes for 
the management of the time factor in systems analysis, see 
H. Raiffa Decision Analysis: Introducing Lectures on Choices 
under Uncertainty (Reading, Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company Inc., 1968}. 
8 This process of ranking or applying 'tests of preferredness' 
is discussed at length by R. N. McKean in 'Criteria' 
E. S. Quade (ed.} Analysis for Military Decisions, pp 81-91. 
9 These relatively simple processes of analysis were termed 
'operational analysis' by the British. 
lO The wartime and early post-war experience with operational 
and systems analysis is discussed in the Introduction to 
E. S. Quade {ed.} Analysis for Military Decisions, pp 2-10 
11 In most countries nearly all of this analysis remains 
classified. However, it is possible to gain clear insights 
into the type of work most conunonly undertaken by studying the 
published proceedings of the US Army Operations Research 
Symposium. This event has been organised on an annual basis 
by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command since the early 
1960s. See, for example, US Army Training and Doctrine 
Conunand Proceedings: Fourteenth Annual US Army Operations 
Branch Symposium (Fort Lee, Virginia, 1975} 
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most significant work was·undertaken at the 
inst'igation of the US Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, 
in the Pentagon's Office of Systems Analysis. But overall 
progress did not come easily, and by the late 1960s some US 
proponents of analysis were withdrawing from the field in a 
state of disillusionment. 12 
While the bulk of defence analysis has remained at the 
single equipment, tactical operational level, some attempts 
have been made to apply systems analysis techniques to much 
more complex questions. Perhaps the most notable efforts 
have been studies to determine optimal force structure 
mixes to meet particular types of threats in important potential 
theatres of operations. 13 For instance, a great deal of 
work has been undertaken by NATO members in attempts to 
derive the most efficient ground force mix to meet a surprise 
Warsaw Pact assaultf 4 Some studies have concentrated on 
maximising the efficiency of air operations in this theatre. 15 
Yet others have probed the efficiency of a variety of 
maritime strategies and force structures for the North 
12 h . d. . f s . . th A compre ensive iscussion o U experience wi 
systems analysis during the McNamara era is provided in 
A. L. Enthoven and K. W. Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping 
the Defense Program 1961-69 (New York, Harper and Row, 1971) 
13 One of the earliest examples of this higher level of 
analysis was a top secret US Air Force study on the 
selection and use of strategic air bases which was led by 
A. J. Wohlstetter from 1951 to 1953. Subsequently 
declassified, this classic examole is detailed at 
length by E. s. Quade in 'The Selection and Use of 
Strategic Air Bases: A Case History' in E. S. Quade (ed.) 
Analysis for Military Decisions, pp 24-63. 
14 Some of the most notable work in this field which has 
been published or alluded to in open documents is that which 
was undertaken on behalf of the Force Structure Commission 
of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
The Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany: 
Analysis and Options (published in 1972/73 by the Force 
Structure Commission in concurrence with the Federal 
Government). 
15 Steven L. Corby summarises the results of much of this 
work in an unclassified document entitled Tactical Airpower 
in Europe: Airing the European View (Santa Monica, 
Technology Service Corporation, 1976). 
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Atlantic in the circumstances of a major conflict 
16 
eruP,ting in Europe. 
It is important to appreciate that this type of 
theatre analysis is much more complex, and to a degree more 
tentative, than that undertaken at the comparatively 
simple tactical and individual equipment level. For 
instance, because of the larger number of uncontrolled 
variables at the theatre level, the processes of 
selecting evaluative criteria are, of necessity, much 
more subjective, and the analysis itself tends to be 
characterised by a higher level of uncertainty. But there 
are also other complicating factors, such as the need to 
consider a much broader range of security options than is 
normally necessary at the tactical or single equipment 
level. Even when the results come to hand, it is 
frequently very difficult for them to be validated because 
many studies at this level are one-of-a-kind exercises. 17 
Notwithstanding the complexity and significant 
theoretical and practical difficulties of theatre analysis, 
it is possible to employ these same techniques at an even 
higher level - that of total force structure planning. 
Swedish and Swiss defence planners have developed methods 
for designing and testing a variety of alternative 
security structures for their capacity to meet the full 
16 The titles of some of the most important US studies in 
this field - NARAC-G, SEAMIX I, CAPLOC and.CAPSTONE - have 
been cited in US Congressional hearings. See the testimony 
of Mr A. Pennington of the Off ice of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defehse, Program Analysis and Evaluation, before 
the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization 
for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and 
Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 5, 11 December 1975, pp. 1996, 1997. 
17 Some of these difficulties with higher level analysis 
are discussed in the final pages of S. H. Dole, G. H. Fisher, 
E. D. Harris and J. String (Jr.) Establishment of a 
Long-Range Planning Capability, p.52 ff. 
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range of their security objectives. 18 The major reason why 
'this.level of analysis has proved to be practical is that, 
in these countries' situations, they have found it possible 
to define the goals of their security policy in very simple 
terms. 19 This clarity of expression has been facilitated 
by the fact that nearly all their planning variables are 
well known. The most likely battle zones of both countries 
are adjacent to, or actually upon, national territory, 
their indigenous security resources are comprehensively 
recorded and they are also well-informed concerning the 
force structures, doctrines and operating procedures of 
their potential adversaries. As a consequence, in the 
cases of Sweden and Switzerland, the employment of analysis 
at the national force structure level is not much more 
difficult than that at the theatre level. 
For countries with wide-ranging security responsibilities 
extending across several quite different potential 
theatres of war, analysis at the total force structure level 
is not as practical. Thus, although countries such as 
France, Canada, Britain and the United States can employ 
18 For a relatively simple account of the Swedish perspective 
planning system, see S. Hellman, The Secretariat for National 
Security and Long Term Defence Planning (a paper prepared 
to explain this organisation's function.) (Stockholm, 
Ministry of Defence, Publication no.1974-10-01, 1974). A 
much more elaborate and, in practice, useful account is 
provided in a four-part booklet series entitled The Defence 
Planning System. See Ministry of Defence, Summary of the 
New Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (Stockholm, 
Ministry of Defence, Publication no.1/1970, 1970); 
Ministry of Defence, The Execution Process (Stockholm, 
Ministry of Defence, Publication no.2/1970, 1970); Ministry 
of Defence, Planning and Planning Documents (Stockholm, 
Ministry of Defence, Publication no.3/1970, 1970), and Ministry 
of Defence The Goal-Setting Procedure (Stockholm, Ministry 
of Defence, Publication no.4/1970, 1970). 
Concerning the Swiss planning concepts, my primary 
source of information was a series of verbal briefings 
provided by the Federal Military Admini·stration in Berne on 
5 November 1975. However, many oetails have been published 
in English by Paolo Urio in 'Decision-making in National 
Defence in Switzerland: How a Fighter Plane is Chosen', 
in S. Sidjanski (ed.) Political Decision Making Processes 
(Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1973), 
pp.183-203. 
19 For a very clear description of the processes by which the 
Swedes derive their goals for security policy see S. Hellman 
On the Use and Usefulness of International Strategic Studies 
(Stockholm, Swedish Ministry of Defence, Publication no. 
1975-05-13, 1975), pp. 10-17. 
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analysis in an extensive fashion to determine the most 
·effective force structures for operations in individual 
theatres, these studies can really only be combined in a 
loose fashion to guide total force structure planning. 
In the past, the employment of analysis at the 
highest levels of Australian force structure planning has 
been constrained by similar considerations. During 
the forward defence era it was necessary for the Australian 
Defence Force to be prepared for many different types of 
operations in support of major power allies in a wide range 
of environments and against several different types of 
potential enemies. In these circumstances, the design 
requirements of the Australian security structure were 
extremely complex and, in important respects, difficult to 
define. But with the major changes in Australia's 
strategic situation during the past decade, the scope for 
employing advanced analysis has increased greatly. The 
country's prime security concerns are now related to the 
Australian continent and its maritime environment and there 
is a general recognition of the need for a high level of 
lf 1 . 20 h . f . t . . se -re iance. T e maJor areas o uncertain y now remaining 
in Australia's strategic environment concern the types of 
pressures and threats which might conceivably confront the 
country, their likely timing, and the role of the United States. 21 
20 These points were argued in some detail in Part I of 
the thesis. 
21 The major question of exactly how it might be possible to 
manage this high level of threat uncertainty for long range 
planning purposes is discussed in some detail in Chapters 3, 
4, 7 and 8 of the th~sis. The processes elaborated there 
do not necessitate the derivation of numerical probabilities 
for particular threats, nor any attempt to predict the 
future with precision. Not surprisingly, both of these 
endeavours are criticised severely in the international 
literature. See, for example, Sidney Hook, The Fail-Safe 
Fallacy (New York, Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 101-104, and 
also Arthur Lee Burns Of Powers and Their Politics: A 
Critique of Theo re ti cal Approaches '(Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey, Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968), pp. 28-46. The concept 
of avoiding these difficulties by deriving a carefully 
designed series of representative scenarios, as outlined in 
Chapter 8, may contribute to a resolution of this problem in 
Australia's processes of security planning. 
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This rationale largely explains the form of the 
analrsis in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 of the thesis. It is 
argued there that if means can be found to limit, or at 
least manage, the uncertainties in Australia's long-term 
threat environment, it should be feasible to develop 
adapted theatre level analysis techniques to guide the 
country's processes of force structure design. 
It is not suggested that the development of 
analytical techniques to direct Australia's processes of 
total force structure planning would be simple or easy. 
But as can be seen from the experiences of the Swedes and 
the Swiss, the returns from such an effort can be very 
great. Australian security planners cannot afford to 
neglect the potential of these techniques at the highest 
levels of force structure design. 
·. 
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units and ground-based systems to be linked and coordinated 
with a variety of air and maritime forces. In response to 
this extensive requirement, a mix of specialised small unit, 
large unit and total battlefield systems is being developed. 
For illustrative purposes, the United States is developing 
an Artillery Battery Computer System (BCS) which will enhance 
gun survivability by permitting widespread gun displacement 
and, in addition, provide a much more rapid response capacity 
125 to forward observer fire requests. One level above BCS, 
the TACFIRE system coordinates the fire of several 
batteries and keeps a real time record of ammunition stores 
126 for all batteries. The French Army have gone one step 
further by matching the RITA tactical communications system 
to the ATILA artillery fire control system so as to produce 
a capacity to record battlefield positions, evaluate targets 
acquired and select the most rational choice of weapons, 
type of ammunition and the time to fire. This system is 
designed to provide a high level of surprise by permitting 
a flexible and rapid concentration of fire from dispersed 
127 
emplacements. 
There are also other types of specialised command and 
control systems such as the TIPI and MAGIS systems. These 
are designed to collect and collate communications 
intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), 
125 
126 
127 
This system will play a central role in reducing time lag 
and other problems likely to be experienced in the 
operational employment of cannon launched guided projectiles 
(COPPERHEADS-CLGPs) . See statement of Dr Currie before 
the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authoriz-
ation for Military Procurement, Research and Development, 
and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel 
Strengths, Part 4, 5 February 1976, p. 2164. 
See Defense Marketing Services, Market Intelligence Report 
on TACFIRE under 'Electronics Systems' dated November 1976. 
For details see H.J. Jung, 'New Automated Command and 
Control System for the French Army' in International 
Defense Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, June 1976, pp. 435 ff. 
remotely emplaced sensor information and data from side-
looking ra4ars, mapping radars, infra-red mapping and 
target acquisition systems, verbal reports and photo 
reconnaissance. The output of these systems is precise 
up-to-date information to permit timely command and 
t 1 d . . . k . 12 8 b k th . t f con ro ecision-ma ing. To ac up is ype o 
operation, there is an array of general purpose support 
85 
systems such as the Tactical Operations System (TOS). This 
provides general purpose computer capacity to receive, 
process, store, retrieve, display and disseminate selected 
. f . 129 in ormation. 
At the very highest level of ground battlefield 
command and control, the United States is attempting to 
integrate the five major functions of land combat - mobility, 
firepower, intelligence, support and command and control-into 
a semi-automated coordinated system called the Integrated 
Battlefield Control System (IBCS). According to US Army 
Brigadier Wilson Reed, the IBCS: 
... will electroni~ally tie the sensors 
to the reactive means - the 'beep' to the 
'boom' as it were - and have the soldiers 
free to do what they do best - think, 
co-ordinate and control. The potential 
seems limitless.130 
Thus, it appears that new military technologies are not 
only improving greatly the capacity of individual military 
systems but also providing new and highly sophisticated 
means of integrating multiple battlefield systems. The 
overall effect is to produce a greatly enhanced structural 
capacity in mission performance. This development provides 
128 
129 
130 
For details on TIPI/MAGIS see the Defense Marketing 
Services, Market Intelligence Repo~t on the systems 
under 'Electronic Systems' dated January 1977. 
For details see Defense Marketing Services, Market 
Intelligence Report on TOS under 'Electronic Systems' 
dated November 1976. 
Quoted in Paul Dickson, The Electronic Battlefield, 
p. 171. 
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great potential scope for the orientation of complete 
defence sy~tcms on a more directly functional basis. 
7. New Weapons Concepts· 
Rapid advances in a large number of military technologies 
are expanding greatly the technical capacities of many 
traditional types of weapons systems. For example, modern 
precision guidance, propulsion, and warhead technologies 
have revolutionised long range bombardment capacities by 
making it possible to produce very compact cruise missile 
systems which can be launched from standard torpedo tubes, 
aircraft pylons, shipboard canisters and ground vehicles to 
hit fixed targets up to 3,200 kilometres distant with 
accuracies of a few metres. 131 Shorter range systems, 
especially those designed for the anti-ship function, are 
limited more by the problems of precise target acquisition 
than those of range and accuracy. 
Developments of comparable significance are underway 
in the field of tank gun systems. New types of propellant, 
cartridge, projectile, gun barrel and automatic loading 
concept have been applied to produce both liquid and solid 
132 propellant automatic tank guns of the future. It has 
been found tha~ because of the greatly increased muzzle 
velocities and firing rate of these weapons, an armour 
131 
132 
For details see the testimony of Captain W.M. Locke, 
Project Manager for the TOMAHAWK missil~ before the 
Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? 
Authorization for Military ProcurementJ Research and 
DevelopmentJ and Active DutyJ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 11, 17 March 1976, 
pp. 6214 ff.· 
For details see the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, 
Director of DARPA, before the Research and Development 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
ProcurementJ Research and DevelopmentJ and Active 
DutyJ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Streng~hs, 
Part 11, 11 March 1976, p. 5777. 
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piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot (APFSDS) round of 
only 75mm c~libre is sufficient to penetrate all types of 
conventional and spaced armour which are currently deployed. 
An additional bonus is that the same guns can also be 
equipped with infra-red homing rounds to perform a supple-
. . f f . 133 h' f 'd f' mentary anti-aircra t -unction. T is type o rapi ire, 
high penetration capacity should increase greatly the combat 
effectiveness of armoured forces in the first few seconds of 
combat. Historical analysis suggests that action in this 
period is frequently decisive in determining battlefield 
134 
outcomes. 
Technological advances in other fields are having the 
effect of reducing greatly the costs of lightweight weaponry. 
The United States' Improved Light Anti-tank Weapon· ( ILAW-
VIPER) programme, for instance, has produced a weapon with 
a capacity considerably superior to that of the current M-72, 
for less than US$100 per unit. 135 Cost-effectiveness is 
being raised in other fields by the design of weapons with· a 
multi-purpose capacity. For example, there are strong 
indications that the missile which will eventually replace 
DRAGON and TOW in the United States' inventories will have 
very high flight speed, be laser beam riding and be 
effective not only against armoured vehicles but also 
. f 136 aircra t. 
The new technologies have also expanded greatly the 
scope for decreasing costs with the adoption of modular 
133 
134 
135 
136 
Ibid. , p. 5 7 8 0. 
Ibid., p. 5777. 
For details of this system see the testimony of 
Dr Malcolm Currie, the former US Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering, before the Research and Develop-
ment Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 4, 5 February 1976, pp. 2156, 2157. 
See details in a Defense Marketing Services, Market 
Intelligence Report on the Advanced Multi-purpose 
Missile (AMM) System programme under Missiles/Spacecraft 
dated April 1976. 
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concepts. Perhaps the best example of this development 
is the GBU-15 family of guided glide bombs. 137 This system 
is to have three interchangeable warhead types initially -
a conventional high explosive, a minelet and bomblet cluster 
and a hard structure munition. A fuel air explosive warhead 
is likely to be added in the early 1980s. All of these 
warheads will be designed so that they can be fitted with 
either a cruciform medium range wing guidance kit or a planar 
long range wing guidance kit. Any combination of the above 
will also be compatible with television, laser designator 
homing, imaging infra-red or distance measuring equipment 
guidance heads. All possible combinations will be fitted 
with the same aerodynamic control and data link modules. 
In other words, it is now becoming possible to construct 
inexpensively from these alternative components an aircraft 
weapons load to suit the lighting, weather, terminal defence 
and target characteristics of a specific mission. A modular 
guided glide bomb has even been equipped with rocket 
boosters to demonstrate the potential for short range ground 
and ship launched applications. 
Rapid advances in tech~ology are also making completely 
new weapons concepts feasible. One of the more important 
developments is that of sensor-weapons. These are being 
developed in many forms, for many different operational 
environments. In the air~ miniature unmanned drone aircraft 
have been produced which can be programmed to fly into 
enemy air space and loiter there for up to six hours waiting 
138 to acquire the emission of an enemy radar. When this is 
137 
138 
For a full description and discussion of the GBU-15 
weapon system, see the testimony of Lt Col J.A. Hager, 
US Air Force Program Element Monitor, before the Sub-
committee on Tactical Air Power, Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for 
Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active 
Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 10, 15 March 1976, pp. 5243 ff. 
For details see the testimony of Col D.G. Newbold, US Air 
Force Assistant Program Director, before the Subcommittee 
on Tactical Airpower of the Committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 9, 12 March 1976, pp. 5198, 5199. 
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done, it can fly into the target automatically and, with 
its integra~ed warhead, cause severe damage. In the future, 
advanced, discriminating, non-imaging infra-red and other 
sensors may be employed aboard these aerial loit~ring mines 
139 for the attack of armoured vehicles and other targets. 
A similar ground-based development called the Self 
Initiated Attack Missile (SIAM) can be left or dropped 
unattended in enemy territory. When the missile detects a 
pre-programmed enemy aircraft 'signature', it is capable of 
t t . 1 h d t h . 140 au oma ic aunc an arget oming. 
At sea, the United States has developed a new family 
of mines to largely replace the aging stock which was 
compromised during operations in Vietnam. The CAPTOR 
(encapsulated torpedo) mine is essentially a Mk46 homing 
torpedo coupled with a complex anti-submarine detection 
system. It is designed for operation in a variety of water 
depths and in practice would be air-, surface- or 
submarine-dropped outside harbours, or in straits and 
narrows, to await the specific sensor signature of its assigned 
. . h . 1 141 categories of target, whence it can launc automatical y. 
For shallower and intermediate depths and for generalised 
anti-submarine and anti-ship purposes, the CAPTOR mine is 
to be complemented by the Propelled Rocket Assisted Mine 
139 
140 
141 
See this outlined by E. Ulsamer, 'Flying Robots With 
a Lethal Sting' in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 60, 'No. 2, 
February 1977, p. 32. 
For details see Philip J. Xlass, 'Major Technology 
Gains Foreseen' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 104, No. 10, 8 March 1976, p. 13. 
For details see the testimony of Vice Admiral D. Murphy, 
US Navy Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare and Oceans 
Surveillance Programs, before the Research and Development 
Subcommittee of· the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
ProcurementJ Research and DevelopmentJ and Active DutyJ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 4, 11 December 1975, p. 2009. 
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(PRAM) and the QUICKSTRIKE . 142 mine. All of these sensor-
weapon mines possess an area coverage several orders of 
magnitude above that of conventional mine systems. 
Finally, developments in technology have produced some 
completely original types of weapon systems. The most 
notable and potentially the most significant of these may 
be high-powered laser weapons. There are many different 
types of laser, each of which possesses particular attributes. 
However, the technical complexities are immense and the 
barriers to practical employment for military purposes very 
great. The most notable problems arise in precision pointing 
and tracking, the development of durable high power optics, 
high energy propagation through the earth's disturbed 
atmosphere, thermal blooming (overheating of the air in 
transit causing laser refraction) and penetration of the 
vaporised cloud that often forms when a beam initially 
143 
strikes a target. For many applications, there are 
additional environmental problems such as laser attenuation 
in fog, rain, sleet, snow, smog and in the high levels of 
humidity which are common in coastal and sea environments. 
These limitations can also be exploited in countermeasure 
144 
systems such as smoke screens and aerosol sprays. 
142 
143 
144 
Recent research and development efforts have, however, 
For details see the testimony of Rear Admiral R.J. 
Blount, the Director of the Undersea and Strategic 
Warfare Development Division, US Navy, before the 
Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 
Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 6, 26 February 1976, 
p. 3358. 
See these described at length by Philip J. Klass, 
'Advanced Weaponry Research Intensifies' in Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, Vol. 103, No. 7, 18 August 1975, pp. 35-38. 
A list of potential laser countermeasures is elaborated 
by Philip J. Klass in 'Current Systems Still More Cost-
Effective', Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 103, 
No. 10, 8 September 1975, pp. 53-59. 
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overcome some of the more serious technical difficulties. 
Por instance, the thermal blooming problem can be overcome 
by careful laser focussing and pulsing the beam to prevent 
the air through which the laser transits from overheating. 
The very large adaptive optics programme which has been 
undertaken in the United States has demonstrated a capacity 
to overcome most of the problems caused by atmospheric 
d . t b d . f l' 14 5 is ur ances an aircra t s ip-streams. 
Thus, despite a number of continuing difficulties, there 
remain several potentially promising military applications 
for high power lasers. Lasers as a bomber defence system 
are attractive because they work particularly well in the 
l h h . h l . d 146 d . h c ear atmosp ere of ig a t1tu es. However, esp1te t e 
relatively large carrying capacity of these aircraft, the 
power sources which are available with current technology 
remain too bulky and heavy to be practical. 147 In the ground 
based air defence role, the US already has a test unit fitted 
145 
146 
14 7 
For details see Philip J. Klass, 'Advanced Weaponry 
Research Intensifies' in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 103, No. 2, 18 August 1975, pp~ 35, 36. 
The employment of lasers in this role is discussed by 
Philip J. Klass in 'Current Systems Still More Cost-
Effective', Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 103, 
No. 10, 8 September 1975, p. 53. 
For details of these difficulties see Philip J. Klass, 
'Pentagon Seeks to Channel Research' in Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, Vol. 103, No. 9, l September 1975, 
p. 54. However, early in 1977, Dr Kumar Patel, the 
inventor of the high-energy carbon monoxide laser, 
was reported as saying that: 
... with recent technology, his laser 
had the potential size, efficiency and 
power to be packaged in a transport 
aircraft from which it could knock 
other aircraft from the sky "at long 
ranges"~ 
See Drew Middleton, 'Powerful Lasers Reported Bound 
For American and Soviet Arsenals' in The New York 
Times, 16 February 1977. 
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b d h 'b' d 1 h' 1 148 a oar an amp i ious armoure assau t ve ic e, This 
system has .destroyed unmanned aircraft in flight but has also 
been plagued by reliability problems in simulated operational 
conditions. 149 In shipboard air defence applications, many 
of the power problems can be overcome, but in this 
environment laser transmission attenuation problems caused 
by atmospheric humidity are accentuated. 
Much of the current high powered laser research and 
development effort is centred upon space based applications 
which fall beyond the purview of this chapter. However, in 
addition, a variety of tactical applications are being 
pursued actively. In contrast to a decade ago, there is 
now no question that very high powered lasers can be built. 
The major uncertainty remaining is whether they can be 
developed successfully into reliable and effective military 
weapons which can compete in cost-effectiveness terms with 
more conventional weapons systems. 
8. New Weapons Platforms 
Developments in a wide range of technologies are 
providing a very much broader array of transport and weapon 
platform options. For example, in the area of heavy lift air 
transport, there are several proposals for very large 
transport aircraft with between three and four times the 
load carrying capacity and twice the range of the largest 
aircraft now operational. Flying wing concepts carrying 
1 . h . h . lSO 1 . 1 ig tweig t cargo containers, very arge conventiona 
148 
149 
150 
This system is described in detail and illustrated with 
photographs by Philip J. Klass in 'Current Systems Still 
More Cost-Effective', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 103, No. 10, 8 September 1975, p. SS. 
For details see Flight International, Vol. 110, No. 3525, 2 
October 1976, p. 1016 and also Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 105, No. 7, 23 August 1976, p. 9. 
This concept is elaborated by W.C. Wetmore in 'Lockheed 
Details "Flying Wing" Concept', Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 102, No. 20, 19 May 1975, pp. 30 ff. 
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transport aircraft151 and new types of hybrid heavy-lift 
. h' 152 b d f h' . airs ips . have all een propose or t is function. 
The United States National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) has predicted the introduction of 
such aircraft by 1985. 153 
A second and possibly related type of aircraft 
development which can be expected to appear in approximately 
the same time frame is a very long endurance ocean surveillance 
d 1 . f 154 h. b f 1 . b an patro aircra t. T is concept may e u filled y 
the deployment of a combination of existing technologies -
an already deployed civil airframe, an AWACS radar system, 
a long range FLIR, other surface surveillance and advanced 
ASW sensors and an array of stand-off precision guided 
weapons systems. This type of aircraft will possess a 
the tasks which are currently 
. f 155 
capacity to perform many of 
undertaken by carrier-borne aircra t. 
15.1 
152 
153 
154 
155 
See, for example, the Japanese proposal for a 1,200 
passenger flying boatin R.G. O'Lone, 'Japanese Pushing 
Flying Boat Designs', Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 106, No. 20, 16 May 1977, pp. 45 ff. 
For details see B.M. Elson, 'Hybrid Heavy-Lift 
Airships Under Study' in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 104, No. 25, 21 June 1976, pp. 48 ff. 
See Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 103, No. 19, 
10 November 1975, p. 23. · 
Ibid. 
Ibid. See also a detailed report of a major US study 
of this type of aircraft in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 105, No. 16, 18 October 1976, p. 91. 
There may be yet other applications for this type of 
large long endurance aircraft. Dr Malcolm Currie, the 
former US Director of Defense Research and Engineering, 
emphasised their potential flexibility in the following 
terms: 
On the USAF's horizon also are multi-
purpose aircraft, in the multi-million 
pound class and with long range and endurance, 
that are being made possible through new 
technologies in materials, propulsion, and 
aerodynamics. 
Cited by E. Ulsamer in 'The New Five-Year Defense Plan' 
in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 60, No. 1, January 1977, p. 64. 
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The United States is developing a new generation of 
medium weight V/STOL aircraft for naval aircraft carrier 
and general purpose shipboard applications as well as to 
overcome some of the airfield vulnerability problems of land 
based aircraft. The first of these systems will be subsonic 
or transonic with a multi-role capacity to perform ASW 
search and attack, surveillance, surface ship attack, ground 
strike, troop transport, resupply and general logistic 
support and utility functions. 156 The second aircraft will 
be a supersonic strike fighter, possibly a development of 
Rockwell's XF-12A prototype design or the McDonnell Douglas 
AV-8B. 157 
A range of advanced fighter programmes is also underway 
with the emphasis upon improvements in agility, speed and 
. b'l' 158 f' h h th surviva i ity. Some new ig ter concepts, sue as ose 
employed in the US High Manoe~verability Aircraft Technology 
(HIMAT) programme, are being tested in small scale remotely 
'l d h' 1 159 h h • I 0 f' h pi ate ve ic es. Ot ers, sue as Boeing s micro- ig ter 
156 
157 
158 
159 
For details see the testimony of Commander J. Davis, 
US Navy V/STOL Project Manager, before the Subcommittee 
on Tactical Airpower, Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military 
ProcurementJ Research and DevelopmentJ and Active DutyJ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Part 
10, 16 March 1976, p. 5405; also E.H. Kolcum, 'Navy 
Request Stresses Shift to V/STOL' in Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 4, 24 January 1977, p. 18 
and D.M. North, 'V/STOL Design Emphasises Simplicity' in 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 6, 
7 February 1977, pp. 17 ff. 
The various possibilities in this regard are discussed by 
C.A. Robinson, Jr, in 'Navy Plans Emphasis on V/STOL', 
.Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, No. 9, 
9 March 1976~ pp. 12 ff. 
See this discussed in Defense Marketing Service~ Market 
Intelligence Report on the Advanced Tactical Fighter 
(ATF) Program under 'Military Aircraft' dated March 1976. 
For details see J.M. Lenorovitz, 'Tooling Begin~ for 
Research Vehicles' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 106, No. 8, 21 February 1977, pp. 36 ff. and also 
Air Force Magazine, Vol. 59, No. 1, January 1976, 
pp. 20, 21. 
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concept, have been the subject of very extensive paper and 
wind tunnel. study. This particular experimental aircraft 
programme, which has received extensive encouragement from 
the United States' Air Force and Navy, employs very 
advanced 'supercruiser' wing technology in a small aircraft, 
several of which could be carried aloft, launched and 
t . d b h . b . f . 160 11 f re rieve y a ost air orne aircra t carrier. ~- o 
the new fighter aircraft concepts involve the ext~nsive 
use of stealth technologies. Composite materials, special 
design techniques and paints are being employed extensively 
in an effort to reduce optical, radar, acoustic and other 
. . . 161 
signatures to a minimum. 
There are, in addition, several more radical· aircraft 
proposals under active study. For example, the United 
States is actively experimenting with an X-wing concept 
aircraft whose wings can rotate in the manner of a helicopter 
at slow speeds, but at high speeds can iock and perform the 
162 lift function of conventional wing surfaces. Much 
attention has also been directed towards advanced research 
on a possible aerodynamic successor to currently deployed 
swing-wing aircraft. Instead of altering t~e angle of both 
wings so that they move symmetrically in relation to the 
aircraft fuselage, oblique wing aircraft simply pivot a single 
rigid wing so that one end swings forward and the other 
rearwards. This highly-simplified technique has already 
been proven aerodynamically feasible and displays great 
160 
161 
162 
For details see Barry Miller, 'Advanced Tactical 
Fighter Studies Set' in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, Vol. 104, No. 3, 19 January 1976, 
pp. 16 ff. 
Ibid. I p • 16 . 
See the testimony of Commander R.D. Friichtenight, 
US Navy RPV Project Manager, before the Subcommittee 
on Tactical Airpower of the Committee on Armed 
Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization 
for Military Procurement~ Research and Development~ 
and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian · 
Personnel Strengths, Part 10, 16 March 1976, p. 5519. 
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. 1 mb f . f l' . 163 potentia in a nu er o aircra t app ications. 
The final major area of development in airborne 
technologies is that concerning remotely piloted vehicles 
(RPVs). There appear to be three distinct categories 
emerging. Mini-RPVs weigh under lOOkg and can be readily 
carried by two people. Medium sized RPVs weigh up to 2,000kg, 
are frequently air launched and normally possess a relatively 
long range multi-mission capacity. The largest RPVs are of 
conventional aircraft size and normally require full-sized 
aircraft ground facilities. The most notable example of this 
last category is the COMPASS COPE system which has a 30 metre 
wingspan and is designed to cruise at an altitude of well 
over twenty thousand metres for up to thirty hours, primarily 
for electronic and communication intelligence, data link and 
d d . . . 164 groun an sea reconnaissance missions. 
Mini RPVS derive the greatest proportional benefit from 
the absence of an on-board pilot. They are normally of model 
aeroplane size, although not necessarily of model aeroplane 
configuration, can be made of fibreglass and plastic for low 
radar reflection (comparable to a bird) , have a very low 
infra-red signature, can be made very quiet and very hard to 
see and, even if sighted, are very difficult to hit with small 
arms fire. Even if hit, small calibre rounds can harmlessly 
pass through large portions of their structure. The proximity 
fuses of medium and large calibre rounds, 30mm and above, 
are normally insensitive to targets with such a small 
signature. Yet with a capacity for launch and recovery from 
the back of a truck, with radii of action approaching 160 
kilometres, the capacity to perform reconnaissance, kamikaze 
163 
164 
For full details see J.W.R. Taylor (ed.), Jane's All the 
World's Aircraft 19?5-?6 (London, Jane's Yearbooks, 
19 7 5) I PP o 5 4 4 I 5 4 5 • 
For lengthy accounts of the full range of RPV 
developments see Astronautics and Aeronautics, Vol. 12, 
No. 9, September 1974 and also I. Stambler, 'US Remotely 
Pi'loted Vehicle Programs' in International Defense 
Review, Vol. 7, No. 2, .April 1974, pp. 179 ff. 
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hard target killing, radiation homing, defence suppression, 
data relay,_ 
and with a 
employment 
electronic jamming and laser designation tasks 
price tag under US$20,00~ the future widespread 
165 
of mini-RPVs appears assured. 
Seaborne platforms may be transformed dramatically 
during the next quarter century by the extensive employment 
not only of small but also medium and perhaps even large 
sea-going hydrofoils, hovercraft and other unconventional 
hull concepts. The United States ocean-going Patrol 
Hydrofoil (PHM) programme has been a technical and operational 
success but the costs of the very short production run 
1 . d . 166 . . current y envisage appear excessive. In Britain, 
similarly sized and armed hovercraft systems are being 
actively studied which have a 1,600 kilometre range 
capability. 167 In a separate development, the United States 
is actively pursuing the utility of large sea-going hovercraft 
in its construction of a 3,000 ton rigid side-wall surface 
ff h . 168 h f h 1 d e ect s ip. T ese types o systems ave a rea y proven 
to be technically reliable and economic in many environments. 
They promise surface speeds of between 40 and 100 knots in 
all but the worst weather, reduced vulnerability to mine, 
torpedo and missile attacks, greatly improved standards of 
platform stability and a quantum jump in overall mission 
flexibility. 
165 
166 
167 
168 
A third type of unconventional hull configuration is 
For a detailed description of some types of mini-RPV 
operations and their costs, see E. Ulsamer, 'Flying Robots 
With a Lethal Sting' in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 60, 
No. 2, February 1977, pp. 22 ff. 
For details of this programme see Lt Cmdr E.H. Ashburn, 
'Pegasus (PHM-1): The Patrol Hydrofoil Ship' in US 
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 103/1/887, January 
1977, pp. 101 ff. 
See Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, 
No. 10, 7 March 1977, p. 11. 
For details see International Defense Reviehl, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, February 1977, p. 161. 
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under development, primarily for small and medium sized, 
long endurance deep ocean missions. Called the semi-submerged 
hull concept, it consists of two torpedo-shaped underwater 
propulsion systems arranged in a catamaran configuration and 
attached to an above-surface hull platform by aerofoil 
shaped pylons. The advantages of this concept are its 
naturally high propulsion efficiency, the very high levels 
of stability it provides to small platforms and the minimal 
169 degradation of speed it suffers in heavy seas. 
The new technologies are also enhancing greatly the 
capacities of both nuclear and conventional submarines. As 
was discussed earlier, new propulsion systems show promise 
of enhancing range, endurance and speed capabilities while 
at the same time reducing platform signatures. But in 
addition, laminar flow technology is reducing greatly the 
underwater drag of submarines and torpedoes and hence also 
170 
contributing significantly to advances in range and speed. 
The increasingly frequent employment of plastics and other 
non-metallic materials is reducing submarine acoustic and 
magnetic signatures while, in some instances, providing 
deeper diving capacities at low cost. 
Transport and weapons platforms in the ground environment 
are generally being developed by a process of evolution 
rather than revolution. However, there are two new 
technology developments which may have a very great impact 
upon a range of ground battlefield platforms. The first of 
these is a new type of composite armour plating called 
CHOBHAM Armour. Believed to be composed of layers of 
plastic, ceramic and metal armour plating, CHOBHAM armour 
169 
170 
For details see Commander L.J. Holt, 'SWATH' in 
US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 101, No. 3/865, 
March 1975, pp. 26 ff. 
See the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director 
of DARPA,before the Research and Development Sub-
committee of .the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active _ 
Duty~ Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 9 March 1976, p. 5898. 
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can be bolted onto some existing heavy armoured vehicles 
to provide a capacity to survive attack from a1i currently 
d 1 d . d f. . d . . . 1 71 ep oye groun - ire anti-armour munitions. As this 
armour is only expected to add approximately 1-2 per cent 
to the cost of new armoured vehicles, it can, in time, be 
expected to be deployed widely on the ground battlefield. 172 
This, in turn, will necessitate the development of a new 
range of anti-tank weaponry and probably a considerable 
modification of anti-armour techniques and tactics. 173 
The second major technology advance in ground 
battlefield weapons platforms is somewhat related to the 
first. The development of rapid-firing, very high velocity 
tank guns of 75mm calibre, which was discussed earlier in 
this chapter, means that new generation tanks may not need 
to be constructed to withstand the very great weight and 
recoil forces of current 105mm and 120mm tank guns. As a 
consequence, the United States is actively pursuing, through 
the High Mobility Agility (HIMAG) programme, the possibility 
that new generation tanks may be relatively light (i.e. 
between 20 and 40 tons), have low profiles, be very agile 
171 
172 
173 
For details of the development of CHOBHAM armour see 
International Defense Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 
1976, p. 641. 
Ibid. 
There is a secondary development in armour technology 
which is of some significance. This concerns the 
employment of thick ballistic blankets woven from 
commercially produced synthetic fibres. This type of 
flexible armour can be used inside conventional light 
armoured vehicles (APCs, MICVs etc.) to greatly reduce 
the spall damage caused by the penetration of medium and 
large calibre projectiles. Alternatively, it can be used 
to protect personnel, weapon teams or objects of military 
significance in the open from the majority of shell frag-
ments and small calibre direct-fire projectiles. For 
details see Survivability Office, US Army Material 
Systems Analysis Activi~y, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Mary-
land, Survivability Primer (Alexandria, Virginia, US 
Army Material and Readiness Command, 1976), pp. 37-46. 
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and be relatively inexpensive. 174 Current indications are 
that this type of tank concept may be deployed in the late 
1980s. 
Summary 
It is difficult to summarise the overall impact of 
recent developments in conventional military technology. 
On the one hand, they provide a greatly increased potential 
to acquire, identify and track targets, to deliver ordnance 
over both long and short ranges with high accuracy and 
speed and to destroy a wide range of objectives with a 
single hit. But, on the other hand, the new technologies 
also provide greatly enhanced capacities far a range of 
countermeasures. 
Certainly the nature of conventional warfare as it has 
been known in the past is being changed fundamentally. In 
the words of Dr Malcolm Currie, the former US Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering: 
A remarkable series of technical developments 
has brought us to the threshold of what I 
believe will become a true revolution in 
conventional warfare.175 
However, the practical implications for particular 
strategic environments are not easy to determine in advance. 
A wide range of non-technological variables, such as the 
174 
175 
See the testimony of Dr G.H. Heilmeier, the Director 
of DARPA, before the Research and Development 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, US 
Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement.,· Research and Development., and Active 
Duty., Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, 
Part 11, 9 March 1976, pp. 5886, 5887. 
Cited by Phil Stanford in 'The Automated Battlefield', 
New York Times Magazine, 23 February 1975. 
degree of superpower involvement and the levels of 
constraint.applied by local financial, political, bureau-
cratic, social, geographic and climatic conditions, can 
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all influence the consequences of new technological develop-
ments in specific regions. Further, and at least as 
importantly, a great deal will always depend upon local 
human capacities to perceive the broad consequences of the 
new developments, to choose selectively from the greatly 
expanded range of technological options, to operate 
effectively those systems which are procured, to service 
and maintain them efficiently and to derive strategies, tactics, 
structures, doctrines and operational procedures which exploit 
the potential of the new systems fully. Primarily because of 
the number and variability of these factors, the practical 
impact of the new technologies upon particular military 
structures can be expected to differ greatly. However, 
despite these qualifications and difficulties, it is 
possible to derive a series of broad consequential trends 
which possess a degree of general applicability. These are 
elaborated in the following discussion. 
Some Implications of New Technology Developments 
1. The In9reasing Vulnerability of Large and Obvious 
Weapons Platforms and the Degradation of their 
Cost-Effectiveness 
Military platforms which have large radar, magnetic, heat, 
acoustic, electronic or other media signatures are becoming 
much easier to detect, identify and acquire as targets as a 
result of significant advances in long range surveillance 
and target acquisition technologies - satellite-borne optical, 
radar, infra-red and electronic intelligence sensors, OTH 
radar, long range passive sonar systems, AWACS aircraft and 
long range electronic warfare interception systems, etc. 
Once acquired as a target, the new precision guidance, 
propulsion and warhead technologies are increasing greatly 
the ease with which targets can be attacked and destroyed 
at both short and long ranges. 
However, in reality, this greatly increased capacity 
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for large target destruction or active attrition represents 
only a portion of the total impact of the new technologies 
upon aircraft, large surface ships and armoured vehicles. 
In addition, these large and obvious weapons platforms are 
being forced to adopt expensive defensive equipment fits 
and elaborate defensive operational tactics in attempts to 
ensure their continued survivability on the modern battlefield. 
These defensive reactive measures are very complex and 
expensive and many imply a very great degradation in total 
system cost-effectiveness in the performance of traditional 
functions. 
Th~ Increased Vulnerability of Large and Obvious Platforms 
in the Air 
In intense battlefield environments, aircraft are now 
subjected to an array of advanced ground based systems. 
New generation light man-portable surf ace-to-air missile 
(SAM) systems, such as BLOWPIPE, STINGER, SABRE and RBS-70, 
not only possess a greater range capacity and more effective 
warheads than their predecessors, they also possess an all-
aspect multi-directional attack capability. Mobile radar-
controlled rapid-fire gun systems like the Soviet ZSU-23-4 
SHILKA and the West German FLAKPANZER are likely to retain 
important battlefield functions. Similarly, larger vehicle-
mounted SAM systems like ROLAND, RAPIER and SAM 8, medium 
range systems like ADVANCED HAWK and SAM 6 and medium to 
long range systems like SAM-D PATRIOT can be extremely 
effective in providing a high level of twenty-four hour all-
weather security against air attack. However, it should be 
noted that th& greatly increased lethality of ground based 
air defences is not due simply to the vastly increased 
performance capabilities of individual systems. In order 
for ground based anti-aircraft defences to be maximised over 
the tactical battlefield, it is necessary to integrate a 
coordinated mix of individual surface-to-air systems, each 
103 
of which has high performance capabilities within its 
assigned p~rameters. 
The vastly increased lethality of coordinated anti-
aircraft defences has forced tactical aircraft to adopt a 
wide range of measures to improve their survivability and 
maintain their mission effectiveness. The response of many 
western European air forces is to fly through such areas at 
extremely low altitudes and very high speeds. This tactic 
has been designed so that aircraft can penetrate below the 
coverage of most ground based surveillance and target 
acquisition sensors. The speed of penetration gives the 
few ground based systems which can acquire targets flying at 
that altitude insufficient time to react effectively. 
However, mission profiles requiring high speed flight at 
low levels effectively limit range capability and encourage 
aircraft configurations which are not optimised for the 
secondary task ·of air-to-air combat at low and medium 
altitudes. 176 
A second response, which is most notably practised by 
the United States Air Force, is to fly at medium altitude 
within the coverage of area air defences where necessary, 
but to do so only with the assistance of large numbers of 
air superiority fighter aircraft and also specialised 
electronic warfare and defence suppression systems. This 
involves a direct air superiority confrontation. Specialised 
176 This concept of air operations is described at length 
by Steven L. Canby in Tactical Airpower in Europe: 
Airing the European View (Santa Monica, Technology 
Service Corporation, 1976). It should also be noted 
at this stage that those US squadrons equipped with 
A-10 aircraft are being trained to employ similar 
low-level terrain following flight profiles in 
attacks involving shallow penetrations of enemy 
airspace. For a detailed elaboration of A-10 
tactical doctrine see Donald E. Fink, 'A-10 
Survivability in Attack Role Shown' in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 25, 20 June 
1977, pp. 88-93. 
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fighter aircraft cover the fighter-bomber formations and 
engage in ~ir-to-air duels where this is necessary. In 
attempts to foil anti-aircraft surveillance, tracking and 
guidance systems, parts of fighter-bomber weapon loads are 
frequently sacrificed to permit the carriage of defensive 
underwing electronic countermeasure pods. In some intense 
environments, supplementary aircraft are required 
. . 1 f h k f 1 . . 1 7 7 specifica ly to per arm t e tas o e ectronic suppression. 
In addition, in areas where air, defences are well coordinated 
and controlled, it is frequently necessary for attacking or 
specialised supporting aircraft to concentrate firstly upon 
the destruction and suppression of surface-to-air systems 
before the primary targets can be attacked with an acceptable 
. . 178 . . degree of security. The gradual addition of a large 
number of essential supporting aircraft to those required to 
make close support or interdiction strike missions in the 
intense European environment has prompted one prominent 
United States defence analyst to describe planned US Air 
. . 
179 h 1 't d Force operations as air convoys. T e comp exi y an 
expense of mounting this type of operation is clearly much 
greater than that which was required to perform a similar 
function in the past. 
A third type of air force response to the growing 
lethality of integrated ground based anti-aircraft networks 
involves a partial abandonment of the traditional close air 
support function and its replacement by strengthened ground 
based tube and rocket artillery systems. Under this concept, 
where air delivered ordnance is still required in intense 
177 
178 
179 
See this point elaborated by G.S. Sundaram in 'EW~ 
Dedicated Aircraft - the EA-6B and EF-lllA Systems' 
in International Defense Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, 
February 1977, pp. 54 ff. 
The United States has developed aircraft units 
(F-105Gs and F-4Gs) which are specially configured 
to destroy ground based air defence systems under the 
WILD WEASEL programme. 
This point is made by Steven L. Canby in Tactical 
Airpower in Europe: Airing the European View, p. 37. 
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battlefield environments, it is delivered at extended 
ranges by .stand-off air launched precision guided munitions. 
In practice, however, this does not overcome all of the 
difficulties which are associated with traditional types 
of close air support operations. The acquisition of many 
categories of ground target from tactical strike aircraft 
is extremely difficult at stand-off ranges. In order to 
overcome this problem, at least partially, extensive 
support technologies are required to provide a remote 
target acquisition and designation capability. The other 
major difficulty of stand-off precision guided munition 
delivery into intense battlefield environments is that 
weapon launch points may not always be placed beyond the 
range of components of an enemy's integrated air defence 
system. As I have argued elsewhere, the fluidity of 
intense modern battlefields may make the accurate identif-
ication of secure launch areas extremely difficult. 180 
Following the Middle East War of October, 1973, 
General Herzog, the prominent Israeli military correspondent, 
reflected on the significance of these developments: 
180 
181 
The role of the plane in war has changed, 
and new strategies and uses of airpower 
will have to be evolved. To a degree 
air power will obviously not be as 
influential as it has been and will 
affect the battlefield less than it did. 
The proliferation of iight, portable 
missile launchers in the front line means 
that close support will be the exception 
to the rule in the future, with the air 
force being forced to concentrate on 
isolating the field of battle, maintaining 
supremacy in the air and destroying the 
forces in or near the battlefield.181 
See this argument elaborated in my 'The Implications 
of Changing Technology for the Future of Manned Tactical 
Aircraft' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The Future of Tactical 
Airpower in the Defence of Australia, (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 32, 33. 
Quoted by B. Latter in 'Lessons for NATO from the Yorn 
Kippur War' in Royal Air Forces Quarterly, Vol. 16, 
No. 4, Winter 1976, p. 385. 
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The Increased Vulnerability of large and Obvious Platforms 
At Sea 
The new military technologies are also increasing 
greatly the vulnerability of large and obvious surface ships. 
They too are becoming easier to acquire at long range and 
much more vulnerable to a wide range of short and long 
range anti-ship weapon systems. William H. Pickering, Head 
of the Naval Studies Board of the United States Academy of 
Sciences and a former Director of the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory, outlined the two major themes in surface ship 
passive attrition in the following terms: 
As the world moves into an era of 
widespread, inexpensive precision-guided 
weapons, the vulnerability of all ships 
increases. This will require either that 
the Navy develop an effective defense to 
protect a small number of high value ships 
or else deploy large numbers of low value 
ships to perform the same mission.182 
In response to the increasing anti-shipping threat, most 
modern navies have concentrated their resources on a five-
element programme to enhance the security of their major 
183 
surface platforms. The overall effectiveness of this 
effort is, however, the subject of serious doubt. 
The first element of the programme is to seek to destroy 
weapon launch platforms before weapons are released. If 
the defending naval unit, task force, convoy or fleet 
contains an aircraft carrier, it may be possible for its 
aircraft to strike cruise missile-equipped patrol craft, 
surface shipping and aircraft at short and medium ranges 
before weaponry can be launched. However, for a variety of 
reasons this might not always be possible. Firstly, carrier 
182 
183 
Quoted in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 105, 
No. 18, 2 November 1976, p. 19. 
Describing naval reaction in terms of sudh a five-
pha se programme involves a large degree of over-
simplification. Many other areas of naval activity 
may, in reality, have been changed in response to the 
increased anti-ship missile threats, training programmes, 
operational procedures etc. However, for the purposes 
of this discussion,it is sufficient to argue mainly 
within the bounds of these five elements. 
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aircraft may not always be available to perform this 
function .. Secondly, even if they are available, they may not 
be authorised to launch this type of pre-emptive attack. 184 
Thirdly, even if carrier aircraft were on regular patrol, it 
seems likely that in many environments enemy aircraft and 
surface vessels could approach undetected within the 
maximum range of their weaponry. Fourthly, everi if such a 
strike were authorised and effectively carried out, that 
would still not ensure the survivability of major surface 
shipping. Hostile submarines and mobile ground-based 
systems could still launch anti-ship missile and torpedo 
attacks. The capacity of surface shipping and their 
accompanying aircraft to attack submarine and ground based 
platforms is limited in most environments. Thus it can be 
concluded that it is unlikely that all anti-ship systems 
will be destroyed before they can be launched in any 
particular conflict unless some type of special circumstances 
185 
apply. 
The second element of the surface naval ship's defensive 
capability also involves the use of carrier-borne aircraft. 
Naval AWACS and fighter aircraft would attempt to destroy 
anti-ship missiles in flight. This capability assumes the 
propitious air deployment of naval AWACS and advanced fighter 
aircraft with a look-down, shoot-down capability at the time 
and in the area of missile flight. Even if all of these 
systems were deployed in advance in appropriate locations 
and were not saturated by a large number of incoming cruise 
missiles, they would still be ineffective against very high 
184 
185 
These types of availability constraints might also 
confront attackers. But for them, the issue would not 
be nearly so critical because their survivability would 
not be at stake. In most environments the attacking 
forces would largely retain the prerogative to select 
the time, place and mode of attack. Obviously, these 
choices could be made in the light of any existing 
availability constraints. 
Special circumstances may include an opponent's 
possession of very few anti-shipping weapons, their 
carriage_in a few large,obvious and highly vulnerable 
platforms and missile system malfunctions preventing 
the launching of the attack, etc. 
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altitude Mach 2+ missiles18 G and against submarine launched 
torpedoes .. Again it seems that only in very particular 
circumstances could anti-ship strikes be expected to be 
defeated at this point. 187 
The third element of the surface ship defensive concept 
is to employ long range ship-borne missiles to destroy 
approaching anti-ship weapons. Clearly there is no practical 
means of intercepting long range self-homing torpedoes 
although it may be possible for them to be spoofed. Wire 
guided torpedoes could be thwarted only if the launching 
platform's sensors or control systems could be confused or 
destroyed prior to launch or during running time. This 
would, however, be extremely difficult to achieve in practice. 
The destruction of anti-ship missiles by long range 
ship-borne systems would be possible, although still not 
easy, if the incoming weaponry flew at medium altitude and 
moderate subsonic or transonic sp~ed. However, in the more 
likely instance of a missile flying at very low altitude, 
it would be extremely difficult for it to be acquired and 
tracked, as most sea-skimming missiles have a very small 
radar cross-section and would need to be detected against the 
188 
'clutter' of the sea's surface. However, for the purpose of 
this discussion, if it can be assumed that advanced radar 
186 
187 
188 
This is the flight profile of the Soviet SS-X-12. 
See C.A. Robinson, Jr, 'Soviets Make New SALT Bid' 
in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, 
No. 5, 2 February 1976, pp. 13, 15. 
It should be noted that the operational capabilities 
of the latest Naval Carrier AWACS (E-2C) have been 
overrated by many commentators. See the account of 
an E-2C operator in US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. 103/3/889, March 1977, p. 82. 
For the flight profiles of all Soviet designed anti-ship 
missiles, see C.A. Robinson, Jr, 'Soviets Make New SALT 
Bid' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, 
No. 5, 2 February 1976, pp. 13-16. 
This part of the argument also assumes that the defending 
ship will be operating with its surveillance radar system 
actively emitting. Operating in this manner makes 
targeting of the ship very easy as it can be identified 
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techniques and a high state of crew alertness largely resolve 
the clutte~ problem, there would still be serious difficulties 
arising from the very limited reaction time which would be 
available. If the incoming missile were detected the instant 
it broached the horizon (which seems highly improbable) and 
if it were travelling at between Mach 1 and 2, between 1\ 
and 2~ minutes would remain before impact. If the ship were 
in a high state of alert, long range weaponry could probably 
be fired within that time. But even then, directing 
interception against the clutter of the sea of a very fast 
missile, which may well be taking evasive countermeasures, 
would be extremely difficult. Even if this were possible, 
specialised proximity fuses would be required to be fitted 
to prevent premature missile detonation in response to the 
interference of the sea's surface. The problems would, of 
course, be compounded in the event of a simultaneous, rnulti-
directional attack by several weapons. The long range 
interception of v~ry high altitude anti-shipping missiles 
presents yet another series of extremely complicated 
problems. The success of a ship-borne defence system 
against this type of threat would depend upon the attacking 
weapon's speed, its long range detectability and a wide 
range of other factors. 
The fourth element of the surface naval ship's defence 
is its electronic countermeasure capability. Some active 
radar horning missiles can be spoofed with chaff and 
electronic jamming; some infra-red horning systems can be 
decoyed with flares; electro-optical systems can be 
disrupted with smoke screens; laser designation systems can 
be foiled by aerosols and smoke and some magnetic and acoustic 
188 cont'd 
and located from very long range. However,. if the 
ship's surveillance radar is not operatin~an incoming 
missile may not be detected at all, unless it emits 
an active radar signal during the terminal horning 
phase. New types of highly sensitive ship-borne 
infra-red scanning systems may provide a passive 
missile detection system for surface ships in the 
1980s. 
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homing torpedo systems can be defeated by trailed 
decoys and .jammcrs. nowevcr, it should be noted that some 
· wire and inertial guided weaponry is not susceptible to 
electronic countermeasures at all. Moreover, the 
incorporation of many counter-countermeasures in anti-ship 
weaponry is reducing greatly the effectiveness of a wide 
range of current shipborne electronic warfare (EW) systems. 
Frequency-agile homing radars, infra-red tuning, infra-red 
imaging, improved data links, multi-sensor terminal guidance 
and many other techniques are being employed to decrease 
anti-ship missile susceptibility to EW. 
The final defence element available to surface shipping 
is that of close-in weapons systems (CIWS) . Against 
submarine-, coastal- or aircraft-launched torpedo systems~ 
guns and short range missile systems are completely 
ineffective. In order to provide surface ships with a 'last 
ditch' defence against anti-ship missile attack, the United 
States has developed the PHALANX automatic gun system and 
the British the SEA WOLF short range missile system. 
However, senior United States officials have already admitted 
that, against some types of existing anti-ship missiles, the 
t t b d 1 d ·11 b ff . 189 ye o e ep aye PHALANX system wi not e e ective. 
The SEA WOLF system, on the other hand, has a minimum 
reaction time between the acquisition and tracking of 
successive targets, but before firin~ of six seconds. The 
time for missile launch to intercept would have to be added 
to this figure to calculate the time required for each 
190 
engagement. For a very short range system which may be 
confronted with coordinated multiple supersonic missile 
attacks, .this time delay may be critical. 
189 
190 
See the testimony of Commander G.R. Meinig, the US Navy's 
PHALANX Project Manager, before the Subcommittee on 
Tactical Air Power of the committee on Armed Services, 
US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? Authorization for Military 
Procurement~ Research and Development~ and Active Duty~ 
Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel S~rengths, 
Part 10, 17 March 1976, p. 5570. 
For details see 'Seawolf/GWS25, the Royal Navy's Anti-
Missile Missile System' in International Defense Review, 
Vol. 9, No. 5, October 1976, p. 792. 
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While in one-only non-manoeuvring or jamming target 
situations the capacity of both PHALANX and SEA WOLF appears 
credible, they are both potentially susceptible to external 
jamming, spoofing and decoying. Further, because of the 
very short range nature of these systems, many of the 
intercepts they have achieved, even in ideal circumstances, 
191 have taken place at ranges of 500 metres or less. It 
should be noted that if an anti-shipping missile carrying a 
550kg third generation fuel air explosive warhead is detonated 
at 300 metres range, the blast effect would be sufficient to 
destroy most types of ship-borne radio, radar, EW and other 
192 
external antennae. This would effectively render a ship 
defenceless to a following missile attack. If· detonation 
occurs at 170 metres or less, the blast effect would be 
ff . . t . k d 1 . d h. 19 3 su icient o sin a mo erate y size s ip. 
Thus, despite the fact that all of the major naval 
powers have expended very large sums of money on anti-ship 
missile defence systems of various sorts, their effectiveness 
in realistic wartime multiple attack conditions is highly 
questionable. By far the most sophisticated, elaborate 
and expensive anti-ship missile defence system in existence 
is the United State AEGIS system. In February and March 1975, 
the first complete and fully tested AEGIS system, which is 
191 
192 
193 
Ibid., and see also the testimony of Commander G.R. 
Meinig, the US Navy's PHALANX Project Manager, before 
the Subcommittee on Tactical Air Power of the Committee 
on Armed Services, US Senate, Fiscal Year 19?? 
Authorization for Military Procurement~ Research and 
Development~ and Active Duty~ Selected Reserve and 
Civilian Personnel Strengths,. Part 10, 17 March 1976, 
p. 5574. 
See this elaborated by Desmond J. Ball and Steven J. 
Rosen in 'Fuel Air Explosives for Medium Powers', 
Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 10, April 1977, 
p. 18. 
Ibid., and see also G. Johannsohn, 'Fuel Air Explosives 
Revolutionise Conventional Warfare', International 
Defense Review, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1976, 
pp . 9 9 5 ' 9 9 6 . 
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mounted on the USS NORTON SOUND, was subjected to simulated 
wartime operations for a continuous period of six days. At 
the end of this period, the AEGIS system's project manager 
and the Naval Systems Technical Representative could not 
report that the ship's systems had 'defeated' all simulated 
attacks. The best that they could state was that none of the 
manned aircraft raids had penetrated within mis~ile range 
undctectca. 194 
In an even more candid statement of surface ship 
vulnerability, the former United States Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering, Dr Malcolm Currie, pointed to the 
extreme difficulty of providing an effective defence even 
against currently depl6yed anti-ship missile systems. When 
discussing the capacity of the new Soviet aircraft carrier 
KIEV, he stated that it was not so much its V/STOL aircraft 
which made the ship so formidable: 
... rather that it is so heavily armed 
(with) SS-M-12's, a supersonic cruise 
missile that can come in (at various) 
angles and ... from a naval point of 
view - not a strategic nuclear point of 
view - is next to impossible to defend 
against.195 
The technology struggle between the offence and defence 
on and above the surface of the sea is likely to intensify 
further. On the one hand, high energy laser point defence 
systems might be available to supersede PHALANX and SEA WOLF 
by the late 1980s. But on the other hand, there are already 
Mach 2+ integral rocket/ramjet sea-skimming cruise missiles 
194 
195 
See Rear Admiral W.E. Meyer and Captain B.D. Mura, 
'Aegis' in US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 103/2/888, 
February 1977, ~- 95. The very great expense of the 
AEGIS system and the cancellation of the CGN-38 Strike 
Cruiser programme now means that AEGIS will only be 
deployed aboard the DDG-47 class. The implications of 
this for US fleet air defence are elaborated by Arthur 
D. Baker in 'Aegis~ US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. 103/7/893, July 1977, pp. 87, 88. 
Quoted by E. Ulsamer in 'The New Five-Year Defense 
Plan' in Air Force Magazine, Vol. 60, No. 1, 
January 1977, p. 63. 
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under development in both Europe and the United States and 
torpedo-ca~rying surface skimmers may be developed to avoid 
196 
close-in weapons systems altogether. In this environment, 
the survivability of major surface ships in the face of modern 
multiple anti-ship missile and torpedo attacks appears by no 
means assured. 
In addition, it should be realised that the incrcasin9 
vulnerability of large and obvious surface shipping and the 
defensive reactive measures which have followed have caused 
a severe degradation in the operational effectiveness of 
individual platforms performing their primary assigned 
roles. In some cases, self defence considerations have 
driven the elaboration and expansion of originally simple 
ship designs into larger and more complex platforms. Yet 
even when these extremely sophisticated ships are deployed 
in to high threat environments, they must be operated in 
closely coordinated teams if their survivability is to be 
maximised. However, this tactic serves to reduce their 
capabilities to perform most of their originally intended 
functions to an even greater degree, be they anti-submarine 
warfare, convoy escort, shore bombardment, the attack of 
surface shipping or some other task. 
As a result of these accumulating pressures of active 
and passive attrition, a second and more long term reaction 
to large surface ship vulnerability is now beginning to 
display itself in a definite shift away from the largest, 
most elaborate and expensive types of ship. Where the spon-
soring nation's economy can afford to replace aging large 
surface naval platforms, they are frequently being superseded 
by larger numbers of smaller, less conspicuous and less 
expensive craft. In many instances, this represents a 
deliberate attempt to reduce the wartime possibility of 
losing rapidly a significant proportion of total capability 
196 See Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 105, No. 11, 
13 September 1976, pp. 71 ff. and International Defense 
Revie~, Vol. 9, No. 6, December 1976, p. 1024. 
114 
with the destruction of a small number of ships. 197 
Submarine survivability varies greatly depending upon 
a large number of factors. Older, large, metallic submarines 
which are poorly shaped and emitters of great amounts of 
noise are much more easily detected than new, smaller, tear-
drop submarines constructed primarily of reinforced plastic 
and employing laminar flow tedhnology. Current types of 
conventional submarines will retain an additional source of 
vulnerability because of their requirement to cruise for 
significant periods with their snorkels above the surface of 
the sea. New types of non-nuclear propulsion systems are 
likely to reduce this requirement greatly. 
The second major determinant of submarine survivability 
is the intensity with which their area of operations is 
seeded with passive sonar sensors and patrolled by opposing 
anti-submarine warfare forces. There is a far higher 
probability of submarines of all types being detected, 
targeted and in a wartime situation destroyed in the 
North Atlantic and the Sea of Japan than in the Antarctic 
or the Southern Indian Oceans. In the future, the balance 
of the offence/defence struggle in this field is likely to 
depend heavily upon the ocean environments within which 
submarines are deployed. 
The Increased Vulnerability of Large and Obvious Platforms 
on the Ground 
The vulnerability and cost-effectiveness of major units 
of defence capital in the ground environment is also in a 
state of flux. The irrunediate reaction of many countries' 
armoured units to the proliferation of light, highly accurate 
197 The US Navy's move in this direction is outlined by 
E.H. Kolcum in 'Navy Request Stresses Shift to V/STOL' 
in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 4, 
24 January 1977, pp. 18 ff. A comparable trend is 
noted in the Soviet Navy by J. Erickson in 'Soviet 
Military Operational Research: Objectives and Methods', 
Strategic Review, Vol. V, No. 2, Spring 1977, p. 65. 
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and inexpensive anti-tank weapons has been an intensification 
of combined arms tactics. As a consequence, it seems 
extremely unlikely that in the future armoured units will 
manoeuvre and attack fixed positions in isolation, as 
occurred during the first hours of the Yorn Kippur War. 
Rather, infantry will travel in close proximity to tanks in 
mechanized infantry combat vehicles or open-topped urrnoured 
personnel carriers, spraying likely missile team vantage 
points with machine gun and mortar fire. In addition, self-
propelled rocket and/or tube artillery will travel in 
strength in reasonably close proximity so as to be able to 
add weight to the curtain of suppressive fire. If enemy 
surface-to-air systems can be suppressed effectively in the 
local region, close air support aircraft can be expected to 
operate in coordination. The final integrated component of 
the modern all-arms ground battlefield team is a mobile gun 
and/or missile anti-aircraft capability. Thus, in order for 
modern armoured forces to be effective and survivable, a 
large number of supportive systems are required to act in 
coordination in most environments. 
The second major reaction of armoured units to the 
proliferation of light anti-tank weaponry has been to 
improve standards of armoured protection. Vehicles equipped 
with conventional solid armour (AMX 30, LEOPARD I Al and I A2, 
M-60, T-62, T-64, etc.) are likely to remain susceptible to 
a very large number of ground and air launched anti-tank 
weapon systems. Those vehicles which are equipped with 
spaced armour (eg. LEOPARD I A3, CHARIOT) gain a degree of 
protection from the smaller man-portable shaped charge 
weapons. However, CHOBHAM 'special' ·or layered armour, which 
is currently being fitted to XMI, LEOPARD II and the latest 
CHIEFTAIN tanks, offers a much greater degree of protection. 
This armour effectively resists all but the largest artillery 
and air launched shaped-charge warheads and all currently 
deployed tank gun rounds. The most effective ground weapon 
penetration against this new armour appears to have been 
achieved by a British experimental, very high velocity, 120mm, 
armour penetrating, fin stabilised, discarding-sabot (APFSDS), 
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kinetic energy (KE) tank gun round and a United States 
experimental very high velocity 105mm, KE depleted uranium 
. 198 
tank gun round. 
The implications of these new developments in armour 
plating are very great indeed. It appears that, because 
CHOBHAM armour is not excessively expensive, it may 
eventually be deployed widely on a variety of armoured 
vehicles. This, in turn, will impact heavily upon the 
types of anti-armour weaponry which will be effective in the 
future. In terms of warheads, there appears to be the option 
of either very large shaped charge or very fast KE penetration 
rounds. As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the United 
Sta.tes is developing a 75mm anti-tank gun which fires very 
high velocity APFSDS rounds. As yet it remains to be seen 
whether this medium calibre weapon can generate sufficient 
penetrator velocity to be effective against CHOBHAM armour. 
Another consequence of the widespread introduction of 
new armour is that it may be extremely difficult to develop 
an effective new-generation man-portable anti-tank system. 
The size of the shaped charges needed would almost certainly 
require vehicles to transport a missile system as a whole. 
Another alternative might possibly be available if the 
terminal accelerator technology developed for air launched 
runway penetration bombs can be extended and applied in the 
anti-tank field. 199 This would require the development of an 
extremely rapid flight acceleration capacity for a light 
man-portable or vehicle-mounted KE round. 
The vulnerability of major ground battlefield weapons 
platforms in the future will depend at least partly upon the 
extent of CHOBHAM armour deployment and the speed with which 
198 
199 
For details see International Defense Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 1, February 1977, p. 21. 
see this technology described in NATO's Fifteen Nations, 
Vol. 21, No. 2, April-May 1976, p. 97 with regard to 
the Thomson-Brandt lOOmm tactical support bomb and in 
R.T. Pretty (ed.), Jane's Weapon Systems 1975, p. 502 
with regard to the DURANDAL penetration bomb. 
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effective ground launched direct fire anti-tank systems can 
be develop~d and deployed. However, it should be realised 
that, even before new types of anti-tank systems are developed, 
all tanks, regardless of the composition of their armour 
plating, will remain vulnerable to many air- and artillery-
launched precision guided munitions, fuel air explosives 
and anti-tank mines and minclcts. 
There appears to be a clear, identifiable trend emerging 
from the nature of the battlefield situation which is 
confronting large and obvious weapons platforms. Although 
their offensive capabilities are rising, large surface ships, 
aircraft and conventionally armoured vehicles are becoming 
increasingly easy to detect, target and destroy on 
technologically advanced battlefields. Many of the weapons 
systems which can effectively damage and destroy these 
platforms are relatively cheap to procure and hence are 
likely to be proliferated in the armed forces of many states. 
Thus, in intense battlefield situations, all of these large 
and obvious concentrations of defence capital are likely to 
be subjected to multiple coordinated attacks by new 
generations of anti-systems. In order to enhance their 
survivability, aircraft, ships and tanks are requiring the 
support of increasing numbers of supplementary systems and 
technologies and the development of more protective and 
elaborate operational tactics and doctrines. Even with heavy 
supportive technologies and tactics, there are now some 
tasks which are extremely difficult and expensive for 
200 traditional platforms to perform at all. Thus, the overall 
impact upon large and obvious weapon platforms performing 
their traditional battlefield functions is to degrade their 
survivability, stimulate a quantum jwnp in their costs and 
in many cases cause a drastic reduction in their operational 
effectiveness. 
200 For ex.;i.mple, it is becoming extremely difficult and 
expensive for tactical aircraft to perform close air 
support tasks in intense battlefield environments. 
The same can be said of large s,urface ships performing 
conventional gun fire support missions adjacent to 
coastlines occupied by well equipped enemy forces. 
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2. The Increasing Utility of Small Units 
Because large and obvious weapons platforms are being 
subjected to higher levels of both active and passive 
attrition in intense battlefield environments, it is 
becoming increasingly desirable to disperse military 
capacities. It is becoming preferable to force an enemy to 
try to find and destroy many relatively inexpensive platforms 
rather than a few high value ones. This development is 
being reinforced by the fact that the range capabilities of 
many small weapons platforms are being extended greatly and 
most forms of effective guided firepower are becoming 
increasingly light and compact. In combination, these 
factors are having the effect of making small units viable 
for a much wider range of tasks than has hitherto been the 
case. Small units are not only able to threaten and destroy 
larger units in more situations, but they themselves are 
frequently more survivable because of their lower all-media 
signatures and their high level of natural agility. Add to 
this the relatively low cost of these small units and it 
becomes clear that in many battlefield environments in the 
future small unit proliferation will be a major feature. 
The proliferation of small, relatively independent 
military units will have a large number of secondary 
implications for military structures. Most notably, research 
and development and equipment priorities are likely to change. 
Further, tactical doctrines and operational procedures are 
likely to require heavy modification if the potential offered 
by the new technologies is to be exploited fully. One likely 
change in tactical doctrine will be a reduced requirement for 
the highly vulnerable close concentration of military units 
in many environments. Concentrations of precisely directed 
firepower launched from remote locations will be able to 
provide much of the capability which in the past has been 
available only from closely deployed forces in the immediate 
battlefield area. However, at the same time, it is important 
to realise that high levels of force dispersion are likely 
to increase reliance upon high capacity command, control 
and communications facilities. In many situations the span 
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of effective command is likely to be reduced severely. 
This, in t~rn, will place very greatly increased authority 
and responsibility in the hands of small unit commanders. 
Personnel training systems will need to be adjusted to 
ensure that military personnel filling key positions within 
this type of structure are equipped adequately to meet the 
~ery intense demands which may be made upon them in 
battlefield situations. 
3. The Increasing Importance of Remaining Untargeted 
Because precision ordnance delivery at both short and 
long ranges is becoming increasingly easy and the destructive 
capacity of conventional warheads much greater, it is clear 
that one's capacity to remain untargeted is becoming an 
increasingly central determinant of battlefield outcomes. 
As has been discussed above, this is stimulating a high level 
of force dispersal, but it is also encouraging the rapid 
development of a wide array of stealth technologies and 
tactics. In terms of equipment, it means the extensive 
deployment of visual, radar, sound, heat and electronic 
suppression and camouflage systems. In the field of tactical 
doctrine, the primary effect will be to accentuate the 
requirement for dispersed and coordinated movemen.t undertaken 
in the cover of vegetation, built-up areas, darkness and 
poor weather. Where a battlefield function regularly 
requires a high level of battlefield visibility, remotely 
controlled or remotely emplaced automatic systems are likely 
to provide the most desirable means of task performance. 
4. The Increasing Importance of Target Detection, 
Identification and Localisation System Survivability 
In order for one's target acquisition sensor systems 
to remain untargeted by the enemy, it will be important for 
them to operate in as covert and passive a manner as possible. 
Thus, in the ground environment, intensified activity is 
already apparent in the development of advanced acoustic, 
seismic, optical and imaging infra-red systems. Imaging 
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infra-red scanners can already provide a completely passive 
24-hour medium range target acquisition and tracking 
b 'l' 201 . 1 1 . capa i ity. New generations of remote y emp aced passive 
battlefield sensors are also under development for both the 
ground battlefield and maritime applications. Where active 
radiation emitting target acquisition sensors are required, 
it is highly desirable that they be mobile and operated as 
far away from intense battlefield environments as possible. 
Hence, airborne target acquisition radars of various sorts 
are mostly designed to be operated from areas well behind 
the FEBA. OTH radar transmitters are also likely to be 
sited at remote locations and may, in the future, be provided 
with a degree of mobility. 
5. The Accelerating Pace of Tactical War 
A rapidly decreasing proportion of target acquisition 
and weapons guidance systems rely upon unassisted human 
optics. As a consequence, much of the security hitherto 
derived from darkness, bad weather and light camouflage is 
'being removed. The gradual lifting of this target 
acquisition constraint is having the effect of making modern 
tactical war a more intense and an almost non-stop round-
the-clock operation. This has different implications for 
different people in different situations, but on the general 
level it has obvious significance in purely human endurance 
terms. Patterns of sleeping, eating and general human 
activity are likely to be far more subject to modification 
to fit the new military requirements. Various forms of 
drugs may be dispensed to improve peak efficiency, extend 
human endurance or assist personnel to rest and sleep even 
in noisy and uncomfortable environments. 
In a broader sense, the intense and non-stop nature of 
future war will have significant force structure implications. 
201 For details see Stefan J. Geisenheyner, 1 Optronics for 
Gun-Laying and Surveillance' in Asian Defence Journal, 
January 1977, p. 14. 
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This will perhaps be most noticeable in its encouragement 
of a modul<:ir concept of rapidly rcpl a.ceablc sel f-cont<:1incd 
small units. Depending upon the nature of the battlefield 
environment, these might be of battalion, company or even 
platoon size. 
6. Changing Logistics Requirements 
The non-stop nature of modern war and the proliferation 
and wide dispersal of mobile small units will require the 
development of a new logistics support concept. The delegation 
of a larger amount of authority to lower command levels on this 
type of continuously active battlefield could be expected, in 
many environments, to stimulate an increased rate of 
ammunition expenditure. On the other hand, because of 
dramatically improved weapon accuracies and warhead 
efficiencies, far less ordnance should be required to destroy 
a given number of acquired targets than has been the case 
in the past. The balance between these competing factors 
is likely to vary considerably according to operating 
doctrines and the nature of the local battlefield environment. 
In those battlefield situations where it is possible 
for small units to be withdrawn in a modular fashion from 
the major areas of intense battlefield activity at 48 or 
72 hour intervals, it may be sufficient for the logistics 
system to concentrate upon refurbishing forces at these 
locations. However, it can be anticipated that the practical 
difficulties of this concept will necessitate the provision 
of a large amount of logistics support directly into 
intense battlefield areas. In most situations this is 
likely to be provided with conventional means of transport. 
However, in very intense environments in the future, it will 
be possible to deliver relatively compact high value goods 
in simple, re-usable terminally guided rocket-powered 
canisters. These could be ground-, sea- or air-launched to 
home onto the desired location and be restrained in the final 
.seconds of flight by an integrated parachute system. 
In an overall sense, conventional components of 
battlefield logistics systems are likely to become much more 
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vulnerable to direct attack. Roads, bridges, railways, 
tunnels, storage.and transit areas are likely to be 
relatively easy for an enemy to acquire and destroy, even 
if they are located deep behind the FEBA. As a consequence, 
centres and routes of logistics support will need to be 
concealed where possible, but certainly duplicated and 
dispersed. It will thus become increasingly important for 
logistics support vehicles to possess an off-road rough 
terrain capability. 
7. The Survivability of Camouflaged and Dispersed Land 
Based Systems 
The camouflage potential of the environments within 
which military platforms currently operate varies greatly. 
The contrast between a target's natural signature and its 
surrounding background is much more difficult to disguise 
artifically in the air and,to a lesser extent, in the sea 
than it is in the ground environment. Hence, military plat-
forms in the air and on the surface of the sea, in particular, 
are much more readily acquired by a series of short and long 
range surveillance and target acquisition sensors than 
platforms which can operate irt the naturally dense ground 
environment. 
The increased relative survivability of ground based 
systems will be reinforced as new generations of long range 
surveillance sensors, precision guided munitions and ground 
based aircraft are developed and deployed. In combination, 
these systems will make the performance of a much wider array 
of military functions from ground based locations feasible 
and economic. For example, in many environments, much of the 
traditional close air support task is likely to be performed 
in the future by a mix of terminally guided rocket and tube 
artillery systems of various calibres. Tactical airpower's 
traditional long range {nterdiction functiori against fixed 
targets in the enemy's rear is likely to be performed far 
more cost effectively in the future by ground launched 
terminal homing cruise missiles. Where there is a requirement 
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for mobile targets to be hit, particularly in the immediate 
battlefielq area, RPV systems will be capable of either 
direct ordnance delivery or target designation for remotely 
launched munitions. Further, in many battlefield 
environments, it seems likely that the degree of air cover 
required by one's ground forces will be provided effectively 
by ground based air defence systems on their own. In intense 
battlefield environments, manned aircraft are likely to 
become decreasingly competitive in cost-effectiveness terms 
with an array of new technology options. 
The cost-effectiveness of medium and large surface 
shipping is also suffering a rapid decline. In many future 
environments, surface ship and submarine detection, 
identification and localisation is likely to be most 
efficiently performed by a mix of satellite sensors, long 
range passive sonar arrays, OTH radar systems and electronic 
202 detection and identification systems. In some situations, 
the accuracy of these systems is likely to be sufficient to 
permit long range ground launched conventional cruise missile, 
torpedo carrying missile or RPV designated missile attacks. 
In relatively benign maritime environments, very large 
multi-mission, land based, long endurance aircraft will be 
available to prosecute contacts, particularly submarine 
contacts, from closer range when this is desirable. These 
aircraft will also be able to launch multiple long range 
stand~off attacks against surface shipping and perform the 
coastal bombardment role by launching very large numbers of 
relatively cheap precision guided munitions from extended 
stand-off ranges. This type of aircraft would not be 
designed for operations in high intensity environments. 
202 As was noted earlier in the chapte4 satellite systems 
are likely to play an increasingly important role in 
this function for the major powers. See Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 105, No. 18, 1 November 
1976, p. 19 for an elaboration of the satellite's role 
by W.H. Pickering, Head of the US National Academy of 
Sciences Naval Studies Board and a former Director of 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 
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However, in rnilrginul or po ten tiully hos tile s i Lua t_Lons, 
they could be given il degree of protection through their 
capacity to refuel and vector a small number of accompanying 
manned or unmanned, ground or air launched fighter aircraft. 
In summary then, the overall trend is likely to be 
towards larger numbers of ground based systems. Part of the 
stimulus for this development is likely to come from the 
lower procurement and operating costs of most of these 
systems when compared with traditional manned aircraft and 
ship based systems. But the major reason for the move to 
ground based systems will be their very much greater 
survivability in intense battlefield environments when 
compared to alternative systems in the air or at sea. It is 
re-emphasised that this is simply because it is becoming 
much easier to detect targets in the air and sea at both 
short and long ranges than targets which are concealed in 
the land environment. When this is considered in conjunction 
with the fact that the costs of accurate ordnance delivery 
over long ranges are falling rapidly, many of those functions 
which can technically be fulfilled by ground based systems 
will be most cost-effectively performed by them. This is 
particularly the case when the major evaluative criterion in 
the relative assessment of alternative systems is cost per 
kill. 203 
8. The Increasing Vulnerability of Large, Fixed, Obvious 
and Unprotected Base and Support Areas 
Unless base structures are designed, constructed and 
maintained in a highly dispersed, camouflaged and covert 
fashion, their acquisition for targeting is normally relatively 
easily undertaken in times of peace from public documents, 
through diplomatic channels or foreign agents. However, despite 
203 This assessment criterion is most applicable to 
struggles which might reasonably be expected to 
be lengthy. If one could be sure that a conflict 
would necessarily be of very short duration, it 
might be more appropriate for economic factors 
to be given less emphasis. 
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the ease with which they can be acquired as targets, base 
structures and essential elements of the national infra-
structure are highly vulnerable only if precision guided 
weapons can penetrate to the areas in which they are 
located. As long as an effective and affordable anti-
ballistic missile system is not developed, intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can probably reach any target 
on the earth's surface. However, because of their enormous 
complexity and expense, ICBMs are likely to be possessed 
in the future by only a few major powers. Cruise missiles, 
on the other hand, represent a much simpler technology which 
will be significantly less expensive to .acquire and 
proliferate. The new surveillance and target acquisition 
technologies should make the detection of cruise missile 
carrying platforms (aircraft, ships, submarines, etc.) a 
feasible proposition in many environments even at long 
range. However, the detection, identification, localisation 
and interception of long range cruise missiles in flight may 
be a much more difficult proposition. Large, relatively 
unsophisticated cruise missiles possess many of the 
signature characteristics of conventional aircraft and 
hence should be detected relatively easily by satellite 
sensors and OTH and AWACS radar systems. However, the 
stealth technologies employed in the latest cruise missiles 
(eg. the US Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) TOMAHAWK 
and the Air LaunchE'd Cruise Missile (ALCM)) effectively 
reduce the radar signature of these systems to a degree 
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where it is comparable_ to that of a seagull. It has yet 
to be demonstrated conclusively whether these missiles can 
be detected and tracked consistently by the new generation 
long range surveillance systems. 
204
. The radar cross section of SLCM [TOMAHAWK] 
is said to be the equivalent of a seagull's, 
while the Navy is attempting to reduce it to 
that of a sparrow by the use of surface coatings 
which at low altitudes would break the typical 
soviet ground radar's ability to lock on. 
cited from J.P. Geddes, 'The sea Launched Cruise 
Missile' in International Defense Review, Vol. 9, 
No. 2, April 1976, p .. 201. 
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A country's capacity for intercepting incoming cruise 
missiles would also depend heavily upon the length of 
cruise missile flight from an undetected launcher to the 
target. For example, it is unlikely that satellite, OTH 
radar or AWACS vectored air defences would be capable of 
preventing a surprise cruise missile attack upon coastal 
installations from an undetected submarine cruising close 
offshore. However, if cruise missile flight time to target 
was in the order of twenty minutes or more, it is possible 
that this might permit successful interception by fighter 
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aircraft stationed nearby. 
The essential point to be made here is that in some 
environments it may be possible to provide a defence against 
some types of long range cruise missile attacks. However, 
such defences would be vulnerable to saturation in the 
circumstances of a multi-missile attack and they would be 
very sensitive to the degradation or destruction of the long 
range defensive vectoring capability, whether this is 
provided by satellite sensors, OTH radar, AWACS, a very 
elaborate ground control intercept radar system or a 
combination of the four. Extensive efforts would be 
required to ensure the survivability of this essential 
command and control capacity in the face of a wide range of 
threats. 
Given that effective defences against long range cruise 
missiles and precision guided weapon-equipped strike aircraft 
may not be available or effective in all circumstances and 
in all environments, there will be an expanding requirement 
for the vulnerability of base and support facilities to be 
reduced. 
205 This assumes, of course, that the AWACS or OTH radar 
systems can actually detect incoming cruise missiles 
which incorporate stealth technologies and also that 
fighter aircraft radars and other systems are suffic-
iently sensitive to make close range interception 
feasible. This may be extremely difficult, especially 
if the cruise missiles are flying low and hence are 
heavily camouflaged by ground clutter from some types 
of downward-looking sensors. 
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The vulnerability of military support facilities can 
be decreas~d by dispersing and hardening facilities within 
local base areas. However, it should be realised that in 
an era of precision guided fuel air explosives and hard 
structure munitions, local dispersal and sheltering alone 
may not provide a very effective solution. Moreover, the 
vulnerability of military facilities represents only a 
proportion of the total problem. There are many elements of 
national economic infrastructures - bridges, factories, 
wareh.ouses, railways, tunnels, etc. - which play central roles 
in supporting military capacities. Because of the scope of 
military support vulnerability, both inside and outside 
immediate base areas, this particular problem is not amenable 
to any single, simple solution. Rather, a variety of 
measures is likely to be required if a high degree of 
endurance is to be provided to overall military capacity. 
Many types of military operational systems can be 
dispersed and concealed to prevent targeting. Some can be 
made mobile and prepared with alternative operating sites. 206 
However, factories, transport networks, power stations and 
other key facilities are difficult to conceal and many are 
expensive to harden. In these categories, it may be 
necessary to design selectively and construct a degree of 
system redundancy to ensure the provision of services which 
are vital in wartime situations. 
The most sophisticated and expensive defence equipment 
is of very limited value in military terms if its base and 
operating support system is highly vulnerable to attack. 
206 Air, Naval and Army base refuelling and rearming 
facilities can be given a large degree of protection 
in this manner. European practice is most notable in 
this regard. See, for instance, The Defence Forces of 
Switzerland (A supplementary booklet published by 
The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal, Tavistock, U.K., 
1974), pp. 29, 30 and D. Chopping, 'In Fighting Trim -
The Swedish Air Force' in International Defense 
Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, June 1973, pp. 303 ff. 
128 
9. The Role of Surprise Attack 
If there is a means by which a country's long range 
surveillance and target acquisition sensors can be degraded 
or destroyed in an effective manner, then that country is 
becoming increasingly vulnerable to powerful surprise strikes. 
If, in addition, that country has not concealed, dispersed 
and protected key elements of its defence structure, then 
new generations of precision guided weapons are making it 
increasingly susceptible to rapid and decisive defeat. If 
ships, aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, 
communications, command and control facilities and other 
units of defence capital are grouped in unconcealed and 
unprotected concentrations, it is becoming very easy for 
them to be targeted and destroyed by long range terminally 
guided weaponry. 
However, if long range surveillance and target 
acquisition sensors are concealed, dispersed, protected and, 
where possible, duplicated and made mobile, it wil1 be 
extremely difficult for an opponent to mount a surprise attack. 
Further, if key elements of the defendingcountry's support 
base and national infrastructure are also concealed, 
dispersed, protected and provided with a degree of system 
redundancy, this will serve to enhance defensive endurance 
greatly in a manner which is not likely to be sensitive 
to an opponent's development of new conventional military 
capacities. 
10. The Increasing Necessity for Total Defence Planning 
One consequence arising from developments in long 
range missile, RPV and conventional warhead technologies 
will be to increase greatly the ease with which large numbers 
of countries will be able to target and, if they wish, 
attack the economic infrastructures of opposing states from 
bases within their own national boundaries. Thus modern 
conventional warfare, even between relatively minor states, 
is likely to threaten the existence of all aspects of the 
societies involved. As a consequence, it seems probable that 
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many states will strive to reduce the vulnerability not 
only of key elements of the national infrastructure 
which support the military defence effort in the most direct 
sense, but also a much wider array of targets, including the 
major centres of population. These broad national security 
considerations are likely to surface as a significant 
influence in many aspects of national development policy 
and planning. 
11. The Stimulation of Greater Selectivity in Technology 
Choices by the Rising Costs of Many Military Systems 
In the case of many new and improved conventional 
·1·t · · · ·d1 207 h' mi i ary systems, unit costs are rising rap1 y. T is 
is particularly the case regarding complex multi-purpose 
systems which involve numerous integrated technologies. 
For instance, Desmond Ball makes the case that the costs of 
US fighter aircraft increased between 50 and 80 times from 
1940 to 1975. 208 S.J. Dudzinsky and James Digby support 
this general view by arguing that the costs of US aircraft 
carriers doubled in real terms in the decade to 1975 and 
that the average unit costs of US main battle tanks rose by 
bl t . 209 a compara e propor ion. 
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For a detailed discussion of the costs of an array of 
new weapons technologies see J.P. Large, 'Notes on 
Costs~ an appendix to S.J. Dudzinsky1 Jr, and James 
Digby, Qualitative Constraints on Conventional Armaments: 
An Emerging Issue (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation Paper 
R - 1957, 1976), pp. 87-91. 
See the discussion in Desmond J. Ball, 'Australia's 
Tactical Air Requirements and the Criteria for Evaluating 
Tactical Aircraft for Australian Procurement' in Desmond 
Ball (ed.), The Future of Tactical Airpower in the 
Defence of Australia, pp. 61-65. 
See their argument in S.J. Dudzinsky, Jr, and James Digby, 
'The Strategic and Tactical Implications of New Weapons 
Technologies' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia : Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National Uni-
versity, 1977), pp. 49-56. This case can also be sub-
stantiated by reference to the cost escalation of a number 
of other weapons platforms and systems. For example, with 
regard to attack aircraft, see William D. White, US· Tactical 
Air Power: Missions Forces and Costs (Washington D.C., 
The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 55-59. 
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Certainly the operational capacity of almost all of 
the new teGhnology systems surpasses that of their 
predecessors by a significant margin. Because of this, 
the cost-effectiveness of some of the new systems in some 
operational environments is difficult to dispute. For 
instance, while a guided glide bomb may cost thirty times 
that of an unguided iron bomb, it may, in effect, be able 
to accomplish tasks which would otherwise require hundreds 
of iron bombs, multiple aircraft sorties and greatly 
increased risks to both aircraft and aircrews. 
Cost/performance trade-offs in terms of high/low 
technology mixes are already accepted practice in many 
. 1 . 210 . 
nationa security structures. However, the magnitude of 
the current capital equipment cost expansion is likely to 
place even greater pressure upon the processes of selecting 
new technology elements in total force structures. 
12. The Increasing Cost-Effectiveness of Medium Technology 
Defensive Structures 
Whereas most current defence structures are designed to 
perform both offensive and defensive functions, this situation 
may change as a consequence of new technology developments. 
In particular, there is now increased scope for the 
development of relatively inexpensive specialised structures 
for tactical defence. 
The most desirable selection of defensive technologies 
is likely to vary greatly according to local conditions. 
However, in many countries, it should be possible to procure 
a small number of carefully selected high technology early 
warning, identification and long range target detection systems 
210 The concept of a high-low cost equipment mix has been 
the subject of an intense debate in the United States 
ever since the original proposals·of this type were 
made for the US Navy by Admiral E.R. Zumwalt. 
For an elaboration of the issues involved see the 
article by him entitled 'High-Low' in United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 102/4/878, April 
1976, p. 46, and also the discussion in subsequent 
issues of the same journal. 
and a large number of medium technology weapons systems 
which, when structured into appropriate military units, 
should provide a highly survivable capacity to defend in 
depth. 
In practice, the selective exploitation of the 
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potential which the new technologies provide is likely to 
have the effect of enhancing greatly the deterrence and 
tactical defensive capacity of a wide range of states. For 
countries whose potential enemies are equipped substantially 
with new technology weaponry, the utility of war, as distinct 
from the threat of war, will be reduced greatly. However, 
it should be noted that,if a small or medium state is 
confronted by a major power opponent, its possession of 
advanced defensive technologies, while greatly increasing 
its power of deterrence and tactical defence, will do little 
to increase the effectiveness of that country's strategic 
defences (ie. to protect its total economic infrastructure). 
13. The Enhanced Capacities of Terrorist Groups 
Although national governments will retain a clear 
superiority in conventional military power, the increasingly 
light and compact nature of guided firepower will provide 
stateless groups with a means of inflicting violence in a 
highly discriminatory manner from stand-off ranges. 
Terrorist groups armed with modern anti-aircraft, anti-tank 
and anti-shipping weaponry will pose a threat of quite a. 
. 211 
different type to that of the past. 
211 For a detailed elaboration of this issue see 
Brian M. Jenkins, 'High Technology Terrorism 
and Surrogate War: The Impact of New 
Technology on Low-Level Violence' in Geoffrey 
Kemp, Robert L. Pf al tzgraf f, Jr, Uri Ra' anan 
(eds.), The Other Arms Race: New Technologies 
and Non-Nuclear Conflict (Lexington, Massachusetts, 
Lexington Books, 1975), pp. 91-108. 
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14. The Partial Replacement of Tactical Nuciear 
Weapons by Precision Guided Munitions 
The effectiveness of advanced precision guided weapon 
systems of various sorts against small hardened and large 
unhardened targets will make them a viable alternative to 
tactical nuclear weapons in the performance of many 
battlefield functions. The precision accuracies of these 
weapons serves to reduce greatly the requirements for the 
enormous quantities of firepower which only nuclear weapons 
can effectively provide. Hence, precision guided munition 
equipped forces of moderate size can effectively deter major 
powers on the tactical level and, if deterrence fails, they 
can effectively destroy attacking forces, their immediate 
support and, in many environments, important parts of their 
national domestic infrastructures. As a consequence, 
precision guided munitions may be substituted for tactical 
nuclear weapons w0en major powers wish to destroy major 
enemy forces, when major powers wish to enhance a client's 
defensive capacity or when an independent state wishes to 
·. 212 
enhance greatly its self defence capacity. 
Nuclear weapons (as well as chemical and biological 
weapons to some degree) , because of their unsurpassed 
destructive capacity, are likely to retain a level of 
deterrence potential which exceeds that of any conventional 
munition. The requirement for this level of deterrence, as 
well as the prestige and other incentives which are alway~ 
likely to accompany the possession of tactical nuclear 
weapons, will most probably thwart attempts to reduce non-
superpower holdings of nuclear weapons. However, because 
the strictly military requirement for this type of highly 
expensive large hard target destructive capacity is becoming 
more limited in most environments) pressure for the acquisition 
of tactical nuclear weapons may be decreased in many countries. 
212 The potential for precision guided munitions replacing 
nuclear weaponry is discussed in greater length in 
A. Wohlstetter1 'Threats and Promises of Peace: Europe 
and America in the New Era' in Orbis, Vol. 17, No. 4, 
Winter 1974, pp. 1107-1144. 
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15. Multi-Party Mutual Deterrence 
One significant consequence of the wider distribution 
of accurate long range bombardment capacities is likely to 
, 
be the development of a complex web of mutual deterrence. 
Even where neighbouring states are in conflict over 
serious matters, if their long range precision guided 
munition capacity is comparable, it seems probable that in 
many situations each will be constrained from unrestricted 
deep infrastructure attack by the prospect of heavy 
retaliation. 
Conclusion 
Both civilian and military defence bureaucracies face 
a major challenge if they are to exploit fully the potential-
ities of the new technology environment. Forthcoming 
developments in conventional weaponry and the possibilities 
they offer are of an order of magnitude greater than anything 
experienced in the past. 
However, the processes of adjusting to the new technology 
environment are extremely complex. As Dr Malcolm Currie, 
the recently retired US Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering,points out, appropriate adaption to the new 
technology environment involves much more than the simple 
placement of new technology items on defence equipment shopping 
lists: 
213 
... I want to make the point that 
technology per se is not enough ... 
Equally important to technology is its 
innovative use in the overall military 
context. That is why I believe that 
the development. of tactics is every bit 
as important as hardware and must be made 
an explicit and implicit part of the design 
evolution and development process.213 
However, the choice of new technologies and the most 
Quoted in Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, 
No. 21, 24 May 1976, p. 56. 
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appropriate tactics, doctrines and structures for their 
employment.will vary greatly according to local terrain, 
vegetation, weather and other factors. The lessons which 
might be available from the experiences of others can be 
expected to provide only a generalised guide to the 
requirements of local conditions. Hence, for most countries, 
the only practical method of resolving the problem satis-
factorily will be the initiation of an extensive programme 
of field trials and experiments in an effort to derive 
solutions most appropriate for the local environment. 
Flexibility of thought, a high level of originality and a 
willingness to encourage new ideas will be essential in this 
process. 
In any society, the instigation of such a process of 
fundamental reassessment is certain to arouse the resistance 
of military, bureaucratic and political vested interests. 
However, as Dr Currie points out, this is an essential 
component of any process of serious re-evaluation and 
restructuring: 
The main point is that ... [we] 
... must ... tear down the barriers of 
tradition, of bureaucratic inertia and 
thinking, of service roles and missions, 
of familiar scenarios projected from the 
experience of the past. The world is 
changing fast. The opportunities are 
there and our failure to perceive them 
first could be fatal.214 
Thus, for those countries with national security 
structures which are sufficiently flexible to accept the 
requirement for change and conduct a thorough reappraisal, 
the prospects are that signifi6antly different defence 
concepts, postures, structures, operational concepts and 
equipment priorities will most probably emerge. 
On the other hand, those countries which do not undertake 
to adapt their defence structures to meet the requirements of 
the new technology environment will suffer a significant 
214 Ibid. 
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decline in their relative security, for it is certain that 
national se9urity structures which have not mastered the 
new technology environment will become increasingly 
vulnerable to those which have. 
PART I I 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHANGES 
It is clear from the discussion in Part I that the 
nature of Australia's strategic environment and security 
function has changed fundamentally during the past decade. 
The task of securing Australia's local interests with a 
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high degree of independence in the 1980s differs substantially 
from that of maintaining a capacity to deploy single service 
contingents to support the foreign commitments of major 
power allies in the 1960s. 
In particular, Australia will in the future require a 
capacity to meet a completely different and much broader 
range of pressures and threats. It is the primary purpose 
of Chapter 3 to outline the character of the new threat 
environment and to discuss the extent of Australia's natural 
vulnerabilities. 
A second implication of the changed strategic 
circumstances is that Australia's security response 
requirements have altered substantially. Some of those 
aspects of the current security system which are inappropriate 
for meeting the demands of the new environment are identified 
and analysed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAP'i'ER 3 
WIDENING DEMANDS UPON AUSTRALIA'S RESOURCES 
Because of the changed character of the strategic 
environment, the range of security contingencies for which 
Australia requires a capacity to respond is clearly much 
broader than that of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet the exact 
nature of the pressures and threats to which Australia may 
be subjected in the future is very uncertain. This high 
level of unpredictability is the source of a large number of 
Australia's security planning problems. However, despite 
the imprecision which necessarily characterises the discussion 
of pressures and threats in this environment, it is possible 
to gain some valuable insights into the nature of 
Australia's future security task by examining systematically 
the breadth of the nation's susceptibilities. 
For the purposes of the following analysis the full 
spectrum of international pressures and threats is divided 
into three categories. 
1. The pressures of peace. These concern the 
mostly non-violent but also the sub-national violent 
pressures which are a product of the stresses and strains 
implicit in the world environment in the absence of open 
conflict between states. 
2. The pressures of international crises. This 
category concerns the pressures which might be directed 
against Australia as an indirect result of a conflict or 
war overseas in which Australia is not directly involved. 
3. The pressures of international aggression. This 
category includes those types of pressure which might be 
applied in the context of an external state mounting a 
direct attack upon Australia 8 employing economic, political, 
psychological and/or military means. 
Before considering the types of pressure which might 
arise in each of these three sections, it should be noted 
that each category possesses a varying degree of applicability 
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when its relationship to the Australian environment is 
discussed. The pressures of peace are manifested in many 
types of activity which occur daily. The pressures of 
international crises, while not currently affecting 
Australia in a significant sense, have done so on several 
occasions during the post-war period (eg. during the Korean 
War 1950-53, Indonesian Confrontation 1963-66, the 1973-74 
oil crisis, etc.). However, assigning a high level of 
relevance to the pressures of international aggression, 
especially concerning those threats which are very demanding 
in their response requirements, is far more difficult in the 
Australian environment. This is partly because of the 
limited historical precedent for this type of high level 
threat to Australia. But it is also caused by the fact that 
the current regional and global situation is structured in 
such a manner that it would be difficult for such threats 
to arise quickly. Dr O'Neill has argued that at least one 
of three major changes in the international environment 
would be necessary, although not of themselves sufficient, 
prior to the presentation of a major threat to Australia: 
1 
a. The superpowers change their attitudes 
to each other to the point where one 
or both consider the risk of a serious 
clash to be acceptable ... 
b. World class struggle sharpens a great 
deal while at the same time Australia 
conducts herself in a manner which is 
viewed as extremely irresponsible by the 
less privileged nations ... 
c. Regional and great power actors acquire 
both a high degree of military capacity 
for aggressive action at a long range 
and a high degree of strategic freedom 
to pursue selfish interests at the 
expense of otheis.l 
Dr Robert O'Neill, Changes Required in the International 
Environment for the Development of Extreme Threats to 
Australia. (A paper prepared for a seminar entitled 
'The Potential for Extreme Threats in the Ihternational 
Environment and Australia's Response Options' held by 
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The 
Australian National University, Canberra, on 3-4 March 
1977) I PP• 5-7. 
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This is not to say that major international changes of 
these type~ could not take place rapidly. In some conceivable 
circumstances they could. But the sheer scale of the change 
which would be required serves to limit the potential for 
high level threats arising against Australia. Excepting 
possibly the circumstances where a superpower becomes 
Australia's opponent, much more change would be required in 
the international environment than a simple alteration of a 
single actor's intentions. 
Despite the relative improbability of major direct 
threats arising against Australia in the short term, this 
does not negate the value of their study and serious 
consideration. If such a threat actually did arise, the 
implications for Australian national security would clearly 
be of a much higher order of magnitude than those of the 
lower level threat categories. 
While it is difficult to speculate about the probability 
of major threats arising against Australia, something can be 
stated about their timing. For a high level threat to 
develop against Australia, a large amount of change would be 
required in the international environment. Where the change 
required is primarily that of perceptions and/or intentions, 
a major threat could develop quickly. However, where the 
change required in the international environment involves not 
only an alteration of intentions but also a substantial 
development of military capacities, the threat could not 
readily arise in a short period. 
A similar argument can be made concerning the development 
of medium level threats. However, in their case, a lesser 
amount of change is required in the international environment 
in order for them to arise. Again, where this change does 
not involve a significant alteration of military capacities 
but merely a change in intentions, such threats could, in 
some circumstances, arise very quickly. 
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1. The Pressures of Peace 
Diplomatic channels provide the venue for a wide range 
of low level pressures. These can range from the very 
casual, off-the-cuff ambiguous remark made at a cocktail 
party to a much more formal comment, suggestion, expression 
of opinion or protest. Most international actors, 2 
including the Australian Government, engage in elaborate 
and almost continuous processes of bargaining and negotiation 
over a very wide set of issues, such as relations with 
neighbours, international economic aid, disarmament 
measures, UN related activities and sea bed boundaries, to 
name just a few. From time to time these forums are used 
for minor trials of strength and for the management of 
disputes which threaten an escalation of tension. 
Low level pressure can also be applied through a range 
of economic measures and to some of these Australia is 
unusually vulnerable. Because the normal peacetime economy 
is oriented towards veryhigh levels of international trade, 
the variation of tariffs, import and export quotas, quality 
restrictions, currency values, foreign investment holdings 
and a host of other variables by trading partners can affect 
the prosperity of many sectors of Australian industry to a 
marked degree. The major consumers of Australia's export 
products are probably best placed to cause disruption in 
this regard. As can be seen from Table 1, Japan, the United 
States and the countries of the European Economic Community 
acquire nearly two-thirds of Australia's export product. 
Their restriction of imports, by whatever means and whether 
with the intention of applying pressure or merely attempting 
to solve domestic economic or political problems, can have 
2 International actors may be defined to include nation 
states, interstate organisations, multinational 
corporations and sub-national groups such as terrorist 
organisations. However, during the course of this 
discussion, references primarily refer to nation states. 
Table 1 
AllSTHALIAN EXPORTS AND l:\ll'OHTS, l'HOl'OHTIONS, JIY COllN'I HY OF 
CONSIGNl\IENT OR OIHGIN 
(Per ccnl) 
Expor/,, Imports 
-------
---------· 
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Country 1952-53 1962-63 1972-73 1952-53 1962-63 1972- 7 3 
---------- --·----------·-~--·----- ------·--------
Arab Republic of Egypt 0.39 0.10 0. (,6 0. 18 0.01 0.00 
Austria 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.23 0. 31 0. 31 
Bahrain 0.04 0.06 0.22 2.90 0.02 O.D 
Belgium-Luxembourg 3.69 2.16 0.99 1.07 0.65 0. 89 
Brazil 0.05 0.02 0.08 0. 18 0.12 0.23 
Canada 0.99 I. 77 2.66 3.80 4. 25 3.26 
China, People's Republic of 0.08 6.01 1.01 0.27 0. 52 1.21 
Denmark 0.08 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.32 0.38 
Finland 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.17 0. 52 0.59 
France 8.72 4.92 3.0J I .80 1.64 I. 83 
Germany, Federal Republic of 2.57 3 .18 3.28 2.64 5.42 6.99 
Greece 0.09 0.16 0.49 0.00 0.06 0.09 
Hong Kong 0.56 I. 88 I. 53 0.10 0.71 1.94 
lndi;1 I. 97 I. 73 0.60 2.85 I .67 0. 77 
Indonesia . 0.58 0.29 1.20 4 .19 2.71 0.33 
Iran 0.04 0. 18 0.42 0.06 I. 78 0.45 
Iraq. 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.09 0. 50 
Italy. 5 .13 4.09 2 .15 1.02 I. 81 2 .10 
Japan 9.64 16.09 31.10 0.91 5.98 17.93 
Korea, Republic of (a) 0.30 0.85 (a) 0.02 0.25 
Kuwait (a) 0.20 0.25 (a) I. 76 0.73 
Malaysia (a) I. 38 I. 56 (a) I. 58 0.93 
Nauru 0.06 0.15 0.08 0.25 0.28 0.29 
Netherlands 0.93 0.67 1.03 I. 16 1.27 I. 35 
New Caledonia . 0.29 0.23 0. 31 0.02 0.06 0.0~ 
New Zealand 3.29 6.09 5.24 0.78 I .64 3. 15 
Norway 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.47 0. 33 0.29 
Pakistan 0.52 0.66 0.11 0.44 0.53 0.11 
Papua New Guinea 0.70 I. 79 2. 17 0.92 o .. 68 0. (,0 
Philippines 0.06 0. 58 0.79 0.01 0.07 0.19 
Poland 0.42 0. 58 0.88 0.01 0.05 0.09 
Saudi Arabia (a) 0.17 0.22 (a) I. 85 0.49 
Singapore. 1.47 I. 57 2.12 I. 14 0. 32 0.97 
South Africa, Republic of 0.42 0. 88 I. 53 0.60 0. 75 0.50 
Spain 0.02 0.47 0.36 0.13 0.21 0.49 
Sri Lanka. I. 69 0.60 0.18 I. 90 0. 79 0.23 
Sweden 0. 33 0. 30 0.36 1.32 1.66 2.01 
Switzerland 0.25 0.08 0.12 0. 79 I . 31 l.60 
Taiwan 0.08 0.19 I. 12 0.01 0.05 I. 32 
Thailand 0.14 0.34 0. 58 0.01 0.04 0.17 
United Kingdom 41.23 18.66 9.68 41 .76 30.45 18.63 
United States of America 6.64 12.35 12.21 16.57 21.27 20. 87 
U.S.S.R. 0.19 I. 36 I. 99 0.14 0.05 0.07 
Yugoslavia 0.05 0. 55 0.80 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Other countries . 6.40 6.00 5.36 8.98 4.27 3.60 
'For Orders' and Country of origin or 
destination unknown 0. 72 0.08 0.06 0.10 0.46 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100 00 100.00 
(al Comparable figures not availabl:. 
This table has been reproduced from Australian Bureau 
of Statistics,OfficiaZ Yearbook of Australia 1974 
(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1975), p. 324. 
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. . . l' 3 a significant impact upon Austra ia. 
The potential for applying low level pressure through 
the disruption of imports to Australia is much more restricted. 
The Australian economy is 
and most basic materials 
self-sufficient in essential foods 
4 
required for its short-term sustenance. 
3 
4 
Probably the most notable examples of this influence in 
recent years have been the quotas on beef imports into 
the United States and Japan and the much broader 
restrictions on a wide range·of primary products being 
imported into the European Economic Community. 
Australia's dependence on imports is at present limited 
to a relatively small, although increasing, number of 
commodity areas. At present the list primarily comprises 
liquid fuels and lubricants, an array of chemical' 
materials, some pharmaceutical products and a wide 
variety of medium and high technology manufactured goods 
machine tools, transport equipment, motor vehicle compon-
ents etc. The table reproduced below provides an 
indication of the quantities involved. 
7\USTRALIAN IMPORTS OF MERCHANDISE, BY ECONOMIC CLASS 
Proportion <>l ralw· of i111po1 ,'. 
Value ($'000 f.o.b.) of merchandise (per cent) 
1970--71 1971-72 1972-73 1970-71 1971-72 1972-73 
PURPOSE 
Producers' materials for use in-
Building and con,trultion 146,947 135,.5.13 167,084 3. (, 3.4 4.1 
Rural industries 45,383 40,768 47,880 I. I 1.0 1.2 
Manufacturing-
Motor vehicle assembly(a) 288, I 00 256,379 228, 760 7.0 6.5 5 .6 
Other(b) 1,297,846 1,257,555 1,269,279 31. 7 31. 8 31.2 
Total producers' materials(b) 1,778,276 1,690,234 1,713,002 43.4 42.7 42.1 
Capital equipment(<')-
Producers' equipment 981,930 915,335 855,892 24.0 23.2 21.0 
Transport equipment-
Complete road vehicles and as-
sembled chassis 155,285 I 59,5:13 193,853 .1. 8 4.0 4.8 
Railway equipment, vessels and 
civil aircraft 137,780 90,072 69,382 3.3 2.3 I. 7 
Total capital equipment 1,274,995 1,164,940 1,/19,127 31.1 29.5 27.5 
Finished consumer goods-
Food, beverages and tobacco 157,2:14 165,121 171,073 3.8 4.2 4.2 
Clothing and accessories 57, 108 76,438 88,180 1.4 I. 9 2.2 
All other(d) 580,210 628,298 736,561 14.2 15.9 18. 1 
Total, finished consumer goods(d) 794,552 869,857 995,814 19.4 22.0 24.5 
Fuels and lubricants(e) 61,495 69,406 68,933 I. 5 1. 8 1. 7 
Auxiliary aids to production([) 99,823 100,515 93,505 2.4 2.5 2.3 
Munitions and war stores 89,419 59,824 81,530 2.2 1.4 2.0 
Grand total 4,098,560 3,954,775 4,071,911 100.0 100.0 100.0 
(a) Owing to insufficient information, it is not possible to treal unassembled tractors and other machinery in a similar 
manner to motor vehicles, and all such machinery and replacement parts therefor arc treated as capita! equipment whether 
imported in an a<;semblcd or unassembled condition. (h) Excludes a percentage for piece-goods to he sold at retail, 
and paper to be used solely for wrapping. which arc recorded in Finished consumer goorls. Ai'I other; and Auxiliary a;d.;; 
to production, respectively. (CJ See footnote (a). (d) Includes a percentage for picce·goods to be sold at retail: 
SC'<' footnote (b). (C') Excludes crude petroleum, which is included in Producer~· matPria/s, Ma11ufacturing~Other. (f) 
Includes a perccntag~ for paper to be ustd solely for wrapp:ng; ser foctnotc (h). (g) The class fuels and luhricants 
consist~ of goods 'simply tran:~formcJ'. and the classes Capital equipment and Munitions and war stores entirely of goods 
'rnore clahorately transformed'. The class Auxiliary aids to production is about equally divided between goods ·~:imply 
transformed' and 'clahoratdy tram.formed'. 
This table is reproduced from Australian Bureau of 
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Moreover, the range of corrunodities which she does import, 
although i~creasing substantially, 5 is available from a 
number of intensely competitive alternative suppliers. 
Hence, although the variation of imports by a major 
supplier such as the United States, Japan or the United 
Kingdom could cause severe inconvenience to particular 
sectors of the economy, Australia is not susceptible to long-
term disruptive activities of this type undertaken by a 
single international actor. Australia's vulnerability to 
these pressures would only increase significantly if a 
number of commodity producer states combined to enforce trading 
restrictions. However, even this extreme action would probably 
only have a major and immediate impact upon Australia if the 
commodity involved was oil. 
There are some low level international pressures to 
which Australia is vulnerable which could be applied with or 
without the sanction of a foreign government. For example, 
in the economic sphere, disruptive activities initiated by 
foreign-owned or multinational corporations could be the 
cause of serious difficulties in some circumstances. Their 
domination of a series of key Australian industries 6 and 
their vast capacity to transfer funds, technologies and 
ultimately productive capacity and jobs between countries 
does impose a significant constraint upon governmental 
prerogatives. 
4 cont'd 
5 
6 
Statistics#Official Yearbook of Australia 1974, p. 322. 
A much more detailed classification of Australian imports 
appears on p. 319 of the same publication. 
In recent years many areas of Australian secondary industry 
have declined in the face of greatly increased competition 
from imported products originating principally from newly 
industrialised Asian countries. This phenomenon is 
discussed at length in the report to the Prime Minister 
by the Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing 
Industry, Policies for Development of Manufacturing 
Industry, (The Jackson Committee Report), A Green Paper, 
Vol. I (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1975). 
Most notably the petroleum, mqtor vehicle, chemical, 
pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries. 
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'!'here arc other types oL government sponsored or non-
yovL!rnmcnt µrcssurc Lo which l\ustrnlla ls purtlcularly 
vulnerable because of her size, the length of her 
uninhabited coastline and the difficulties of maintaining 
effective control over activities in remote regions. 
Incursions by foreign fishing vessels into national 
territorial waters or declared sovereign fishing zones, 
illicit offshore mineral and oceanographic exploration and 
fishing surveys, coastal landings by individuals with 
contagious diseases, diseased animals or destructive plant 
parasites, the landing of illegal immigrants and the 
smuggling of narcotics, bullion and native fauna are of 
particular concern. During the past decade, Australia has 
7 been subjected to many of these pressures and there appears 
to be little reason to suspect that they will not be the source 
of further problems in the future. 
In normal peacetime conditions, military capacities 
rarely dominate as a means of applying pressure. However, 
they can exert a very significant background influence upon 
the manner in which diplomatic, economic, political and 
other activities are undertaken. For example, if the 
Australian Government and Australian officials feel that the 
country is greatly inferior in military terms to an inter-
national actor or country with whom they are negotiating a 
sensitive issue, they may perceive that their freedom of 
action is limited for fear of unintentionally provoking the 
other actor to escalate the dispute into the military or some 
other media in which Australia is relatively weak. In some 
circumstances, the possession of military strength may be 
the only effective means of deterring a rival from 
escalating a dispute into a higher level of conflict. Thus, 
the possession of military strength can have a significant 
7 These matters are discussed in the chapters of the 
annual Australian Defence Reports entitled 'Activities 
of the Defence Force'. For instance see Department 
of Defence, Defence Report 19?6, {Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1976), p. 3. 
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moderating or restraining influence upon the behaviour of 
international actors, even though it may not be exploited 
deliberately for this purpose. Australia may be particularly 
susceptible to the indirect pressures arising from perceived 
military inferiority because of the population's long and 
deeply held feelings of isolated vulnerability. 8 
2. The Pressures of International Crises 
(a) Global or Regional Resource Crises 
As major industrialised countries of the world gradually 
exhaust local supplies of raw materials and many centres of 
world population become increasingly dependent upon external 
supplies of food, energy, fertiliser and other basic 
materials, increasing pressure is being brought to bear upon 
resource suppliers. The relative geographical concentration 
of a variety of key resources provides potential scope for 
the artificial regulation of supply by producers acting in 
concert. 
8 This is a consistent theme in national opinion polls con-
ducted in Australia on defence and security questions. For 
example, in the Australian Public Opinion Newsletter, Vol. I, 
No. I, September 1971 on page 20, the question was asked, 
'What is the one thing you fear most in Australia's 
development over the next ten years?'. The second most 
popular resonse (after economic instability) on the very 
long list of answers, was 'war and invasion'. 
On page 23 of that same survey, the question was asked, 'Do 
you think that Australia will be threatened from outside 
its borders in the next fifteen years?'. 45 per cent of 
the respondents answered no, 42 per cent answered yes, and 
13 per cent were unsure. 
In The Bulletin, Vol. 98, No. 5038, 8 January 1977 on page 41, 
an International Gallup Poll table was published which 
showed that amongst the populations of thirteen comparable 
countries, Australians gave the second most pessimistic 
response to a question which asked whether they expected 1977 
to be a peaceful or troubled year. The most pessimistic 
response came from Spain, which might at least partially 
be explained by distrubances which accompanied domestic 
political changes at that time. 
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lnternutionul crises ovur resource suvvly unJ 
distribution may not necessarily involve Australia directly. 
If, as a result of regional or global action, the flow of 
imports to Australia is restricted, this is likely to cause 
serious damage to the economy in a direct and immediate 
sense only if petroleum products are involved. However, 
it is possible that in an indirect manner, the impact of 
restrictions upon the flows of some basic raw materials may 
be more severe. Many of Australia's major trading partners 
are likely to be affected very heavily by an artificial 
restriction in their capacity to import fuels and other key 
raw materials. International shipping and air transport 
might be disrupted. As a result, the capacity of several 
of Australia's major trading partners to pay for, transport 
and consume Australian exports may be reduced significantly. 
It would thus appear that while the survival and basic 
well-being of the Australian population is likely to be 
secure during the course of any international resource crisis, 
those sectors of Australian industry which depend heavily 
upon international trade for their prosperity may be vulnerable 
to severe reverses. A continuation of this type of indirect 
international ·pressure over a protracted period would be 
likely to imply a major reduction ·in Australia's livi~g 
standards. 
(b) Regional or Global Conventional Conflict with 
Australia Not Participating as a Combatant 
A serious regional conflict, perhaps in North East Asia, 
on the Sino-Soviet border or in Korea, would be likely to 
have a significant impact upon Australian security. Depending 
upon the nature and scope of the hostilities, international 
sea and air transport might be disrupted severely. As was 
explained above, this could directly and indirectly affect 
the prosperity of those sectors Of the Australian economy 
which are. import- or export-oriented. 
If regional hostilities were extended to, or initiated 
in, areas much closer to Australia, there would probably be 
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heightened demands upon the Australian Defence }brces to 
deter and, .if necessary, resist violations of national 
sovereignty. Advanced methods of surveillance and air and 
sea patrolling of offshore possessions and the long coast-
line could be expected to be at a premium in this type of 
situation. 
If conflict were to escalate to a global or major bloc 
level, the impact upon Australia would probably be greater, 
but not necessarily more damaging. For example, while most 
of the world's shipping might be expected to be transferred 
to satisfy wartime requirements, the combatants on one or 
both sides of the conflict might seek to draw upon 
Australian agricultural, mineral and perhaps also secondary 
industrial resources to help meet their needs. In other 
words, it is possible that this type of conflict could 
actually serve to boost the Australian economy, as was the 
case during the Korean War. 9 
3. The Pressures of International Aggression 
(a) Demands and Threats Which are Directed Against 
Australia and Supported by Political, Military 
and/or Economic Measures 
Demands and threats can be made in a highly specific 
manner, outlining detailed diplomatic, economic, political 
and/or military consequences of particular activities. 
Alternatively, they can be introduced in vague and ambiguous 
terms in an effort simply to lend weight and draw attention 
to one's strongly held views on a particular matter. For 
whatever motives they are issued and whatever form they may 
take, the receipt of a demand or threat is normally followed 
by an intensive evaluation of its significance. What factors 
9 For details see Commonwealth Bureau of Census and 
Statistics, Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of 
Australia 1962, (Canberra, Commonwealth Government 
Publishing Service, 1962), pp. 479, 482. 
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prompted the demand to be made? What are the chances that 
the threat would be carried out if the dispute continues? 
Exactly what type of action would be most likely? How 
vulnerable is the recipient? Can any support be gained in 
the circumstances, either domestically or abroad? How do 
the possible gairis from the dispute compare with the 
possible consequences in the light of the new developments? 
etc. The answers to these questions will depend essentially 
upon assessments of the relative power, past practices and 
perceived intentions of the actors concerned in those fields 
which are considered most critical. 
The issuing of demands and threats is not without its 
risks and costs. Unless a threat is issued in secret and 
with some kind of guarantee that it will never become the 
subject of international discussion, the threatening actor's 
credibility will be affected by the reaction and the outcome. 
If a demand or threat is widely held to be clumsy, the 
nation's or the government's reputation for finesse may 
decline and subsequent threats given little credence. If a 
threat is widely regarded as unjust or illegal because of 
some kind of international convention or agreement, again 
reputations may suffer. It is also possible that the 
delivery of a demand or threat may stimulate retaliatory 
action, possibly in a series of counter-threats. If a 
demand is made in specific terms, the risks of it being defied 
have also to be considered. The very act of defiance may do 
damage to the threatening state's reputation. In addition, 
the problem would remain of facing the costs of carrying out 
the threat with whatever consequences that may imply, or 
having one's credibility suffer further damage by simply 
accepting that one's bluff has been called. The risks 
implicit in the issuance of threats, at least of those which 
are expressed in specific terms, tends to reduce their 
diplomatic utility to well planned psychological campaigns 
and to situations where they are seen as alternatives to 
the initiation of the threatened action. 
The issuing of a series of demands and threats may 
signal the adoption of a strategy of confrontation. The 
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objective here is normally to wear down, by a process of 
diplomatic, political, economic and/or military measures, the 
willpower of the opponent concerning a particular issue. 
Because of the relatively open nature of its society, 
Australia might prove to be vulnerable to this kind of 
pressure, particularly when the issue at stake is regarded 
as being of marginal significance by a large proportion of 
the population. In such circumstances, an opponent may be 
able to conduct a sustained campaign of subversion to weaken 
national willpower. It would probably be relatively easy for 
an external actor to introduce propaganda into the processes 
of internal debate in such a way that it would be difficult 
for it to be distinguished from legitimate internal criticism. 
The problem of discerning between hostile propaganda which 
is externally sourced and legitimate internal debate which 
is simply exploited by outside powers would be very difficult 
to solve in the Australian environment. 
If the external actor initiating the confrontation 
campaign wished to apply further pressure through a campaign 
of organised violence, it would be extremely difficult for 
any ambiguity or disavowability to be retained. Even if a 
small portion of the Australian population sympathised with 
the external actor's cause, it seems improbable, in current 
circumstances, that they would be prepared, of their own 
volition, to take up arms and attack their fellow citizens 
and government employees. As a result, it would be 
difficult for an external actor to attempt to disguise a 
rash of sabotage, hi-jacking, bomb attacks and isolated 
violent assaults as being merely an expression of internal 
support for his cause or a sign of extreme inner social 
tension. 
The geographic nature of the island continent would also 
mean that external agitators or terrorists and their arms, 
supplies and equipment would have to be transported by some 
means across the surrounding water barrier. If air, sea and 
under-sea surveillance and patrolling of these regions is 
undertaken in a sufficiently thorough manner and international 
civil transport is monitored closely, the task of penetration 
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may itself be difficult. However, once this has been 
achieved, a ~ultiplicity of targets would be presented. In 
Australia's remote periphery, along the coast and on 
offshore islands, a large number of relatively isolated. 
small population centres are within easy reach of air and/or 
seaborne attackers. Communications lines, microwave links, 
telecommunication cables, road bridges, etc. are readily 
accessible in the more remote parts of the continent and 
their systematic destruction would be an effective means of 
applying a large amount of pressure at little risk and cost. 
The economic and military implications of this type of 
violent harassment would be immense. Certainly the normal 
pattern of life in remote parts of the continent and on 
offshore islands would have to alter and economic product-
ivity could be expected to decline significantly. An 
enormously disproportionate Australian military response 
would be required in order to patrol the coastal and 
continental expanses which might be involved. In addition, 
and at the same time as attempting to prevent attacks and 
violent incidents, the installations which are damaged or 
destroyed would have to be replaced or supported by 
additional facilities. The economic drain upon the national 
economy, even of these very direct response requirements, 
could be expected to impact heavily upon the national 
budget. Yet in most circumstances, this would, in effect, be 
but one of the forms of pressure applied by an external 
actor in this type of confrontation. The overall design of 
the campaign would most probably be structured to incur the 
maximum possible theatrical value from the effort. By a 
multiplicity of means and over an extended period, a large 
amount of publicity might be gained, the authorities may be 
discredited, the security forces may be provoked to take 
excessive countermeasures and large portions of the population 
may be demoralised and even terrorised. Over a protracted 
period, when the issue at stake is of marginal significance 
to the nation as a whole, it might be expected that 
Australian willpower and resilience could be gradually eroded 
to a point where major compromises would be politically feasible. 
It is possible to conceive of circumstances in an 
external confrontation situation, where, because of a 
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foreign actor's limited success or his impatience with very 
low level violent harassment activities, he may decide to 
escalate the pace and scope of attacks. The character of 
the operations might continue to be similar to those 
elaborated above, but they may be expanded in number and 
scope, they may be better planned and perhaps also be 
executed in a more professional manner by regular military 
forces. The depth of penetration of this type of force would 
probably be significantly greater than that achievable by 
irregular harassment forces. In addition, the higher 
standards of training and technical skill which could be 
expected would probably mean that the new generations of 
light and compact, but extremely accurate, high firepower 
weaponry could be made available to enhance greatly the 
d t . . h 11 . lO h es ructive capacity of t ese sma units. T e targets 
for this type of campaign might also be expanded to include 
not only isolated population centres and their lines of 
communication, but also centres of Australian reactive 
capacity, airfields, base structures and perhaps portions of 
Australian industry. In addition to violent raids, pressure 
might also be exerted by deploying small bodies of troops to 
demonstrate temporary control of relatively remote positions 
of high political, economic or strategic importance, eg. one 
of the islands in the Torres Strait, Cocos Island, or 
perhaps even the joint US-Australian communications facility 
at North West Cape. 
It should be noted, however, that if an external actor 
maintained an intransigent negotiating stance and at the same 
time escalated the level of conflict, it seems improbable that 
any Australian government would be. content merely to maintain 
10 Examples of this new light weaponry in the anti-tank 
field are MILAN and DRAGON and in the anti-aircraft 
role S'rINGER, SABRE, BLOWPIPE and RBS-70. The 
significance of these modern technological 
developments is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. 
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a defensive position. In the international sphere, for 
instance, i_t can be anticipated that efforts would be made 
to mobilise the diplomatic support of allies and others to 
pressure the opponent to compromise. The United Nations and 
other international forums would almost certainly be used 
in attempts to arouse world-wide opposition to the opponents' 
action. In addition, Australia could move to discriminate 
against the state concerned in its trading relationships and 
may also be able to organise broader regional economic, 
diplomatic and other sanctions. The success of these 
retaliatory activities cannot be expected to be very great 
in all circumstances because the opposing state and its 
international supporters would almost certainly be attempting 
similar strategies which, depending upon the issue at stake 
and the relative balance of forces, may more than offset 
Australia's capacity in this field. 
An escalation of violent activities by Australia's 
opponent may also stimulate an offensive military response. 
Air or surface raids of various sorts could be launched in 
reply, subversive activities could be fostered and dissident 
groups within the opposing state might be encouraged and 
actively supported from Australia. Depending upon the nature 
of the country concerned, these counter-offensive activities 
may present an even worse disproportionate response problem 
for the opponent than he is capable of inflicting upon 
Australia. 
There is one other major category of influence which 
might be employed by external actors to support demands and 
threats - that of economic pressure. Variations in tariffs, 
quotas, investment rules and even wholesale embargoes and 
sanctions might be employed, but, as was mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, unless Australia 1 s opponent happens to he a 
major trading partner, or alternatively, major trading 
partners support the opponent's cause, any restrictions of 
this kind are likely to be marginal and manageable. Even if 
Australia 1 s opponent were able to coerce some major trading 
partners to apply sanctions, unless petroleum products were 
involved, the effects would fall primarily upon non-essential 
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export sectors of the economy. The major implication of 
this situation would be a reduction in economic prosperity 
which would threaten national security only in so far as it 
reduced Australia's capacity to respond to other pressures. 
(b) Economic Warfare Against Australia 
In a situation where an external actor or group of 
actors decided to conduct economic warfare against Australia, 
tariff and quota regulations, embargoes, sanctions and a 
range of other weapons would be available. Australia's 
vulnerability to this type of pressure has already been 
discussed in earlier parts of this chapter. 
Any attempt to use a military blockade to isolate the 
Australian economy would appear to offer doubtful potential 
gains and be extremely difficult to implement in practice. 
The country's relative self-sufficiency implies that, while 
major disruptions to its trade flows would affect national 
prosperity seriously, they would not represent, in themselves, 
an extreme threat to national security. The prospects for an 
external actor gaining substantial rewards from the 
imposition of a blockade would appear to be limited. 
The physical difficulties which would be experienced by 
an opponent who attempted to blockade Australia would be 
considerable. Firstly, because of the country's geographic 
position, there are a very great number of alternative 
approach routes to Australian ports. In order for an external 
actor to mount a distant blockade against the country, all of 
these. approach routes would have to be controlled effectively 
or at least threatened. In reality it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for any power to undertake 
such a task at the Cape of Good Hope, Suez, the Straits of 
Hormuz, the Indonesian Straits, in the Coral Sea and across 
the expanses of the Pacific and Antarctic Oceans. Even if 
this level of surveillance were achieved, for it to be 
effective in the facilitation o~ a traditional form of 
blockade, every ship passing through these areas, which are 
some of the busiest in the world, would have to be boarded 
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so that their manifests could be inspected. However, even 
if this were done, there would still be major problems. 
For example, an obvious and immediate countermeasure would 
be to forge ships' manifests. 
Historically, blockades have been used by major maritime 
powers or alliances of maritime powers against significant 
11 
adversaries and in the course of major wars. An attempt 
to blockade Australia from distant narrows and waterways 
would be an instance of a power, or group of powers, attempting 
to isolate a relatively minor state in the course of a limited 
dispute and in several of the world's most heavily travelled 
seas. The danger and nuisance to innocent shipping could be 
expected to evoke resistance from the great powers, 
particularly if the hindrances persisted over many months. 
The difficulties of attempting to blockade Australia from 
distant transport 'choke' points and the almost innumerable 
alternative approach routes to the country would appear to 
make the option of blockading from close in-shore a 
relatively attractive proposition. This option would, in 
addition, possess potential for the disruption of Australian 
coastal shipping. However, this type of action would 
necessitate the stationing of large numbers of ships at 
very long distances from their home bases to cover the 
numerous and widely spaced Australian ports. Minefields 
might be laid directly outside ports or in their entrance 
channels as part of the campaign, but these would have to 
be protected to prevent clearance by helicopters or mine 
12 
counter-measure vessels operating from the ports concerned. 
This close patrolling would almost certainly make effective 
Australian counteraction a simple proposition. Blockading 
11 
12 
For a background analysis of this subject in a different 
geographical context see S. J. Rosen, Military Geography 
and Military Balance in the Arab-Israel Conflict. (An 
unpublished seminar paper presented at the Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, on 22 April 1976). 
This argument assumes that these mineclearance forces 
are available in the Australian Defence.Force. 
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ships could be attacked directly by land-based artillery 
and missile units, by short range attack aircraft and by a 
variety of light coastal defence vessels. 13 
The problems, difficulties and expense of attempting to 
impose a total blockade against Australi~either from a 
distance or from close in-shore, would appear likely to more 
than off set the possible gains in terms of the impact upon 
the Australian economy. Howeve4 it should be noted that there 
may, in fact, be alternative, more cost-effective means of 
applying severe pressure on Australian trade and international 
transport. For instance, the surveillance problem could be 
reduced by employing modern technologies, satellites, high-
flying long-range remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and 
towed and fixed long-range passive sonar arrays. 14 The 
scope of the problem could also be narrowed by concentrating 
attention upon vessels leaving Australian ports. This might 
mean that attempts would be made to intercept only the small 
numbers of ships known, with a high degree of certainty, 
to be involved in trade with Australia. In this type of 
campaign, the resources required would be relatively limited 
and its effectiveness would depend more on the deterrent 
effect created by uncertainty in the minds of ship owners 
and neutral actors than on the physical severence of all lines 
of seaborne communication. This type of campaign might also 
lend itself to extension in the form of h~rassment attacks 
upon aircraft and air transport facilities involved in trade 
with Australia. 
Thus, it does appear that, in some circumstances short of 
a major conflict, the volume of Australian trade could be 
reduced significantly and at limited costs to an opponent by 
13 
14 
This argument assumes that coastal attack forces are 
available. 
These surveillance systems are discussed in greater 
length in Chapter 2. 
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a carefully orchestrated application of economic warfare 
techniques~ However, they would almost certainly not take 
the form of an attempted water-tight blockade. A more 
attractive option might bear more resemblance to a well-
designed and coordinated terrorist or pirate campaign 
against international transport carriers and facilities. 
(c) Assault With a Limited Objective 
This type of operation could take the form of an 
extended raid involving no more than one or two hundred 
troops or, at the other end of the scale, it could concern 
a multiple division assault aimed at permanent occupation of 
a major geographic section of the continent. Such an assault 
could thus be defined to be limited either in the sense of the 
scale of the geographic area occupied, the time period of 
occupation, or the magnitude of the assaultsunderlying 
political objective. 
In one sense, any assault upon Australia is difficult 
simply because armies are unable to walk or drive across a 
land border. Ships and/or aircraft are an essential 
pre-requisite for any assault. The resources currently held 
by several regional powers would be sufficient, at least in 
theory, for an assault which was very limited in scale and/or 
15 length. However, no power in Australia's region currently 
a capacity to deploy division-sized forces onto possesses 
Australian . l6 . . . f h b · 1 · territory. The acquisition o .sue a capa i ity 
15 
16 
For details of the air and sea transport capacities of 
regional states, see The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1976-1977, 
(London, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1976), pp. 53 ff. 
It should be noted that several regional states possess 
multi-divisional armies, but none possess the air and/or. 
naval capacity to readily transport and support their 
deployment onto the Australian continent. Ibid. For 
a discussion of the numbers of ships and aircraft which 
have been required to transport major military forces 
across sea/air gaps during recent histor~ see my A 
Strategy for the Continental Defence of Australia. (An 
unpublished M.Ec. thesis, University of Sydney~ Sydney, 
1974)' pp. 22, 23. 
would presumably be readily detectable by Australia's 
intelligence organisations. 
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Australia offers a plethora of possible geographic 
objectives. 'I'hose which are most commonly mentioned in the 
context of this type of attack include areas of the North 
and North West coasts and various off-shore islands, eg. 
the Pilbara, the Northern Territory, Cape York and various 
islands in the Barrier Reef, Torres Strait, Gulf of Carpentaria, 
Arafura Sea and the Indian Ocean. 17 However, other conceivable 
objectives have occasionally been mentioned. Dr O'Neill, for 
instance, has suggested that Tasmania could represent an 
attractive target for a high technology major power, perhaps 
prior to an invasion of the mainland itself. 18 
The scale of any assault could be expected to vary 
primarily according to the size of the area to be attacked 
and the length of time it is to be held. Some of the offshore 
islands could probably be assaulted and then defended by a 
force of one or two battalions. However, any attempt to 
attack and hold the Pilbara, the Northern half of the Northern 
Territory or Cape York would certainly be a multiple division 
operation. 
The achievement of surprise would, in many circumstances, 
be a pre-requisite for the success of such an operation, for 
if an assault were contested seriously during the initial 
crossing of the sea-air gap, it might fail completely. 
Even if the assaulting forces arrived on their objective 
relatively unscathed, they would still be vulnerable to 
continuous interdiction of their lines of communication and 
supply across the water gap. Short of major preliminary 
attacks upon Australia's reactive capacity, an opponent 
17 
18 
See these geographical targets discussed by Colonel J.O. 
Langtry, 'Ground Defence of the Australian Continent' 
and Dr Rbbert O'Neil~ 'Australia as a Target for 
International Violence' in United Service, Vol. 28, No. 2, 
October 1974, pp. 55, 12. 
See Dr Robert O'Neill, 'Australia as a Target for 
International Violence', ibid., p. 12. 
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mounting this type of operation would have no simple means 
of providing a high level of security to these links. 19 
Once landed on any objective along or adjacent to 
Australia's northern coastline, an enemy would be confronted 
with a naturally inhospitable environment. The weather 
pattern throughout Australia's tropical north is monsoonal. 
During the summer 'wet', cyclones are common and frequently 
cause extensive damage. Overland travel during this season 
is extremely difficult and the human efficiency rating falls 
20 to very low levels. Because almost all of the annual 
rainfall is concentrated into a relatively short season, the 
vegetation cover on nearly all of the west and northern 
coasts is relatively open woodland. During the dry season, 
water can become very scarce in some areas and dust clouds 
tend to betray any vehicle movement. 
In the north of the continent, transport resources are 
rudimentary except in the immediate Darwin area, the east 
coast south of Cairns and on a few of the offshore islands. 
While there are many airstrips, few are sealed and most are 
not supplied with fuel. Almost all of the major round-
Australia highway is sealed with at least one trafficable 
lane but, with very few exceptions, other roads are simply 
graded from the natural earth. General purpose port facilities 
in a developed form exist only at Townsville and, to a 
lesser extent, Cairns and Darwin. However, in addition, there 
are many specialised port facilities serving mining 
installations. The most notable of these are at Dampier, 
19 
20 
Some of these questions are addressed in detail in 
Robert O'Neill, 'The Strategic Guidelines' and J.O. 
Langtry, 'Army Aspects of the Tactical Airpower Require-
ments' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The Future of Tactical 
Airpower in the Defence of Australia, (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 8-24, 106-123. 
Details of Australia's geographic environment, and 
particularly its climate and ground cover characteristics, 
are illustrated in the Appendix. A more complex and 
comprehensive elaboration of these matters appears in 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official Yearbook of 
Australia 19?1, pp. 27-75. 
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Karratha, Wickham, Port Hedland, Gove and Weipa. 
In general then, it can be said that i£ surprise is 
·achieved, at least in timing, it should be possible for a 
small assaulting force to cross the sea-air gap and occupy 
a localised area. On the assumption that such an assault 
were made in isolation, it would be vulnerable to rapid air 
and naval counter-strikes and the disruption·and possible 
severance of its lines of communication. However, if the 
assaulting force were reasonably self-contained and protected, 
it might well be able to maintain its position until major 
Australian land forces were mobilised and deployed for a 
direct confrontation. 
In the case of a much larger assault, th~ achievement of 
surprise would probably be far more difficult. But if it 
could be assumed that surprise could be gained and a 
relatively secure air and sea crossing of the water gap were 
possible, an extensive range of objectives' would be available 
for an enemy's consideration. Once landed, the relative 
paucity of local facilities in most areas would be a major 
liability and the continued vulnerability of supply and 
communications lines an ongoing problem. As pointed out 
above, as long as Australia's air and maritime strike forces 
were not destroyed in an initial coordinated attack, any 
foreign landing could be bombarded and harassed at an early 
stage. But the distances involved and the openness of 
terrain in much of the northern continent would most probably 
mean that an assaulting force would not be confronted by 
major Australian land forces for several weeks at least. 
This might mean that the invading forces would have sufficient 
time to methodically prepare extensive ground defence 
positions. However, Australian air, sea and small-scale land 
harassment could almost certainly preclude the full-scale 
exploitation and export of major on-site resources. 
(d) Full-scale Invasion 
Similar considerations to those discussed above would 
apply to any country attempting a full-scale invasion through 
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the north or west of the continent. Achieving surprise 
in the lan4ing of the massive forces which would be 
required for this type of operation would be very difficult. 
Assuming that Australian air and maritime strike forces 
survive any initial attack, the invading forces would be 
extremely vulnerable if their initial crossing of the sea-air 
gap could be intercepted. This would be the stage at which 
the assaulting forces would be most susceptible to attack, 
ie. when they are packaged in a highly concentrated form 
aboard large and relatively vulnerable ship and aircraft 
platforms. 21 When landed and relat~vely dispersed they would 
almost certainly be less vulnerable, but still susceptible 
to aerial bombardment and to the interdiction of their lines 
of communication and supply. 
The difficulties of moving large land forces across 
the long and, in most places, relatively open expanses of 
the continent could also be expected to inhibit severely the 
expansion of invasion bridgeheads in isolated areas. The 
distances are immense and in most areas the routes available 
for rapid advance are restricted and predictable. Even 
without a well coordinated Australian ground, sea and air 
harassment of enemy forces, the logistics problems of a major 
force advance across the continent would be immense. 
With these considerations in mind, a very attractive 
option for a major power high technology invader might be a 
direct assault upon the south-east coast of Australia. This 
type of operation would demand the allocation of very 
substantial ground, naval and naval-air forces. Because 
such a force would need to operate from bases in the archipelago 
to Australia's north, the North West Pacific Ocean or the 
Indian Ocean, their passage to the south coast of the continent 
would necessitate long transit routes adjacent to, although 
probably a substantial distance from, the Australian coast. 
21 This matter is discussed in J.O. Langtry, 'Army Aspects 
of the Tactical Airpower Requirements' in Desmond Ball 
(ed.), The Future of Tactical Airpower in the Defence of 
Australia, p. 111. 
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This might provide Australia's maritime strike forces with 
an extended opportunity to extract a heavy rate of attrition 
should they survive to do so. However, if an invader could 
successfully thwart such plans, possibly by mounting a 
preliminary surprise strike against Australia's reactive 
capacity, this type of direct assault would hold great 
potential for the conduct of a rapid and dec.isi ve campaign. 
(e) ·Australian Involvement in a Global or Regional Nuclear, 
Biological or Chemical Exchange 
The escalation of a superpower conflict into a nuclear 
exchange, even if it were on a limited restrained level, would 
present a very high degree of danger for Australia. The 
presence of several important United States defence facilities 
on Australian territory could make some parts of the country 
vulnerable to direct attack at an early stage. The immediate 
implication is tha4 in the event of a limited or an unlimited 
nuclear exchange, the populations of Alice Springs and 
Exmouth, which are situated close to Pine Gap and North 
West Cape respectively, may be subjected to a nuclear 
assault. Depending upon the nature of the weapons used, the 
manner in which they are detonated and the pattern of the 
weather at the time, a much larger proportion of the 
Australian population might be threatened by the subsequent 
fallout. 
In the event of a general uninhibited global nuclear 
exchange, as long as further installations on Australian 
territory were not targeted by the major combatants~ the 
prospects for the survival and continued well-being of the 
Australian population would appear to be favourable. 
Because in this situation most of the nuclear weapons would 
be detonated in the northern hemisphere, the world weather 
pattern would ensure that Australia would be relatively 
f f . f 11 . . 22 h . bl ree rom a -out contamination. Ot er conceiva e 
22 See L. Machta and R.J. List, 'The Global Pattern of Fallout' 
in J.M. Fowler (ed.), Fallout: A Study of Superbombs, 
Strontium 90 and Survival (New York, Basic Books Inc., 
19 6 0) I pp• 2 6- 3 5 • . 
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effects, such as a diminution of the·ozone may, in time, 
affect the whole globe but current research indicates that 
Australians would certainly be better placed to survive 
these indirect effects than populations situated in the 
northern hemisphere. 23 For similar reasons, the effects 
of chemical and most types of biological warfare attacks 
which take place in the northern hemisphere are also likely 
to be concentrated within that half of the globe. 
Finally, it should be noted that because of the country's 
high level of population and industrial concentration, 
Australia is extremely vulnerable to any form of nuclear, 
chemical or biological bombardment on these centres. The 
identification of various categories of superpower and 
regional state motivation for this type of attack has been 
undertaken by various writers. However it is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate their potential 
b b ·1· 24 or pro a 1 ity. 
Conclusion 
One of the major consequences of Australia's changing 
strategic environment is that the prime national security 
requirement has become the development of a capacity to de.ter 
and, if necessary, meet a wide range of possible threats 
independently. 25 Some potential pressures and threats could 
23 
24 
25 
For details see Committee to Study the Long-Term World-
wide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons Detonations, 
Long-Term Worldwide Effects of Multiple Nuclear Weapons 
Detonations (Washington D.C., The National Academy of 
Science, 1975), p. 44. · 
Possible motivations for nuclear bombardment are discussed 
in Desmond Ball, 'American Bases in Australia: The 
Strategic Implications', Current Affairs Bulletin, 
Vol. 51, No. 10, March 1975, pp. 16, 17. 
It is assumed here that deterrence and defence should 
be the primary goals of national security doctrine. 
A means of determin~ng these objectives and an 
elaboration of their possible nature appear in 
Chapter 4. 
163 
conceivably be deterred by Australia's independent actions. 
If Australi.a can prevent serious pressures and threats 
arising, this is clearly preferable to reliance upon purely 
defensive measures. However, many potential pressures and 
threats are likely to be beyond Australia's capacity to 
deter. This applies most notably to many of the pressures 
of international crises and some of the more demanding 
pressures of international aggression. Australia's capacity 
to prevent these types of threat arising in the flow of 
world-wide events would, in nearly every conceivable 
circumstance, be marginal at best. Hence, if Australia is to 
have a security option in these types of situations, it has 
little choice but to develop an independent capacity to meet 
many different types of pressure and threat. 
This broadened defensive requirement must be evaluated 
in the context of the limited resources which Australia can 
afford to devote on a full-time basis to national security 
tasks in times of peace. A significant multiplication of 
the current full-time military and diplomatic resources 
maintained by Australia is not politically feasible in the 
absence of a clear and obvious major threat. But even if 
this type of force expansion were possible, it is doubtful 
that it would be a highly effective means of meeting many 
of the types of pressure and threat with which Australia 
may be confronted in the future. A large number of the 
pressures and threats which have been identified in the 
discussion above are primarily economic, political, social 
and psychological in character. Their effect upon Australia 
would not necessarily heavily involve the military and 
diplomatic sections of the community at all. Many pressures 
and threats would impact far more directly upon much broader 
sectors of the total community, rural and secondary industry, 
and, in the case of the more demanding pressures and threats, 
the total community may be directly threatened, if not with 
destruction, by a substantial reduction in living standards. 
The increasing complexity of modern societies, such 
as that in Australia, serves to increase their vulnerability 
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to serious disruption should normal peacetime international 
interactio~s be disturbed. New possibilities are being 
provided for international actors to pressure and threaten 
advanced countries through the exploitation of these 
susceptibilities. Certainly the dangers from military 
pressure and threat are still present and in some areas may 
be increasing. But in order to have a capability to deter 
effectively and, if required, meet the full range of potential 
pressures and threats, it may be necessary to extend national 
security preparations beyond the long-institutionalised 
military and diplomatic spheres and into much broader areas 
of the total Australian community. 
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CHAP'l'El< 4 
NEW RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS 
It is clear from the discussion in Chapter 3 that in 
the future the range of security problems which might 
conceivably require a response from Australia will be much 
broader, and in.many respects more demanding, than that of 
the forward defence era. Many potential pressures and threats 
might most properly and effectively be met through the 
employment of resources and capacities which have not normally 
been engaged in the past for national security functions. But 
even in those instances where the more traditional types of 
military and diplomatic responses would be appropriate, the 
nature of the new requirements in terms of scale, timing and 
type is likely to impose demands of quite a new character. 
However, despite the greatly altered nature of Australia's 
strategic environment, the security concepts and structures 
which are currently employed are primarily those which have 
been inherited from the forward defence era. Thus, it is perhaps 
not surprising that, in the context of the new environment, 
they are characterised by a series of fundamental weaknesses 
and contradictions. In the discussion which follows, those 
established security concepts and structures which appear to 
be most directly challenged by the new requirements of 
Australia's changed strategic situation are discussed in turn. 
1. The Requirement for an Independent National Security 
Strategy Formulation and Evaluation Capacity 
Because of the nature of Australia's historical experience, 
it has never been necessary for the nation's security 
planners to derive a completely independent strategic policy, 
concept and structure. Almost all of Australia's military 
history involves single service operations with comparable 
allied units in foreign environments. Thu~ in the past, 
Australia has been heavily .dependent upon allies for commitment 
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decisions, operating doctrines, tactics, many types of 
procedures~ equipments and logistic support services. 
Consequently, there has never been a need to independently 
develop, test and modify a complex national security 
strategy and structure to meet the specialised requirements 
of defending the Australian continent and its vital interests. 
However, now, with a wide range of environmental factors 
changing the fundamental nature of Australia's security 
problem, there is a clear requirement for the nation's 
security policy, strategy and structures to be derived 
independently from first principles. 
The general nature of Australia's changed strategic 
environment has been recognised by both the present 
Government and the Opposition. 1 .However, the strategic 
assessment and planning system which has been inherited from 
the forward defence era appears to be incapable of the level 
of adaption which the new environment requires. The under-
lying problem appears not to be one of personal failings or 
intellectual weakness on the part of those government 
employees involved in this area of policy development. 
Rather, the most serious planning difficulties have arisen as 
a result of the retention of the established system and 
structure to perform functions of a much more complex and 
demanding nature than those for which they were originally 
designed and intended. 
The basic foundation for all current security planning 
is a document entitled The Strategic Basis for Australian 
Defence. As an official explanatory paper expresses it, 
'the genesis of all significant defence decisions is the 
1 The general nature of some of the more important dynamic 
influences in Australia's strategic environment is 
outlined in both Australian Defence, A White Paper 
presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence, the 
Hon. D.J. Killen, November 1976 (Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1976), pp. 1, 2 and 
also in an address by Mr W. Hayden, MHR, then Opposition 
Spokesman on Defence to the Joint Services Staff College 
at Canberra on 10 May 1977, pp. 13, 14 (the address had 
no formal title) . 
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Strategic Basis'.~ The former Defence Minister, Mr W.L. 
Morrison, cl.aborates the significance of the document in 
the following terms: 
Within the Department, the Strategic Basis 
paper is used as a reference document in 
the preparation of the Force Capabilities 
paper which informs policy proposals on 
force levels and weapons procurement.3 
However, there appears to be a general recognition both 
inside and outside the Department that the Strategic Basis 
paper is an imperfect means of performing this task. For 
instance, Rear Admiral Synnot, the Chief of the Naval Staff, 
has stated that in his opinion: 
2 
3 
4 
At a time of low or intermediate threat, 
strategic guidance [in the form of the 
Strategic Basis] cannot be expected to 
be sufficiently specific to enable us 
to determine the force structure; if 
there were a clear threat this problem 
would of course be much easier.4 
Mr Morrison appears to support this view: 
The Strategic Basis paper read in the light 
of the Government's response forms the 
parameters of defence policy. What it really 
amounts to is an informed account of the 
current situation and a useful perception of 
Programmes and Budgets Division, Department of Defence, 
Making Defence Decisions (Canberra, August 1975), p. 6, 
quoted in T.P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical 
Infrastructure for Force Structure Decision-Making in 
the Australian Defence Department, Unpublished B.A. 
(Honours) thesis (Department of Economics, Faculty of 
Military Studies, University of New South Wales, Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, 1976), p. 32. 
W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the Minister in the Making of 
Australian Defence Policy Since the Re-Organization of 
the Department of Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The 
Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), p. 74. 
Rear Admiral A.M. Synnot, 'The Changing Challenge for 
Our Defence Force' in J. Birman (ed.), Australia's Defence 
(Perth, Extension Service, The University of Western 
Australia, 1976), p. 11. 
future trends. I l is not an immutable 
major premise from which to deduce all 
manner of policies.5 
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Certainly a great deal can be learnt from a systematic 
study of foreign actors' economic, technological, social, 
political and military capabilities. Some of this information 
can be used to extrapolate present trends into the future. 
Yet in the absence of knowledge concerning the future 
intentions of foreign actors, the further one attempts to 
predict events, or even the development of trends, the less 
6 
credible the process becomes. No matter how skilled the 
analysts may be, and no matter how many analysts may be 
available for the task, this type of predictive study is 
incapable of providing, on its own, a sufficient basis for 
coherent long term security planning in the Australian 
environment. 
Many of the weaknesses of the Strategic Basis document 
are a direct consequence of the processes of its formulation. 
5 
6 
The draft [of the Strategic Basis] is 
prepared in the Strategic and Force 
Development Organization drawing on the 
information and judgements of the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the 
assessments of the Joint Intelligence 
Orgnnization which in turn draws on US 
and UK intelligence sources, the military 
judgement of the CDFS [Chief of the Defence 
Force Staff] and the Chiefs of Staff and 
the technologjcal advice of its defence 
scientists. The draft is considered 
and finalized by the Defence Coordination 
Committee, comprising apart from the 
Defence component, the Secretaries of the 
Departments of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the Minister in the Making of 
Australian Defence Policy Since the Re-Organization of 
the Department of Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The 
Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p. 79. 
For a brief discussion of the difficulties of attempting 
this type of analysis, see Robert O'Neill, 'Australian 
Defence Policy 1971-1975' in W.J. Hudson, Australia in 
World Affairs 1971-75 (Melbourne, Nelson Ltd, forthcoming), 
p. 10 of Dr O'Neill's text. 
Foreign Affairs and Treasury. The 
Strategic Basis is certainly derived from 
the best advice available and assessed 
by experienced people. It represents the 
best judgement that can be made at the time. 
But by its nature it is a committee document 
and has all the failings of such a document, 
particularly as it represents a consensus 
and necessarily involves compromises. 
Furthermore it deals with perceptions of 
future trends and is subject to the 
uncertainties, unknowns and variables of 
prognostication.7 
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As a consequence, it appears from the accounts of 
experienced observers that the final document lacks the 
precision and clarity required for detailed security planning. 8 
According to Dr Mediansky: 
7 
8 
9 
A common complaint about the present 
Strategic Basis is that it is too vague 
and too generalised; that it is written 
so as to mean all things to all men. 
As such, it is of little use to defence 
planners.9 
In support of this view, Dr O'Neill has written: 
The Strategic Basis document is one 
obvious source of general guidance but, 
in the light of what has appeared recently 
in some newspapers purporting to be 
extracts from earlier versions of this 
document, one hopes that more precise 
guide-lines have been generated and 
W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the Minister in the Making of 
Australian Defence Policy since the Re-Organization of the 
Department of Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The 
Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p. 78. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to write comprehensively 
and with complete clarity concerning the problems and 
difficulties of the current security planning system because 
official information concerning anything but its formal 
structu're is unavailable on the public record. As a 
consequence, it has been necessary to rely heavily in the 
following analysis upon the accounts of those who have been 
involved personally in the current system, those who have 
studied its operations in detail and those who have observed 
its performance from an external vantage point over a long 
period. 
F.A. Mediansk~ 'The Danger of Mixing Defence and Politics' 
in The Sydney Morning Herald, 10 May 1976. 
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d . . . h 10 isseminated in some ot er form. 
The consequences of this apparent absence of clarity, 
coherence and direction in the basic foundations of defence 
planning are far reaching and of very great significance. 
It impacts directly upon the quality and integrated nature of 
nearly every important aspect of Australia's processes of 
strategic analysis - security planning, the generation of 
operational requirements and procurement options, judgments 
concerning the security significance of civil industries 
and other components of the national infrastructure, the 
options considered in the processes of manpower planning, the 
development of doctrines, tactics, operational procedures, 
etc., etc. 
The fundamental weakness and inappropriate nature of the 
·existing system can best be illustrated by citing the accounts 
of a number of experienced observers concerning specific 
system failures. For example, in discussing the reasons for 
the apparent lack of clear procurement priorities, Dr O.'Neill 
has stated: 
If there currently existed clear policy 
guidelines, setting forth priorities 
in the light of threat assessments and 
required response strategies, one could 
be optimistic. 
However to the best of our knowledge 
such clear guidelines do not exist as a 
formal policy. 
No doubt they exist in different 
forms in the minds of different individuals 
at senior levels within the Department of 
Defence but much remains to be done.11 
Dr Ball has cited an instance where the weakness of 
the current security planning system has seriously inhibited 
long-term decision-making in Australia's defence-related 
industries: 
10 
11 
Robert O'Neill, 'The Development of Operational Doctrines 
for the Australian Defence Force' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), 
The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p. 138. 
Robert O'Neill, 'How Effectively Will that $12,000 Million 
Be Spent?' in Australian Financial Review, 10 June 1976. 
In 1974, for example, during the Industries 
Assistance Commission's inquiry into the 
A·ustralian aerospace industry, a number of 
the principal aircraft manufacturers, whose 
forward planning depends upon a clear statement 
of such a policy, in their submissions 
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frequently lamented 'the lack of any real policy 
guidelines ... from the Government' regarding 
defence procurement. The IAC report itself 
states that the Department of Defence was unable 
to provide any specific list of Australian defence 
equipment requirements. And a study by a Defence 
(Industrial) Committee Panel which provided much 
of the detailed background material for that IAC 
inquiry noted that the panel had sought guidance 
on the relevant strategic considerations, but 
that 'authoritative guidance could not be given 
by the Department of Defence' .12 
T.P. Muggleton points out that the absence of clear 
strategic guidance has also had the effect of undermining 
seriously the Defence Department's own analytical research: 
12 
The consequences of such a vacuum on 
the economic efficiency of subsequent 
analyses of a force structure are marked. 
First, analytical groups develop their own 
operational scenarios which may, or may not 
represent the most likely future threat 
environments. The validity of subsequent 
analyses rests therefore on dubious premises. 
The Naval Air Power and Tactical Air Weapon 
System study, completed in mid-1975, 
provides an example of the possible adverse 
effects of inadequate guidance. The NAP/TAWS 
study was relevant only as long as the seven 
scenarios on which it was based were relevant. 
These scenarios however were not created by 
the higher defence machinery but by CSE [the 
Central Studies Establishment] itself. The 
scenarios are in fact no longer legitimate 
reflections of the most probable future 
states of the world. Thus just fourteen 
months after its completion, ' ... the general 
feeling in the Defence Department is that the 
NAP/TAWS study is now invalid'. As the NAP/ 
TAWS study incorporated the equivalent of 
fifty man-years of analysis, a lack of guidance 
leads to a wastage of analytical resources on 
Desmond J. Ball, 'Equipment Policy for the Defence of 
Australia' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, pp. 101, 102. 
projects of doubtful relevance and to a 
misallocation of resources.13 
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The inappropriate nature and basic weakness of the 
present system can be elaborated further by examining the 
manner in which the Strategic Basis document is used within 
the Department of Defence. According to official explanatory 
papers: 
The Force Development and Analysis Division 
of the DoD derives from the Strategic Basis 
the Defence (as opposed to Service) 
Capabilities Guidelines Paper which is 
issued to the Services for assessment. From 
this paper the Services prepare their 
individual Service Capabilities Papers which 
'indicate areas in which the present 
capabilities are least consistent with 
guidance'. The individual Capabilities 
Papers are synthesized by Defence Central 
into a single Defence Capabilities Paper. 
It is by this process of articulating 
endorsed guidelines that Defence Central 
directs and integrates Service planning 
efforts.14 
Although this statement clearly describes the formal 
structural processes, because the Strategic Basis documents 
have proved to be generally unsatisfactory for defence planning 
purposes, the manner in which they are actually employed 
appears to be quite different. As. T.P. Muggleton points out, 
in practice: 
13 
14 
Services develop their own long term force 
structure philosophies. The Army, for 
example, has produced a 'Basis for Army 
Development' paper which is a perspective 
document aspiring to a twenty-year validity. 
It is at present only in a draft form but its 
existence is indicative of the Services belief 
that a strategic guidance vacuum does exist in 
areas in which it should not. Whereas the 
Services in theory should justify any bid for 
T.P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical Infra-
structure for Force Structure Decision-Making ~n the 
Australian Defence Department, pp. 52, 53. 
This passage appears in T.P. Muggleton, ibid., pp. 25, 26. 
It is composed almost entirely of phrases and short sentences 
taken from Department of Defence, The FYRP System New 
Major Equipment Component (Canberra, June 1975), p. 2 and 
also Programmes and Budgets Division, Department of Defence, 
Making Defence Decisions (Canberra, August 1975) p. 6. 
a weapons system in terms of the Strategic 
Basis, because the Strategic Basis is too 
g·eneral a document, . . . the Services in 
practice develop their own conceptions of 
what the force posture should be. The 
Services disjointed programmes are then 
submitted to higher defence committees. 
Defence Central has therefore accepted 
the limited role of arbiter ... 15 
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Some of the more obvious difficulties arising from this 
situation have been raised by Dr Foley: 
But although those [strategic] assessments 
explicitly recognized change, they have been 
so scant, general and qualified that, for 
reasons different from those prevailing in 
the past, the planner has remained without a 
basis for rational selection of roles, 
missions and weaponry. In those situations 
the Defence Department, Army, Navy, and Air 
Force have been in a position of virtually 
'writing their own scenarios' .16 
In these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising 
that Muggleton can quote middle-ranking Service officers as 
saying that the Strategic Basis is 'not a professional 
military document', is 'irrelevant for force-structure 
decision-making' and that 'the Strategic Basis can be used 
17 to justify the procurement of any weapon system'. 
It appears that, on the evidence of many of those who 
are active participants in the system as well as on that of 
a number of experienced external observers, clear strategic 
concepts, planning objectives and guidelines have not been 
derived. One of the most important consequences of this 
structural failure has been that the performance of the 
current security system and of possible future alternatives 
cannot be tested and evaluated. As Muggleton points out: 
15 
16 
17 
Ibid., pp. 35, 36. 
K.J. Foley, 'Planning for Australia's Defence: 
Exercises in Non-Rationality' in J. Birman (ed.), 
Australia's Defence, p. 19. 
T.P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical Infra-
structure for Force Structure Decision-Making in the 
Australian Defence Department, pp. 32, 36. 
The ultimate measure of defence expenditure 
utility is how well it achieves strategic 
objectives, however, given little 
operationally meaningful articulation of 
strategic objectives utility has no basis 
for measurement.18 
Dr Foley supports this view: 
Without explicit objectives no 
management group can have meaningful 
evaluative criteria or performance 
indicators.19 
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Thus, primarily because 'Australia's basic national 
security policy is too vacuous and inchoate ... ' , 20 realistic 
input-output analysis is impossible. Mr Morrison elaborates 
this point further: 
18 
19 
20 
The purpose of program and performance 
budgeting is not simply what forces 
cost, but also what they do - to 
measure outputs as well as inputs. 
To do this effectively there must be 
program categories which are largely 
mission-oriented and whose purposes are 
defined. This is not an easy task, which 
to a large extent explains why it has 
not been attempted. It involves a much 
clearer concept of roles and missions and 
will cut across individual Services. 
Maritime surveillance could be a program 
involving as it does both Naval and 
Air Force inputs. The output is not 
merely measured in terms of nautical 
miles steamed or flying hours achieved 
but in results such as the apprehension 
of vessels illegally fishing, interception 
of smugglers or the role that the program 
plays in inhibiting such activities. By 
teasing the data, judgements could be 
made as to the desirable mix of air and 
surface operations. This type of analysis 
Ibid., p. 38. 
K.J. Foley, A Study of the Feasibility of Introducing 
Program Budgeting into the Shire of Eltham (Report 
commissioned by the Shire of Eltham, June 1976), p. 2. 
Quoted in. T.P. Muggleton, ibid., p. 54. 
Desmond J. Ball, 'Equipment Policy for the Defence of 
Australia' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p. 117. 
has not, as the Tange Report reveals, 
been carried out.21 
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From this discussion, it appears to be clear in the minds 
of several of those who have been directly involved and who 
have studied the present system closely that it has not only 
failed to conduct any meaningful input-output analysis but 
it has also proved to be incapable of deriving any clear 
strategic concept, preferred national security structure or 
long term planning criteria. 
Mr Morrison once described his view of a departmental 
22 
manager as one who 'muddles through purposefully'. In the 
view of many critics the present system is one which 
encourages muddling through, with the purpose and direction 
varying from time to time according to the relative power 
and influence of the bureaucratic actors involved with the 
issue at stake. 23 To many external observers and to at least 
some participants, the system appears to be distinguished by 
a long succession of loosely structured ad hoc decisions which 
almost always involve a perpetuation or supplementation of 
existing processes, structures and programmes. Dr Foley and 
others have claimed that this essential characteristic of the 
system is clearly evident from the Defence Department's 
public documents: 
21 
22 
23 
The recent White Paper, (Australian 
Defence), in spite of its pathbreaking 
character and substantial stimulus to 
public debate, does little to allay the 
concern of those who argue that planning 
for Australia's defence lacks coherence 
and as a result more closely approximates 
W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the Minister in the Making 
of Australian Defence Policy Since the Re-Organization 
of the Department of Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), 
ibid. I PP• 84, 85. 
Ibid. I p. 71. 
The bureaucratic forces brought to bear in national 
security decision-making are discussed in detail ln 
Chapter 6. · 
a model of disjointed incrementalism than 
one of rationality.24 
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It is notable that Muggleton summarises his extensive 
work by emphasising this same characteristic: 
24 
25 
26 
27 
The principal conclusion is that although 
rejecting in theory a strongly pragmatic 
approach to decision-making the DoD has, 
in practice, adopted a permutation of the 
pragmatic approach, namely, disjointed 
incrementalism ... individual w~apon systems 
are evaluated not in terms of how they 
contribute to the preferred force structure, 
as no such force structure exists, but simply 
as additions or alterations to the existing 
force structure.25 · 
. b . k 1 26 He continues y quoting Dere Woo ner: 
' ... our planning processes are biting 
around the edges'. The NAP/TAWS study, 
for example, limited ~he scope of its 
analysis to a consideration of only those 
option elements that were possible 'future 
additions to the current force structure'. 
Analysis in Australia is not being utilized 
to determine a preferred force structure ... 
Analysis in the Australian DoD is in fact a 
constraint on rational decision-making as 
it has been used extensively within a frame-
work consistent with a disjointed incremental 
planning philosophy.27 
Kevin J. Foley, 'Selecting an Australian Tactical Fighter 
Force: Marginal Strategies, Rationality and the Australian 
Aircraft Industry' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The.Future of 
Tactical Airpohler in the Defence of Australia (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 125, 126. This matter 
is also discussed by Dr F.A. Mediansky in 'The Defence 
White Paper', Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 6/7, 
January 1976, pp. 11-13. 
T.P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical Infra-
structure for Force Structure Decision-Making in the 
Australian Defence Department, pp. 7, 56. 
Derek Woolner was Research Advisor to both Mr L.H. Barnard 
and Mr W.L. Morrison during their terms as Minister for 
Defence. 
T.P. Muggleton, An Evaluation of the Analytical Infra-
structure for Force Structure Decision-Making in the 
Australian Defence Department, p. 56. 
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It would appear from this discussion that the security 
analysis and planning system inherited from the forward 
defence era is unsuited to, and possibly incapable of, the 
task of developing and testing an independent security 
structure appropriate for Australia's new strategic 
environment. However, although the requirement for major 
change is appreciated widely, it is not recognised universally. 
The last major reassessment of the system's efficiency was 
conducted in 1973, by the Secretary of the Department of 
Defence, Sir Arthur Tange. In his discussion of the current 
system, he failed to mention the existence of any serious 
problem: 
In the reorganization it is important to 
preserve and preferably improve the 
processes by which the strategic assessments 
are made for the Government. There appears 
to be no need to change the basic machinery.28 
As a primary consequence of Australia's changed strategic 
environment, it would appear that the judgments of 1973 now 
deserve thorough re-examination. 
Australia requires a coherent and integrated system of 
strategic analysis, assessment and both long and short range 
planning. The detailed complexities and practical difficulties 
of developing such a system are discussed at some length in 
Part IV. However, it is important to note at this stage that 
the primary function of such a system would be to evolve 
strategies, structures, technologies, tactics, doctrines and 
operating procedures to employ the limited resources which 
can be allocated consistently to the national security task in 
the most efficient manner possible. 
28 Sir Arthur Tange, Australian Defence~ Report on the 
Reorganization of the Defence Group of Departments, 
presented to the Minister for Defence, November 1973, 
p. 44. This aspect of the Tange Report is also noted 
by W.L. Morrison in 'The Role of the Minister in the 
Making of Australian Defence Policy Since the 
Re-Organization of the Department of Defence' in 
Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects, p. 78. 
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The basic foundation for this type of extremely complex 
and demand~ng process of security planning would need to be 
a clear expression of strategic goals or objectives. In 
practical circumstances, these would necessarily be 
determined, or at least agreed, by the government of the 
day. 29 However, in order to simplify and clarify a large 
amount of the discussion which follows in this thesis, it 
is desirable that a series of primary goals for national 
security doctrine be defined in a tentative fashion at this 
point. 
29 
30 
1. To prevent the development of pressures and 
threats. 
2 . 30 To deter pressures and threats. 
It should ideally be the government's task to determine 
clearly what are to be the supreme goals of the national 
security structure. Is the system to be designed so as 
to prevent threats arising, to avoid conflict, to deter 
or defer an opponent, to defeat an enemy, to compel a 
disproportionate respons~, to extract a favourable exchange 
ratio or to achieve some other objective? It is conceivable 
that a government may wish to apply all of the above 
criteria in various situations. But if this is the case, 
in what types of situations and in what order of priority? 
It is also important to note here that it would be highly 
desirable, if not essential, for a large degree of 
political agreement to be reached between the major parties 
concerning the general strategic objectives to be adopted. 
Changes of basic national security objectives with changes 
of government would present major difficulties of a 
fundamental nature for the total system. 
It is a very complex matter to derive appropriate background 
assumptions for the determination of the capacities 
required for deterrence to be successful. For example, 
should it be assumed that an opposing state could devote 
its total mobilisable resources against Australia (ie. 
the absolutist approach)? If not, what assumptions is 
it appropriate to make concerning the resources which an 
attacker may be able to make available? It can be argued, 
for instance, that Australia's national security structure 
should have the capacity to deter only those forces which 
an opponent could 'reasonably' be expected to spare from 
other tasks (ie. the marginalist approach). Hence, it 
can be reasoned that, if the costs to an opponent of 
mounting this type of marginal action can be raised above 
the marginal benefits which are imputed, the opponent 
would be theoretically deterred. Th~se matters are 
discussed by Kevin J. Foley in 'Selecting an Australian 
Tactical Fighter Force: Marginal Strategies, Rationality, 
3. To defer those pressures and threats which 
a~e undeterrable. 
4. To provide a national capacity to withstand 
non-deterrable pressures of peace and 
pressures of international crises in .such a 
manner that their impact upon the total society 
is minimised. 
5. To provide a capacity to defeat regional 
power attacks at short notice. 
6. To deprive a great power of the potential for 
rapid victory. 
7. To assist other government agencies in the 
apprehension of persons or vehicles infringing 
30 cont'd 
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and the Australian Aircraft Industry' in Desmond J. Ball 
(ed.), The Future of Tactical Airpower in the Defence 
of Australia, pp. 129 ff. 
The major problem with this type of theory is simply 
that it is too far divorced from reality. Statesmen 
rarely make careful cost-benefit analyses in deciding on 
a course of action. As Adam Roberts points out: 
In some cases where states are concerned 
as much with face, reputation or high 
principles as with more mundane and 
measurable values, and where they pursue 
their interests by threatening or using 
force, cost-benefit analysis quickly 
becomes irrelevant. It is well to 
remember that most wars result from a 
process of commitment and counter-
cornmitment, threat and counter-threat, 
claim and counter-claim, perception and 
mis-perception: not from a single 
calculation by one side that a war of 
military occupation would be worthwhile. 
Cited from Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory 
and Practice of Territorial Defence (London, Chatto and 
Windus for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1976), p. 93. 
Australian territorial rights in a manner 
. 31 
which does not constitute an attack. 
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The determination of a firm series of doctrinal goals 
for the national security structure would provide a basic 
foundation for strategy formulation and evolution. From 
this beginning, it should be possible to evolve planning 
str~ctures within which alternative strategies and force 
structures could be tested, modified and retested, with 
' 
effectiveness being judged according to the degree of role 
fulfilment. Eventually, the characteristics of an optimising 
strategic concept and force structure might be determined. 
This, in turn, would make it possible to derive clear 
priorities in operational tasks and provide a rational basis 
for the allocation of total national security resources. 
Alternative means of technical task performance could then be 
evaluated within the allocated resource constraints. 
Manpower, equipment, technology and other choices could be 
made so as to optimise not only individual task performance 
but also the efficiency of the total national security 
structure. 
Many of these processes of conceptual testing and· 
experimentation could be expected to be on-going. Not all 
questions would be amenable to rapid or simple solutions. 
In the military sphere, new technologies, equipment, tactics, 
procedures and structures would require testing modification 
31 These tentative doctrinal objectives for the Australian 
national security structure have been developed from a 
series of roles outlined for the Australian Defence 
Force by Robert O'Neill in 'The Development of 
Operational Doctrines for the Australian Defence Force' 
in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects, pp. 129, 130. This list of 
objectives has intentionally been limited to those 
related specifically to the defence of Australia. Other 
less essential functions could also be mentioned, such as 
the provision of disaster relief, the capacity to 
contribute to UN peacekeeping forces and the training of 
allied forces, etc. 
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and retesting in the search for optimal solutions. 32 
These processes of system re-evaluationr strategy and 
concept reassessment and thorough restructuring would be 
extremely complex and demanding. Dr O'Neill described the 
personal qualities of those required for this type of task 
wheµ discussing the means by which adaptation must be made 
to new technology developments: 
This process of experiment should be 
carried out in a rigorous and daring 
manner, by people who have a burning 
desire to master the challenges of the 
new technologies, who are fruitful in 
their own ideas and whose imagination 
can lift them out of the groove of 
their past experience without forgetting 
what that experience has taught them 
along the way. Otherwise we might as 
well not bother. Feeble or timid 
experimentation is unlikely to bring 
in any knowledge that we do not already 
have.33 
Similar personal characteristics are likely to be 
required at all levels of the structural reassessment, 
strategy formulation and evaluation process. If this task 
were to be performed in a half-hearted fashion, or perhaps 
not undertaken at all, it would be likely that the security 
assessment and planning structure inherited from the forward 
defence era would be retained with only minor alterations, to 
meet the requirements of Australia's new strategic 
environment. This would imply a willingness to permit the 
suitability of the country's national security system for 
the requirements of the 1980 s to be left more to chance than 
design. 
32 
33 
A possible means of undertaking this process of 
experimentation to meet Australia's requirements is 
discussed by Dr Robert O'Neill in The Influence of 
Recent Developments in Conventional Weapons Technology 
on Strategic and Tactical Doctrine: Consequences for 
Australia. (An unpublished paper presented to the 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, Canberra on 5 May 1976), pp. 1-6. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
2. The Requirement for a Surge Capacity Sufficient to 
Deter,. Defer and, if Necessary, Meet a Wide Range 
of Violent Threats 
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Australia's current 'core force' rationale, depending 
heavily upon small numbers of regular service personnel, 
made considerable sense when Australia's forces were designed 
primarily for deployment in support of major ally corrunitments 
overseas.
34 In that situation, although the expanded forces 
were frequently required urgently, the direct physical 
security of Australia was never heavily dependent upon the 
speed and efficiency of core force expansion. The Australian 
Government was always in control of the timing in the 
expansion process. It largely determined the rate. at which 
force expansion was attempted and decided exactly when 
Australian units would be deployed to the war zone. In 
peacetime, there has thus never been an over-riding incentive 
to adopt unusual measures to optimise force expansion 
(surge) capacity. 
But now, with the Australian Government accepting prime 
responsibility for the defence of the continent and its 
territories, there may be little choice as to whether and 
when Australia's armed forces are committed to undertake 
defensive operations. Far more than in the past, that basic 
decision-making prerogative will be dependent upon the 
opponent's activities. Thus if, in the future, Australia is 
vulnerable to a certain type of attack with little warning, 
the Defence Force will have to be designed to react effectively 
within the same time span. In such situations,a rapid force 
expansion capacity is likely to be crucial. 
34 The 'core force' concept is very difficult to explain 
satisfactorily in a few words. However, in its most 
elementary sense, it refers to the forces .maintained 
during periods of peace, which would form the 'core' 
or basis for expansion at mobilisation. This, and 
other related concepts, are elaborated and discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter 7. · 
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But it is extremely doubtful whether the present core 
force stru~ture has the capacity to expand fast enough to 
meet effectively the types of threats which Australia may 
face in the future. If one were to attempt to justify the 
retention of the present core force structure to meet the 
demands of the new environment, a range of highly questionable 
assumptions would need to be accepted. For example, in the 
area of army manpower, it would be necessary to accept that 
for any scenario requiring the response of an Australian army 
larger that 150,000 men, between 2~ and 5 years defence 
preparation time would be available. Similarl~ it would need 
to be assumed that for any scenario requiring the response of 
an Australian army larger than 250,000 men, between 4 and 8 
years defence preparation time would be available. 35 It is 
35 It has been calculated for this discussion that between 
2~-5 years active preparation time would be required in 
order to expand the present 33,000 man regular army with 
its 20,000 man poorly trained reserve to a well-trained 
150,000 man army and between 4-8 years defence preparation 
time for it to be expanded to a well-trained 250,000 man 
army. For the time to approximate the lower figures, it 
needs to be assumed that there are no problems experienced 
in rapidly expanding the training facilities, that there are 
no problems in providing the equipment requirements of the 
expanded force, that the peacetime forces have an over-
preponderance of long lead time middle ranking officers 
and specialists already in their ranks, that nearly every 
newly trained soldier can be immediately used to ,train others 
and that during the expansion process army units are not 
required for operational or active security duties. If it 
is assumed, however, that during the expansion process 
significant forces would be required for active security 
duties, that not all newly trained personnel could be used 
to train others, that the normal levels of middle rank officers 
and specialists were apparent in the core force, as at 
present, and also that difficulties are experienced in 
establishing the expanded training facilities and in 
equipping and housing the greatly expanded forces, the time 
requirements tend to lengthen towards the upper estimates. 
It should be also noted here that the times required to 
expand the present Air Force and Navy by a similar percent-
age increase would almost certainly exceed those for the 
Army by far. This is primarily because of the long lead 
time character of the many highly skilled officers and 
technicians who play central roles in Air Force and Naval 
activ~ties and operations. Major items of Air Force and 
Naval equipment are also likely to be more difficult to 
acquire at short notice. 
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important to realise that this defence preparation time 
would only begin when the Government perceived the existence 
of a specific threat andordered the full scale mobilisation 
of Aus~ralia's resources in response. Several important 
evaluative decision-making processes would have to be 
completed before any government could take such extreme 
action. 
Firstly, political, diplomatic and perhaps military 
pre-warnin~ signals would have to be received by the country's 
intelligence services. But actually perceiving such signals 
as pre-warning indicators may be very difficult against the 
background of a confused international environment, especially 
if, as must be assumed, the potential enemy attempts to 
disguise or conceal his real intentions. The meaning of the 
pre-warning signals, even if they are correctly identified 
and·perceived, is almost always open to alternative 
explanations. The consistently accurate interpretation of 
these signals to deduce the goals and intentions of other 
countries at the pre-warning stage is extremely difficult, if 
not irnpossible. 36 But if we assume here that the Australian 
intelligence services actually do perceive the pre-warning 
signals and then interpret them in a fairly accurate manner, 
they would need to be convinced and united on the matter for 
it to be taken to the Cabinet. But again, assuming the most 
favourable outcome, the Cabinet would then have the choice 
of deciding whether to wait and study the matter further or, 
alternatively, of making a decision to institute some type 
of preliminary or precautionary military response. Even if 
the latter course were decided upon, a wide range of 
possibilities would be open, such as the ordering of greater 
numbers of long lead time equipment items, the strengthening 
36 The problems experienced by the Israelis are noteworthy 
in this context. See Agranat Commission of Inquiry into 
Yom Kippur War, Partial Report, Israel Government Press 
Office, 2 April 1974 and A. Shlairn, 'Failures in National 
Intelligence Estimates: the Case of the Yorn Kippur War' 
in World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, April 1976. This 
question is discussed further in a later part of this 
chapter. 
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of domestic defence industries or ordering the partial 
expansion of the manpower strength of the armed forces, to 
name just a few. But it is implicit in the expansion 
theory concerning the present core force that not only all 
of the early pre-warning decisions are made in a positive 
manner by all of the parties concerned, but that when the 
matter is actually taken to the Cabinet, a decision is made to 
order a full national mobilisation to meet the threat as it 
is then perceived. Defence preparation time can only begin 
at the successful conclusion of this long and complicated 
chain of decisions. The length of time which lapses between 
the initial perception of pre-warning signals by members of 
the intelligence community and the Cabinet decision to 
mobilise may well be weeks, months or perhaps even years. 
And yet, even when a decision to mobilise is taken, it must 
currently be assumed that no threat requiring an army response 
greater than 150,000 men could arise within 2~ to 5 years and 
that no threat requiring an army response greater than 
250,000 men could arise within 4 to 8 years. 
But exactly what type of threat would require the response 
of an Australian army of these dimensions? Certainly an army 
of 150,000 men would not be required to meet normal peacetime 
surveillance, maintenance of sovereignty, civil aid and 
rescue tasks. Nor would it be required to meet and defeat 
isolated low level terrorist attacks. But if a well-organised 
campaign of widespread terrorist attacks again~t scattered and 
remote installations and population centres was organised by 
a sub-national organisation, with or without the direct 
support of a foreign government or a small section of the 
Australian population, the present Australian Army could find 
itself overstretched. When it comes to a foreign national 
organisation or a foreign government conducting an intensive 
campaign of small scale raids on a continuing basis 
throughout large parts of the continent and against off shore 
territories and coastal shipping, an army of at least 150,000 
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and possibly 250,000 might well be required. 37 If the raids 
were intensified further and were conducted by battalion-sized 
units, the response requirement would probably heavily 
38 press a 250,000 man army. Certainly if an attacking state 
undertook a limited land-grab or lodgement operation with 
multiple brigade or division-sized forces co-ordinated with 
widespread raids, a response capacity of over 250,000 is likely 
to be required. If multiple lodgement or larger, more 
numerous sustained enemy operations of various types were 
considered, it can be assumed that the manpower requirements 
of an effective Australian response are likely to be even 
39 greater. 
But can it be assumed realistically that none of these 
terrorist, raid, confrontation or lodgement threat possibilities 
37 
38 
39 
This would depend heavily upon assumptions which are made 
concerning the numbers of men required to secure vital 
installations, the numbers required in supporting roles, 
logistics, etc., the numbers required in the training 
structure to provide a capacity to expand further if 
needed and the numbers of men required to be held in 
reserve to guard against a possible escalation by the 
enemy. In raid-type scenarios, the overall manpower 
requirements would also depend heavily upon the effective-
ness of the air, ground, sea and undersea surveillance 
systems which Australia possessed to monitor enemy 
activities across the vast expanses of its continental 
space, offshore maritime zones and the enemy's home waters. 
If these syste:nswere highly effective, the requirements 
for army personnel on the ground could be reduced 
significantly. 
It should be noted that the addition of very meagre 
resources to those which would be required for raids would 
permit an enemy to exacerbate greatly the problems for 
the defender. Thus in some situations, a raid-bombardment 
or raia.:..mining scenario may be more likely than a simple 
raiding campaign. While these more complex campaigns 
would require very little additional effort from the 
attacker, the impact upon the manpower requirements of the 
defence could be very significant. 
During the period of mobilisation, it is most likely that 
the enemy would also be expanding his forces, possibly at 
a rate which is faster than that of which Australia is 
capable. Thus, even in the event that a decision were made 
to mobilise very early during a period of heightening 
tension, there could, of course, be no guarantee that the 
final force ratios would be favourable to Australia. 
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could arise and physically confront Australia less than 
2~-8 years .from the government decision to mobilise to meet 
such a threat? In other words, can it be taken for granted 
thatAustralia's intelligence organisations will receive 
preliminary warning signals, that they will be interpreted 
correctly, that the Cabinet will be alerted, that the Cabinet 
will then decide to order general mobilisation and that,even 
at that stage, there will still be 2~-8 years time to prepare 
a response before an enemy could attack? 
If an analysis is made of the major conflicts which have 
occurred during and since the Second World War, the precise 
length of perceived governmental warning time and defence 
preparation time is, in many instances, difficult to determLne 
exactly. But it can be concluded that in only one instance 
which has been brought to the author's attention has defence 
preparation time exceeded seventeen months. 40 In most instances, 
it was well under twelve months and in many instances it was 
under three. 
Is there any reason to expe~t that in the future 
Australian defence planners can anticipate effective defence 
preparation time of an order of magnitude five to twenty-five 
times greater than that which has been available to others in 
40 The exception is in Australia's active defence 
preparation prior to the onset of hostilities with 
Japan in 1941. The defence preparation time in 
that instance was approximately two years and six 
weeks. The details of other individual cases are, 
of course, open to dispute. However, the major 
point to be made by this discussion is more 
difficult to question seriously, i.e. the order 
of magnitude of defence preparation time available 
in recent historical experience. There appears to 
be no evidence to suggest that defence preparation 
time in a future conflict situation involving 
Australia is likely to be an order of magnitude 
several times greater than that which has been 
available to other countries in recent history. 
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41 the recent past? There h0ve been those who have argued 
that Australia's remoteness from the major world centres 
of power would serve, to some degree, to insulate it from 
t . . 42 h h . s rategic surprise. T ey tend to argue t at, for a nation 
41 
42 
It should be noted that assumptions of this nature are 
not uncommon in the Australian defence establishment. 
For instance, in the Interim Report of the Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Industrial 
Support for Defence Needs and Allied Matters (Parliament 
of Australia, June 1977), it is stated without any 
supporting argument or attempted justification that: 
It has been assessed by the Committee 
that it would take him [a potential 
enemy] three years to build up the 
capability to mount a major raid on 
Australia and five years to mount 
an invasion. 
(See paragraph 2.10). 
It is upon these highly contestible assumptions that the 
primary objectives for Australia's industrial support 
capacity are deterimed for this important study: 
Recognizing that a high-level threat to 
Australia could arise in a situation of 
world chaos and that there would then be 
a strong likelihood that overseas supplies 
would not be available during either the 
build-up or the combat period, the Committee 
has concluded that: 
(a) Australia's defence industrial base, 
in R & D, design, production overhaul and 
repair, should be maintained in peacetime 
at a level of capability and capacity from 
which, given five years warning, expansion 
to self reliance in the provision of 
equipment of moderate complexity could be 
achieved. Such achievement could require 
stockpiling now in those areas where current 
deficiencies could not be overcome within 
the five year time frame; 
(b) The planned rate of expansion should be 
such that, within three years from go-ahead, 
industry would be capable of providing the 
Services with the level of support needed to 
resist a major raid. 
(See paragraph 2.12). 
The weakness of the background assumptions of this important 
report undermines seriously the value of its conclusions. 
See, for example, L.H. Barnard, Ministerial Statement on 
Australian Defence, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, Twenty-Eighth Parliament, 
22 August 1973, p. 239. , 
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to attack over such long distances, extensive preparations 
would be required which could be detected many years in 
advance. This would depend very much upon the characteristics 
of the country concerned and the nature of the attack intended. 
For example, it would certainly take considerable time for a 
close regional neighbour to develop the armed forces, transport 
and logistics capacities which would be required to mount a 
conventional multiple division over-the-beach assault against 
continental Australia. Sections of that country's domestic 
economy would need to be mobilised and extensive foreign 
assistance would be required. All of these preparations 
would be readily detectable by Australia's intelligence 
services. However, it must not be assumed that the detection 
of a neighbour's developing capabilities would imply a rapid 
and automatic Australian mobilisation in response. The 
regional state's long term intentions may be far from clear. 
If, in reality, they are detrimental to Australia's 
interests, they are almost certain to be concealed in. an 
elaborate disguise. In order to decoy Australia, a dispute 
might be fostered with a relatively minor regional power. 
Alternatively, newly raised and equipped forces may be 
exercised in quashing a series of artificially stimulated 
internal revolts. Diplomatic assurances of all types might 
be freely available. In this sort of environment, despite 
the development of a clearly superior regional military power, 
the reactive response of Australian politicians may be very 
limited. It is quite conceivable that full scale Australian 
mobilisation would be ordered only when the regional state's 
intentions were unambiguously identified. It is difficult to 
judge ·at what stage before the mounting of an assault a 
potential enemy's intentions would be sufficiently clear to 
justify a mobilisation order. 43 However, it is an implicit 
43 It needs to be emphasised that the process of identifying 
the general nature of an opponent's intentions may in 
itself be very difficult. However, even when this is 
determined in fairly unambiguous terms, there may be great 
doubt and uncertainty concerning the nature of the intended 
attack, its objectives, its timing, its location, the 
technologies and tactics to be employed etc. 
Australian uncertainties concerning these matters might, in 
many circumstances, affect the nature and vigour of the 
Government's response. 
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assumption of the current Australian national security 
structure that, from the time that full mobilisation is 
ordered, between 2~-8 years would still be available before 
a regional opponent could attack. The validity of this type 
of institutionalised presumption ought to be the subject of 
considerable scepticism. 
In discussing this subject, there are a number of related 
matters w~ich should not be taken for granted. For instance, 
it ought npt to be assumed that, in order for Australia to 
require the response of a 150,000 or 250,000 man army, it would 
be necessary for an opponent to transport forces of a 
comparable size onto Australian territory. On the contrary, 
in the circumstances of a regional dispute stimulating armed 
confrontation, Australia may need to deploy forces of this 
size in order to meet satisfactorily the threat posed by 
44 forces which number less than 20% of their own strength. 
The length of time which would be required by the regional 
state concerned to prepare to mount an extensive confrontation 
campaign of raids and possibly local bombardment and mining 
operations against isolated Australian installations and 
population centres might be a matter of days, weeks, or, at 
the most, a few months. The degree of warning and, more 
importantl~ the lengtti of active defence preparation time 
which Australia might receive in these circumstances could 
conceivably be limited to a few days. In this type of 
situation, Australia could obviously not afford to wait 2~-8 
years for appropriate response forces to become available. 
44 This type of situation would represent a ~lassie 
illustration of the strategic principle of dis-
proportionate response. The opponent's great 
advantage could be gained because in normal circum-
tances the attacking forces would possess the initiative 
for attack. They would be free to choose the time, 
place,mode, method and duration of operations. In 
most respects, the demands of these circumstances are 
analogous to the widely held requirement foi a 10 to 1 
force ratio to defeat guerilla insurgencies. See 
this discussed in John S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare (London, Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1965) 
pp. 86' 8 7. 
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Either significant concessions or losses of sovereignty 
would have to be accepted or,alternativel~major escalations 
in the seal~ of conflict would have to be made. 45 Both options 
would be inimical to Australia's short and long term national 
security interests. 
The warning times likely to be received prior to the 
onset of many types of threats are also being affected heavily 
by new developments in technology. As was discussed in 
Chapter 2, there is a major trend developing in weaponry and 
transport technologies towards the effective reduction of the 
significance of distance as a constraint upon the rapid 
application of force. The proliferation of jumbo aircraft, 
remotely piloted vehicles and long range precision guided 
munitions is having the effect of cutting deployment times for 
powerful units of military capability over long distances in 
a dramatic fashion. Hence the capability of major powers to 
project rapidly different types of force in a precise fashion 
over long ra~ges is being transformed. At the same tim~ their 
capacity to supply this potential to client states at short 
45 The most potent and readily available means of 
conflict escalation would be the threat, and possibly 
the use, of Australia's long-range air and naval 
bombardment and interdiction capacity against the 
opponent's homeland and surrounding waters. At least 
in theory, these units could be employed for the 
performance of two types of offensive function -
to attempt to destroy the opponent's offensive forces 
in their home bases or to attack a much broader 
range of infrastructure targets, ports, support 
shipping, railways, roads, centres of industry and 
possibly major cities. The first option may be 
militarily difficult if the opponent's strike forces 
take the form of medium and low technology 
surface vessels and aircraft. These can be readily 
dispersed and are difficult to detect in many types 
of coastal environment. The second type of 
retaliatory option would have a limited utility in 
this type of situation because of its very great 
diplomatic ramifications. But, in addition, it is 
possible that,in the future,regional states will be 
able to deter this type of deep infrastructure 
retaliatory strike through their acquisition of 
highly survivable long-range counter-bombardment 
capabilities in the form of air-:, ground- or sea-
launched cruise missile forces. 
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notice is also increasing markedly. In this highly dynamic 
strategic environment, Australia's retention of the national 
security response concepts of a previous era is difficult to 
justify. 
If Australia is to maximise its capacity to deter and 
defer the development of threats and, at the same time, optimise 
its capacity to meet a wide range of potential security 
problems, it needs to develop a surge capacity which can 
produce satisfactory force levels within the minimum warning 
times for particular threats. This is not an argument for 
the simple multiplication of the current regular manpower force 
structure. Such a proposal would be politically and 
economically unrealistic. However, there are several 
alternative means of expanding surge capacity. 46 The changed 
nature of Australia's strategic environment serves to increase 
greatly the desirability of considering their adoption seriously. 
3. The Need for an Independent Intelligence Capacity 
Oriented to the Requirements of Australia's 
Changing National Security Environment 
Australia's national security interests will not always 
coincide with those of its great power allies. Hence, 
reliance upon foreign intelligence services for significant 
components of the country's priority requirements is highly 
undesirable. Institutionalised dependence upon foreign 
sources of intelligence may render Australia vulnerable to a 
large number of potentially damaging influences. To illustrate 
the point, there is considerable scope in this type of 
relationship for the dispensing country to regulate or modify 
the flow of information in its own interests. Misinformation 
might be supplied either unintentionally or otherwise. It 
must be anticipated that, in addition to flows of valuable 
objective information, foreign countries will channel their 
own value judgments, philosophies and concepts into senior 
levels of the national security structure. Over an extended 
46 Alternative means of developing surge capacity are 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 11. 
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period of time, this influence could have a significant 
impact upoQ the attitudes and reactions of Australia's 
national security decision-makers. Further, in some types 
of situations, foreign sources of information could be 
suspended arbitrarily or made the subject of bargaining 
pressures which would not be in Australia's interests. 
The policy implications of these misgivings were 
expressed clearly in Justice Hope's third report of the Royal 
Commission on Intelligence and Security; 
Australia's intelligence interests 
do not and cannot coincide with those of 
any other country. Therefore, although 
we can and should benefit from exchanges 
of information and views with friends and 
allies we need our own intelligence 
collection and assessment capabilities. 
We also need constantly to re-assess 
the benefits to Australia from 
intelligence relationships with other 
coun~ries against the costs.47 
From Australia's point of view, one of the continuing 
enticements of close intelligence relationships with major 
power allies is likely to be that those countries alone 
will be able to afford the full range of sophisticated 
intelligende collection and analysis facilities. 48 The 
heavily restricted and constrained passage of material from 
these sources is likely to be of continuing interest to 
Australia. However, it should be noted that, in the context 
of Australia's reorientated national security requirements, 
most of these highly specialised areas of allied intelligence 
activity are likely to become relatively less important. 
As Australian intelligence organisations restructure their 
47 
48 
See Third Report of the Royal Commission on Intelligence 
and Security: Abridged Findings and Recommendations 
(April 1977, tabled in the House of Representatives by 
the Prime Minister, Mr Fraser on 5 May 1977), p. 17. 
For detailed descriptions of superpower technical 
intelligence gathering capabilitiesisee P.J. Klass, 
Secret Sentries in Space (New York, Random House Inc., 
1971) and also Ted Greenwood, 'Reconnaissance and 
Arms Control' in Scientific American, Vol. 228, No. 2, 
February 1973, p. 14. 
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activities ·to meet the requirements of the new security 
environment and strategic concept, an increasing proportion 
of high priority information should be available from 
indigenous intelligence gathering facilities based on 
Australian territory. Some increased intelligence 
gathering capacity may be gained as a consequence of long 
range surveillance systems of various types being deployed 
primarily for other purposes. 49 Other more specialised 
methods and means of intelligence collection are likely to 
be required if a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency 
is to be gained and these will requi~e spec~al attention and 
funding. 
An expansion of Australia's independent intelligence 
gathering capabilities would need to be matched by a more 
sophisticated capacity for intelligence analysis and 
interpretation. This area is highly complex and difficult. 
The derivation of meaningful intelligence assessments from 
the almost overwhelming background 'noise' of spurious 
information in the international environment requires the 
employment of advanced techniques and high levels of technical 
skill.so In the key area of interpreting and foreseeing 
foreign actor intentions, the experience of several foreign 
countries suggests that the intelligence assessment structure 
should be designed in such a manner as to facilitate the 
. l . . . 51 h . f expression of a ternative opinions. T e suppression o 
dissenting views in the normal decision-making processes of 
a conventional bureaucratic structure serves to generate and 
perpetuate theories, views and concepts which become 
conventional wisdom within the structure but which have, on 
49 
50 
51 
Over-the-horizon radar and long range passive sonar 
sensors could be expected to have significant potential 
in this field. See the discussion in Chapter 2. 
There is a detailed discussion of the difficulties of 
deriving accurate intelligence assessments in an 
environment characterised by high levels of 'noise' in 
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision 
(Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1962), 
pp. 71-169. 
See this discussed in A. Shlaim, 'Failure in National 
Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yorn Kippur War' 
in World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, April 1976. 
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several occasions,proved to be misleading, inaccurate or 
. . . 52 h 1 . . incorrect i_n important respects. T e structura incorporation 
of alternative assessment staffs, at least in key areas, would 
provide an important means of encouraging the expression of 
non-conformist views and potentially a method of sharpening 
the value of the total intelligence assessment staff. 
The changed nature of Australia's security strategy is 
likely to impact directly upon the tasking of the intelligence 
services. Much greater attention will need to be applied to 
intelligence which is likely to be of specific significance 
to Australia. Perhaps most importantly, a very close monitor 
will have to be maintained upon all variables relating to 
pressure and threat lead and warning times. 53 It would be 
upon the basis of detailed material in this field that many 
important characteristics of Australia's response capacity 
could be determined. 
Another important consequence of Australia's strategic 
reorientation will be a much greater requirement for 
detailed 'general intelligence' relating to Australia's 
. d' . . 54 h f h l' irnrne iate security environment. .Muc o t e Austra ian 
52 
53 
54 
These matters are discussed at length in a series of 
unpublished papers delivered to a Conference on Strategic 
Issues, The Leonard Davis Institute for International 
Relations, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, held from 
7-9 April 1975. In particular see A. Ben-Zvi, Surprise 
Attacks: Theoretical Aspects; A.L. George, Warning and 
Response: Theory and Practice and B. Whaley, The Causes 
of Surprise in War. 
The types of variables which would need to be monitored 
are discussed in the papers cited above. ibid. In 
addition, see M.I. Handel, Perception~ Deception and 
Surprise: The Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War a paper 
delivered at the same conference. 
The term 'general intelligence' is defined by Norman Gelb 
in the following terms: 
General intelligence deals with such 
matters as a country's topography, the 
character of its shores, beaches and tides 
(if it borders the sea) and of its rivers 
and other inland waters; details of its 
economy and of its transportation and 
communications systems; the character of its 
people; and a wide range of other general 
areas of information. 
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continent hus yet to be mapped in detail and large portions 
of Australia's coastal and offshore waters have not been 
55 
charted in any but the most generalised manner. If 
Australia's security forces are to have the capacity to 
operate effectively in all parts of the continent and its 
surrounding environment, much more detailed information will 
be required on terrain, weather patterns, vegetation, land 
use, human occupation, man-made structures etc. 
On the local level, a great deal might be gained from a 
more active involvement of the local population in the 
collection of routine tactical intelligence - the sighting 
of unusual shipping and aircraft movements, the presence of 
strangers acting in a suspicious manner etc. This type of 
activity could be expected to be particularly valuable and 
generally accepted in the more remote parts of the country 
where it might conceivably be coordinated by local police 
54 cont'd 
55 
Gelb distinguishes 'general intelligence' from 'political 
intelligence~ 'strategic intelligence' and 'tactical 
intelligence'. Norman Gelb, Enemy in the Shadohls: The 
World of Spies and Spying (London, William Luscombe, 1976), 
pp. 18 ff. 
The entire Australian continent has now been mapped in 
1:250,000 scale, but only approximately 40 per cent of 
these maps are contoured and many are over fifteen years 
old. In 1965, a programme was commenced to provide a 
complete coverage of the continent in the more detailed 
1:100,000 scale within ten years. However, because of 
budgetary cut-backs and rigidly imposed staff ceilings, 
the programme was only approximately 50 per cent complete 
at the end of 1977. 
The lack of up-to-date knowledge and detailed charts on 
much of Australia's coastline and adjacent waters is also 
a serious problem. Some areas of Australia's northern 
coastline remain essentially uncharted and for others the 
most recent material was produced in the nineteenth 
century. The difficulties of navigation in such 
conditions are highlighted in United States Defense 
Mapping Agency, Hydrographic Centre, Sailing Instructions 
for the North and West Coasts of Australia (Washington D.C., 
United States Defense Mapping Agency, Revised Edition, 
1976). 
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56 forces. 
Australia's requirements for intelligence in the 1980s 
can be expected to differ considerably from those of the 
past. Many types of information relating to Australia's 
immediate environment can be expected to gain increased 
significance. There is also likely to be a broadened 
intelligence req.uirement in non-military national security 
areas concerning economic, social, political, and other 
developments. It is clear that it would be preferable for 
all areas of intelligence which are centrally important to 
the national security structure to be satisfied in the future 
from purely indigenous means of collection, processing and 
assessment. This cannot be expected to be simple or 
inexpensive. However, it is unavoidable if Australia's 
national security structure is to be provided with independent 
intelligence assessments of central relevance, timeliness 
and high quality. 
4 • d 1 d . . ( 3) New Cornman , Contra an Commun1cat1ons C Requirements 
One major consequence of Australia's changed security 
environment is a greatly increased requirement for the 
security forces to prepare for operations on and from 
Australian territory. The Australian continent, its offshore 
islands and maritime approaches need to be considered, for 
long term planning purposes, a potential battle zone. This 
has major implications for the Australian c 3 structure. 
56 In some coastal areas, this type of assistance is 
already provided by the Voluntary Coastal Patrol, the 
Voluntary Coastguard and on an ad hoc basis by 
Australian commercial fishing and other vessels 
operating in coastal waters. There is, in addition, 
the remnants of the wartime coastwatcher organisation. 
However, because of its classified nature, it is 
difficult to evaluate the strength and/or operational 
capacity of this structure. There would appear to be 
considerable scope for rationalising and integrating 
the intelligence gathering capacities of these 
disparate groups and individuals. 
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At present, the Australian armed services exist as 
three scpar~te organisations. They are organised internally 
on functional principles consisting of an operational 
element - the Fleet, the Army Field Force Command and the 
RAAF Operational Command - and one or more support elements. 
As Dr R.J. O'Neill has pointed out, this structure is not 
well suited to the requirements of operating flexibly and 
at short notice in Australia's immediate environment: 
Each service can ... readily 
make contributions to a joint force 
if required to do so. However, the 
joint force structure into which such 
contributions would have to be fitted 
does not exist and so if the Australian 
services are to be used jointly to defend 
Australia, there would be appreciable 
delays until the framework was set up. 
Given that the Department of Defence is 
now integrated, that the post of Chief of 
Defence Force Staff has been created 
giving its incumbent command over the 
'three services, it seems only logical that 
a joint service force structure should be 
established also.57 
Dr O'Neill has argued in detail the case for a command 
structure more appropriate for the requirements of security 
• • t 1 • I • d. • 5 8 b bl operations in Aus ra ia s imme iate environment. Pro a y 
the simplest type of system would involve the establishment 
of regional Maritime Defence Commands comprising air and 
naval forces and regional Continental Defence Commands 
comprising ground and air forces. For instance, there might 
be two Maritime Defence Commands, one for the East and one 
for the West. The continental land mass adjacent to each of 
the maritime commands might best be divided for the purposes 
of command into two, in such a manner as to produce a North 
East and a South East Continental Defence Command adjacent to 
the Eastern Maritime Defence Command, and a North West and a 
South West Continental Defence Command adjacent to the 
57 
58 
R.J. O'Neill, 'Structural Changes for a More Self-Reliant 
National Defence', Dyason House Papers, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
January 1976, p. 2. 
Ibid. 
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Western Maritime Defence Corrunand. The ideal boundaries for 
each comman~ area are not easy to identify. It is notable, 
however, that overseas experience testifies to the great 
advantages of closely coordinating military command 
boundaries with those already existing for state and local 
community administration. This facilitates meaningful 
59 
civil-military cooperation of al.l types and at all levels. 
Ideally, the military support structure might be divided 
into a logistics command, a training command and a reserve 
command, each of which would have centralised and regional 
tri-se~vice and single service elements. However, in 
addition to this military support structure, there would be 
a requirement for a small coordinating body to communicate 
centrally determined national emergency priorities with the 
broader sections of the total community - a range of Federal 
Government departments, state and local governments, civil 
defence organisations, industry, trade unions, medical 
authorities, the media, churches, social welfare agencies 
60 
etc. Peacetime planning in this field would need to be 
comprehensive with ultimate authority resting at the highest 
levels of national government. 
Inevitably, this level of change to the national security 
command structure would disturb Australia's military 
establishment during the period of transition. However, 
the compensating advantages would be of very great value. 
Most importantly, this type of regional tri-service command 
structure would provide a suitable basis for rapid reaction 
to security problems of all types in Australia's environment. 
59 
60 
The Swedes have employed these principles in the 
development of their national command and control 
structure. They claim considerable benefits from the 
coordination of civil and military areas of authority. Inter-
view with Major-General Nils Skold, Commander of the 
Eastern Military District, Stockholm, 27 October 1975. 
A possible means of involving broader sections of 
government in forming national security policy is 
discussed by R.J. O'Neill in 'Structural Changes for a 
More Self-Reliant National Defence', Dyason House Papers, 
Vol. 2, No. 3, January 1976, pp. 1-2. 
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For the military sector, it would encourage a degree of 
regional specialisation which, when combined with increased 
familiarity with local terrain, weather, population and 
other factors, could be expected to increase greatly the 
efficiency of local operations. Additional economies of 
effort might be forthcoming from the regional integration 
of service activities and particularly support facilities. 
Tri-service operations would become daily practice and 
operational procedures, doctrines and tactics could be 
tested regularly and inexpensively in the areas of likely 
future operations. Finally, it can be noted that the 
institution of an integrated regional command structure 
would entail a significant degree of geographical dispersion. 
Depending upon the effectiveness of supporting concealment, 
mobility and hardening measures, this level of dispersion 
should have the effect of increasing significantly the 
potential survivability of the total command structure. This 
in turn may serve to encourage further efficiencies through 
h . . f . . . 61 t e integration o service communication systems. 
An efficient, reliable and secure command, control and 
communications capability is crucial to the credibility and 
effectiveness of the total national security structure. Much 
remains to be done if Australia's capacity in this field is 
to be optimised for the new strategic environment. 
5. Expanded Requirements for Australia's Industrial 
Support Capacity 
The need for greater self reliance impacts upon the 
industrial sector's capacity to support national security 
policy in three categories of situation - in meeting peacetime 
61 
Effective integration of service communications may make 
the employment of high data rate, jam resistant, highly 
secure, time synchronised frequency agile techniques an 
economic proposition. A modified form of the United 
States Joint Tactical Information Distribution System 
(JTIDS) would appear to have very great potential in 
Australia's contental environment. For details of this 
system see Chapter 2. 
requirements, in meeting tho pressures of international 
crises and in meeting the pressures of international 
aggression. 
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In normal periods of peace, the national security 
structure is likely to be organised on the basis of an 
anticipation that industry will have the capacity to provide 
three different types of support. The first requirement is 
likely to be for industry to supply equipment and support to 
meet those specialised requirements which cannot be met by 
systems already in low cost production overseas. The second 
peacetime requirement is likely to be for industry to 
produce high usage ordnance and parts for a large range of 
equipments held in the national security structure. The 
third and, most probably, increasingly important peacetime 
requirement will be for Australia's total civil industrial 
sector to prepare a flexible capacity to produce a wide 
range of national security requirements in crisis situations. 
In the face of pressures of international crises, 
Australian industry will almost certainly be expected to 
reduce the vulnerability of the total society. In practice, 
this would involve the institution of active measures to 
compensate for those areas of essential resource and commodity 
production which Australia currently lacks. 62 Some critical 
resources may have to be stockpiled in advance and in other 
instances alternative means of production may have to be 
established to substitute for critical imports. 
The third major area of greatly increased importance 
will be in the development of a highly survivable industrial 
capacity sufficient to provide essential civil and military 
commodity requirements in the face of pressures of 
international aggression. Ensuring the survivability of 
essential components of industry in the face of a wide range 
of pressures and violent attacks could not be expected to be 
62 
The major areas of domestic production deficiency are 
outlined in Chapter 3 and possible means of instituting 
compensatory measures are discussed in Chapter 10. 
20 2 
easy. Some production capacities may need to be dispersed 
and others pf very high priority may need to be duplicated, 
concealed and hardened. However, it must be recognised that, 
even if it werewell protected and highly survivable, 
Australian industry in its present state could not be expected 
to provide all the support requirements of the current 
security structure. Nor would it be easy to expand industrial 
capacity in such a way as to provide a capability to support 
fully a mobilised version of the current force structure. 
Even with heavy stockpiling of imported raw materials, 
equipm~nt components and fully built-up pieces of equipment, 
the very wide variety of systems currently deployed in the 
service structure would make long-term support extremely 
difficult. 
In order to increase Australia's independent operational 
capacity in serious crises of international aggression, a 
degree of equipment rationalisation may be required. One 
approach might be to adopt a carefully calculated high-low 
. f ·1· . 63 f l h' h mix o mi itary equipments. In the case o arge, very ig 
technology equipments - advanced combat aircraft, large 
sophisticated warships, main battle tanks, etc. - it may be 
possible to retain a capacity to produce high usage parts 
and to undertake minor overhauls and repairs from purely 
indigenous resources. However, the capacity to replace or 
heavily modify this type of equipment without extensive foreign 
support needs to be recognised as being beyond Australia's 
. . . 64 . . 
current capabilities. In a crisis situation, the development 
of an indigenous capacity to undertake these demanding tasks 
63 
64 
The concept of a high-low equipment mix has been the 
subject of intensive debate in the United States ever 
since original proposals of this type were made for the 
US Navy by Admiral E.R. Zumwalt. See the article by him 
entitled 'High-Low' in US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. 102/4/878, April 1976, p. 46, and also the 
discussion in subsequent issues of the same journal. 
This point is elaborated in the Interim Report of the 
Joint (Parliamentary) Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Industrial Support for Defence Needs and Allied Matters. 
In particular see the discussion in paragraphs 5.63 and 
5.64. 
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would be technically impossible in some areas and extremely 
difficult and expensive in others. 65 In the absence of a 
major peacetime government initiative to encourage large 
scale high technology developments in a significant number 
of industrial sectors, it may be preferable to withdraw 
from all but the production of a very carefully selected 
number of small high technology systems, high usage parts and 
the general support of large high technology equipments. 
Foregoing aspirations to produce locally large warships, 
advanced combat aircraft and main battle tanks would serve to 
weaken the Australian security structure in two main 
categories of situation. Firstly, in the circumstances of a 
threat arising which provided Australia with a very long 
defence preparation time, the Australian security structure 
would not possess an independent capacity to proliferate 
large high technology systems. In the second situation,of a 
very prolonged high intensity conflict, battlefield losses 
could not be replaced by similar large high technology 
systems. 
However, in compensation for the lack of production 
capacities for major sophisticated items, very significant 
resources of all types would be freed to concentrate on 
Australia's small system high technology and medium and lower 
technology requirements. In these fields, Australia already 
possesses most of the industrial capacities required to 
design and produce small arms, light and heavy wheeled 
vehicles, small ships, light and medium missiles, remotely 
66 piloted vehicles, many types of communication equipments etc. 
There exists great potential scope for exploiting 
imaginatively these already acquired technologies to satisfy 
many of the new emerging high-priority national security 
equipment requirements. 
65 
66 
The Interim Report of the Joint (Parliamentary) Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence also discusses this 
question. ibid. 
Australia's capacity in these fields is discussed in the 
Interim Report of the Joint (Parliamentary) Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence. ibid. 
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This is not intended to be an argument for the peacetime 
production 9£ all low and medium technology systems, all high 
usage parts for high technology systems and a carefully 
selected number of small high technology systems within 
Australia. It would certainly be desirable for a large 
number of them to be produced domestically. However, in 
peacetime conditions, the small quantities of equipment required 
may make.such production extremely expensive and unacceptable 
politically. Perhaps even more important than full-time 
small-scale domestic production would be the possession of a 
capability to transfer rapidly large portions of civil 
industrial capacity to meet those national security 
requirements not normally supplied by domestic industries. 
Because of the scope of local civil production capabilities, 
the potential currently exists to produce a wide range of low 
and medium technology and some specialised high technology 
systems in a fully mobilised domestic economy. However, in 
practice, for this potential capacity to be exploited at 
short notice, elaborate peacetime preparations would be 
required. Firm and detailed decisions would need to be made 
concerning those types of equipment which would be required 
in the circumstances of particular national security crisis 
situations. Comprehensive equipment designs would need to 
be finalised in peacetime and prototypes tested thoroughly. 
Production dies and jigs could then be made so that volume 
manufacture could commence at short notice. The processes 
of converting civil industrial facilities to produce national 
security requirements might even be tested in key areas. The 
potential benefits from this type of close and detailed 
civil-military interface can be expected to be very 
significant. According to FordAustralia's Chief Engineer, 
Mr J.A. Tweeddale, the normal lead time for a new vehicle 
production line exceeds three years from the decision to 
commence. However,he has assessed that this time could be 
reduced to well under twelve months if preliminary planning 
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for the transfer of productive capacity is comprehensive. 67 
The time which might be saved in other production processes 
- in the electronics and ship-building industries, for 
example - might be far greater. 
The development of a high degree of self reliance in 
national security capacity will necessitate a greatly 
improved working relationship between political leaders, their 
national security advisers and large components of civil 
industry. A much greater degree of cooperation and consultation 
will be required over a wide range of matters, but most 
particularly concerning procurement policy. 68 The design of 
the national security structure will need to be determined, 
at least partly, by the capacities of domestic industry to 
produce and support important equipment. Significant trade-
offs would be involved in this process. For example, an 
imported heavy armoured vehicle X may be considered to provide 
the most appropriate technical means of performing an important 
offensive ground force function. However, X may be extremely 
expensive to support with purely domestic resources and 
impossible to produce locally. This may make the option of 
an alternative domestically produced lighter armoured vehicle 
Y, which is 1/3 the unit cost and ~ the life cycle cost of 
X,much more appropriate. Larger numbers of a lighter 
domestically produced and supported vehicle may optimise 
overall national security capacity in the face of a wide 
range of potential threats for a given resource input. Many 
of the trends arising from recent military technological 
67 
68 
This matter was raised in the discussion following 
Mr J.A. Tweeddale's address to the United Service 
Institution of the Australian Capital Territory on 
1 June 1977. For the text of his address see J.A. 
Tweeddale, 'The Defence Capability of the Australian 
Vehicle Manufacturing Industry' in The United Service 
Institution of the Australian Capital Territory, The 
Defence Capability of Australian Industry (Canberra, 
The United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, 1977) pp. 8-31. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence is critical of some aspects of the current situation 
in this area. See Interim Report of the Joint (Parliamentary) 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Industrial Support 
for Defence Needs and Allied Matters. In particular see 
the discussion in paragraphs 3.27-3.29. 
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developments may add further support to options involving 
larger num~ers of smaller, medium technology dispersible 
equipments, not only in the ground but also in the sea and 
air environments. 69 
If Australia requires a high level of self sufficiency 
in crisis situations, it will be necessary for the country to 
develop a capacity to produce a large proportion of its 
national security equipment requirements at short notice. 
With many types of equipment, arrangements might be made for 
foreign designs to be produced under licence in Australia. 
In some areas, there may be scope to undertake joint research 
and development programmes with foreign countries with which 
Australia shares important technical requirements. 70 
However, it will be necessary to realise that, because of 
Australia's changed strategic situation, there are likely to be 
an increasing number of technical requirements and specific-
ations which are peculiarly Australian. There are also 
likely to be some technical concepts which may not warrant 
foreign development but which, because of Australia's unique 
national security environment, may be particularly suitable 
71 for local employment. It would be primarily to these 
latter areas that Australia's research and development 
capacity would need to be directed. The development of 
successful prototypes would make domestic peacetime production 
69 
70 
71 
See this matter discussed in Chapter 2. The impact of 
volume upon the relative cost disadvantage of Australian 
versus foreign production is elaborated by Desmond J. 
Ball in 'Australia's Tactical Air Requirements and the 
Criteria for Evaluating Tactical Aircraft for Australian 
Procurement' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The Future of 
Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia, pp. 88 ff. 
This matter is raised in the Interim Report of the Joint 
(Parliamentary) Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Industrial Support for Defence Needs and Allied Matters, 
paragraph 3.34. 
Some possibilities in this regard are discussed by 
Desmond J. Ball in 'Equipment Policy for the Defence of 
Australia' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, pp. 109-112. 
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of some equipments feasible. Other systems might be readied 
for rapid production by mobilised civil industries in crisis 
situations. 
Most of the desirable trends in national security 
industrial policy which have been discussed above are far 
removed from current experience. At present, many areas of 
Australian secondary industry are declining and this in turn 
is impacting directly upon Australia's future national security 
. . . 72 . . . industrial support capacity. In those industries which are 
heavily dependent upon defence contracts in periods of peace, 
there is an urgent requirement for defence equipment 
procurement to be phased in a long term planning structure. 
This would exert a stabilising influence upon work loads and 
permit production processes to be integrated and made more 
efficient. 73 In addition, active measures are required to 
ensure the continued viability of those civil industries 
whose supporting role would be critical in a range of 
pressure and threat situations. 
6. Greater Involvement of Civil Society in National 
Security Crises 
The introduction of new weapons and weapon platforms 
following the industrial revolution had the effect of making 
armed forces far more dependent upon the comprehensive 
support of the civil sections of society. During periods of 
war it became necessary to divert the greater part of total 
national resources to supply the requirements of the armed 
72 
73 
The nature of the decline in Australia's secondary 
industrial capacity is discussed at length in the report 
to the Prime Minister by the Committee to Advise on 
Policies for Manufacturing Industry, Policies for 
Development of Manufacturing Industry (The Jackson 
Committee Report), A Green Paper, Vol. I (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1975) . 
These matters are discussed in the Interim Report of 
the Joint (Parliamentary) Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and Defence Industrial Support for Defence Needs and 
Allied Matters. In particular, see paragraphs 4.47, 
4.65, 4.70, 5.66, 5.75. 
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forces. Australia experienced the draining effect of modern 
conflict du.ring the two world wars. However, a related 
consequence of modern developments in warf,are did not 
immediately impact upon Australia. During the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries,larger parts of civil societies 
became important military targets in their own right. Cities, 
towns, industrial concentrations, transport modes, etc., all 
became the subject of direct attacks in major wars. However, 
in contrast to the experience of most of the modern world, 
Australia's support structure and population remained 
relatively immune from direct experience of the pressures of 
international crisis and war. Primarily because of their 
remote location, Australia's major cen.tres of population have 
never been the subject of serious pressure or attack. 
This situation may alter as a result of the transformation 
in Australia's national security environment. In the future, 
Australia will need to manage the pressures of international 
crisis and many of the pressures of international aggression 
independently. Its armed forces will be orienting their 
capacities more towards operations on and from the Australian 
continent. As a consequence, the potential for the 
Australian population mass to be affected directly and in a 
significant way by national security crises is rising 
considerably. The major implication 'of this development is 
that the direct involvement of the total population and 
society in future national security crises must be recognised 
and,as far as possible, managed. 
Conclusion 
The Australian national security establishment is 
confronted by a series of critical challenges. During the 
past decade, Australia's strategic situation has changed 
significantly. Mainly because of the altered nature of the 
United States' regional role, Australian forces are unlikely 
to be deployed again for long periods of time into Asia. 
Because of the stated US intention to support allies with its 
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full resources only when they are threatened by a superpower 
rival, Aus"t;ralia now needs to mobilise its own resources to 
develop an independent capability to meet a wide range of 
lower and medium level problems. 
Many of the pressures and threats with which Australia 
may be confronted in the future may be primarily economic or 
political and be beyond Australia's capacity to prevent or 
deter independently. In other situations, Australia may be 
subjected to serious pressures as an indirect result of 
disputes and conflicts in other parts of the world. In the 
future, many of these threats as well as some types of 
direct military attacks may develop within a very short 
timespan. In this situation, the Australian national security 
structure requires a rapid response capacity sufficient to 
deter, defer and, if necessary, meet such threats independently. 
But Australia's current strategy formulation, force expansion, 
intelligence, command, control and communications, industrial 
and total civil support capacities have been evolved during a 
long history of foreign commitments in support of major power 
allies. They were never designed to be appropriate for, nor 
are they suited to, the type of national security environment 
likely to confront Australia in the 1980s. 
What is required in this radically altered strategic 
situation is the evolution of a new Australian national 
security strategy from first principles. It is necessary to 
question what really should be the functions and priorities 
of the national security structure in the new environment. 
What types of contingencies should it be designed to meet? 
What are the most efficient and economic technical means of 
providing the capabilities desired? And how might the 
existing structure best be transformed to satisfy the new 
demands? Nothing less than a fundamental re-examination is 
required if Australia's national security strategy is to be 
viable in the 1980s. 
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PART I I I 
CONSTRAINTS ON RESPONSE TO CHANGE 
The major conclusion to be drawn from the discussion in 
Parts I and II is that many of the concepts, doctrines, 
structures and operational procedures which were evolved 
during the forward defence era are inappropriate for the 
new strategic environment. As a consequence, there is now 
an important requirement for the Australian security system 
to be reassessed and adapted to meet the demands of the new 
situation. 
However, there are important practical limits to change 
in Australia's security system. Because of the nature of 
the parent society and its position within the international 
environment, there are a large number of physical, economic, 
social, diplomatic and political factors which effectively 
constrain the scope for alterations. The nature of those 
restraining influences which are essentially non-bureaucratic 
in character is discussed in Chapter 5. 
Bureaucratic constraints on adaptation are analysed 
separately in Chapter 6. This division of the discussion 
in Part III serves to emphasise the importance of the 
restraining influence exerted by the large number of 
organisations and people who are already engaged in the 
performance of national security functions. 
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CHAP'I'ER 5 
NON-BUREAUCRATIC CONS'l'Rl\IWI'S 
The potential to change Australia's national security 
structure and policy is limited by two major categories of 
non-bureaucratic constraint - those which are e~sentially 
domestic and those which are international in character. In 
this chapter, these two types of non-bureaucratic restraining 
influence are discussed in turn. 
Internal Constraints 
The major domestic non-bureaucratic restraints on change 
in Australia's national security system flow largely from 
the general characteristics of its parent society. For 
instance, the size of the overall national economic 'cake' 
effectively restricts the dimensions of the budgetary 'slice' 
which can be allocated for national security expenditure. It 
is important to realise that Australia's economy is compara·t-
i vely limited in size, its national income being US$44,397 
million in 1972. 1 In a total world environment, this can be 
related to US$92,538 million for Canada, US$139,637 million 
for the United Kingdom and US$1,040,860 million for the 
United States. 2 Local regional comparisons tend to be more 
favourable to Australia. For example, in that same year of 
1972, the national income figures for Indonesia and the 
Philippines were US$13,655 million and US$9,975 million 
. 3 
respectively. 
Australian national security policy is not only constrained 
by the scale of the domestic economy but also by its character. 
For instance, the capacity of Australia's secondary industry 
1 
2 
3 
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistical Yearbook 1974 (New York, United Nations 
Organization, 1975), p. 646. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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to produce the quantity and quality of goods required by 
the nationa~ security force within acceptable time and 
cost parameters is limited. Writing in 1974, Brigadier P.J. 
Greville summarised Australia's capabilities in a rather 
optimistic fashion in the following terms: 
A perusal of our present capacity indicated: 
-a. that we could manufacture all the vehicles 
(A, Band c)4 needed by the Services. To do 
this, however, we must develop or get a 
licence to build one or more diesel or multi-
fuel engin~ and transmission sets for the 
vehicles; 
b. we have the capacity to produce our own 
communications systems, and some at least of 
our electronically controlled weapons systems; 
c. we have the capacity to produce our own 
transport aircraft and some of our needs for 
first and second line aircraft; 
d. we can produce our own ships; 
e. we can produce most small arms, conventional 
weapons and munitions; 
f. we can produce special foods, shelter, 
clothing.5 
In fact it is doubtful whether Australia possessed all 
of these capacities in 1974. It certainly does not possess 
them in 1978. 6 For instance, in order for Australia to acquire 
4 
5 
6 
A, B and C vehicles can be defined as follows: 
A vehicles are fighting vehicles which are armed 
and/or designed to carry weapons. eg. tanks, 
armoured personnel carriers, mechanised infantry 
combat vehicles, certain recovery vehicles, etc. 
B vehicles are non-fighting vehicles of all types 
which are not specifically designed to carry offensive 
weapons and do not fall within the C vehicle category. 
C .vehicles co~prise equipment designed for construction, 
excavation, highway maintenance and other types of plant 
and equipment of predominantly engineer usage. 
Brigadier P.J. Greville, 'Infrastructure Requirements for 
a Self-Reliant Defence Policy', United Service, Vol. 2 8, 
No. 2, October 1974, p. 84. 
The defence support capacity of the munitions, aircraft, 
ship building and related industries is discussed at length 
in the Interim Report of the Joint (Parliamentary) Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence~Industrial Support for 
Defence Needs and Allied Matters (Canberra, Parliament of 
Australia, June 1977). 
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the capacity to produce all of the components required 
for the construction of A vehicles, transport aircraft and 
warships, a maj6r and highly specialised expansion of 
industrial capacity would be essential. 7 In the current 
economic and national political environment, this type of 
development appears highly unlikely. In fact, in recent 
years, it has been made clear by a variety of sources that 
the national security support capacity of Australia's 
secondary industry has suffered a relative decline. 8 This 
appears to be primarily because the rapid growth in Australia's 
mining sector has raised the domestic costs of labour and 
capital to new heights and, as a consequence,weakened the 
competitive position of the rural and manufacturing sectors. 9 
These problems have been exacerbated by the processes of 
rapid industrialisation in South East Asia. The developing 
countries of this region have been very successful in 
producing low technology, high labour intensity manufactures 
which have commanded a widening price advantage as 
Australia's labour costs have continued to rise. 
Consequently, many manufacturing processes which were formerly 
undertaken within Australia have been transferred offshore or 
replaced by those overseas. 
The current developments in Australian mining and Asian 
manufacturing both appear to be of a long term nature. As 
a consequence, in the future there is likely to be a further 
decline in Australia's manufacturing industry and hence in 
the country's independent defence support capacity. The 
trend is already firmly established. Between 1962-63 and 
1972-73, the proportion of gross domestic product derived 
7 
8 
9 
Ibid. 
In particular, see the discussion in the report to the 
Prime Minister by the Committee to Advise on Policies for 
Manufacturing Industry, Policies for Development of 
Manufacturing Industry (The Jackson Committee Report), 
A Green Paper, Vol. I (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, October 1975), p. 59. 
This relationship between the mining and manufacturing 
sectors has been termed the 'Gregory thesis'. For 
details see Glenn Withers, 'Economic Futures and 
Australian Defence Policy', The Australian Journal of 
Defence Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, October 1977, pp. 122, 123. 
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from the manufacturing sector fell from 2 7. 6 per cent to 
10 24.2 per cqnt. Perhaps an even more significant indicator 
is that in that same decade the proportion of private fixed 
papital expenditure directed to the manufacturing sector fell 
11 from 25.7 per cent to 19.7 per cent. As the Jackson 
Committee Report points out, it appears that Australia's 
manufacturing industries have attempted to maintain their 
earnings and profitability by running down capital stock. 12 
Theoverall implication of these trends has been described by 
Sir Ian McLennan in the following terms: 
I think it can be said that Australian 
industry is now at a lower stage of relative 
technology, that is relative to overseas 
countries, than it was in 1939 and, 
similarly, I think it can be said that the 
development of new equipment requires much 
more sophistication than it did then.13 
These considerations constrain heavily the levels of domestic 
industrial support which can be assumed in emergency situations. 
Australia's manpower strength is also limited in both 
quantity and quality. The Borrie Report emphasised that 
Australia's post-war population growth rate is declining to 
14 
a very low level. During the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
is expected to be an almost constant 130,000-140,000 males 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing 
Industry, Policies for Development of Manufacturing 
Industry (The Jackson Committee Report), p. 62. 
Ibid.,p.62. 
Ibid. , p . 61 . 
Sir Ian McLennan, Chairman of the Broken Hill Proprietary 
Co. Limited and Chairman of the Defence Industrial 
Committee 1 'The Defence Capability of Australian Industry'. 
An address to the United Service Institution of the 
Australian Capital Territory on 3 May 1977. Published 
in the United Service Institution of the Australian 
Capital Territory, The Defence Capability of Australian 
Industry (Canberra, United Service Institution of the 
Australian Capital Territory, 1977), p. 8. 
Population and Australia: A Demographic Analysis and 
Projection (The Borrie Report) , (Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1975), Vol. 1, p. 7. 
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15 
reaching the age of 18 each year. Moreover, the limited 
scale of this potential civil and military workforce is 
likely to be eroded further by the changing occupational 
patterns of young people. Most notably, there is now a 
strong tendency for a larger proportion of young adults to 
attend tertiary educational institutiorts full-time and to 
remain there for longer periods. 16 These trends are having the 
effect of reducing significantly the size of the 17-25 year-
old male workforce available for recruitment by both domestic 
industry and the armed services. 17 
These developments may have the effect of exerting a 
constraining influence on an array of strategic options. 
The demanding nature of the minimum aptitude selection criteria 
for military service already means·that substantially more 
applicants are required than the number of vacant recruit 
positions. Yet with the pool of young potential recruits 
being restricted to an almost static level and civilian 
incomes rising continuously, it may prove to be much more 
difficult and expensive than in the past to retain and expand 
current regular service manpower strengths. 
The relative ease with which current service ceilings are 
being met appears to be primarily a consequence of the high 
rate of domestic unemployment. As Glenn Withers has pointed 
out: 
15 
16 
17 
Ibid. 
At present unemployment is permitting some 
gradual build-up of force strength without 
increasing relative pay. The crunch will come 
See a table of actual and projected rates of enrolment 
in tertiary institutions, ibid., p. 396. 
Actual and projected male work participation rates for 
the age groups 15-19 years and 20-24 years are presented 
in diagramatic form, ibid., p. 334. A similar point is 
made with earlier statistics by Darcy McGaurr in 
Conscription and Australian Military Capability (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1971), p. 2. 
if the unemployment problem is successfully 
resolved ... 18 
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The means available to overcome this problem of restricted 
regular manpower supply in the long term are very limited. 
The most controllable variable determining enlistment rates is 
19 that of service pay. However, the price elasticity of 
supply for military manpower in Australia appears to be low, 
particularly in comparison to that in the United States. 20 
Withers has calculated that, in Australia, a 10 per cent 
increase in service pay would only invoke a very moderate 
1 . . . l' . 21 h. 0 per cent rise in enlistment app ications. T is 
limited supply response together with the reduced scale 0£ 
the available manpower pool constrains heavily the levels 
of regular professional service manpower which can be maintained 
in Australia within the currently accepted budgetary parameters. 
Any proposals for greatly expanded full-time military manpower 
would need to depend on either a vastly increased budgetary 
allocation or some form of national manpower mobilisation or 
conscription. 
The limited availability of manpower for part-time 
military service further restricts Australia.'s future 
security options. However, it is important to note that 
the apparent reluctance of Australians to perform part-time 
military service is a product not only of their failure to 
enlist, but also of their high rate of withdrawal and 
resignation. The very low retention rate, and hence the 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Glenn Withers, 'Economic Futures and Australian Defence 
Policy', The Australian Journal of Defence Studies, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, October 1977~ p. 127. 
In the long term there are, of course, other variables 
which are amenable to manipulation. For example, alterations 
to the minimum selection criteria might be expected to 
increase manpower supply and changes to conditions of 
service and to social relationships within military 
structures may serve to reduce the rate of manpower wastage. 
This point is discussed by Darcy McGaurr in Conscription 
and Australian Military Capability, pp. 14-16. 
This was discussed by Darcy McGaurr in a lecture on 
manpower policy to the Australian Army Staff College, 
Queenscliff, Victoria, May 1977. 
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modest strength of part-time military forces, would appear 
to be due more to the unfavourable conditions of part-time 
service than to any deep-seated social or political attitudinal 
. 22 
constraint. 
The potential for change in Australia's national security 
system is also restrained heavily by the values and attitudes 
of the domestic population and its political representatives. 23 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Australians are generally 
apprehensive about the potential for future national security 
crises and many fear Australian involvement in a major war. 
However, expressions of strong opinion and concern by the 
Australian public concerning national security issues have 
.been by no means continuous or consistent. As Dr W.H. Smith 
points out: 
22 
23 
it is all too evident that interest in 
defence is largely spasmodic. True there is 
a continuing concern over vaguely defined 
perils which are seen to originate in the 
Several factors contributing to the unsatisfactory 
strength of part-time military forces in Australia are 
discussed in Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen 
Military Forces Report (The Millar Report), (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974), pp. 49, 
50. The opinions of those individuals who were serving 
or had served in the Citizen Military Forces in the 
early 1970s are recorded in Appendices C and D of this 
same report. Several specific areas of dissatisfaction 
are identified in these analyses. 
One important means by which the values and attitudes of 
the Australian population and its politicians are 
manifested is the manner in which the country's national 
security forces are tasked in periods of peace. To the 
extent that politicians and the public desire the 
national security system to perform subsidiary 
ceremon±al, display and other functions to the detriment 
of deterrence, deferment and defensive functions, the 
system is constrained from optimal efficiency in 
resource allocation and in adapting to meet changing 
strategic requirements. 
It is interesting, in this context, to note an inter-
national compar~son of the functions for which national 
security forces are empioyed. For details see a table 
by James Eayrs reproduced in J.C.M. Baynes, The 
Soldier in Modern Society (London, Eyre Methuen Ltd, 
1972),p.9. 
Asian hordes, world corrununism, global 
population pressures and the like; and 
it may be that some of these fears have 
basis in fact, particularly if the West is 
considered to be a spent force in world 
politics. When in the past direct threats 
to Australia have been identified - Russia 
in the nineteenth century, Japan after the 
raid on Darwin, the communist thrust in 
Southeast Asia - public opinion has usually 
greatly exaggerated the degree of danger. 
But currently, at least, there is widespread 
scepticism about potential specific threats 
to Australia. 24 
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The propensity of Australians to overreact to both 
menacing and peaceful international developments is no 
doubt due to a large number of factors. Certainly one 
important influence is the gross inadequacy of foreign news. 
coverage and interpretation in the Australian media. As 
Henry Albinski has pointed out; 'Historically the Australian 
press has, by common consent, been disgracefully deficient 
' h' I 25 ' ' h ' in t is area . It is a reflection of t e importance 
placed upon national and, indeed, international security 
issues by. the Australian media and public that there are only 
two journalists acting as essentially full-time defence 
correspondents in the domestic mass radio, television and 
d . 26 newspaper me ia. 
Dr Smith has identified a second major reason for the 
tendency of Australians to overreact in response to national 
security issues: 
24 
25 
26 
On the one hand, Australian society does seem 
largely uninterested in defence except in 
extreme situations and tends to leave matters 
W.H. Smith, The Determinants of Defence Policy (A paper 
delivered to the Conference on Armed Forces and 
Australian Society at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 
Canberra, 20-22 May 1977), pp. 9, 10. 
Henry S. Albinski, Politics and Foreign Policy in 
Australia: The Impact of Vietnam and Conscription (Durham, 
North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1970), p. 11. 
Major Peter Young (a former Regular Army Officer) is 
defence correspondent for The Australian and Frank Cranston 
is defence and aviation correspondent for The Canberra 
Times. 
to the experts and the military professionals. 
On the other hand, governments have encouraged 
the idea they are the repository of wisdom 
in such matters and have been pre-disposed to 
keep defence questions out of the arena of 
public debate.27 
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In this type of environment the public is rarely informed 
in a well-balanced routine manner of developments in the national 
security sphere. When the passage of unusual, newsworthy and 
possibly potentially threatening events captures widespread 
attention, the reporting is frequently sensationalised and 
the poor state of the public's background knowledge tends to 
facilitate an attitudinal overreaction. In the current 
situation, a high level of expertise in national security 
affairs is attained by only a small and select group of 
bureaucrats, military officers, diplomats, politicians and 
d . 28 aca emics. 
27 
28 
W.H. Smith, The Determinants of Defence Policy, p. 11. 
The high degree of concentration of specialised human 
capacities in security and strategic affairs is perpetuated 
by the long term neglect of these subjects in Australia's 
military colleges, universities and colleges of advanced 
education. Australia's situation contrasts markedly in 
this respect with nearly every other advanced western 
state. For instance, in the United States, there are 
numerous military, academic and corporate organisations 
which teach and conduct research in the field. Most of 
these are listed as Corporate Members in The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), List of Members 
(London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1974), pp. 86-89. In the United Kingdom, there are several 
military colleges and university departments dealing 
explicitly with strategic studies. For details see the 
IISS Corporate Membership list. In Canada, apart from 
the National Defence College, there is· a very strong 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs and Strategic 
Studies as well as ten universities with military 
professorships. For details see Richard A. Preston, 
'The Study of War and Its Causes', Canadian Defence 
Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 1, Summer 1977, pp. 46-50. 
By contrast, in Australia, there is no Department of 
Strategic Studies at the Royal Military College at Duntroon. 
(The subject was first offered as an undergraduate option 
only in 1977.) Nor is a Department of Strategic Studies 
planned for the new Australian Defence Force Academy 
(ADFA). For details see Paul Mench, Education and 
Officers: Changing Concepts of Officer Education (A 
paper deliv~red to the Conference on Armed Forces and 
Australian Society at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, 
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Despite fluctuations of interest, especially government 
interest, c.oncerning the seriousness and probability of 
external threats, Australian attitudes towards military 
service have been remarkably consistent over the past 
thirty-five years. The most precise records in this area 
concern public opinion poll results to questions regarding 
compulsory military service. For instance, as can be seen 
in Table 1, from 1943 to 1973 more than 73 per cent of the 
Australian population has consistently expressed its approval 
However, it 
is moderated 
f 1 ·1· . f 29 o compu sory mi itary service or young men. 
it is notable, in Table 2, that public approval 
somewhat when poll questions concern selective or non-universal 
enlistment and the possibility of conscript service overseas. 
The poll figures also display a significant divergence 
of opinion on conscription between those in an age group liable 
28 cont'd 
29 
Canberra, 20-22 May, 1977), pp. 28-33. In the 
universities the situation is little better. There is 
a small number of isolated academics holding teaching 
positions in various universities who occasionally 
contribute to debates on global, regional and national 
strategic issues. The only academic structure in 
Australia which is specifically tasked with the full-time 
study of strategic matters is the Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre at The Australian National University. 
Despite the energetic efforts of all who have been 
associated with this body since its inception in 1967, 
its size remains miniscule. It is still without a 
single tenured academic position and its Head is on loan 
from the Department of International Relations. This 
long term neglect of defence and strategic studies in 
Australia accounts in no small way for the quality and 
quantity of the expertise in strategic affairs which is 
apparent in the Parliament, the Public Service, the 
military structure, in academia, the media and in the 
general community. 
The information contained in Tables 1 and 2 was obtained 
directly from the card files of The Roy Morgan Research 
Centre Pty Ltd, 77 Pacific Highway, North Sydney. A 
detailed analysis of the 1971 poll results, displayed in 
Table 2, was published in The Sun Herald, 3 October 1971, 
p. 2 7. 
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Table 1 
Australian Attitudes to Compulsory Military 
Training (Percentage Response) 
Date clunc ,Tune Dec. May Dec. July Mar. June Feb. June June Mar. 1943 1945 1945 1946 1946 1948 1949 1949 1950 1956 1961 1973 
Question (a) (b) ( c) (c) ( d) (e) ( c) ( f) ( f) (g) {h) ( i) 
Yes 79 74 78 76 73 75 76 74 74 83 73 78 
No 14 24 19 19 20 20 17 19 20 11 21 18 
Undecided 7 2 3 5 7 5 7 7 6 6 6 4 
Questions - (a) Should compulsory military training for 
young men continue after the war? 
Source: 
(b) After the war, would you favour compulsory 
military training for young men of 18? 
(c) Do you favour or oppose, compulsory military 
training for young men of about 18? 
(d) Do you favour, or oppose compulsory military 
training? 
(e) Do you favour or oppose compulsory military 
training for young men? 
(f) If a referendum were held, would you vote for, 
or against, compulsory training? 
(g) In your opinion should compulsory military 
training continue or stop? 
(h) Would you favour or oppose again having 
compulsory military training? 
(i) Would you favour or oppose - all young men 
going to military camp for several months? 
See footnote 29. 
Table 2 
Australian Attitudes to Two Years Full-Time Military Service, with Possible 
Overseas Deployment, for a Randomly Chosen Minority of Men Aged Twenty 
{Percentage Response) 
Dec. Apr. Sept. Jul. Mar. Mar. Dec. Aug. Oct. Oct. June Sept. Sept. Sept. Sept. Date 1964 1965 1965 1966 1967 1967 1968 1969 1969 1970 1971 1971 1971 1971 1971 
Question (a) (a) (b) ( c) ( c) ( c) ( c) (d) (d) (d) ( e) ( f) ( f) ( f) (f) 
Age group 
(if specified) 'adult' 'youth' 'youth' 16-20 21-25 30-49 50-69 
Yes 71 68 69 68 70 57 68 63 58 58 53 53 66 70 74 
No 25 29 23 26 25 40 29 32 32 34 37 39 27 22 17 
Undecided 4 3 8 6 5 3 6 5 10 8 10 8 7 8 9 
Questions - (a) The government plans to register all young men of 20, and to call up about 7,000 a year for two years 
full-time service - overseas if necessary. Do you favour or oppose that? 
(b) Each year about 8,400 20 year old men are called up for two year's military training, with possible 
overseas service. Are you for, or against that call-up? 
(c) Each year about 8,000 20 year olds are called up for two year's military training with possible 
overseas service. Are you for or against that call-up? 
(d) Election Issue: End Conscription for national s'ervice [.ie. say no] or continue two year's national 
service, with possible overseas service [ie. say yes]. 
Sept. 
1971 
( f) 
)70 
76 
17 
7 
(e) Of all young men aged 20, 1 in 12, selected by ballot is called up each year for 2 years military training 
with possible overseas service. In your opinion; should that call up be continued fie. say yes] or ~ 
ended [ie. say no]. N 
( f) In your opinion, should compulsory military training continue or be ended? 
Sources: See footnote 29. 
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for call-up and those who are older. In 'rable 2, the 
figures fo~ both 1964-65 and 1971 show a significant 
divergence of opinion according to age, although in both 
cases a majority of potential conscripts still supported the 
call-up even though it was selective and entailed possible 
overseas service. It appears that while a very large 
proportion of the population perceive a general need for 
national security forces and are even prepared to support 
universal conscription, they are significantly less keen to 
be involved individually as participants. No doubt there are 
many reasons for this, such as the perception by individuals 
that full-time military service is a potentially disruptive 
influence to civil careers and normal patterns of social 
behaviour. However, an important influence may also be an 
apparent divergence between publicly perceived military 
attitudes, practices and social mores and the changing 
nature of those values held in the wider community. 30 The 
broad nature of the attitudinal changes taking place in 
civilian society are summarised in the Jackson Committee 
Report in the following terms: 
30 
The long standing ethic of delayed gratification 
has far less weight than before; individuals 
in today's affluent society want opportunities 
for pleasure and relaxation now ... Since 
governments now assume more responsibility for 
caring for aged and sick people, there is less 
incentive to accumulate funds to maintain a 
standard of living in retirement ... 
Current attitudes include the belief that a 
complete person should show independence of mind 
and make his own personal choices. 
It is widely accepted, at the same time, that 
individuals have the right to be well informed 
about decisions affecting them, to be involved 
in making the decision if they choose, and. to 
accept or reject the outcome. Open education 
is reinforcing such attitudes. 
Some emerging values question the rationale of 
the exercise of authority and power in any form. 
At one time older people derived authority from 
accumulated experience and wealth. But the pace 
This question is discussed briefly by W.H. Smith in 
The Determinants of Defence Policy, pp. 13 ff. 
of change within one generation has made 
experience look less relevant, property 
and wealth less authoritative ... 
22 4 
The decline of the work ethic is now an 
accepted thrust of change in the affluent 
society ... Affluent, better-educated workers 
are asking for work to have meaning in itself, 
and to have purpose to which they can subscribe. 
But there is no clearcut evidence that people 
do not want to work at all. Rising educational 
standards and the demands discussed above are 
simply incompatible with a large pool of people 
willing to do dirty, unpleasant, monotonous 
work. 31 
It may be that the values and culture of the· Australian 
military establishment and, most particularly, the public's 
perception of them may not be completely compatible with the 
changing values of the total society. The essentially 
hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the armed forces 
and the high level of discipline which is implicit in service 
membership may lose much of its appeal as young people seek 
more independence of mind, more control over their work 
environments and more participation in decisions affecting 
their employment. If the perceptions of military life held 
by young Australians clash with their developing aspirations, 
their propensity to accept the current type of regular 
military service either voluntarily or compulsorily is likely 
to decline. 
In the face of an expanded range of potential 
difficulties in recruiting regular service manpower, it is 
possible that the public may be.prepared to ameliorate the 
problem by sanctioning substantially higher levels of funding. 
Certainly public opinion poll results show that Australians 
32 
are in favour of larger armed forces. They also show that 
31 
32 
Committee to Advise on Policies for Manufacturing Industry, 
Policies for Development of Manufacturing Industry (The 
Jackson Committee Report),, pp. 125, 126. 
In 19 71 ANOP asked the question, 'Should the size of 
Australia's armed forces be increased or reduced?' 59 per 
cent replied that they favoured an increase, 19 per. cent a 
reduction and 22 per cent were unsure. Australian Public 
Opinion Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1971, p. 29. 
It is difficult to evaluate this type of result because 
opportunity cost factors are not introduced into the question. 
If, alternatively, it was asked whether the size of the · 
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the public desires at least the current levels of defence 
expenditure, with nearly half favouring a definite budgetary 
increase. 33 However, the views of the public appear to be 
less clear when the specific financial consequences and 
opportunity costs are displayed in poll questions. 34 
It is notable that, should there be a broadly perceived 
serious threat to Australia, there is scope for a significant 
increase in defence expenditure. During the Second World 
War, ~ational security spending reached 40 per cent of the 
35 
national product. However, during the past thirty years, 
the balance of social, political, military and bureaucratic 
forces in Australia has meant that the country has devoted a 
relatively stable proportion of its resources to national 
security. As can be seen from Figure 1, Australia has 
consistently spent approximately 3 per cent, or slightly less, 
32 cont'd 
33 
34 
35 
armed forces should be increased even though it would 
require an increase of taxes or a cut in education or 
social security expenditures, a more accurate gauge of 
public opinion could be derived. 
In 1971 ANOP asked the question, 'Should Australia 
increase, decrease or leave as it is its defence spending?' 
46 per cent replied that they favoured an increase, 40 
per cent that it should be left as it· is, 10 per cent 
favoured a decrease and 4 per cent were unsure. Australian 
Public Opinion Newsletter, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1971, 
p. 31. As with the case cited in footnote. 32, it is 
difficult to interpret this result in the absence of 
opportunity cost factors. 
The only clear example of this which is ·available is the 
response to a question asked by Roy Morgan Research Centre 
Pty Ltd in October 1952. 'Compulsory military training 
now puts 34,000 youths into camp each year. Soon 60,000 
youths will become 18 each year, and to train them all 
would cost another ilO million a year. Do you favour 
training them all, or exempting some?' 66 per cent 
responded that they favoured training them all, 29 per 
cent favoured exempting some and 5 per cent were unsure. 
This result displays a significant softening of attitude 
from the responses given to questions concerning the 
desirability of compulsory (ie. universal) military 
training. (See Table 1). 
Details are given by Brigadier P.J. Greville, 'Infra-
structure Requirements for a Self-Reliant Defence Policy' 
in United Service, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, p. 81. 
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Defence Outlay as a Percentage of Total 
Government Outlays and Gross Domestic 
Product 1965-66 - 1975-76 
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__ .-.. ___ __ 
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Financial Years 
Defence outlay as a percentage of total government outlays. 
- - - - - • Defence outlay as a percentage of gross domestic product. 
Source: R.J. O'Neill, J.O. Langtry and J. Tie, Australia's Defence Capacity: Supplementary Data 
(Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, forthcoming.) 
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of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence. Since the 
height of the Vietnam war, this has implied a steadily 
decreasing percentage of total government outlays. At a 
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time when serious pressures and threats are perceived to be 
notably absent from Australia's strategic environment, it is 
not difficult to justify continuing expenditure at this low 
level. In fact, in the current circumstances, it can and 
has been argued that increased expenditure upon the defence 
forces is detrimental to Australia's long range security 
interests. 36 The case can be made that if finance which would 
otherwise be expended on defence were to be allocated in the 
short and medium term into industry, education and the 
development of national infrastructure, in the long term 
this investment might serve to expand the capacity of the 
country's mobilisation base. When forcefully put, this 
argument cannot be dismissed readily. Certainly it places 
little emphasis upon the requirements of maintaining both 
continuous deterrence and the capacity to expand deferment 
and defensive potential rapidly. But on the other hand, it 
does serve to highlight the fact that decisions to 
determine the allocation of total government resources 
inevitably involve political compromises which, in nearly 
every circumstance, will act to constrain the level of 
resources available for national security purposes. However, 
it is by no means clear that present allocative decisions 
are made by any systematic process of rational decision-
making. Desmond Ball paraphrases Bernard Schaffer to explain 
his perception of the processes of budgetary allocation: 
36 
Do we really have here a policy that has to 
be met by an expenditure of 3% of GNP, or do 
we have a compromise between a series of 
impulsive or instinctive decisions on the one 
hand (eg. that Australia must have some sort 
of defence forces) and a purely extrinsic 
decision that the expenditure will be fixed 
at no more and no less than 3% of GNP? It 
is possible that we have the worst sort of 
compromise: a defence system that has 
This case was argued in some detail by Mr Bill Hayden, MHR 
(then Opposition Spokesman on Defence) in an address to 
the Joint Services Staff College at Canberra on 10 May 
19 7 7 , pp. 3-5 . 
st0bilized at a p0rticular le~cl of 
expenditure, high enough to be a burden 
on the economy but not high enough to 
provide a worthwhile defence at a11.37 
22 8 
In the simple terms of social and political realities, 
it would appear that in the absence of an obvious and generally 
perceived national security threat, there are limits to the 
levels of defence expenditure which governments will sanction. 
However, as far as the public itself is concerned, opinion 
poll results indicate that, in the current environment, it 
may be prepared to support defence expenditure levels higher 
than those of recent years. 
External Constraints 
There are three major external influences which may act 
to constrain seriously changes to Australia's national 
security strategy and structure. 
First, it should be noted that those countries which 
supply high technology equipments to Australia can also 
determine, to a degree, the nature of the technologies 
which are to be made available. President Carter's arms 
sale policy is largely illustrative of this potentia1. 38 
In practice, the transfer of arms to those countries which 
do not have major defence treaties with the United States may 
be restrained significantly by the President's initiative. 
While this particular set of restrictions does not currently 
apply to Australia, it should be noted that the transfer of 
37 
38 
Desmond J. Ball, The Politics of Australian Defence 
Decision Making (Unpublished paper), (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 9, 10. 
President Carter's arms sales policy is described in 
detail by Bernard Weinraub in 'Carter Moves to Cut Back 
Sales of US Arms Abroad' in The New York Times, 
20 May 1977. 
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d d t h 1 . . 1 d h . 1 . d 39 many a vance ec no og1es is a rea y eav1 y constra1ne . 
It is not inconceivable that, in some circumstances, the 
United States may decide that it is in its own interests to 
restrict the flow of technologies and equipments further. 
Alternative suppliers might be available for most types of low 
and medium and some types of high technology equipment. 
However, if Australia required access to the most sophisticated 
and advanced technologies, particularly those which could be 
employed in long-range strategic roles, it is extremely doubt-
ful whether these would be made available, either in normal 
times of peace or in crisis situations. 
The second major external constraining influence may 
arise in the form of greatly extended international 
disarmament agreements and regulations. The St Petersburg 
Declaration, the Hague Convention and the Geneva Protocol 
formally limit the acquisition and use of weaponry which has 
indiscriminate effectsi which causes unnecessary suffering 
or superfluous injury and which can kill or wound individuals 
40 in a treacherous manner. In recent year~ the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the General Assembly of the 
United Nations have sponsored major international 
conferences in an attempt to reach agreement on the proh1bition 
of a wider range of weaponry. Those systems which have been 
under the most intense discussion include incendiary, time 
delay, blast fragmentation and small-calibre projectile 
weapons as well as new potential weapons developments (such 
39 
40 
The United States holds the details and results of most 
advanced research and development programmes and many 
production programmes very closely for both national 
security and commercial reasons. Australia and other 
close allies of the US gain access to some of this 
information through a number of international agreements 
and exchange programmes. Many of those in which Australia 
participates are listed in Department of Defence: 
Australian Defence Scientific Service, Weapons Research 
Establishment Annual Report 1975-76 (Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1976), p. 55. 
These matters are discussed in detail by R.R. Baxter, 
'Conventional Weapons Under Legal Prohibitions' in 
International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3, Winter 1977, 
pp. 42 ff. 
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as high-powered lasers). In the field of conventional 
weaponry, it is very difficult to foresee the type of 
agreement which might eventually be reached, the timescale 
likely to prevail and the potential impact upon Australia's 
security options. However, in a broader sense, it is notable 
that Australia's signature and ratification of the Hague 
Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Biological Weapons Convention already limit effectively the 
scope for consideration of a wide range of security concepts 
involving nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry. 41 Future 
arms control agreements may serve to restrict Australia's 
strategic options to an even greater degree. 
The final major area of external constraint upon change 
in Australia's national security strategy involves consideration 
of the reactive response of neighbours, allies and potential 
enemies. It is possible that Australia's adoption of certain 
types of security options may lack credibility in the view 
of several important external actors. For instance, if 
Australia's capacity to operate jointly with the United 
States declined significantly and was not replaced or 
compensated for by an increased self-defence capability, 
the US might view its own interests in the regional 
environment to be more vulnerable as a result. Diplomatic 
and possibly other forms of pressure might be applied in an 
effort to achieve a reversal of policy. Because of the 
historically close alliance relationship with the United 
States, any major alteration of Australian security policy is 
likely to necessitate a judicious and sensitive process of 
detailed explanation. 
Australia's adoption of other types of security concepts 
.might stimulate reactions of a different kind. Some external 
actors might view particular options as being offensive or 
aggressive. It is conceivable that, in some circumstances, 
41 For details of Australia's signature and ratification 
of the Biological Weapons Convention, see Department 
of Foreign Affairs Backgrounder, No. 109, 7 October 1977, 
p. 9. 
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important global and regional actors may be alienated and 
hence respond in a hostile fashion. Unfavourable diplomatic 
reactions might even serve to offset any purely military 
advantages which particular strategic concepts might promise. 
Regional and global reactions could effectively undermine 
Australia's primary strategic goals of preventing conflict 
and deterring and deferring its occurrence. Sensitivity 
to these constraining external influences needs to be 
regarded as an essential element of any process of national 
security strategy formul~tion. 
Conclusion 
Non-bureaucratic constraints on change play a major role 
in determining the boundary between proposals which are practical 
and those which are impractical. Some of the non-
bureaucratic factors which heavily influence the position of 
these bounds of practicality may be very similar in the 1980s 
to those of the 1960s and 1970s. For instance, it can be 
stated with some confidence that, in the absence of a serious 
international crisis, the level of national security 
expenditure is likely to be in the same general order of 
magnitude (in real terms) as at present. 
On the other hand, there are some dynamic non-bureaucratic 
factors which are likely to force substantial alterations 
to the bounds of practicality in the future. For example, in 
the 1980s the support capacity of domestic secondary industry 
is likely to decline and there may be increasing restrictions 
on external equipment supply. These factors may serve to 
constrain heavily Australia's future technology options. In 
the area of regular service manpower, it is clear that the 
maintenance of current numerical ceilings will become 
increasingly expensive and the potential for regular manpower 
expansion will be limited severely. In another sphere, 
changing civilian values and attitudes may have the effect 
of undermining, to some d~gree, the attractiveness of 
traditional military life styles. This is likely to impact 
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not only upon the propensity for young people to enlist 
for the conventional type of military training but also upon 
the status of civil-military relations in general. Thus, 
while some non-bureaucratic constraints on Australia's 
processes of national security formulation are likely to 
remain relatively unaltered in the 1980s, there are others 
which will magnify existing policy limitations. 
Perhaps the primary conclusion to be drawn from this 
discussion is that, in the future, the processes of strategic 
and structural adaptation will need to be very selective. 
While it is possible that the altered nature of Australia's 
strategic circumstances may stimulate the requirement for 
a radical change in defence posture, any such proposal will 
need to be considered carefully in the light of the limited 
scale and flexibility of the nation's security resources. 
CHAP'I'EH. 6 
BUREAUCRATIC1 RESISTANCE 
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How the System Works 
In Australia, national security policy is formulated 
through the interaction of a large number of autonomous or 
semi-autonomous actors. Many of the actors are organisations 
or cohesive groups, but some are individual persons. At the 
very top of the structure are the Minister for Defence, the 
Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS) , the Secretary of the 
Department of Defence and a handful of senior military and 
civilian officers. The influence and power-base of each of 
these major actors varies in both formal and informal senses. 
In terms of legal power and responsibility, it is clear, 
under the Defence Act, that the Minister is pre-eminent. 2 
However, in practice, his power is constrained by a variety 
of factors. For example, the tenure of a Minister is 
frequently short and of an uncertain duration, his expertise 
in defence matters is often very limited and the demands of 
the Cabinet, Parliament, public appearances and electoral 
duties serve to reduce effectively the time which he can 
devote to departmental matters. 
1 
2 
The labelling of institutions as 'buraucracies ', their 
personnel as 'bureaucrats' and their processes as 'bureau-
cratic' has often carried pejorative connotaticins. This is 
not intended here. In this thesis these terms are used to 
describe governmental institutions that are organised 
hierarchically, the personnel that are in their employ and 
the ways in which they typically behave. 
The absolute and relative powers of the Defence Minister, 
the Chief of Defence Force Staff and the Secretary of 
the Department of Defence are discussed at greater length 
by W.L. Morrison in 'The Role of the Minister in the 
Making of Australian Defence Policy Since the Re-Organization 
of the Department of Defence in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The 
Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 71 ff. 
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The formal powers, authority and responsibility of the 
CDFS, as principal military adviser to the Minister, appear 
in the Defence Act and in the Ministerial Directives. 3 In 
practice, the CDFS and his staff are the undisputed providers 
of military judgment and a major source of military information 
for civilian actors in the system. As a consequence of the 
Tange reforms, the CDFS has been given the right of direct 
access to the Minister. However, in practice, the powers of 
the position have been degraded by a relatively high turnover 
of personnel. 
The legal powers of the Secretary of the Department, as 
principal civilian adviser to the Minister, are outlined in 
the Public Service Act and also in the Ministerial 
Directives. 4 In practice, the Secretary not only has direct 
access to the Minister but all of the advantages of a 
potentially long tenure. The Secretary can devote himself 
full-time to the most important tasks at hand, he can gain 
extensive experience, accumulate knowledge and coordinate 
the generation of centralised policies. 
The differing nature of the formal and informal power 
held by each of the three major actors serves to prevent a 
complete dominance of the system by any one of them. 
However, it also means that all three possess independent 
capacities to resist change by mobilising their own 
individual and organisational sources of influence and 
authority. 
Depending upon the nature of the matter at hand, a 
number of other actors can play important roles in the 
processes of national security policy formulation. Most 
notable are the Prime Minister, the Ministers and Departments 
of Finance, Treasury and Foreign Affairs, Cabinet itself, 
Parliamentary committees and pressure groups, such as industry 
bodies and the Returned Services League. Possessing a much 
lower level of influence are individual parliamentarians, 
3 Ibid. I p • 7 5 • 
4 Ibid. I p • 7 5 • 
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medium level bureaucrats and military officers, ministerial 
advisers, j~urnalists, academics, etc. All of these actors 
manoeuvre, pressure and bargain in an effort to influence 
the shape of the national security policy which is adopted 
and implemented. Their motivation in most instances is a 
genuine concern for the country's national security. 
However, as Morton Halperin points out from US experience, 
this concern can be manifested in a variety of forms: 
5 
Their problem is to determine what is in 
fact in the national security interest. 
Officials seek clues and guidelines from a 
variety of sources. Some hold to a set of 
beliefs about the world which provide strong 
clues, eg. the Soviet Union is expansionist 
and must be stopped by American military 
power. Others look to authorities within the 
government or beyond it for guidance. Many 
bureaucrats define what is necessary for the 
nation's security by a set of more specific 
immediate interests. For some these may be 
personal: "Since, in general, I know how to 
protect the nation's security interests, 
whatever increases my influence is in the 
national interest". For others the immediate 
interests relate to domestic political interests: 
"since a sound economy is a prerequisite to 
nat~onal security I must oppose policies which 
threaten the economy"; or "since only my 
party knows how to defend the security interests 
of the United States I must support policies 
which keep my party in power". 
For many participants the immediate 
objectives which provide strong clues for what 
is in the nation's security interest are the 
interests of the organization to which they 
belong. Career officials come naturally to 
believe that the health of their organization 
is vital to the nation's security. So also do 
individuals who are appointed by the President 
to senior posts in Washington foreign policy 
bureaucracies. This tendency varies depending 
on the individual, the strength of his prior 
conviction, his image of his role, and the 
nature of the organization he heads.5 
Morton H. Halperin, National Security Policy-Making 
(Lexington, Massachusetts, Lexington Books, 1975), p. 5. 
This type of explanation led Don K. Price to make the much 
heralded statement that 'Where you stand depends on where 
you sit'. See this cited and discussed in Graham T. 
Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Nuclear Missile 
Crisis (Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 176. 
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Hence, although there may be agreement, in the most general 
sense, conc~rning overall long term national security 
objectives, the variety of attitudes possessed by the 
multiplicity of actors within the government policy-making 
system means that short range, immediate objectives differ 
greatly. 
It is perhaps not surprising that those with an over-
whelming experience in economic matters tend to see solutions 
primarily in economic terms, that those with diplomatic 
backgrounds frequently place undue emphasis upon those 
techniques and that those with experience in advanced tactical 
aircraft, ships or armoured vehicles tend to concentrate upon 
military solutions and usually in the context of those systems 
with which they are most familiar. As Darcy McGaurr points 
out, individual bureaucratic actors or coalitions of actors 
working within their own value systems seek to optimise 
functions which they subjectively view to be of primary 
importance: 
Anti-submarine and maritime surveillance 
capabilities are ea~h contributed to by 
both the RAAF and the RAN. Each.can be 
expected to propose expenditures which 
promote a more effective operation of the 
forces which it contributes. ie. each 
can be expected to attempt to sub-optimjze. 
It is unlikely that the result would be the 
best combination of forces from the two 
services considered together.6 
The divergent views of the participating actors are 
subjected to a complex process of evaluation, bargaining and 
compromise. Some actors are likely to concentrate upon 
setting the scene and the parameters of debate, others may 
make firm proposals and otheYsagain may have the power to 
react, modify, delay, determine the method of implementation, 
veto, etc. The eventual outcome will depend heavily upon 
the relative power of the actors involved and their individual 
6 A.O. McGaurr, Defence Procurement - In Search of 
Optimality (A paper delivered to the Conference on 
Armed Forces and Australian Society at the Royal Military 
College, Duntroon, Canberra, 20-22 May 1977), p. 12. 
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capacity to influence the matters at stake. 
In this type of environment, it is frequently in the 
interests of individual actors to attempt to form coalitions 
or alliances toenhance the prospects of successful action on 
matters which they consider to be important. 7 Some of these 
coalitions tend to be of an almost continuous nature, as, for 
example, that between the former Department of Supply and the 
local defence industries. 8 Others may be short term alliances, 
sometimes between policy-making actors ~ho normally share a 
strong adversarial relationship. For example, Desmond Ball 
cites the case, in July 1973, of the RAAF supporting a 
Cabinet decision to postpone the replacement of the MIRAGE III 
fighters. 9 Their apparent motive was to increase the 
prospects of an eventual decision being made in favour of 
the McDonnell Douglas F-15. 
It seems clear that, as Graham T. Allison points out, 
the final product of the national security decision-making 
process should not be viewed as a completely rational and 
consistent response to objectively determined requirements. 
7 
8 
9 
The decisions and actions of governments are 
intranational political resultants: resultants 
in the sense that what happens is not chosen 
as a solution to a problem but rather results 
from compromise, conflict and confusion of 
officials with diverse interests and unequal 
influence; political in the sense that the 
activitiy from which decisions and actions 
emerge is best characterized as bargaining 
For a detailed discussion of the role of bureaucratic 
alliances and coalitions see Morris Janowitz, 
The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political 
Portrait (Illinois, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), 
pp. 283 ff. 
This relationship is described in Desmond J. Ball, 
The Politics of Defence Decision-Making in Australia 
- The Mirage Replacement (Unpublished paper) , (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1975), p. 43. 
Ibid. I p. 4 2. 
along regularized channels among individual 
members of the government. Following 
Wittenstein's employment of the concept of 
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a "game", national behaviour in international 
affairs can be conceived of as something that 
emerges from intricate and subtle, simultaneous, 
overlapping games among players located in 
positions in a government. The hierarchical 
arrangement of these players constitutes the 
government. Garnes proceed neither at random 
nor at leisure. Regular channels structure 
the game; deadlines force issues to the 
attention of incredibly busy players. The 
moves, sequences of moves, and games of chess 
are thus to be explained in terms of the 
bargaining among players with separate and 
unequal power over particular pieces, and with 10 
separate objectives in distinguishable subgarnes. 
The policies which emerge from this type of system are 
frequently difficult to predict with certainty. As Allison 
11 
explained it, internal politics is messy' Because 
of the very nature of the system, policy outcomes and 
reactions cannot be expected to be internally consistent or 
in any sense rational from an external objective point of 
view. 
The workings of national security bureaucracies are 
made even more confusing by many of the methods which are 
employed by actors in the system to further their interests. 
For instance, the policies advocated by many parties may not 
necessarily represent their view of the ideal outcome so 
much as a calculated bargaining stance which they perceive 
to maximise the probability of an ideal outcome being derived. 
As Desmond Ball notes: 
10 
11 
12 
This may mean that the initial proposals 
presented to the bureaucracy could bear 
little resemblance to the desired policy; 
but it is only the outcome of the decisional 
process which is important.12 
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 162, 163. 
Ibid.,p.146. 
Desmond J. Ball, The Politics of Australian Defence 
Decision-Making (Unpublished paper), (Canberra, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National 
University, 1977), p. 37. 
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In practice, this activity can effectively warp the basis 
for judgmen~ in several key areas of the decision-making 
process. It is frequently difficult to distinguish between 
objective scientific, military and analytic information which 
is provided to support the decision-making process and 
bureaucratic political viewpoints shrouded in the same 
language and format. 
While distinctions between bureaucratic political 
statements and real opinions and objectives are frequently 
difficult to make, the problem can be eased to some degree by 
the fact that bureaucratic interests tend to follow recognisable 
patterns. Halperin argues that bureaucratic actors strive 
primarily to maintain or improve their autonomy, organisational 
morale, functional 'essence', roles and missions and their 
13 budgets. 
Autonomy is most commonly sought because individual actors 
and organisations tend to believe that their specialist 
skills and/or experience qualify them ideally for determining 
the optimum method of task performance and the scale of 
resources required. 
A high level of personnel·motivation and morale is 
sought not only because it generatesworkefficiency but also 
because it tends to raise the status of the organisation's 
leadership. Hence, bureaucrats are frequently prepared to 
resist changes and efficiencies if they suspect that the 
morale of the organisation will be affected detrimentally. 
Career officials are usually keenly aware of what the 
essence of an organisation is and should be in terms of its 
characteristics and tasks. Although in large organisations 
there are inevitably differences of view, in national 
security structures these seem to be somewhat limited. For 
instance, in the RAAF the almost universally regarded essence 
or core of the structure is its high performance combat 
aircraft and their functions. In the Army it is the 'sharp 
13 See this case outlined in detail in Morton H. Halperin, 
National Security Policy-Making, pp. 7 ff. 
240 
end' armoured units and infantry battalions. In the RAN 
the csscncq is represented primarily by the frigates and 
destroyers and the Navy's carrier and strike aircraft. 
Support aircraft, support shipping and minority specialist 
forces in all services tend to be accorded a lower priority 
and are frequently regarded as being of more marginal 
significance. 
The intensity with which organisations will act to 
safeguard those roles, structures and equipments which they 
regard to be central components of their essence can be 
highly dysfunctional if altered external circumstances 
produce a requirement for significant organisational 
adaptation. As Roger A. Beaumont points out, this form of 
institutional conservatism is readily apparent in many 
military structures: 
Weapons systems have a social function for 
the professional, and those new ideas which 
suggest turmoil, or too much emphasis on 
youth or on new bodies of expertise, are 
naturally suppressed in the same way that 
pioneer physicians like Jenner, Semmelweiss 
and Freud were opposed in various fields. 
The professional system has more involved 
than merely performing a mission. It is a 
community with social needs. Professional 
soldiers and sailors, starved for budgets and 
rank in peacetime through most of Anglo-American 
history, have been steadily on guard against 
upstarts. Until the nuclear era, only wartime 
instability brought on growth, sudden rich 
resources and anxiety produced dramatic change, 
and victory tended to lull the successful.14 
Thus, in the absence of substantial wars or other 
traumatic disturbances, there is a very great tendency for 
national security systems to retain the general form, structures, 
equipments and practices which were derived from the previous 
major conflict. Despite a changing external environment and 
altered operational tasks, large military bureaucracies tend 
14 Roger A. Beaumont, Military Elites (London, Robert 
Hale and Company, 1976), pp. 79, 80. 
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to continue heavy commitments to traditional systems and 
functions. 1? Darcy McGaurr illustrates this point from 
his experience of the Australian national security structure: 
15 
16 
Since each service consists largely of groups 
whose careers involve the operation of 
particular items of equipment, it is not 
surprising that a motive for many equipment 
proposals is simply the replacement of 
existing equipment at the end of its 
operational life. If HMJ\S Melbourne is not 
replaced by another platform for fixed wing 
aircraft, a way of life which has been a 
source of satisfaction and pride to present 
senior RAN officers and which is the 
aspiration of many young servicemen may vanish. 
To the extent that a service can be expected 
to seek replacement for aging equipment 
rather than promote new capabilities which 
have no existing interest group to support 
them, the system is conservative.16 
In this respect, the goal of maintaining a national security 
organisation's perceived 'essence' is closely related to 
the concept of militarism as defined by Alfred Vagts: 
Every war is fought, every army is maintained 
in a military way and in a militaristic way. 
The distinction is fundamental and fateful. The 
military way is marked by a primary concentration 
of men and materials on winning specific objectives 
of power with the utmost efficiency, that is, with 
the least expenditure of blood and treasure. It 
is limited in scope, confined to one function, and 
scientific in its essential qualities. Militarism, 
on the other hand, presents a vast array of customs, 
interests, prestige, actions and thought associated 
with armies and wars and yet transcending true 
military purposes. Indeed, militarism is so 
constituted that it may hamper and defeat the 
purposes of the military way. Its influence is 
unlimited in scope. It may permeate all society 
and become dominant over all industry and arts. 
Rejecting the scientific character of the military 
way, militarism displays the qualities of caste and 
cult, authority and belief. 
See Alfred Vagts, A History of Militarism (London, Hollis 
and Carter, 1959), p. 13. 
A.D. McGaurr, Defe~ce Procurement - In Search of Optimality, 
pp. 14, 15. 
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The follow-on imperative or replacement complex is 
thus a natural product of large national security 
bureaucracies. 17 It is a mechanism which effectively secures 
key elements of the perceived essence of military structures. 
The fourth major goal for bureaucratic actors concerns 
the acquisition, possession and maintenance of roles and 
missions. Functional divisions between competing bureaucracies 
are rarely clear and incontestable. Hence, the development 
of new or varied roles and missions frequently provides a basis 
for bureaucratic conflict. 18 An organisational actor is most 
likely to seek new roles and functions if it perceives that 
it would be placed in a disadvantageous position by new areas 
of responsibility being conceded to a bureaucratic rival. 
Thi~ was the general nature of the bureaucratic squabble 
between the RAN and the Army over control of the new heavy 
landing craft in the early 1970s. 19 
In other instances, an organisation may judge a new 
function to be peripheral to its essence and to represent a 
potential source of resource diversion from areas of higher 
priority. This has been the attitude of both the RAAF and 
the Army to airfield surface-to-air missile (SAM) defence 
17 
18 
19 
See the discussion of this concept in J.R. Kurth, 'The 
Political Economy of Weapons Procurement: The Follow on 
Imperative', American ·Economic Review (Papers and 
Proceedings), Vol. LXII, No. 2, May 1972, pp. 304-318. 
In national security policy, as well as in a number of 
other important areas of government responsiblity (education, 
health, social welfare, etc.) Australia faces major 
political and bureaucratic problems because of the division 
of powers under the Australian Constitution. In theory, 
the centralisation of defence powers should provide the 
Commonwealth with unquestioned authority in national. 
security affairs. However, in practice, even in times of 
national emergency, the federal structure of Australian 
government can, and has, constrained national action. See 
this detailed in S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939-42 (Canberra, 
Australian War Memorial, 1955), p. 353. 
Peacetime consultation and cooperation on a wide range of 
national security policies which affect state and local 
authorities is likely to be necessary if the influence of 
the Constitution as a negative constraint is to be minimised. 
For an account see 'Navy to Run the Army's Landing Craft', 
The Sydney Morning Herald, 4 January 1973. 
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20 
systems since the early 1960s. It is perhaps not surprising 
that the obsolescence of the BLOODHOUND airfield defence SAMS 
has not been heralded by the clamour for a replacement system. 
The fifth and final area of competing bureaucratic 
interest relates to budgetary stimuli. Bureaucrats naturally 
prefer budgets of large dimensions because the factor of size 
impacts directly upon relative power and bargaining strength. 
Henc~, proposed changes in policy or patterns of action are 
usually scrutinised laboriously for their potential effects 
upon budgetary allocations. Halperin cites one US example 
where an armed service was prepared to subordinate concerns 
of organisational essence to those of potential budgetary 
gain: 
... the Army was interested in acquiring 
responsibility for the deployment of MRBM 
[medium range ballistic missiles] in the 
1950s, in part because this would give the 
Army a strategic nuclear role. The Army 
hoped that this would justify its getting 
an increased share of the over-all defense 
budget, since the existing allocation was 
based on the Army having no strategic function. 21 
In other situations, when bureaucrats perceive that 
additional functions under consideration are unlikely to be 
accompanied by supplementary funding, their adoption is 
almost certain to be opposed, regardless of the function's 
objective significance for overall national security capacity. 
The Problems of Bureaucratic Adaptation 
The partially non-rational nature of the decision-making 
processes in large national security bureaucracies impacts 
directly upon the prospects for appropriate and systematic 
change when this is required because of variations in external 
20 
21 
See the discussion of this issue by E.P. Esmonde in 
'Air Defence Artillery', Army Journal, No. 324, May 
19 7 6 I PP• 4 5 ff o 
Morton H. Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, p. 14. 
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circumstances. Bureaucratic structures which are designed 
specifically to perform a particular type of function and 
become well-practised in it are constrained very little by 
institutional behaviour patterns. However, when requirements 
change, organisations normally find it extremely difficult 
to restructure their form, operating procedures and 
equipments to meet the new situation. R.W. Korner noted this 
institutional inflexibility in the application of US policy 
in Vietnam: 
Each organization inevitably tended to make 
policy to conform in practice to that with which 
it was most familiar - to play out its standard 
organizational repertoire. Each reflected that 
fact of institutional life cited by an anonymous 
White House aide who wrote that "bureaucracy as 
a form of organization tends to contort policy 
to existing structures rather than adjusting 
structures to reflect change in policy".22 
National security bureaucracies have strong vested 
. . h 23 h. . interests in t e status quo. In some respects t is is not 
very surprising, as there are strong motivations for this 
type of decision-making to be undertaken in a conservative 
manner. Most notably, it must be recognised that an alteration 
.of national security policy can have momentous consequences 
for the outcome of future international events. Clearly, 
national security bureaucracies bear a very heavy 
responsibility for decisions which are, or are not, made in 
their area of authority. To some degree, at least, individuals, 
22 
23 
R.W. Korner, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutionai 
Constraints on US-GVN Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica, 
Rand Corporation, R-967-ARPA, 1973), pp. 15, 16. 
Janowitz elaborated this point in the following terms: 
Th~ dependence of the military on the status quo 
- whether that status quo is industrial capitalism 
or communism - reinforces traditionalism. Tradit-
ional attitudes are institutionalized by the 
requirements of military organization and planning. 
When war-making becomes more technical, the military 
establishment requires years of preparation and 
advance thinkin9. Sudden developments are resisted 
as disruptive, for it takes years to translate 
ideas into weapons systems. 
See Morris Janowitz, The Professionai Sotdier, pp. 22, 23. 
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groups and organisations can be held accountable for any 
judgments which prove to be seriously in error. Thus, in 
many environments, the stimuli to entertain radical new 
ideas, to experiment or to rapidly adapt are very weak. 
A major consequence is that in many national security 
structures, institutional conservatism itself becomes a way 
of life. Well-established social mores, patterns of 
behaviour, types of equipment, work locations and levels of 
activity frequently become relatively easy to perpetuate 
indefinitely. In this type of environment, little 
imagination, skill and effort is required for individual 
bureaucrats to avoid making the sort of mistakes which might 
damage their career progression. Komer discusses his 
perception of the problem under the heading 'institutional 
inertia 1 : 
Bureaucrats prefer to deal with the familiar. 
It is more comfortable and convenient to 
continue following tested routines, whereas 
to change may be to admit prior error - a 
cardinal bureaucratic sin. So, whether private 
or public, civilian or military, organizations 
typically like to keep operating the way they 
are operating, and to shift only slowly in 
response to changing situations. And the more 
hierarchical and disciplined they are -
military organi.zations are almost archetypes -
the greater the built-in institutional obstacles 
to change ex~ept slowly and incrementally. 
Even a cursory review of the fate of many 
military innovations and innovators would be 
sufficient to illustrate the point. Dr Vannevar 
Bush, World War II head of the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development, has 
described some of the obstacles to technological 
innovation in the military services even during 
wartime. To him, military organization "suffers 
from a disease that permeates all governmental 
... organizations - the daft belief that if one 
does nothing one will not make mistakes, and 
the drab system of seniority and promotions will 
proceed on its way".24 
As a consequence of these factors, when large national 
security structures are required to change, they tend to react 
in highly conventional ways and usually according to precedent. 
24 R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does It's Thing, pp. 65, 66. 
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The balance of well-established competing interests almost 
always means that decisions are made and actions implemented 
which will not disturb institutionalised practices and 
structures. Policy agreements tend to follow the line of 
- . 25 least bureaucratic resistance. 
When national security structures are confronted by an 
al terc~d external environment and a clear require.inent for 
change is evident, it cannot be anticipated that the 
processes of adaptation will be simple or easy. Some 
bureaucrats prefer to ignore the requirements for change and 
concentrate on meeting the pressuresof ongoing activities. 
Other bureaucrats prefer to support existing systems on the 
basis of their capacity to perform in previous environments. 
As Beaumont points out, bureaucratic defence by reference 
to historical precedent is not a new theme in military affairs: 
There were peacetime battles over the 
introduction of rifles, ironclads, breech-
loaders, battleships, airplanes, tanks, 
aircraft carriers and on and on. One 
reason the old guard fought hard against 
novelty was that the old systems worked in 
war - even if the war may have been fifty 
years earlier.26 
Other bureaucrats tend to feel a high level of 
institutional loyalty to an organisational structure with 
which they have been associated over an extended period. 
These individuals frequently brand proposals for significant 
change as unworkable. Senior bureaucrats also often perceive 
the challenge of new ideas, concepts, technologies and 
structures to represent a threat to their well-established 
personal positions. Beaumont describes this type of reaction 
following the First World War~ 
25 
26 
The swiftness with which the "old guard-" 
returned to pre-1914 military systems and 
traditions of soldiering in America, France, 
Britain, Italy and Germany has been described 
by those who saw the rejection of armour, 
Komer illustrates this point at length in his discussion 
of US and GVN policy in Vietnam, ibid. See especially, 
pp. lix, xi, and 14 ff. 
Roger A. Beaumont, Military Elites, p. 115. 
aviation and shock troops as blindness 
to military necessity. But the guardians 
0£ the old way knew the new weapons were 
a young man's game, and that more than 
tactical advantage was implicit in their 
use. Real reform, they sensed, would put 
too much power in the hands of junior 
officers, as it had in Turkey and Italy. 
And so from 1918 until the middle of 
World War II, the battleship dominated 
naval tactical thought in all major fleets. 
Young George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower 
were warned that their enthusiasm for armour 
would hurt their careers.27 
247 
Even when the requirement for change is accepted in 
strategic policy, military bureaucratic structures are adept 
at warding off the disturbance which would be implicit in 
meaningful adaptation. A wide array of bureaucratic 'games' 
can be played to defer and modify policy proposals and even 
firm government directions to change. For example, one 
tactic is to institute studies of the new requirements. If 
it is considered that their conclusions are likely to be 
disturbing, those conducting the work can be given poor· 
direction, inadequate resources and insufficient time. The 
preliminary reports which result can then be either rejected 
as unsatisfactory or alternatively accepted in a qualified 
manner for subsequent analysis. Working groups can then be 
established to examine particular aspects in greater detail 
over an extended period of time. The results of widely 
dispersed semi-autonomous working groups can be expected to 
become available progressively. This permits piecemeal 
shelving of individual specialised proposals on various 
grounds or, alternatively, the qualified acceptance of those 
proposals which are more broadly supported by bureaucratic 
actors. Actual implementation requires the passage of an 
even more 1 b . · 11 28 h f. 1 lt . comp ex ureaucratic mi • T e ina resu is 
usually a verbal acceptance of the changing nature of the 
external environment and the mouthing of a generalised 
27 
28 
Roger A. Beaumont, Military Elites, p. 26. 
Some of the specialised problems of implementation are 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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requ_ircmcnt for change, but the substance oI whu.t is actut1lly 
done conccr~ing operating concepts, procedures, doctrines, 
equipments, etc., is frequently of marginal consequence, if 
indeed it can be distinguished at all. As Halperin points 
out, large bureaucracies are ideally equipped to absorb 
pressures for change with a minimum of disturbance. 
In many cases ... officials reach consensus 
by designing an ambiguous policy which avoids 
substantial costs to the different interests 
of the participants, including the interests 
of the organizations involved. The compromise 
avoids making choices on priorities and 
leaves organizations free to continue operating 
as they have in the past and to control their own 
operations. Once a decision is made, the 
organizations themselves shape the way in 
which it is irnplernented.29 
In national security structures, these processes of 
comfortable accorrunodation normally provide adequate scope 
for individual actors and organisations to pursue their own 
entrenched interests. For highly institutionalised special 
interest groups, such as the armed services, this has 
particular significance. As James Thompson remarked 
" ... the military mind develops its own momentum in the 
absence of clear guidelines from the civilians 11 • 30 
Factors Acting to Perpetuate Bureaucratic Inertia 
There are at least five major factors which serve to 
perpetuate institutional inertia in Australia's national 
security bureaucracy. The first concerns the inadequacy of 
political direction and oversight; the second, the 
misdirection of personal and organisationa.lincentive patterns; 
the third, the absence of meaningful analyses of structural 
performance; the fourth, the relative rigidity of the 
Australian Public Service system; 
of bureaucratic secrecy. 
and the fifth, the intensity 
29 
30 
Morton H. Halperin, National Security Policy-Making, 
p. 5. 
Quoted in R.W. Korner, Bureaucracy Does It's Thing, p. 66. 
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The entire Australian Government bureaucracy suffers 
from ministerial control which is highly variable and 
' 31 frequently incoherent. Limited ministerial involvement and 
direction of departmental activities makes it possible for 
large sections of the bureaucracy either to lose a sense of 
policy direction or to develop their own. The report of the 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (The 
Coombs Report) emphasises the vital role of clearly stated 
government objectives in determining the efficiency of 
administrative bureaucracies: 
Of primary importance to efficiency in the 
bureaucracy, then, is clarity in the objectives 
of the government and in the priority which is 
to be attached.to them. Clear and effective 
processes will be required by which the 
government establishes and reviews its 
objectives and their priorities. To provide 
an adequate base for administrative 
performance, such objectives must be more than 
general directions for a department or agency 
as a whole. They must be capable of expression 
in sufficient detail to provide a program of work 
not only for the department or agency but also 
for sections and units, functional and geographical, 
within it. Only if this is possible will departments 
and agencies receive adequate political direction 
on which to base their administrative processes, 
or will individual officers receive an adequate 
stimulus to effort and an ability to relate their 
individual performances to group objectives.32 
However, the derivation and expression of such clear 
policy objectives is not always easy. As Dr H.C. Coombs 
has pointed out: 
31 
32 
Of course, ministers do not always have clear 
objectives and frequently lack the capacity 
to formulate them. Ministers are chosen from a 
limited field by processes which give little 
The problem of ineffective ministerial control is 
elaborated in the Royal Commission on Australia 
Government Administration Report (The Coombs Report), 
(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1976) f PP• 33, 34, 54 • 
Ibid., pp. 33,. 34. 
weight to administrative and executive 
competence. 33 
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In this respect, the absence of provisions for the 
appointment of non-parliamentary members as Cabinet ministers 
can be seen as an inherent weakness of the Westminster system 
of government. Means must be found to increase the minister's 
capacity to direct bureaucratic activity effectively. 
The second major influence supporting bureaucratic 
inertia is derived from the fact that personal career incentive 
patterns in large Public Service bureaucracies tend to be 
dominated by the pressures for conformity. Adaptive response 
on an individual or a sub-group organisational level is 
likely to rouse peer group resistance as well as to clash 
with the institutional norms embodied by senior bureacrats. 
The penalties for questioning the system may include transfers 
to areas of mechanical routine work and restricted promotion. 
Progression is gained by working within the system and 
accepting its procedures, values and operational limitations. 
The third major factor is the reluctance of Public 
Service structures to attempt to obtain a meaningful index of 
th . . 1 ff. . 34 . eir operationa e iciency. As Komer points out, 
"organizations are usually neither long on self criticism nor 
very receptive to outside analysis of their performance 11 • 35 
In the specific case of Australia's security structure, the 
task is made doubly difficult by the absence of a clear 
political statement or uniform perception of national 
security goals. It is no doubt true that the uncertain nature 
of Australia's strategic environment does not make this task 
easy. However, as is argued elsewhere in this thesis, this 
33 
34 
35 
H.C. Coombs, 'The Commission Report' (The text of an 
address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 11 August 
1976) published in Cameron Hazlehurst and J.R. 
Nethercote (eds.), Reforming Australian Government: The 
Coombs Report and Beyond (Canberra, The Royal Institute 
of Public Administration (A.C.T) in association with 
Australian National University Press, 1977), p. 55. 
This point is emphasised in the Royal Commission on 
Australian Government Administration Report, pp, 54, 55. 
R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy Does It's Thing, p. 73. 
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d k . f . . bl 36 . b oes not ma e its per ormance impossi e. In its a sence, 
there can be no means of conducting even the most simple test 
of functional efficiency and many pressures for significant 
structural change are effectively constrained. 
The relative rigidity of the Australian Public Service 
system represents a fourth contributing factor in the 
perpetuation of institutional inertia. Restrictions on 
lateral recruitment, personnel exchanges and post-graduate 
study and research effectively limit the potential to develop 
expertise to optimal levels in important functional areas. 37 
In those sections of the Australian bureaucracy which deal 
with national security issues, contact with domestic and 
international research bodies and organisations is particularly 
restricted. This contrasts markedly with the policy and 
practice in nearly every other western democracy. 
The very limited nature of bureaucratic incentives to 
be highly efficient and adaptive is discussed at length in 
the Coomb.s Report. Great emphasis is placed in these findings 
upon the limited accountability and scope for initiative 
in the system, particularly for senior public servants. 38 
The stultifying impact of the system upon personnel is 
described most graphically by H.C. Coombs: 
36 
37 
38 
... I found the younger members of the 
bureaucracy impressive. Those recruited to 
what might broadly be called policy work 
generally are intelligent, educated and socially 
involved ... The raw material with which the 
system has to work is of good quality. 
But what does it do with it? Corresponding 
discussions with older officials who have 
experienced twenty or so years of its impact 
left me with a profoundly different impression. 
Years of involvement in routine and ritualistic 
processes, an inability to see the outcome of 
See the discussion of this issue in Part IV. 
The nature of these restrictions and their impact upon 
the efficiency of the Australian Public Service is 
discussed at length in the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration Report, pp. 145, 146, 165-181. 
Ibid. I pp. 36-55. 
work done, a sense of isolation from those 
with whose affairs government administration 
is concerned and a prevailing flatness in 
the quality of life, official and unofficial, 
generally has destroyed much of the vitality 
and concern which no doubt were as evident 
twenty years ago among them as it now is 
among their successors ... 
It is of course from those who have 
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gone through these experiences that, 
predominantly, the top echelons of the bureau-
cracy are chosen. Fortunately there are some of 
exceptional capacity and resilience who have come 
through relatively undamaged and some who by good 
planning, good management or good luck have 
evaded the routine and the ritual. Nevertheless, 
many of those at the top reflect the flatness 
and unimaginativeness which years without stimulus 
have imposed upon them. For them the cardinal 
sin is 'to rock the boat'. It was of them that 
John Osborne wrote in Look Back in Anger saying,. 
'They spent their time mostly looking forward to 
the past' ... There is I believe something 
seriously wrong with a system which so stultifies 
worthwhile human beings.39 
National security structures are endowed with a fifth 
and extremely powerful means of perpetuating their 
institutional inertia in their capacity to restrict the flow 
of bureaucratically sensitive information. In the national 
security field, there are naturally a large number of matters 
which are properly held under a high level of security 
classification. While Australia's governmental bureaucracies 
. l h . f 40 . . h f in genera ave a reputation or over-secrecy, it is t ere ore 
39 
40: 
H.C. Coombs, 'The Commission Report' in Cameron Hazlehurst 
and J.R. Nethercote (eds.), Reforming Australian Government, 
pp. 50, 51. 
This case is made in H.V. Erny, Public Policy: Problems and 
Paradoxes (Melbourne, The Macmillan Company of Australia, 
1976), p. 51. It has also been the source of frequent 
comment by defence correspondnets in the Australian media. 
For example see 'An Obsession With Secrecy' in Pacific 
Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, No. 8, February 1977, p. 2 and 
'Defence Must Move to Improve their Public Image if they 
are to Retain the Present Levels of Government and 
Financial Commitment' in Pacific Defence Reporter, Vol. 3, 
No. 9, March 1977, p. 2. This issue is discussed in a 
very formal and limited manner in the Coombs Report. See 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration 
Report, pp. 345-353. As P.N. Troy has remarked: 
... the report glosses over the secrecy of 
decision-making and the monopolization and 
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not surprising that the Depu.rtrnent of Defence is most noted 
in this reg~rd. General operating philosophies, concepts, 
doctrines and a wide range of bureaucratic actions and 
inactions are consistently and effectively shrouded from 
public view. One obvious and most important consequence is 
to limit enquiry and investigation by the media, academics, 
members of the public and even members of Parliament. 41 
Means of Encouraging Adaptation 
Because of the natural bureaucratic characteristics of 
Australia's security structure, its capacity to adapt to meet 
the requirements of the country's changing strategic 
environment is limited. As a consequence, a sustained effort 
is required to encourage and, if necessary, compel bureau-
cratic adaptation. This must be done in a realistic manner. 
It is, for instance, not possible to prohibit the processes 
of bureaucraticpolitics,bargaining and compromise. As 
James Forrestal, the first US Secretary of Defense, pointed 
out, bureaucratic politics is an integral part of any 
government decision-making process: 
I have always been amused by those who say 
they are quite willing to go into government 
but they are not willing to go into politics. 
My answer ... is that you can no more divorce 
government from politics than you can separate 
sex from creation.42 
Rather than to seek their abolition, the processes of 
bureaucratic politics require redirection, with active measures 
40 cont'd 
41 
42 
manipulation of information at senior 
levels of the bureaucracy. 
P.N. Troy, 'And Now the Bad News' in Cameron Hazlehurst and 
J.R. Nethercote (eds.), Reforming Australian Government, p. 88. 
This matter was the subject of discussion following the 
presentation of a paper by T.B. Millar, 'Some Indicators 
and Conclusions', at a Seminar of the United Service Instit-
ution of the Australian Capital Territory in September 1974. 
See United Service, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, p. 94. 
Forrestal is quoted by Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision, p. 147. 
being taken to counteract the institutional disincentives 
for flexible change. Six tentative proposals are made in 
the discussion which follows. 
1. More Effective Ministers 
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Firstly, there is an urgent requirement to strengthen 
ministerial capacities to direct the bureaucracy with clarity 
and, where necessary, precision. An array of possible 
measures could conceivably contribute to this process. For 
instance, in theory at least, political parties could 
intentionally select parliamentary candidates who possess 
high levels of expertise in vital areas of government 
responsibility and seek to groom such individuals for 
ministerial duties. Ministers themselves could make more 
active efforts to educate the~selves concerning the vital 
issues in their portfolios. To some degree, ministers could 
also seek much broader assistance from external advisers and 
sources of information. Yet, in practice, the scope for all 
of these possibilities is constrained severely by a number of 
conflic~ing pressures which characterise the real world. 
For example, a wide range of occupational, social and 
political forces effectively prevents all but a few experts 
entering Parliament and gaining ministerial control in their 
area of specific interest. As was mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, the demands of Parliament, the constituency, public 
speaking and other commitments absorb a very large proportion 
of the time available to ministers and reduce effectively 
their capacity to direct departments and authorities which 
come under their control. Furthermore, the tenure of 
individual ministers in particular portfolios is also 
frequently relatively short and hence much of their time tends 
to be taken up by basic familiarisation and learning functions. 
Ministerial advisers of an appropriate calibre can be very 
useful but they are frequently difficult to recruit and their 
relationship to the government bureaucracy as a whole has 
been the source of many difficulties and disputes in the 
43 past. 
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In these circwnstances, it may be.desirable to redefine 
the responsibilities of ministers and senior bureaucrats so 
as to retain the authority of ministers undiminished, but to 
concentrate their attention on the determination of a series 
of centrally important and readily definable policy issues. 
This would be an effective means of increasing the level of 
bureaucratic accountability for the performance of clear 
ministerial directions. 
44 the Coombs Report. 
This was a major recommendation of 
2. Bureaucratic Incentives to Adapt 
Civil and military training and incentive systems need 
to be restructured so as to place a much higher premiwn upon 
flexibility and adaptiveness. The simple regurgitation of 
conventionally accepted solutions and responses needs to be 
questioned at all levels. Organisational conformity 
and submission needs to be replaced as a criterion of career 
progression by a preparedness to question, to innovate 
actively and to experiment. 'when discussing the requirement 
to exploit fully the potential of the new military 
technologies, Dr Malcolm Currie, the US Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering, argued for a review of personal 
incentive patterns in the follo,wing terms: 
43 
44 
... we must remove barriers to innovation which often 
exist. Innovation that might alter a service's 
role or mission is often resisted as are 
The potential and problems of employing external 
Ministerial advisers are discussed in considerable 
detail by W.L. Morrison in 'The Role of the 
Minister in the Making of Australian Defence Policy 
Since the Re-Organization of the Department of 
Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, pp. 79-83. 
There is also a useful discussion of the matter in 
the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration Report, pp. 78~81. 
For details see Royal Commmission on Australian 
Government Administration Report, pp. 95-98. 
concepts that might "threaten" su,pport 
to a program that has already been "sold". 
Stronger incentives for innovation and risk 
must be supported in terms 6f retaining 
ownership of proprietary rights. Fixed 
price R and D contracts often discourage 
innovation. We must more clearly recognize 
the right and the need to fail. Too often 
those in DoD feel that they cannot afford a 
"failure" with Congress and the news media 
ready to second guess everything. Too often 
to-days bureacrats. substitute research for 
insight, management for leadership and 
experience for guts - because it's the safe 
thing to do. We must move together to 
strengthen the innovation which has been our 
nation's hallmark.45 
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The same p~oblems were recognised in the Coombs Report 
and a large number of its recommendations are directed towards 
their solution: 
A persistent theme of this Report, underlying 
many of its recommendations, is the need for 
adaptability, for thos~ in the administration 
to be aware of and responsive to the facts of 
social change. We have made it clear that an 
effective response must be preceded by analysis 
of the nature of the changes occurring, 
examination of the alternative responses in 
the light of the government's objectives, and 
further analysis of the means available to make 
the response. We have also emphasised that 
adaptability implies a readiness to take risks, 
to experiment, in the interests of finding the 
right means to achieve greater efficiency. If 
the spirit of these recommendations infuses 
the attitudes of officials, adaptation is more 
likely to become a continuous, self-generating 
process. It would not, however, be wise to 
rely wholly on such internal sources of self 
criticism and adaptability. External stimulus 
is from time to time necessary, as is the 
'lateral thinking' of persons with wide but 
different experience.46 
The commissioners then proceed to recommend the more 
frequent institution of studies and inquiries into the 
45 
46 
Quoted in 'Currie Cautions on Soviet Missile Gains' 
in Aviat1:on Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, No. 21, 
24 May 1976, p. 57. 
Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration 
Report, p. 407. 
257 
functional performance of sectors of the public servicc. 47 
These might.be expected to have a very important role to 
play. However, in practice, they could be supplemented by 
a much broader range of initiatives, some of which are 
outlined on the following pages. 
3. Flexible Bureaucratic Task Forces 
When the requirement arises for a new programme which 
does not readily fit the practised organisational repertoire 
of existing bureaucratic structures, it may be best to 
establish an autonomous ad hoc task force for its development, 
implementation and management. This would not involve an 
expansion of the bureaucracy, but rather the introduction of 
a larger amount of structural fluidity. Under this concept, 
personnel, funding and resources would be made available for 
reallocation from existing structures to perform specific 
functions within task force programmes. For each new 
programme, there would normally be an initial requirement for 
a small central task force staff to be established around 
which specialists could operate at particular stages of each 
project. This would mean, for example, that, once the 
detailed planning for a particular programme was completed, 
individual planners could frequently be reallocated directly 
to new task forces. I~ the autonomy of individual actors 
from their parent organisations could be increased, a higher 
level of objectivity in decision-making might be facilitated. 
4. A Total Programme Role for Task Forces 
If a primary objective of bureaucratic restructuring is 
to achieve a high level of objective rationality in policy 
adoption and implementation, it would be necessary to 
reduce the current gap between stated policy intentions and 
actual achievement. General Taylor has stated the nature of 
the problem as he experienced it in Vietnam: 
47 Ibid. I pp. 407-409. 
One of the facts of life about Vietnam was 
that it was never difficult to decide what 
should be done but it was almost impossible 
to get it done, at least in an acceptable 
period of tirne.48 
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The problems of implementation have been studied in 
considerable depth by J.L. Pressman and A.B. Wildavsky. 49 
They concluded that one of the major reasons why programmes 
are rarely carried out in the manner their designers intend 
is the number of decision points structured into the 
processes of implementation. Desmond Ball summarises the 
particular case that they studied in the following terms: 
An oversirnplif ied schernatization of the 
programme shows that there were 15 principal 
participants, with differing perspectives and 
objectives and senses of urgency, some 30 
decision-points, and about 70 separate 
"agreements" necessary. Even if the 
probability of agreement was 99% at each 
clearance point, the overall probability of 
programme success could be less than half 
after 70 clearances. As Pressman and 
Wildavsky remark, "the remarkable thing is 
that new programmes work at all".50 
The general integrating processes of the recent 
reorganisation in Australia's Department of Defence have had 
the effect of reducing significantly the number of organisational 
actors and, to some extent, the number of decision points for 
h . 1 . f f l' . . 51 t e imp ernentation o many types o po icies. . However, 
through the application of the integrated task force concept, 
there would be scope for even greater advances. Task forces 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Quoted by R.W. Korner, Bureaucracy Does It's Thing, p. 8. 
J.L. Pressman and A.B. Wildavsky, Implementation: How 
Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland; 
or~ Why It's Amazing that Federal Programs Work at All~ 
This Being a Saga of the Economic Development Administration 
as Told by Two Sympathetic Observers Who Seek to Build Morals 
on a Foundation of Ruined Hopes (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1973). 
Desmond J. Ball, Review of Implementation by J.L. Pressman 
and A.B. Wildavsky, Politics, Vol. IX (L}, May 1974, pp. 108, 109. 
For details of the reorganisation see Sir Arthur Tange, 
Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganization of the 
Defence G~oup of Departments (Canberra, Department of 
Defence, Presented to the Minister for Defence, November 1973). 
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which are created to develop a programme concept and 
determine a? optimum solution would ideally also be provided 
with the authority and resources required to manage the 
programme's detailed implementation. This would serve to 
reduce drastically the number of decision points which would 
confront individual programmes and might be expected to 
encourage better decision-making because of the extended 
period of time which would be available for the consideration 
of each issue. 
5. Flexible and Imaginative Bureaucratic Managers 
The personnel characteristics required for highly original 
conceptual development and analytical programme management 
differ markedly from those required for routine line 
management or for the satisfactory peacetime command of 
. 1 . . 52 . t. h . operationa service units. In a situa ion w ere ma]or 
changes in the country's environment demand flexible adaption 
at all levels, there is a greatly enhanced need for both 
civil and military personnel to be selected, trained and 
retrained with these requirements in mind. 
An array of measures could be instituted to facilitate 
this process. For instance, much greater emphasis could be 
placed upon the qualifications and training of both civil and 
service personnel prior to, and in the years immediately 
52 The existence of a problem in this area has been 
recognised by Admiral Sir. Victor Smith, a former 
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee: 
The problem here is that the more time 
that an officer spends on courses or in 
field postings the less time there is for 
him to develop the special skills required in 
policy formulation. One solution that comes 
to mind is that a Service officer should be 
selected relatively early in his career and 
his future postings in the main, but by no 
means exclusively, would be at Russell. 
[ie. the Department of Defence offices] 
Admiral Sir Victor Smith, Military and Civilian Inputs 
into Defence Policy (A paper delivered to the Conference 
on Armed Forces and Australian Society at the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, Canberra, 20-22 May 1977), p. 6. 
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following, their recruitment. In order to increase the 
general awareness, knowledge, flexibility and adaptability 
of young officers, much greater use could be made of staff 
colleges, universities and professional associations such 
as the United Service Institutions. During their periods 
of service, civilian and military officers could be 
encouraged to further broaden their thinking and experience 
through the provision of greater freedom to participate in, 
and contribute to, internal and external journals, conferences 
and other avenues of debate. Another possibility, which was 
recommended in the Coombs Report, would be to.draw upon the 
very great benefits which could be gained through exchanges 
of personnel with other government agencies, large firms in 
industry and commerce, academic institu·tions and some 
types of voluntary agencies. 53 This would permit not only a 
broadening of experience of those officials who temporarily 
vacate their normal positions but also an injection of new 
knowledge and expertise through those individuals temporarily 
transferred into the national security structure. In many 
areas requiring very high levels of conceptual adaptability, 
these characteristics could be fostered further through an 
expansion of short term appointments and an increased emphasis 
54 . 
upon lateral recruitment. Only through such a wide range of 
complementary measures could the imaginative and adaptive 
capacity of the bureaucratic managers in Australia's national 
security structure be increased substantially. 
6. Public Debate on Important ~ational Security Issues 
At present in Australi~ the closed nature of the debate 
on many national security issues appears to be a consequence 
more of bureaucratic convenience than security necessity. 
The contrast between Australia and nearly every comparable 
western country is most marked in this respect. The national 
53 
54 
See this detailed in the Royal Commission on Australian 
Government Administration Report, pp. 145, 146. 
These matters are discussed in the Coombs Report, 
ibid., pp. 180, 181. 
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security structur0s of most western states make an active 
effort to disseminate information, to argue their case in 
detail and, in some instances, .even to fund independently 
. d bl. f . d d. . 5 5 organise pu ic con erences, seminars an iscussions. 
The closed nature of the government institutions involved 
in national security affairs in Australia is undoubtedly 
a major factor contributing to the mediocre standard of press 
reporting, parliamentary debate and public understanding. 56 
However, it must also be a significant influence in determining 
the nature of the decision-making processes and the quality of 
the decisions made within the structure. As Desmond Ball 
commented: 
What is needed is more open argument. 
Positions of particpants will still be 
reached subjectively, and the resultant 
·decisions "irrationally" but at least 
the positions would have to be justified, 
and the decisions would be subject to 
expert and professional criticism.57 
Conclusion 
Primarily because of its closed nature, it is extremely 
difficult for an external researcher to gain a comprehensive 
55 
56 
57 
Perhaps most notable in this regard is the Swedish 
Ministry of Defence. It allocates a small proportion of 
its budget each year to encourage public debate on national 
security issues through the subsidy of a wide range of 
conferences, seminars etc., and by funding the publishing 
of major discussion papers and reports written by prominent 
members of the national security structure. Interview with 
Lennart Grape, Head of the Secretariat for National 
Security Policy and Long-Range Defence Planning (SSL~), 
Swedish Ministry of Defence, 29 October 1975. 
This matter was the subject of discussion following the 
presentation of a paper by T.B. Millar, 'Some Indicators 
and Conclusions', at a Seminar of the United Service Instit-
ution of the Australian Capital Territory in September 1974~ 
See United Service, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, p. 94. 
Desmond J. Ball, Some Notes on the Decision-Making Process 
in the Australian Defence Establishment (Unpublished paper), 
~anberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, 1975), p. 27. 
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view of the functional efficiency of Australia's national 
security structure. However, the commentaries of 
experienced external observers and of those formerly involved 
in the system support the general contention that it shares 
many, if not all, of the bureaucratic weaknesses which are 
evident in foreign systems and, in some instances, has these 
weaknesses in a higher degree than other systems. 58 The 
implications of this for the prospec.ts of future change are 
very important. In particular, it means that the potential 
for adapting Australia's national security system is limited 
not only by a wide range of physical, economic, social, 
diplomatic and political factors, but also by major bureaucratic 
constraints. As a consequence, if proposals for change are 
to have any prospect of adoption and implementation, they must 
not only be structured to fit within the parameters of the 
non-bureaucratic constraints but also be formulated-in such a 
manner as to manage or accommodate bureaucratic influences. 
Certainly the processes of meaningful change are demanding 
and difficult. It is almost always easier for individuals. 
and bureaucratic structures to repeat well-established 
operational repertoires. However, it is clear that, if 
Australia's security structure is to be adapted in the type 
of fundamental manner which is required, a wide range of 
measures will need to be employed to encourage a much higher 
level of flexibility than has been apparent in the past. 
58 See, for instance, the Royal Commission on Australian 
Governmental Administration Report, the .works of 
Desmond J. Ball and A.D. McGaurr cited in this chapter, 
also W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the Minister in the 
Making of Australian Defence Policy Since the Reorganization 
of the Department of Defence' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), 
The Defence of Australia: Fundamental New Aspects 
(Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, 1977), pp. 71 ff. and 
K.J. Foley, 'Labor's Strategy of Continental Defence: 
Substance or Shadow?' in R. Scott and J.L. Richardson 
(eds.), The First Thousand Days of Labor, Vol. I (Canberra, 
Canberra College of Advanced Education, APSA Conference, 
1975) . 
PART IV 
GAINING A SENSE OF DIRECTION: TOWARDS 
COHERENT SECURITY PLANNING 
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As has been discussed in earlier parts of this thesis, 
the future quality of Australia's security will be much more 
dependent upon the scale and character of her independent 
efforts. Perhaps the most vital element of this greatly 
enhanced requirement for self-sufficiency is the need to 
develop a~ indigenous capability to plan resource allocation 
coherently to satisfy gf ficiently derived and clearly defined 
national security priorities. 
However, the task of independently planning Australia's 
security in the future is of quite a different character to 
that of the forward defence era. As has been discussed in 
Chapter 4, the security planning system which has been 
inherited from the past now appears to be deficient in 
several important respects. As a consequence, new conceptual 
processes must be found which provide a capacity to derive, 
evaluate, select and implement original solutions to satisfy 
Australia's unique security requirements. Only when clearly 
defined national security objectives, strategies, structures, 
doctrines and operational procedures are deduced in a 
coherent fashion in an unconstrained evaluative process can 
optimality be approached in the determination of priorities 
and the allocation of resources. The primary objective of 
Part IV is to outline and discuss an array of conceptual 
techniques which might provide a means of performing these 
important functions satisfactorily. 
This area of analysis is inherently complex and to some 
degree the discussion in this part of the thesis reflects 
that characteristic. But despite the difficulties of dealing 
with this subject, its central importance to considerations 
of Australia's future security policy necessitates that it be 
discussed in some detail. In Chapter 7, the nature and most 
important deficiencies of the current security planning concept 
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are elaborated and a series of criteria for evaluating 
alternative. concepts, strategies and structures is detailed 
and discussed. The four categories of planning criteria 
which are introduced in this analysis are contingencies, 
doctrinal objectives, constraining influences and those 
factors which serve to reconcile security concepts with 
national goals. 
One of the most difficult obstacles to coherent security 
planning in Australia is the high degree of uncertainty which 
characterises its strategic environment. This problem is 
examined in Chapter 8 and a potential means of managing the 
plethora of conceivable pressures and threats for planning 
purposes is elaborated. This discussion is followed, in 
Chapter 9, by an analysis of a progression of planning 
concepts which might provide a feasible means of selecting 
strategies and force structures to optimise security capacity 
for a given resource input. 
Thus, the overall thrust of Part IV is ~ search for 
concepts which would make the processes of security planning 
more efficient and coherent and, as a consequence, serve to 
clarify the priorities and direction of the entire security 
system. 
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CHAP'rER 7 
THE ·DERIVATION OF BASIC PLANNING CRITERIA 
The Planning Problem 
The security planning system which Australia has 
inherited from the forward defence era has not been designed 
for, nor does it appear to be suited to, the demanding 
functions which it is· now required to perform. As was 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Strategic Basis documents have 
highlighted effectively the notable trends in the strategic 
environment. However, they have not provided an appropriate. 
basis for the derivation of clear strategic concepts, planning 
objectives or expenditure priorities. As a consequence of 
this systemic failure, it appears that individual sections 
of the Defence Department and the armed services have been 
forced to develop their own structures, operational concepts, 
priorities and philosophies. 1 
The major problems and difficulties of planning 
Australia's security appear to be recognised within the 
Department of Defence, but the conceptual manner in which 
they are managed is of limited effectiveness. 2 It appears 
generally to be appreciated that Australia's security 
forces must be capable not only of a satisfactory response to 
immediate pressures, but also of a rapid expansion to meet 
the requirements of more demanding contingencies. 3 The 
1 
2 
3 
This situation is detailed in Chapter 4. 
Many of the conceptual problems of planning Australian 
security in an uncertain strategic environment were 
discussed by Mr D.J. Killen, the Minister for Defence, in 
his review of Defence Policy following the announcement of 
the 1977-78 budget. See Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 
House of Representatives, Thirtieth Parliament, 22 September 
1977, pp. 1478, 1479. 
The characteristics required of the peacetime forces are 
elaborated in the Defence White Paper, Australian Defence, 
A White Paper presented to Parliament by the Minister for 
Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, November 1976 (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), pp. 12, 13. 
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methods which have been adopted in an attempt to achieve 
these objec,tives can be explained simply as follows. 
First, in order to meet the immediate response 
requirement, the existing force structure (the force-in-
being) is constructed in such a manner as to provide a basic 
capability to react quickly to a number of low level pressures 
and threats. But, in addition, in order to provide the key 
elements of a capacity to meet the requirements of more 
demanding pressures and threats, the force-in-being is 
modified gradually as Australian perceptions of the strategic. 
environment (expressed in the Strategic Basis documents) 
indicate the changed nature of the country's long term 
security needs. Thus, at least in theory, the structure of 
the force which would exist at mobilisation (the core force) 
gradually changes character over time to ·more closely satisfy 
those requirements which are identified in the Strategic 
. d 4 Basis ocuments. 
One of the major problems with this concept is that, 
because of the uncertain nature of the strategic environment 
and hence of future contingencies, it is impossible, in the 
Department's view, to determine the optimal shape of the 
fully mobilised force structure (the terminal force). In 
fact, because there is an almost infinite range of conceivable 
pressures and threats, the core force is designed in such a 
manner that it is capable of expanding relatively quickly into 
the size and shape of a large number of terminal forces. 5 In 
4 
5 
The conceptual relationship between the force-in-being, the 
core force and the terminal force was the subject of a 
notable debate on the morning of 28'0ctober 1976 at the 
'Defence of Australia : Fundamental New Aspects' Conference, 
held by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at The 
Australian National University. The description of the 
current planning system appearing in the text is derived 
primarily from the explanations made by senior Department 
of Defence officers on that occasion. 
This process of multi-path force expansion planning is 
described by Desmond J. Ball, in 'Equipment Policy for the 
Defence of Australi~·inRobert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence 
of Australia : Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National 
University, 1977), p. 119. 
2~ 
order to maximise the potential speed of this multi-
dircctional force expansion capacity for a given resource 
input, the core force is designed to include a very large 
number of high technology, high complexity, long lead time 
capabilities. It is in this context that a wide range of 
very advanced equipments and technologies can be justified in 
terms of the maintenance of the 'state of the art'. It is 
argued that if a particular type ~f capacity is important in 
meeting an array of potential contingencies, the development 
and maintenance of high levels of expertise in the field 
serves to reduce significantlytheminimum time required to 
expand that capacity should it be necessary to do so. 6 
The primary difficulty with this conceptual management 
process is that, because of the lack of clarity concerning 
the contingencies which are to be accepted for planning 
purposes, the system fails to perform any of its major 
objectives satisfactorily. The present security system 
possesses a basic capacity to meet a large number of 
contingencies but it is important to realise that the price 
of this multiple-contingency flexibility and adaptability 
is very high. In effect, it necessitates the procurement 
of small numbers of practically every conceivable unit and 
equipment type. This dilution of the limited resources which 
Australia can devote to national security functions over a 
wide variety of unit and equipment types limits heavily 
economies of scale in procurement, maintenance, training and 
practically every other area of national security activity. 
Moreover, because the combat personnel who can be mobilised 
readily are so widely dispersed, in a functional sense, the 
total structure's irrunediate response capacity is constrained 
severely. But perhaps the most important weakness of all is 
that this diffusion of expertise limits effectively the 
current security concept's surge capacity. As was discussed 
in Chapter 4, in order to meet the demands even of some 
6 This requirement is described in the Defence White Paper 
as the 'military competence and capacity to absorb and 
operate high technology equipments'. Australian Defence, 
p. 13. 
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relatively minor harassment and raid scenarios, the current 
force-in-being requires periods of defence preparation time 
which are unrealistically long. 
Thus, in summary, the utility of Australia's present 
security planning concept should be the cause of considerable 
concern. The limited immediate operational response and 
surge capacity of the current structure is justified primarily 
by the perceived requirement in an uncertain strategic 
environment of retaining a capacity to expand in almost any 
direction, however slowly, should the need arise. The 
practical effect of this planning concept upon the structure 
of the armed forces is particularly significant. Despite 
major changes to Australia's strategic environment and the 
nature of its security requirements, the current force 
structure and that which is officially postulated for the 
1980s is almost identical in shape and form to that of the 
7 
mid-1960s at the height of the forward defence era. Is it 
to be concluded that the force structure which was designed 
for and presumably was suited ideally to the demands of 
committing single service formations overseas to complement 
the foreign deployments of major power allies is also, by 
some extraordinary coincidence and good fortune, the structure 
which is ideally suited to the demands of securing Australia's 
immediate environment with a high degree of independence? 
It is difficult to avoid the judgment from the information 
available on the public record that, despite official recog-
nition of the changes in Australia's strategic circumstances, 
their full implications and ramifications have not been 
identified and acted upon in any comprehensive manner within 
the current planning system. As long as Australia lacks 
7 Although the shape of the force structure appears to-be 
relatively static, significant mea5ures are being taken 
to develop and adopt concepts, doctrines and procedures 
more appropriate to Australia's new strategic circumstances. 
This is discussed in detail by Robert O'Neill in 'The 
Development of Operational Doctrines for the Australian 
Defence Force', Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, pp. 138-143. · 
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a rigorous and coherent security planning process, it 
seems likely that the bureaucratic inertia and well-entrenched 
vested interests which are manifested in the current security 
, 
structure will perpetuate the status quo irrespective of 
the level of its functional efficiency in the new environment. 
Deriving New Planning Criteria 
1. Contingencies 
The primary underlying cause of Australia's current 
security planning problem is the high level of strategic 
uncertainty with which the country is confronted. Thus, the 
nature of possible future pressures and threats is a logical 
starting point for the processes of coherent security 
planning. However, this major area of uncertainty is not 
easily clarified. As Darcy McGaurr points out, the almost 
imponderable nature of Australia's future security 
environment presents a much more severe planning problem 
than that faced by a wide range of advanced western states: 
The lack of a foreseeable threat 
means Australia has no pressing defence 
problem. However, the same phenomenon 
is at the root of our defence planning 
problem. Paradoxically, a country like 
Israel with a far greater defence problem 
has a less complex defence planning 
problem. The threat is there. It can be 
measured and observed and planned against. 
All the NATO nations develop their force 
structure to counter those of the Soviet 
bloc. Australian governments realize that 
lack of threat in the short term does not 
eliminate the need for defence preparedness 
in the long term. The problem is one of 
allocating limited resources between a very 
large array of possible defence projects.8 
Mr Killen has also emphasised the constraining influence 
of the uncertain strategic environment and hinted at a 
8 Darcy McGaurr, 'The Case for a Balanced Defence Policy', 
The National Times, 3-8 March 1975, pp. 50-51. 
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conceptual solution: 
If there was a perceived threat 
it would make defence planning ever so 
much easier because you know precisely 
where you want to spend your money, how 
you want to spend your money and when you 
want to spend your money. But there is no 
perceived threat, and so as a consequence 
of that one must take into account 
contingencies, and the contingencies again 
must be tinged with reality.9 
But the questions arise of which contingencies should be 
considered and how they should be derived and expressed. It 
is argued in Chapter 8 that it is possible to reduce the wide 
array of conceivable pressures and threats into a form which 
is manageable for planning purposes without oversimplifying 
greatly its potential diversity. This is achieved by 
carefully selecting a set of scenarios which, in terms of 
its national security response requirements, is representative 
of the full range of future possibilities. The contingencies 
elaborated in these scenarios would provide an ideal initial 
foundation for the processes of detailed security planning. 
Their potential utility in this role.brought Desmond Ball to 
conclude: 
In strategic planning, there is no 
substitute for a contingency/options 
approach~ ie. making conscious decisions 
concerning the contingencies to be prepared 
against and those to be ignored, and then 
selecting options to fulfil the required 
capabilities. This, however, requires both 
more positive strategic guidance and stronger 
decisions than are seen today.10 
In other words, a primary means of overcoming the current 
difficulties of planning in Australia's uncertain strategic 
environment would be to design and test in concept a wide 
range of strategic and structural options for their capacity 
9 
10 
Address by the Minister for Defence, the Hon. D.J. Killen, 
to the 62nd Annual Congress of the Returned Services 
League, Canberra, 7 September 1977, p. 8. 
Desmond J. Ball, 'Equipment Policy for the Defence of .. 
Australia' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australia: Fundamental New Aspects, p. 119. 
to meet the demands of a representative and agreed set of 
scenarios .. 
2. Dodtrinal Objectives 
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It would be extremely difficult to determine those 
security concepts and structures which would most adequately 
meet the requirements of the agreed scenarios in the absence 
of any clear measures of efficiency. Strategic and 
structural options could be tested in the circumstances of 
the representative scenarios, but what would be the basis 
for their evaluation? Would the most efficient ones be those 
with the greatest capacity to deter an enemy, to defer the 
onset of hostilities, to defeat an opponent, to cause an 
opponent to institute a disproportionate response,to prevent 
wholesale defeat or perhaps a combination of the above? A 
clear statement of national security doctrinal goals would 
be central to any process of coherent security planning. As 
was discussed in Chapter 4, it would be most appropriate for 
this second planning criterion to be determined by the 
government of the day, although preferably in the context of 
a bi-partisan political consensus. 
3. Constraining Influences 
With the derivation of the first two categories of 
planning criteria, it would be possible to design and evaluate 
conceptually a wide range of alternative security strategies 
and structures for their capacity to meet the demands of the 
doctrinal objectives in the circumstances of the 
representative scenarios. Yet this form of evaluation would 
be largely removed from reality. There would be no explicit 
limits on finance, manpower, technology, social and diplomatic 
factors or many other restraining influences which are present 
in the real world. These multi-dimensional constraints would 
need to be integrated into any process of coherent planning. 
Many of those factors which restrain Australian security 
options - finance, manpower, public attitudes, industrial 
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capacity, technical skills, etc. - have been discussed 
in Chapter_5. However, for u. comprehensive process of 
national security planning, they would need to be 
elaborated in much greater detail. In practice, this 
integration might best be done by the Department of Defence 
for approval by the Government. 
4. Reconciling Security Concepts With National Goals 
On the basis of the first three categories of planning 
criteria, alternative concepts and structures could be tested 
for their capacity to optimise doctrinal objectives in the 
context of the representative scenarios while not transgressing 
the bounds set by the elaborated constraints. However, the 
processes of planning on these bases alone would still be 
deficient. It would be possible to design alternative 
strategies and structures with a comparable capacity to 
satisfy the established criteria but which would differ 
markedly in their impact upon the nation at large. Great 
variations could be expected to be evident in the strength of 
domestic industrial support, research and development, 
intelligence, repair and maintenance capacities required by 
each proposal. Alternative security options may also differ 
markedly in the levels of their structural flexibility, 
adaptability and endurance. The nature of all of these 
characteristics would be of significance to any government 
because they impact in a major fashion not only upon the 
basic form of national security policy, but also upon a broad 
range of domestic and international political, economic and 
social concerns. As a consequence, it would be important for 
the government of the day to be given scope to select and 
define basic objectives for those categories of additionally 
stated planning requirements which it regards as being 
important, eg. the levels of Australian industry participation, 
procurement offsets, domestic research and development, 
dependence upon foreign sources of intelligence and upon 
foreign sources of equipment supply, etc. 
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The General Character of a Coherent Planning System 
The provision of all four categories of planning 
criteria would provide a comprehensive conceptual basis for 
the construction and detailed evaluation of a wide range of 
alternative strategic concepts and structures in realistic 
circumstances. Alternative options could be tested for 
their capacity to maximise doctrinal goals in the 
circumstances of the selected scenarios while satisfying 
the additionally specified requirements of national policy 
and not transgressing the bounds set by the elaborated 
constraints. Through this process, it should be possible to 
make optimising decisions concerning the most efficient 
strategic concepts, structures and even details of the most 
efficient organisation and equipment types for a given 
financial input. The progression of this analysis is 
illustrated in a simplified form in Figure 1. 
This pattern of testing in concept a wide range of 
security options offers great scope for overcoming many of 
the serious weaknesses of the present security planning 
system which were identified in Chapter 4. Most obviously, 
it would encourage greatly increased creativity in security 
structure design. But perhaps more importantly, the clarity 
of national security objectives and goals would make it 
possible for the entire planning processes to be more 
directly end-product or functionally oriented. A total-
systems view could be adopted in the sense that all security 
resources could theoretically be available for inter-system 
trade-offs and interactions in order to maximise the 
achievement of the stated goals within given total resource 
constraints. In an economic sense, it should be possible to 
determine the optimal distribution of marginal resource 
inputs and also to undertake full input-output analysis. 
Judgments on most of the matters in this process could 
be expected to be both complex and difficult to reach. Thus, 
in all decision-making in the planning system, and particularly 
in the derivation of representative scenarios and the 
evaluation of alternative security concepts and structures, it 
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would be highly advantageous to limit, as far as possible, 
the scope for purely intuitive judgments. The roles of 
analytical studies and research would be increased greatly. 
However, where ~ntuitive decisions are unavoidable, it would 
be desirable for the questions involved to be structured 
carefully to ensure a high level of decision-making precision 
and to facilitate the ~pplication of the most advanced 
expertise which is available. 
Ideally, the processes of generating and testing 
alternative security concepts which have been described above 
would produce a conceptual strategy and structure which 
approaches an optimisation of national security objectives 
for the level of resources which is available. However, 
because of heavy existing investments in equipment, personnel 
training, facilities, etc., it might prove impossible for 
the Australian security system to adopt any new security 
solution in the short term. As a consequence, it would be 
necessary to transfer the optimising strategy and structure 
to a long term planning framework so that clear and 
unambiguous guidance could be made available for the gradual 
adaptation of the existing security system. Detailed decision 
paths could be elaborated for system transformation and 
key decision points could be identified and phased so that 
the broadest possible array of options is kept open until the 
last possible moment. In practice, this approach would serve 
to increase the importance of long term perspectives, improve 
freedom of action in decision-making and optimise the system's 
capability to adapt rapidly to meet unforeseen develop~ents. 
As a consequence, the need for ad hoc decision-making should 
be reduced to a minimum. 
In summary, a well integrated coherent security planning 
system should improve the understanding and control of the 
decision-makers in those factors which are capable of rapid 
change. Risks and uncertainties should be identified, 
clarified and described at an early stage and unambiguous 
policy direction made available to all sections of the 
security structure on a continuous basis. In totaL these 
developments could be expected to increase significantly the 
potential for effective governmental influence on the 
essential elements of security planning. 
Conclusion 
276 
Undertakinq such a process of coherent security planning 
in Australia would be extremeiy complex and difficult in 
practice. Many serious problems can be anticipated. For 
example, exactly how could a series of properly representative 
scenarios be derived for planning purposes? How could the 
planning structure be integrated as a whole? Could such a 
planning system be evolved within the bureaucratic structure 
which already exists? How might such a system work in 
practice? It is not intended to provide adequate answers to 
all of the potential problems which could beset such an 
undertaking. Rather, the prime purpose of Chapters 8 and 9 
is to discuss a number of conceptual techniques and tools 
which might conceivably be employed to overcome some of 
Australia's current security planning difficulties. Thus, 
although much of what follows is elaborated in the form of 
an operating process, the concern is not to argue the case 
for a particular type of structural solution so much as to 
introduce some general concepts in a logical fashion for wider 
discussion and debate. 
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CHAP'l'ER 8 
MANAGING AN UNCERTAIN THREAT ENVIRONMEN'I': 
DERIVING REPRESENTATIVE SCENARIOS 
As a consequence of Australia's changed strategic 
environment, it appears that, in the future, Australia's 
security will be much more dependent upon her indigenous 
capacity to meet the demands of a wide range of pressures 
and threats. But as was discussed in Chapter 7, the 
uncertain nature of Australia's strategic environment, with 
its almost innumerable theoretically conceivable pressures 
and threats, has complicated greatly the task of coherent 
security planning. If high levels of efficiency in resource 
allocation are to be approached, it is essential that the 
vast array of possible contingencies be reduced into a more 
manageable form. 
What is required in these circumstances is a refining 
process to elaborate, test and select a series of contingencies 
which, in terms of their security planning requirements, would 
be representative of the full range of pressure and threat 
possibilities. As was briefly described in Chapter 7 and is 
elaborated in much greater detail in Chapter 9, the range of 
representative scenarios which might be produced by such a 
process would be well-suited to play a central role in the 
processes of security planning as one of the four basic design 
and evaluation criteria. 
The discussion which follows represents an attempt to 
derive a conceptual progression which might be effective in 
performing the contingency refinement function. The total 
process involves twelve steps. These are best understood 
by progressive reference to the attached figures in addition 
to the main text. (Please fold out Figure 2 on page 291.) 
Stage 1. The first stage involves a detailed analysis of the 
global and regional environment with a view to highlighting 
the more significant developing trends. It is generally 
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recognised that this function can be performed very 
effectively by the present type of Strategic Basis document. 
For instance, Sir Arthur Tange has written: 
To assess Australia's strategic outlook 
for the purpose of defence decisions, we 
must distinguish between tides and eddies. 
There are types of violent events which, 
like eddies, are sometimes not predictable. 
They may well be injurious to others, but 
they will not necessarily be a threat to the 
security of this country. Events of this 
kind - outbreaks of religious violence, 
border disputes and the like - might contingently 
impose on Australia an obligation to contribute 
to a United Nations collective actioni but 
experience suggests that this uncertain 
prospect, in itself, should not be a determinant 
of this country's defence effort ... 
But if we can ignore the eddies, or at 
least not over~react to them, we must study 
the tides of international movements; and 
such things as the changes in the distribution 
of military and economic power in the world, 
and in the political power of groups of 
countries, and in their objectives towards 
countries in Australia's position. These I 
believe are the tides which, in their ebb and 
flow, increase or decrease the vulnerability of 
Australia to threats of real consequence. 
They do not flow regularly. Their movement 
is, however, discernible and their implications 
for our future security can, I believe, be 
estimated. This is what the periodic 
Strategic Surveys by the Defence Committee set 
out to do for the Government.l 
Ideally for the threat management structure being 
proposed, this basic environmental analysis would be reviewed 
and updated on a regular cycle, such as at one, one and a 
h 1 . 1 2 quarter or two and a a f yearly interva s. 
Stage 2. By extrapolating from the developing trends 
identified in Stage 1, a series of alternative futures could 
1 
2 
See Sir Arthur Tange, 'Defence Policy Making in Australia', 
in John Birman (ed.), Au8tPaZia's. Defence (Perth, 
Extension Service, University of Western Australia, 1976), 
PP• 6 I 7 • 
This timing has been selected so that the strategic assess-
ment would fit easily into the long range planning phasing 
which is elaborated in detail in Chapter 9. 
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be constructed for a period fifteen 3 years hence. Each 
of these possible future environments would describe a 
complete and coherent global and regional situation. For 
example, they might range from an environment fifteen years 
hence which was very similar to that of the present, through 
to situations with regional conflict close by, regional 
confli~ts at distant locations, significant resource 
shortages, serious instability in the superpower balance, 
limited or unlimited superpower conflict, etc. The primary 
intention would be to derive a broad and reasonably 
representative range of possible futures without proliferating 
4 them in unmanageable numbers. 
Stage 3. The ne~t step would be to draw upon the environmental 
analysis in Stage 1 to identify a number of international 
actors which, because of their present or potential 
intentions or capabilities, could conceivably present a 
threat to Australia in the timespan fifteen to twenty years 
hence. 5 Then, by drawing upon a relatively large number of 
3 
4 
5 
The selection of this timespan might be justified by a 
variety of arguments but here the prime motivation was 
to obtain compatibility with proposed processes of long 
term security planning outlined in Chapter 9. A point 
fifteen years hence is particularly appropriate as a 
long range planning objective because it is sufficiently 
remote to make significant structural alterations 
feasible but, at the same time, is sufficiently immediate 
to make detailed proposals realistic. 
An appropriate number might be somewhere between ten and 
twenty alternative futures. A number smaller than this 
would probably not provide sufficient scope for the 
analysis and a sufficiently broad range of possible 
alternative developments. A number larger than twenty 
would tend to become unmanageable because of the 
proliferation of paper work it would cause in the 
subsequent stages of analysis. 
In this context, the timespan is broadened from the 
initial fifteen years to permit hypothetical pressures 
or threats to be developed over the time period which 
would be required for them to eventuate. 
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Australians who are experts concerning these countries 6 
(in a process elaborated later in this chapter), judgments 
would be made upon the likely actions of these countries in 
the context of each of the alternative futures outlined in 
Stage 2. In order to make this process as explicit as 
possible, a series of threat types (perhaps similar to those 
outlined in Chapter 3) 7 would be introduced into the analysis 
at this stage. The experts would then be asked to pass 
judgment on whether country A, when placed in environment 1, 
might perceive aggression type p as a reasonable means of 
attaining its higher regional or global political objectives. 
What would be the possible benefits to be gained by country A 
in the circumstances? Then these same questions would be 
asked concerning country A in environment 1 but concerning 
8 
aggression type q, etc. 
6 
7 
8 
These experts might be drawn both from within government 
service and from academic and business circles beyond. 
There are a number of precedents for the employment of 
external personnel for the provision of specialised 
expertise. Apart from the engagement of individual 
consultants from time to time, the Department of Defence 
has, on occasions, worked with specialised groups of 
academics in extended consultations with senior government 
officials. For details see Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre (An information booklet prepared in Canberra for 
the Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian 
National Universityf 1971), p. 3. 
The types of pressure and threat employed might include 
the following: 
a. Low-level pressures of peace, ie. those consistent 
with a peaceful environment. 
b. Pressures resulting from a regional or global 
resource crisis. 
c. Pressures resulting fro~ a regional or global 
conflict in which Australia is not a combatant. 
d. Demands and threats supported by political., military 
and/or economic measures. 
e. Economic warfare against Australia. 
f. Surprise assault with a limited objective. 
g. Full-scale invasion. 
h. Australian involvement in a global or regional 
nuclear, biological or chemical exchange. 
See this process depicted diagramatically in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 1 - A DIAGRAMMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE THREAT 
EVALUATION PROCESS IN STAGE 3 
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By an extended process of placing the selected countries 
in the ful~ range of hypothetical alternative futures, the 
experts would make judgments concerning the complete set of 
accepted aggression possibilities. Eventually, all the 
possible combinations of country, environment and threat 
would be evaluated. Those combinations which are judged to 
be unreasonable propositions (probably the majority) would 
be abandoned. 
In order to facilitate further evaluation by the experts, 
the remaining combinations would be elaborated into 
descriptive cases of aggression. These would simply trace 
the type of international situation which would give rise to 
the threat, the general preparations and precautions which 
the foreign actor would require and the form of aggressive 
action which might be employed. 
Stage 4. The next step would involve a generalised 
evaluation by the country experts of the likely profitability 
of each case of aggression as it is likely to be perceived 
by the foreign actors. 'I'he first question might ask. for an 
assessment of the likely perceived opportunity costs of 
unde.rtaking the action against Australia. How profitable 
might alternative resource applications be when compared 
with the option of pressuring Australia? How much would the 
external actor's security in other spheres be reduced by 
mobilising and applying the resources involved against 
Australia? 
A separate but related function to that of opportunity 
cost would be an estimation of risk costs. What would be 
the perceived risks of other external actors intervening? 
To what extent might the external actor fear that the 
resources calculated as necessary to achieve the objective 
against Australia might be understated? What would be the 
perceived risks to the external actor of other undesirable 
consequences, eg. increased tension with other actors, 
superpowers, allies, neighbours, etc? 
In addition, it would be necessary to attempt to evaluate 
the constraining force of perceived political costs, both 
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domestically and abroad. 
The other side of the profitability equation would 
involve an estimation of the foreign actor's likely perceived 
value of the aggressive action. Questions asked here would 
include a rough evaluation of the foreign actor's perceived 
value of any physical resources expected to be gained by 
the aggression, the foreign actor's likely perceived value 
of any strategic positions or strategic advantages won in 
relation to its competitors, etc. Estimations of likely 
perceptions regarding the value of economic and both 
international and domestic political advantages would also 
need to be made. 9 
Clearly, no matter how well qualified the experts, the 
judgments required of them in this field could not be 
expected to take any precise mathematical form. However, in 
order to gain a very generalised view of a foreign actor's 
likely perceptions in a given situation, basic order of 
magnitude evaluations would be sufficient. What is really 
required from this balancing of the likely perceived costs 
and benefits is a simple and relatively reliable means of 
culling out those cases of aggression which would clearly be 
unprofitable from the external actor's point of view. The 
remaining cases of aggression would progress to Stage 5. 
9 Attempting to gauge the likely perceptions of foreign 
actors in hypothetical situations is obviously a highly 
speculative process. The employment of such 
estimations in this system of scenario refinement is 
not to imply that similar considerations necessarily 
occupy the minds of major actors in real-life situations. 
Calculations concerning the profitability of a given 
action are frequently made in only a shallow manner, 
if they are considered at all. The question of 
employing such calculations in a theoretical 
framework is discussed by Kevin J. Foley in 
'Selecting an Australian Tactical Fighter Force: 
Marginal Strategies, Rationality and the Australian 
Aircraft Industry' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The Future 
of Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia 
(Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The 
Australian National University, 1977), pp. 132-136. 
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Stage 5. The next step would be for the country experts 
to evaluate the cases of aggression in the context of their 
appropriate future environment and assess whether or not 
the foreign actor might have alternative means of attaining 
his overall politico-strategic goals and objectives. If, 
in fact, there do appear to be alternative methods, these 
would be elaborated in the form of generalised cases of 
action and passed to Stage 6. (There may be more than one 
alternative for each case of aggression.) On the other hand, 
if there are no alternative methods of foreign actor goal 
achievement apparent, the case of aggression would be 
transferred directly to Stage 7. 
Stage 6. At this stage, the possible alternative foreign 
actor strategies would be evaluated for their cost~effectiveness 
using the same criteria and methodology which were applied 
to the original cases of aggression in Stage 4. Those 
alternatives which the country experts judge to be clearly 
unprofitable would be abandoned. The remainder would 
progress to Stage 7. 
Stage 7. Where multiple alternatives to an original case of 
aggression progress to Stage 7, the experts concerned would 
be asked to pass judgment on which would be most likely to 
be perceived by the foreign actor as the most profitable. 
This most profitable alternative would then be compared to the 
original case of aggression against Australia from which the 
alternative was derived in Stage 5. If the profitability of 
the aggression against Australia appears to be equal to, or 
better than, the best alternative, it progresses to Stage 8. 
On the other hand, if the most cost-effective alternative 
actions clearly appear to be more profitable for the external 
actor in the light of the postulated future environment, that 
case of aggression would be discarded from subsequent analysis. 
Stage 8. The cases of aggression which progress to this level 
of analysis would then be elaborated into full-scale scenarios. 
The actual process of describing the scenarios would be very 
important. While brevity would be essential, it would, at the 
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same time, be vital to transmit clearly the information 
needed by the security planners who would, in the final analysis, 
base much of their work upon those scenarios which are 
selected at the end of this threat managing process. 
Essentially, a scenario is a description of a hypo-
thetical chain of events commencing with the development of 
circumstances which serve to generate the exterrial actor's 
aggressive intentions and terminating with the final features 
of the plan of attack or pressure. They would probably be 
10 best described in three distinct stages. The fir~t, 
conflict phase would deal with the chain of international 
developments which lead to a situation where the conflict 
is imminent. The second, aggression stage would analyse 
whether it would be necessary or expedient for the foreign 
actor to move against third parties in the international 
environment, before it could pressure or attack Australia. 
If this were judged to be likely or probable, steps would be 
identified in the foreign actor's activitiy and these would 
be clearly outlined. At each of these points, the descriptions 
of the situation would include an account of the actor's 
current estimation of the profitability (gains versus risks) of 
h . d d ,. 11 t e inten e action. 
The third, attack phase of the scenario would describe 
the main features of the aggressor's plan of attack or means 
of applying pressure. 12 To simplify this proces~ it would 
10 
11 
12 
This method of expression is employed successfully in 
Sweden. See Ministry of Defence, The Defence Planning 
System - The Goal-Setting Procedure (Stockholm, Ministry 
of Defence, Publication Number 4/1970), p. 16. 
This consideration would facilitate subsequent analyses 
concerning alternative methods of deterring, deferring, 
defeating or otherwise preventing the development of 
pressures and threats before they can be actively directed 
against Australia. 
It is interesting to note that the Swedish defence planners 
have found by experience that in their situation the best 
method of scenario construction (as opposed to expression) 
is not chronological. In order to achieve a high level 
of internal consistency, they start by defining the 
international situation at the end of the conflict phase. 
From there, the entire aggression stage is designed. 
Only then is the conflict phase constructed and this is 
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need to be assumed that the external actor designed his 
aggression.to impact upon the Australian security structure 
and the nation as a whole, as it existed at the time that 
the analysis was undertaken. 13 
Stage 9. The newly completed scenarios would now be referred 
back to the country experts to check that the various 
hypothetical actions and moves of the participating inter-
national actors are in general accord with their expressed 
doctrines as outlined in the strategic analysis of Stage 1. 
It would be essential for objectives, methods and means of 
all the actors to be consistent with their current and/or 
anticipated patterns of behaviour. In those scenarios 
where there are found to be inconsistencies of a relatively 
minor nature, it may be possible to make corrections in such 
a manner that the established form of the scenario remains 
unchanged. However, where this proves to be impossible, 
because the inconsistencies are of a more fundamental nature, 
the scenario would need to be abandoned. 
Stage 10. At this point, the scenarios would b~ considered 
from the viewpoint of one of the major users of the end product, 
the force structure planner. From his point of view, it 
would be necessary to limit the finally approved number of 
12 cont'd 
13 
done by working backwards from the start of the aggression 
phase. When both of these processes are complete, the 
attack phase is designed and delineated in detail. For 
details see Ministry of Defence, The Defence Planning 
System - The Goal-Setting Procedure, p. 17. 
This implicit assumption would be made in order to simplify 
the experts' evaluations of foreign actors' perceptions of 
Australia's reaction capacity. However, there may also be 
scope here to test the sensitivity of various cases of 
aggression to explicit changes in Australia's security 
structure. It may be possible, by a process of submitting 
further detailed questions to the country experts, to 
evaluate likely alterations to a foreign actor's profit-
ability analyses resulting from changes to Australia's 
security capacity. Howeve~ this would be an aid to 
security planning rather than a means of assisting the 
management of uncertainty per .se. 
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scenarios to a manageable level (perhaps ideally between 
five and fifteen) . One primary means of reducing the 
numbers of scenarios remaining, without affecting significantly 
the value of the few that comprise the final product, would be 
to test them for response overlap. 
It would not be very difficult for strategic planners 
to determine, in general terms, the types and levels of 
forces which might be required to meet most effectively the 
14 
scenarios which reach Stage 10. In respect of their 
requirements for an Australian response, some of the 
scenarios are likely to dominate others. For example, a 
limited assault mounted by country A may require a very 
similar Australian response to an assault mounted by 
country B. If such were the case, one of these scenarios 
could be discarded. In addition, it is also possible that 
one scenario may dominate another of a quite different type, 
in terms of the response structure required. While the 
optimised response structures of the two scenarios concerned 
may differ in minor respects, it may be determined that 
the built-in flexibility15 of one of the optimised responses 
would be sufficient for it to meet effectively the demands of 
the other scenario. Thus, culling may again be possible. If 
this process of scenario discrimination is undertaken 
efficiently, it would be reasonable to assume that if a 
theoretical defence structure we~edesigned and prepared to 
meet all of the remaining scenarios, it should also have a 
14 
15 
In any coherent and rigorous security planning system, 
there is a need for a group of specialist strategic 
planners. As is discussed in Chapter 9, one of their 
most important functions would be to elaborate and test 
alternative concepts and force structures in order to 
determine their functional effectiveness in meeting 
national security requirements in given situations. 
Because of the nature of their normal work, the elaboration 
of generalised force structures which would most effectively 
meet the requirements of the scenarios reaching Stage 10 
would most probably not be v~ry difficult. 
Flexibility is defined here to mean a structure's 
capacity to meet uncertainty (or a non-design optimised 
threat) where the length of advance warning is insufficient 
to make structural alterations possible (ie. defence 
preparation time is zero) . 
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capacity to meet any type of scenario with which Australia 
may be confronted within the fifteen year time limits of 
the planning structure. So,in summary, in terms of their 
response requirements, a wide range of scenario types is 
likely to remain for further consideration at the end of 
Stage 10. 
Stage 11. At this stage, country experts and strategic 
planners would attempt to determine, in a conservative manner, 
the minimum defence preparation time which Australian 
security planners could expect to receive in the circumstances 
of each scenario. In other words, judgments would be made 
concerning the point of time in each scenario at which it 
could be expected with a high degree of probability that the 
Australian Government would authorise full scale security 
force mobilisation to meet the threat as it would then be 
perceived. From this judgment, it would be possible to 
determine, in general terms, the length of time likely to 
be available for changes to be made in the security structure 
before the external actor moves against Australia (ie. the 
length of defence preparation time). In some scenarios, this 
time for structural· alteration is likely to be zero, but in 
others it may be in the order of months or even years. 
The hypothetical and generalised optimised scenario 
response structures of Stage 10 would now be resurrected to 
perform another function. The optimised response structure 
of those scenarios where the minimum length of defence 
preparation time is judged to be relatively long would be 
compared to the optimised response structure of those 
scenarios where the minimum defence preparation time is judged 
to be zero or relatively short. It may be found that between 
these two categories there are optimised response structures 
which are fairly closely related. Where this is so, analysis 
would be undertaken to determine the length of time which 
would be required to adapt the security structure optimised 
for the low minimum defence preparation time scenario to 
approximate that structure which is optimised for the scenario 
with relatively long minimum defence preparation time. Where 
28 9 
this time period is found to be shorter than the difference 
between the defence preparation times for the two scenarios, 
the scenario with the relatively long minimum defence 
preparation time could be safely abandoned. By using this 
process and making explicit and realistic assumptions about 
the defence preparation time adaptability of particular 
security structures, it would be possible for individual 
scenarios, with low minimum defence preparati,on times, to 
cancel more than one other scenario at this stage. However, 
it must be remembered that, as a result of these processes, 
it may be necessary to secure structural adaptability as a 
goal in its own right. This would need to be expressed 
explicitly in the additonally specified requirements of 
. 1 l' 16 nationa po icy. 
Stage 12. The final stage of the scenario culling process 
would be undertaken by politicians, probably by the Cabinet 
on the recommendation of the Minister for Defence. However, 
it should be noted that it would be highly advantageous 
if a politically bi-partisan approach was adopted concerning 
the criteria employed in this process. Basically, judgment 
would have to be exercised as to the political acceptability 
of the final set of scenarios. It is here that politicians 
would be expected to make explicit judgments if they felt 
that the security forces should not be designed to meet 
specific types of pressure or threat. For example, it may 
be decided that, in the case of a particular type of scenario, 
Australia's security forces, no matter what their strength, 
would be incapable of influencing the international 
development or even affecting significantly its impact upon 
Australia. In these circumstance~ it might be decided that 
consideration of this type of scenario in the planning and 
design of Australia's security capacity would imply a 
misallocation of resources. By way of illustration, the 
politicians might, for instance, decide to abandon consideration 
16 The additionally specified requirements of security 
planning are discussed in Chapter 7 and depicted in 
Figure 1 of that chapter. 
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of scenarios involving heavy nuclear, biological or 
chemical a~tacks by the superpowers upon Australia's 
population centres in the design of the country's security 
. 17 
capacity. 
Conclusion 
One of the major obstacles to coherent security planning 
in Australia is the long-standing difficulty of dealing with 
the high levels of uncertainty which characterise the nation's 
environment. Australia urgently requires a means of 
reducing the wide range of conceivable pressures and threats 
into a form which facilitates rigorous security planning. 
The concepts elaborated in this chapter may contribute, to 
some degree, to the development of such a system. 
Basically, the conceptual progression which has been 
outlined represents an attempt to avoid the dangers inherent 
in intuitive decision-making which is undertaken in the 
context of a very large number of highly dynamic and poorly 
defined variables. It systematises the processes of 
scenario evaluation into a logical sequence. It also demands 
that most judgments be made in an explicit manner on the 
basis of a clearly stated information source and in the 
light of coherently expressed criteria and assumptions. In 
addition, it provides well-delineated roles for system 
administration, specialised country experts, security 
planners and politicians. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this type of 
uncertainty managing process provides a basis for marshalling 
a high level of specialised expertise to make intuitive 
judgments when these are unavoidable. Implicit in Stages 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 11 are a series of judgments on likely 
17 It would clearly be important for politicians to command 
a high level of knowledge and expertise in order to make 
these judgments. Potential means of improving their 
capacity in this area are discussed in Chapter 6. 
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foreign actor reactions to a range of hypothetical 
environments. 18 Obviously these evaluations would be 
susceptible to all of the problems of subjectivism. 19 Yet 
these difficulties could be reduced to manageable 
proportions if a relatively large number of people were 
engaged for the task, each of whom possessed a high level 
of expertise concerning at least one of the foreign actors 
concerned. In practical terms, this could probably be done 
most effectively by employing some type of participatory 
polling technique. 20 Where it is considered that it might 
be beneficial, some of the questionnaire results might also 
b d . f 11 d . 1 t. 21 e teste in care u y constructe simu a ion games. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Judgments are also required of security planners concerning 
the nature of optimal security structures designed in 
response to specific pressures and threats (Stages 10 and 
11) , likely warning and defence preparation times (Stage 
11) and the periods likely to be required to adapt 
optimal security response structures to approximate 
others (also in Stage 11). Finally, explicit judgments 
are required of politicians (Stage 12). 
Many of these difficulties are discussed in detail in 
the chapters in the first two parts of Anatol Rapoport, 
Strategy and Conscience (New York, Schocken Books, 1969), 
pp. 3-175. 
These techniques are discussed at length by H. Sackman in 
Toward More Effective Use of Expert Opinion: Preliminary 
Investigation of Participatory Polling for Long-Range 
Planning (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, P-5570, 1976). 
The potential utility of simulation techniques is 
discussed by Anatol Rapoport in Strategy and Conscience, 
pp. 125 ff. It is also important to note at this stage 
that a scenario derivation process, such as that outlined 
in this chapter, would need to be employed regularly if 
the end product is to be expected to retain its relevance. 
Changes in the international environment may alter 
considerably the scope for scenario construction. In 
addition, progressive changes to Australia's response 
capacity may have a significant impact upon the country 
experts' evaluations of foreign actors' profitability 
calculations. Neither of these considerations can be 
expected to remain static for extended periods. As a 
consequence, a cyclical process of regular environment 
and threat reassessment is likely to be justified. 
This requirement is not to imply that each time the system 
is activated a completely new range of scenarios can be 
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It is important to realise that all of these techniques 
are, of course, imperfect means of prediction. A range of 
assumptions acc~pted in the process - extrapolated 
international trends, the absence of unforeseen dramatic 
happenings and foreign actor rationality, to name just a few 
- cannot be justified in absolute terms. As a consequence, 
it is fortunate that the major function of this type of 
system is not to predict the future. Rather, it is designed 
to provide a limited number of inherently consistent threat 
possibilities which, in terms of their non-time sensitive 
response requirements, would be representative of a much 
wider range of hypothetical, but clearly feasible, pressures 
and threats. The overriding aim of the exercise would be to 
provide a very useful and generally accepted tool to assist 
in the management of threat uncertainty for the processes of 
long term security planning. 
21 cont'd 
expected to emerge. Hopefully this level of change 
would not be encouraged. In order to create as large 
a degree of conceptual stability as possible in the 
planning processes, scenarios may be refined from time 
to time and individual scenarios might be abandoned or 
replaced. However, unless it is made necessary by 
dramatic changes in the international or domestic 
environment, .wholesale variations to the total set of 
scenarios would ideally be avoided as far as possible. 
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CHAPTER 9 
A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO RIGOROUS SECURITY PLANNING 
The underlying assumption and basic foundation for the 
discussion in this part of the thesis is that the processes 
of Australian security planning should be directed to 
determining the means of allocating national resources to 
maximise clearly stated national security objectives. Possible 
methods for deriving the four categories of planning criteria 
have been described in Chapters 7 and 8. Perhaps ideally, the 
government itself would define both the objectives of the 
national s·ecuri ty doctrine and the additionally specified 
planning requirements. It would also be appropriate for it 
to approve the representative scenarios and an elaboration of 
the domestic and international constraints on security 
options. With all four planning criteria provided, it would 
be possible to commence the processes of detailed security 
planning. 
As was discussed in Chapter 7, the four planning criteria 
would provide a conceptual basis for the detailed testing 
and evaluation of a wide range of alternative strategic 
concepts and force structures in realistic circumstances. 
Options could be tested for their capacity to maximise 
doctrinal goals in the circumstances of the selected scenarios 
while satisfying the additionally specified requirements of 
national policy and not transgressing the bounds set by the 
elaborated constraints. However, because of the heavy 
constraining influence of the structures and concepts which 
already exist, this process would not provide an effective 
means of directly undertaking short term planning. In order 
to provide the concept and structure designers with sufficient 
freedom to search for optimal solutions, it would be important, 
in the early stages of the planning process, for them to be 
given scope to start with virtually a 'clean sheet'. In order 
to make ·this possible, alternative structures would best be 
designed for complete implementation at a point in time which 
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is sufficiently distant to make significant alterations 
feasible but which, at the same time, is sufficiently 
immediate to make detailed proposals realistic. For the 
purposes of the discussion in this part of the thesis, the 
long term planning period is assumed to be fifteen years. 
Constructing and Testing Alternative Structural Options 
Within the context of these considerations, the first 
theoretical security structures could be constructed. 
Initially, each structure would best be designed to optimise 
response capacity in the circumstances of only one of the 
accepted scenarios. The nature of the concepts and structures 
derived by this process could thus be expected to vary 
considerably. However, it might be anticipated that, in 
practice, many of the structures would contain common elements 
in different proportions and linked in different manners. 
For the purposes of their subsequent analysis, the 
alternative structures would ideally be described in three 
distinct sections. The first would outline the major 
operational principles and concepts of the structure, the 
type of strategy and the type of manpower to be employed, 
the levels of technology required, an assessment of the 
structure's flexibility and adaptability and, finally, a 
generalised estimation of the costs of implementation in 
the three five-year periods leading to its completion. 1 
The second section of each alternative structure proposal 
would elaborate the objectives of the structure's major 
component programmes. The programmes themselves would need 
to be defined in purely. functional terms, eg. Long Range 
Surveillance, Maritime Strike, Interdiction Strike, Air 
Defence, Ground Attrition, Ground Strike, Command and Control, 
Economic Defence, etc. Goals for each of these programmes 
1 The concepts of flexibility and adaptability are defined 
and discussed later in this chapter. 
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would best be expressed in terms of generalised performance 
capabilitie9 in specific situations drawn from the accepted 
scenarios. Finally, in the second section, the minimum level 
of budgetary expenditure required to meet fully the response 
requirements of the specific scenario under consideration 
would be determined and an attempt would be made to distribute 
this hypothetical financial allocation between the programmes 
contained within the proposal. 
The third major section of each alternative structure 
description would postulate characteristics for the essential 
programme components or projects. This would be the most 
speculative part of the proposal for it would, in fact, 
involve detailing a generalised order of battle. By drawing 
upon the budget allocation in section two, each programme 
would be defined in terms of numbers and types of manpower, 
equipment, technology and support. An account of the assumed 
capabilities of the major individual project systems -ships, 
aircraft, vehicles, etc~ would also be included. Finally, the 
structure designers would express their expectations concerning 
the effectiveness of each programme structure to meet the 
requirements imposed by the scenario (or scenarios) which has 
dominated the structure's design. 2 
When a broad range of alternative structures has been 
designed, they could be tested for flexibility. As was 
discussed briefly in stage 10 of Chapter 8, in order to meet 
uncertainty, it is desirable that a security structure possesses 
a capacity to satisfy effectively the demands of a wide range of 
future possibilities. When a threat arises for which the 
security structure has not been designed, if the advance 
warning is insufficient to make structural alterations 
possible (ie. defence preparation time is zero), the basic 
structure's capacity to respond immediately is defined as 
flexibility. 
2 The structure designers and those who might work in this 
type of long range planning system would clearly need to 
be very highly skilled and largely divorced from service 
rivalries and prejudices. Ideally, an organisation tasked 
to perform these functions would contain a mix of personnel 
from all three services as well as civilian analysts. 
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For illustrative purposes, let us assume that a 
security structure has been designed to maximise efficiency 
in meeting the basic doctrinal object~ves in the circumstances 
of each of the scenarios described in Chapter 8, ie. scenarios 
(A~G). It is further supposed that each structure's 
efficiency can be measured in generalised terms on a scale 
from 1 to 10 (with 10 being highly efficient) . It should now 
be possible to plot diagramatically the relative efficiency 
of the structural alternatives in the circumstances of each 
scenario. 
Table 1 
Structural Efficiency 
Accepted Scenarios 
A B c D E F G 
Alternative 1 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 Structures 
2 2 10 3 0 0 0 0 
3 0 4 10 2 0 0 0 
4 0 0 3 10 4 0 0 
5 0 0 0 2 10 5 0 
6 0 0 0 1 3 10 2 
7 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 
As can be seen from Table 1, each of the alternative 
structures is highly specialised in its performance. While 
each structure is very efficient in meeting the requirements 
of its specialised scenario, structural flexibility in meeting 
other scenarios is at best marginal and in most cases 
virtually non-existent. Because of uncertainty about the type 
of pressure or threat with which Australia may be confronted 
in the future, it would be extremely difficult to choose one 
of these seven structures to provide an overall capability. 
The consequences of preparing for the wrong type of threat 
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could be disastrous. Clearly a much greater degree of 
structural ~lexibility is required. 
Table 2 
Structural Efficiency 
Accepted Scenarios A B c D E F G 
8 9 8 6 4 3 3 1 
Alternative 9 6 8 7 5 4 2 2 
Structures 10 4 5 7 7 5 3 3 
11 2 3 4 6 7 8 6 
As can be seen from structures 8-11 depicted in Table 2, 
it is possible to re-design specialised alternatives to provide 
a more generalised response capability. Two factors which 
are implicit in this process should be noted at this stage. 
Firstly, a large degree of flexibility usually means a loss 
of specialised performarice. Secondly, the higher the levels 
of flexibility which are required, the more expensive the 
security bill is likely to be. 
The second process of structural testing and modification 
is related to the first. As was briefly discussed in Stage 11 
of Chapter 8, structural adaptability is relevant where the 
length of advance warning received prior to the onset of a 
threat is sufficient to permit structural changes (ie. defence 
preparation time is greater than zero) . This point can be 
illustrated by reference to Table 2. In a situation where 
Australia possessed structure 9 and was suddenly confronted 
by scenario G, its response capacity would be limited by its 
marginal flexibility. However, if Australia receives sufficient 
advance warning of scenario G, there may be time to develop 
additional capabilities which would increase greatly the 
country's capacity to meet the demands of that threat. It 
may be possible, for instance, to boost rapidly the initial 
structural efficiency from 2 to 5 or 6, or perhaps even 
higher. 
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It is, in fact, possible Lo build a high level of 
adaptability into response structures by designing and 
constructing them in such a manner as to exploit defence 
preparation time fully and to minimise impediments to rapid 
structural change. In practical terms, these factors would 
imply the construction of an intelligence warning system of 
the highest efficiency and of a defence organisation and 
structure prepared and practised in speedy adaptations. But 
inculcating an entire security structure with the necessity 
for rapid adaptability could not be expected to be inexpensive 
or easy. It would, for instance, indicate a requirement for 
a very high level of interest and expertise in strategic 
affairs at the key levels of political and bureaucratic 
decision-making. It would also imply a requirement for an 
advanced standard of technical and analytical research and 
development, so that the detailed knowledge in those areas 
which would be needed to make rapid and efficient adaptations 
possible could be provided with a minimum of delay. In 
addition, in order to provide the equipment and hardware 
requirements of rapid structural change, defence industries 
of many types would have to be maintained at a high technical 
standard and at an advanced state of readiness to facilitate 
rapid starts or increases of production. 3 
Clearly, the acqui~ition of high levels of structural 
flexibility and adaptability would be extremely expensive. 
Consequently, as was mentioned in Chapter 7 and in the early 
stages of this chapter, it would be necessary for the 
government to lay down explicit guidelines in the context of 
the additional requirements for security structure design. 
Relating Financial Input to National Security Output 
As a result of the processes so far described, a series 
of hypothetical response structures would be on hand, each of 
3 The means of incorporating the high levels of structural 
adaptability mentioned in this paragraph are elaborated in 
greater length in Chapters 4 and 7. 
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which would fulfil, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
planning de~ign criteria. Every one of the structures would 
provide an acceptable degree of flexibility and adaptability 
to meet a range of the accepted scenarios and they would also 
satisfy the additionally stated requirements and be feasible 
in terms of the non-financial constraints of the real world. 
However, the alternative response structures could be 
expected to differ markedly in terms of their projected costs 
and also in terms of the types of scenario for which they 
would be optimised. What is really required in this situation 
is a means of relating the more capable response structures 
not only to the more demanding scenarios for which they were 
designed but also to the levels of financial input which would 
be required for their procurement. This is attempted in 
Figure 1. 4 (Please fold out Figure 1 on page 307,.) 'I'he 
hierarchy of scenarios (A-G) is illustrated on the right-hand 
side in the decreasing order of their response requirements. 
Adjacent to them are the alternative structures (22-28) 
which, in each case, have been designed primarily' to optimise 
response capacity in the circumstances of the scenario 
which appears opposite. The alternative structures (22-28) 
are depicted in a decreasing order of overall capability and 
total procurement cost. In addition, a time scale has been 
introduced on the horizontal axis to the left of the 
scenarios. This makes it possible to plot alternative 
financial decision paths from the commencement of the 15-year 
long term planning period right through to its end with the 
completion of an alternative security structure at year 15. 
It is also possible to plot the relative adaptability of the 
.structures at year 15 in the circumstances of receiving an 
effective defence preparation time of two years. As can be 
seen from the relationships depicted between the structures 
(22~28) at year 15 and the scenarios (A-G) at year 17, the 
adaptability of all structures tends to be limited in meeting 
4 A 'decision-tree' analysis, which is related in basic 
concept to that of Figure 1, is elaborated in W.K.M. 
Brauers, Systems Analysis. Planning and Decision Models 
(Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1976), pp. 13-22. 
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those scenarios which are more demanding of security resources 
than in mee~ing those scenarios for which the structures were 
optimised in design. Thus, if at yeai 15 Australia were 
equipped with security structure 25 and it received two years 
effective warning of scenario A or B, it would not possess 
sufficient adaptability to effectively meet that threat. 
Alternatively, if, on the other hand, Australia possessed 
security structure 23 at year 15, it could effectively adapt 
within a two-year period to meet any scenario. In other words, 
Figure 1 displays the obvious point that it is always much 
easier to adapt a security structure to meet the 
requirements of $Cenarios which are less demanding 
than to meet the requirements of scenarios which are more 
demanding. In simple visual terms on Figure 1, adaptability 
upwards is much more difficult than adaptability down. 
It is also possible to draw meaningful conclusions by 
studying the implications of the budgetary choices at the 
decision points (I-V) between years 0 and 12. By analysing 
the options at each of these decision points, it can be seen 
that, if the Australian Government decided to spend large 
amounts of money throughout the early parts of the planning 
period and was spending budget level 1 or 2 at decision point 
(DP) V, it would have the choice at that stage of acquiring 
structures 22, 23 or 24 by year 15. Hence, it would be quite 
feasible to proceed to a structure which would have a capacity 
to meet satisfactorily the requirements of all the accepted 
scenarios at year 17. 
On the other hand, if the Australian Government decided 
to spend only moderate levels of expenditure on national 
security to year 12 and at DP V was spending budget level 4, 
the choice of year 15 structures would be limited to 24, 25 
and 26 and it would not be possible to meet effectively the 
requirements of scenario A at year 17 no matter how much 
money was injected at that late stage. But if it were decided 
to proceed to structure 24, it would be possible to adapt to 
meet the requirements of scenarios B-G. 
Alternatively, if the Government takes a low or fluctuating 
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spending path to financial level 6 at DP V, it would be 
impossible at that stage to procure a structure with a 
capacity to meet scenarios A, B or C by year 17. It would 
only be possible to develop a capacity to meet scenarios D-G. 
Moreover, if expenditure remained at comparable levels to 
that at DP V during the subsequent three years, the most 
effective structural option which would be financially 
feasible would be number 27. This would only possess an 
effective capacity to meet scenarios E, F and G. 
At decision points I and II, judgments would need to 
be made concerning the types and numbers of high technology 
capital equipments required in the security structure at 
year 15. If it were decided at this stage that Australia should 
definitely possess a capacity to meet effectively all of the 
scenarios at the end of the planning period, it would be 
necessary to aim to provide structure 22 or 23. In order to 
retain the option of procuring structure 22, it would be 
necessary to pass through financial level I at DP's II and III. 
An essential part of structural options 22 and 23 would most 
probably be heavy expenditure on major items of capital 
equipment. At DP I, decisions would be required on exactly 
those types of systems which would be required and research 
and development funded where this is appropriate. At DP II, 
orders for advanced technology aircraft, ships and heavy 
armoured vehicles would have to be placed. Research and 
development into items with medium or short production lead 
times could continue. 
However, it should be noted that, if at DP I the 
international environment appears to be relatively sanguine 
and a choice is made to spend at low levels for the first 
years of the plan, it can be seen that by moving to f1nancial 
level 2 at DP II, the option of acquiring structure 22 by 
year 15 is already foreclos~d. This is simply because a 
start must be made on the heavy capital equipment requirements 
of structure 22 at DP I if they are to be operational in time. 
However, if at DP II the Government feels less certain about 
the future, it could opt to move to financial level 2 at 
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DP III. 5 This would leave open the structural options 23-28 
in the hope.that by year 6 clearer choices could be made. 
At financial level 2 at DP III, a firm decision would be 
required about whether structure 23 should be retained as an 
option. If it is to be retained, national security expenditure 
would need to be raised to level 2 at DP IV. On the other hand, 
if the Government feels thatitcannot justify this type of 
expenditure, a choice would be necessary between financial 
levels 3 or 4 at DP IV. Financial level 3, at that stage, 
would retain the option of structure 24 at year 15 but financial 
level 4 would not. 
The reason why it is impossible to move from financial 
level 3 at DP IV to structure 22 or 23, or from financial 
level 4 at DP IV to structures 22, 23 and 24, is that in the 
six years remaining in the plan, it would be impossible to 
procure the long lead time capabilities which those structures 
require. As a consequence of these factors, if Austral~a's 
I 
security expenditure at DP IV is at level 4, even if a 
worsening security environment stimulates the Government to 
accelerate national security expenditure rapidly at every 
decision point from then onwards, at year 15 the country would 
still require two years' active defence preparation time in 
order to be able to meet the requirements of scenario c. 
The onset of more demanding scenarios of types A or B would 
find Australia's security response wanting. In this type of 
situation, the possession of only part of a required capacity 
is unlikely to provide an effective basis for the achievement 
of the Government's national security objectives. 
5 In practice, the budgetary decisions 0£ governments 
relating to national security expenditure in any one year 
frequently bear little relationship to perceptions of the 
probability of long term pressures or threats. Short 
term political considerations, the state of the economy, 
the competing demands of other categories of government 
expenditure, etc. frequently override simple national 
security considerations. However, this does not undermine 
seriously the discussion relating to Figure 1. Whatever 
.reasons are used to determine the levels of the national 
security budget, the practical effect, in terms of options 
retained or foreclosed, remains the same and can be 
illustrated by this analysis. 
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A rapid expansion, such as that postulated above, 
from financ~al level 4 at DP IV to achieve structure 25 
within 6 years, would involve cutting quite a few corners .. 
Structure 25 might, for instance, include an x level maritime 
strike capability. In the originally conceived structural 
plan, it might have been decided that the most cost-effective 
method of obtaining this x level of maritime strike capacity 
was to procure P strike fighters, Q submarines and R ground-
launched cruise missile systems. Howeve~ at DP IV and 
financial level 4, early preparations might have been put in 
train for only ~ strike fighters, ~ submarines and ~ ground-
launched cruise missiles. Thus, when at DP IV a decision is 
made to procure structure 25 by year 15, short lead-time 
substitutes would need to be found to provide the additional 
capability required. By refurbishing and re-arming old 
equipment already held or procurable overseas, some of the gap 
could be bridged. However, in the final structure at year 15, 
the required capability is likely to be provided by a different 
combination of component systems to that originally judged to 
be the most cost-effective. In other words, the final maritime 
strike structure might take the form of ;P strike fighters, i submarines and 3R ground-launched cruise missiles. It should 
be noted, in addition, that the basic inefficiency of this 
type of hasty expansion would be evidenced by the fact that 
the total costs of the completed structure would always be 
significantly greater than those which would be incurred by 
steady progress over the total planning period towards the 
6 
ultimate structural goal. Moreover, although it is not 
discussed here, this type of rapid expansion might also 
6 The basic inefficiency and greatly increased costs which 
are associated with rapid force expansion are not 
effectively portrayed in Figure 1. For instance, it would 
appear that in procuring structure 25, it would be less 
costly to move through financial level 3 at DP III, rather 
than financial level 2. However, in reality, the rapid 
force expansion required from financial level 3 at DP III 
to achieve structure 25 by year 15 would imply the adoption 
of programme structures which are less cost-effective and, 
in total structural terms, more expensive than those which 
would be procured by passage through financial level 2 
at DP III. 
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necessitate the adoption of unusual security concepts, 
doctrines and operational procedures. 7 But perhaps the 
most important consideration of all is that, as the decision 
paths and adaptability functions in Figure 1 display, the 
scope for this type of hasty alteration of structural design 
and size will always remain relatively limited and be 
directly proportional to the amount of active defence 
preparation time received. 
One of the most significant aspects of this type of 
long range security planning concept is that it effectively 
relates, in an explicit manner, the capacity of the force 
structure to meet the full range of potential pressures and 
threats to the Government's decisions on budgetary inputs. 
In the simplest of terms, it ties firmly the level of budgetary 
input with the level of security output, expressed in terms 
of national capacity to meet the demands of the accepted 
scenarios. The higher the budgetary input, the more numerous 
the scenarios which the security structure will have a capacity 
to meet effectively at the terminal stages of the planning 
period. 
Detailed Planning - Determining an Optimal Mix of Programme 
Components 
How might such a long range planning system operate in 
the real world? In practice, in year 0, once the non-financial 
planning criteria are established, the direction of the long 
range plan would most probably be dependent upon the level of 
security expenditure which had been determined for that year 
and the Government's expressed intentions for expenditure in 
the following four years. If the Government expressed an 
intention to expend large amounts on national security up to 
and beyond DP II, the more expensive {and capable) alternative 
structures could be studied as a basis for planning {structures 
22-25). If, on the othe~ hand, the Government expresses an 
7 The varying surge capacities of alternative force structure 
concepts are discussed at some length in Chapter 11. 
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intention to expend relatively low levels on national 
security du~ing the course of the forthcoming five years, 
structures of less capability could be adopted for detailed 
long range planning (structures 25-28). The emphasis at 
this stage would be on that which would be financially 
feasible within the Government's budgetary expectations. 
The alternative structures which are adopted at this 
stage for the processes of detailed planning would already 
be described in terms of their major programme characteristics 
and even their generalised orders of battle. 8 The major 
programmes of the accepted structures would now need to be 
analysed and tested in much greater detail to determine the 
optimal project9 system mix to maximise programme efficiency 
and then total structure capability within the determined 
financial constraints. 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, programmes 
would best be defined in broad functional categories to permit 
an open analysis of a wide range of alternative project 
possibilities. A simplified array of options for the 
Maritime Strike and Air Defence programmes is illustrated 
in Figure 2. 
For a given programme budget, hypothetical project 
mixes could now be tested for their effectivenss in the 
context of the scenarios for which the adopted planning 
structures have relevance. This could be done by an extensive 
proce$s of simulated war-games. When it is possible to 
quantify, in generalised terms, the optimal project mix for 
all of the structures' programmes, they could be tested for 
cross-interaction. This process would determine whether or 
not there may be total capability gains by trading inter-
programme project allocations against each other. It would 
also permit informed judgments on whether funds allocated to 
8 
9 
The processes of deriving these generalised alternative 
structures were described earlier in this chapter. 
The term project is used here in a sense which is almost 
synonymous with the generally used term 'defence system'. 
The programme/project relationship is illustrated clearly 
in Figure 2. 
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specialised programme capacities might not be better 
re-allocate~ to projects which would provide a useful capacity 
in several programme functions. For instance, it can be seen 
from Figure 2 that strike fighters are an opti6nal project 
system for both the air defence and maritime strike programmes. 
Although not illustrated in this diagram, it is conceivable 
that strike fighters may also be an option in the interdiction 
strike, reconnaissance, and close air support prograriunes. 
Obviously, if strike fighters were to be a viable option in all 
of these programmes, great advantages could be won by 
re-allocating resources away from programme-specialised 
projects to enhance multi-programme capacity. Economies of 
scale would be evident in procurement, production, servicing, 
training and many other fields. An important additional bonus 
would be greatly increased operational and basing flexibility. 
Clearly there would be limits to the advantages which could 
be won by this type of trade-off. In some types of programme, 
highly specialised projects would still be required. Appropriate 
programme balances could be expected to emerge from processes 
of intensive gaming. 
There would be an important additional value in under-
taking these detailed evaluations of programme andT· indeed, 
total structure effectiveness. By thoroughly testing a wide 
range of structural possibilities in- the context of clearly 
defined national security objectives, one is approaching a 
viable means of measuring national security output. It would, 
in this context, be measurable in terms of a structure's 
potential efficiency in meeting the hypothetical, but accepted, 
range of pressure and threat possibilities. However, as 
Dr Foley has pointed out, this type of output analysis is 
vulnerable to a series of weaknesses resulting from the 
arbitrary assumptions which are implicit in the techniques of 
simulation. 1° For instance, the peacetime utilities which 
10 See K.J. Foley, A Methodological Prescription for Examining 
the Question of Changing the Organizational Structure of 
the Australian Defence Force: A Systems Approach 
(Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Canberra, Department of 
International Relations, The Australian National University, 
1972), p. 235. 
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security forces can provide could not be taken adequately 
into consid~ration. Nor could goal achievement be quantified 
with precision. However, because this type of analysis is 
designed to provide a basis for alternative structural choices 
and relative structural effectiveness, it could be expected 
to provide consistent information relating to preferred 
options. As a consequence, it could be well suited to 
perform the major function of input-output analysis in the 
Australian national security structure, that of providing a 
framework for the rational allocation of marginal resource 
inputs. 
Integrating Long and Short 'I'erm Planning Requirements 
There remains a major conceptual difficulty with this 
type of planning system as it has been outlined thus far. 
In practice, no current defence establishment commences 
planning in year 0 without a defence structure in being and 
with a national security budget allocation, the sole purpose 
of which is to maximise national security goals in the time 
period 15+ years hence. In reality, Australia has a national 
security capacity of some significance already in existence. 
Large numbers of highly-skilled personnel and great quantities 
of specialised equipment are currently deployed in operational 
and support units. Even if the processes of long term 
planning determined that significant sections of the current 
structure were inappropriate to the needs of the future, the 
extensive investments already existing could not be abandoned 
arbitrarily. Serious consideration would have to be given 
to the maintenance of a significant and efficient national 
security capacity during the processes of structural 
transition. A great deal of skill would be required to 
determine the most appropriate allocation of national security 
resources between the three main areas of investment. 
1. The first area of spending concerns maintenance of 
the current structure including the retention and training of 
personnel in traditionally accepted roles, the maintenance, 
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overhaul and upgrading of capital equipment already held in 
stock and the exercise of the total security structure in 
performing traditionally accepted functions. 
2. The second area of expenditure involves procurement 
of supporting capital items which can be delivered within the 
current five-year defence programme (FYDP) for the development 
of the existing force structure. 11 This category includes the 
training of personnel and the provision of new capital 
equipment to complete the development of partially developed 
b · 1 · t' 12 capa l i ies. 
3. The third area involves investment in research and 
development and in long lead-time capital equipment which 
cannot be delivered within the timespan of the FYDP. 
In the preceding discussion, most of the year O decision-
making which has been discussed has been that concerning 
structural optimisation for year 15 and beyond. While long 
range structural planning should clearly have a central role 
to play, it has yet to. be explained adequately how· the 
transformation could be made from the inherited security 
structure to approach the planned optimum several years 
hence, for a given financi~l input. How could appropriate 
levels of investment in areas 1 and 2 be determined? 
11 
12 
The Five-Year Defence Programme (FYDP) is a statement of 
the major equipment and other priorities for the forthcoming 
five-year period. Its structure permits the sequence of 
annual expenditure to be phased over the five-year period so 
as to reduce the severity of budgetary peaks and troughs. 
See this elaborated in W.L. Morrison, 'The Role of the 
Minister in the Making of Australian Defence Policy Since 
the Re-organisation of the Department of Defence', Robert 
O'Neill (ed.), The Defe~ce of Australia: FundamenfuZ New 
Aspects (Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, 1977), p. 87. 
This category might include the procurement of final equipment 
items for long lead time heavy equipments already delivered 
or close to delivery, eg. weapons systems for already 
procured aircraft, ships, etc. or it might include the pro-
curement of additional equipment to complete the construction 
of effective units - eg. the procurement of additional fire 
units to complete a SAM battery or the procurement of 
additional aircraft to offset an unusually high wastage 
rate, etc. 
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Basically, the processes of force structure trans-
formation would need to be undertaken progressively. This 
would be aided by the fact that, by their very nature, 
national security structures are rarely static in their 
characteristics or capabilities. The major capital equipment 
items - aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles, etc. - gradually 
age, become more expensive to maintain and relatively less 
effective when compared with other nations' holdings. In 
general terms, these processes of obsolescence are 
predictable. Thus, in the present Australian structure, a 
need for replacement or substitute equipments is usually 
recognised at an early stage by the parent service and 
this is structured into the FYDP with justification drawn 
from the Strategic Basis and the service capabilities papers 
as appropriate. There is, in addition, restricted scope for 
the services to bargain for the introduction of new 
capabilities to the FYDP. 
However, in the type of coherent planning system being 
discussed here, it would most probably be necessary to adopt 
new, and possibly controversial, methods of determining FYDP 
input. In this type of system, the main initiators of 
procurement programmes would not be the services directly, but 
rather the organisation which performs the long range 
planning function. 13 In practice, this would mean that when 
major pieces of equipment approach obsolescence or when 
additional financial resources become available, competing 
demands for new equipment would need to be examined carefully 
in the light of the requirements of the adopted long range 
structural plan. But as was discussed earlier, decisions in 
this area would also need to include considerations of the 
ongoing capacity of the security forces during the processes 
13 It is re-emphasised at this point that it would be 
desirable for the organisation which performs 
the long range planning function to be composed 
of civilian analysts and a mix of military 
personnel from all three services. As a 
consequence, there would be ample scope for 
the direct expression of service views at every 
level of the planning structure. 
of structural transformation. In some areas, compromises 
in the long. range planning structure may be necessary in 
313 
order to lower the risks of unexpected conflict arising during 
the period of structural change. 
Where there no longer exists a requirement for the 
original function of the obsolescing equipment to be performed, 
financial resources could be freed for re-allocation into 
areas where the long range plan indicates that new or increased 
capabilities are required. Where the original function of 
the obsolescing equipment remains an important requirement, 
the resources made available for the performance of this task 
could be allocated to those project systems which, in 
combination, are judged to provide the most cost-effective 
functional performance. Thus, by a gradual process of 
reassessing functions in the light of the requirements of the 
long range plan as major capital equipment items approach 
obsolescence, some would simply be replaced by better but 
comparable systems, others would be replaced by a more 
efficient mix of systems and others still would not be 
replaced at all, but instead provide resources for re-
allocation irito new areas of priority investment. 
Once priorities are clearly established for project 
inputs, they could be incorporated into the FYDP in much the 
same manner as at present, so as to minimise financial peaks 
and troughs. However, in contrast to the present system, 
it would be most appropriate for projects, once they are 
introduced into the FYDP, to be relatively immune to 
dislodgement unless a significant change in the international 
situation or in levels of Government funding alters the 
nature of the long range plan. 
The services would have the task of studying the projects 
introduced into the FYDP and making a selection from the brand-
name contenders on the basis of the established project 
criteria. The timing of this decision-making and the 
subsequent processes of procurement, personnel training and 
service introduction would best be determined by the phasing 
of the FYDP. 
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Co-ordination of the long range plan (LRP) and the 
five-yeu.r r<;>lling programme (FYRP) would be vitu.lly importu.nt 
to the efficiency of the total national security planning 
14 
structure. Probably the most effective means of achieving 
this objective in the Australian Department of Defence would 
be for the FYRP system and structure to be retained in a 
modified form. The LRP would probably best operate in phase 
with the FYRP on its five-year cycle. This would mean that 
the LRP cycle would begin every fifth year with the development 
of a strategic assessment. This would be the first step in 
LRP construction or revision. In brief summary, the following 
sequence of functions represents an outline of what might 
conceivably be undertaken in the subsequent months. 
Firstly, from the completed strategic assessment via 
the processes outlined in Chapter 8, the scena~ios could be 
reviewed and refined. At that stage, the Government might be 
expected to express its opinion concerning the acceptability 
of particular categories of scenario and also to outline 
and/or review the goals for national security doctrine and 
the additionally stated security requirements. At about the 
same time, a statement of internal constraints would be 
forthcoming from the Department of Defence for Governmental 
approval. Alternative long term structures could then be 
conceptually constructed, tested and modified. Final 
structural options could be derived for particular levels 
of financial input and response capacity and, in their light, 
the Government might be asked to indicate anticipated levels 
of funding for the forthcoming FYDP period. With this 
information at hand, decisions could be made concerning the 
most effective structure which could feasibly be procured. 
Once this choice is made, detailed project planning would 
then be possible and this, in turn, would· provide inputs for the 
annual cycles of the FYRP during the subsequent long range 
planning period. 
14 The Five Year Rolling Programme (FYRP) is the system by 
which the FYDP is updated. Each year, a programme for the 
pending twelve-month period is taken from the FYDP for 
implementation and a new year's programme is added at the 
other end, for tentative implementation five years hence. 
For details see D.H. Eltringham, 'Defence Procurement in 
Australia' in Defence Force Journal, No. 4, May/June 1977, p. 34. 
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An illustrative example may assist in demonstrating 
this ongoing process. If we assume that,in year O,the LRP 
process begins with the derivation of a strategic assessment, 
the final project mix for the selected structure should be 
available by year 3. By carefully trading-off the requirements 
of the LRP which are concerned primarily with capacities 
judged to be desirable for years 15 and onwards, against the 
short and medium-range requirements of years 5-14, it would 
be possible to determine the procurement priorities for years 
5-9. In years 3 and 4, analyses of the lead time requirements 
and financial implications of the projects to be procured in 
years 5-9 could be completed and this would facilitate the 
construction of a properly phased FYDP for the next five-year 
period (years 5-9) . This in turn would mean that the 
services could make final brand-name choices, according to 
the stipulated project criteria, for those systems which are 
to be procured during year 5. 
During the course of year 5, the first procurement and 
structural choices forthcoming from the planning processes in 
years 0-4 would be translated into procurement decisions. 
But at the same time, the processes of LRPrevision would have 
commenced once more in the new five-year cycle, starting with 
the derivation of a new strategic assessment. 15 
It should be noted that in practice some of the present 
1 rolling' nature of the FYRP would be removed in this system. 
At the beginning of year 5, for example, a full five years of 
FYDP would be decided and structured within the system. 
However, in year 6,only four years' definite decision-making 
regarding structural implementation would remain. In year 7, 
this would shrink again to three, in year 8 to two, and in 
year 9, theoretically only one year's detailed decisions 
15 The Government may judge that, because of broader 
intelligence requirements, strategic assessments need 
to. be produced more frequently than the LRP five year 
cycle provides. If this is the case, the ideal timing 
of the strategic assessments would be at 1, l~ or 2~ 
yearly intervals. Phasing at these periods would ensure 
that a new or revised strategic assessment would always 
be available at the commencement of the planning cycle. 
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regarding planning implementation would rcmain. 16 This 
would be beciluse the r~sults of the current five-year long 
range planning cycle probably would not be available until 
year s. As a consequence, the year 5 FYDP would~ in fact, be 
run down until the new requirements derived from the LRP 
revision became clear. It would then be possible to structure 
in detail the FYDP for the years 10-14 in years 8 and 9. 
Thus, in practic~ the FYDPs would only be changed (and hence 
'roll') once every five years. 17 
An obvious result of this system would be to raise 
gradually the level of procurement uncertainty until the 
results of the LRP are available in the fourth year of each 
cycle. However, it is doubtful that this would cause any 
serious problem within the Department in practice because 
continual internal exchanges of information could be expected 
to take place and a minimum of two years would always be 
provided for the services to make brand-name decisions. In 
the case of major equipments which are phased into the later 
years of a FYDP, the services could receive between five and 
seven years to make final brand-name decisions. 
A second and not insignificant consequence of reducing 
the 'rolling' nature of the FYDP would be to cut drastically 
the requirement for FYRP construction, management and review. 
The workload required for these functions would be concentrated 
heavily in the final two years of the LRP cycle and in overall 
terms could be expected to be reduced greatly. 
16 
17 
But by far the most important potential benefit to be 
In practice, by the latter half of year 8 and during the 
course of year 9, it would be possible for status reports 
to be made available detailing developing trends in the 
LRP. These could be expected to provide sufficient 
information to facilitate meaningful but tentative planning. 
In a figurative sense, it could be said that, the current 
system 'rolls' like a 'pentagonal cylinder'. By contrast, 
the type of planning system described in this chapter 
would be prised up like a 'flat slab of concrete' and 
dropped down again, its own width away, every five years. 
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gained from this type of integrated planning concept would 
be the appronch to an optimisation of national security 
goals for a given resource input. Total resource allocation 
could be made highly efficient and, in a relative sense, it 
could be measurable through input-output analysis. The 
importance of long term considerations would be increased 
greatly. In addition, nearly all intuitive judgments could 
be made on the basis of an extensive information resource 
base and at the conclusion of a process of detailed ga~ing and 
testing. In normal peacetime circumstances, the scope for 
ad hoc decision-making could be reduced significantly. 
Because of the systematic nature of the processes which 
would be involved in this type of security planning concept, 
clear guidelines could be provided automatically for a large 
number of supporting elements. For example, for those 
tasked with the responsibility for detailed manpower planning, 
the structure of the LRP would itself provide a brief 
discussion of manpower types and numbers. 18 Important 
additional manpower planning processes, such as those to 
determine the types of training and skills required to maximise 
structural flexibility and adaptability, would be assisted 
greatly by the Governmental statement on these matters in the 
additionally stated planning requirements and also by the 
conceptual framework provided by the analysis of alternative 
structural options. 
Further, because an integral part of this type of 
planning structure would be a clear elaboration of a set of 
accepted scenarios, response strudtures and concepts, the 
services would be provided with precise guidance concerning 
the types of situation they are expected to meet. As a 
consequence, strategy, tactics and doctrine could be 
developed in a cohesive, integrated and harmonious fashion by 
all sectors of the security structure. 
18 
Thus, in summary, it would appear that this general type 
This would be derived from the detailed description of. 
the alternative structure which is adopted to form the 
basis of the LRP. 
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of conceptual planning sequence could provide clear direction 
and cohesioD to the entire national security system. 
Unambiguous guidance could be derived for the development of 
strategy, structures, equipment priorities, manpower and 
training systems, doctrines, operational procedures, research 
and development programmes, defence-related industries and a 
wide range of other security system components. Objectives 
could be defined with precision, alternatives could be tested 
thoroughly and a sound basis could be provided for the 
maximisation of national security capacity for a given 
financial input. 
Conclusion 
The security planning system which Australia currently 
possesses has been inherited from the forward defence era. 
It has not been designed to perform satisfactorily the 
functions which it is now required to undertake. In operation, 
the current force-in-being - core force - terminal force 
planning rationale is an effective means of retaining most 
security response options open indefinitely. But this cannot 
be done without substantial costs. Attempting to maximise 
structural flexibility and adaptability has, in practice, 
encouraged weak planning criteria, induced indecision and 
militated against the development and retention of strong 
immediate response and surge capacities. 
To some degree, these weaknesses were tolerable in the 
forward defence era. In that environment, combat deployments 
were rarely time-urgent and they were made almost exclusively 
to supplement the much larger capacities of major power allies. 
However, in the new strategic environment, with Australia's 
security dependent primarily upon its indigenous capacities, 
the loose planning concepts of the past appear to be grossly 
inadequate. 
With the requirements of meaningful change becoming 
increasingly obvious, the processes of Australian security 
policy formulation are likely to be the subject of much 
319 
closer political, bureaucratic, academic and public attention. 
The alterna\:ive planning concepts discussed in Chapters 7, 8 
and 9 may broaden the scope of the debate and stimulate a 
more intense search for practical solutions. 
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PARr V 
A·BROADENED RANGE OF SECURITY OPTIONS 
Australia's national security system represents a 
conceptual and structural continuation of that which was 
evolved during the many decades of forward defence 
commitments. But, as has been argued in Chapter 4, the 
historical requirement of sending single service contributions 
to support the foreign cormnitments of major power allies 
differs markedly from that of securing the Australian 
continent in the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
Australia now requires a capacity to deter, defer and, if 
necessary, meet a much broader range of military, diplomatic, 
economic, political, social and psychological pressures, and 
it needs a capacity to perform many of these tasks 
independently. It is by no means clear that the concepts 
and structures inherited from the previous era will provide 
the most cost-effective means of performing these more 
demanding functions in the future. Indeed, in the first 
three parts of this thesis, it was argued that in the 
context o{ the new strategic environment the current 
security concepts and structures suffer from a series of 
major weaknesses. Thus, when discussing future long range 
planning requirements in Chapter 9, it was suggested that 
an extensive series of strategic and structural options 
should be constructed conceptually and tested for their 
functional effectiveness in satisfying Australia's new 
national security requirements. 
It is important to appreciate that this structured 
process of rigorous analysis of options would be quite new 
to Australia's experience. In the past, the relatively 
uniform character of Australia's strategic policy and 
operational experience has limited severely the relevance 
of many alternative strategic concepts and structures. But 
now, because of the greatly altered nature of Australia's 
strategic environment and the new requirements.which flow 
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from it, the range of conceptual options which deserve 
serious con.sideration is much broader than that which has 
been available realistically in the past. In these 
circ';lffistances, the primary function of Part V is to outline 
and evaluate briefly some elements of this range which might 
be suitable to meet Australia's new security requirements. 
In Chapter 10, a series of strategic and structural themes 
is discussed. This is followed in Chapter 11 by an analysis 
of an array of new manpower options. 
CHAPTER 10 
COMPONENT THEMES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE OPTIONS 
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In the discussion concerning future long range planning 
requirements in Chapter 9, it was argued that a series of 
alternative conceptual options should be generated and 
evaluated for their functional efficiency in fulfilling 
carefully evolved planning design criteria. The primary 
purpose of this chapter is to introduce and briefly discuss 
a series of strategy themes which might be viewed as being 
potential components or 'building blocks' in constructing 
these alternative conceptual options. The individual 
strategy themes do not all offer the prospect of a coherent 
and complete solution to Australia's national security 
requirements. They have different objectives, employ 
different types of resources, hold the potential to secure 
different aspects of Australian society and are designed 
primarily to meet different types of pressure and threat. 
Each has the capacity to combine with other themes to 
produce a variety of alternative conceptual options for 
evaluation in the processes of long range planning. 
Theme 1: A Nuclear Weapons Capability 
Australia might conceivably develop nuclear weapons for 
a wide range of reasons. However, one of the most obvious 
motivations would be to provide a new dimension to Australia's 
deterrence capacity. While nuclear weapons would have a 
capability to perform this function, it is important to 
realise that their credibility in this role would be limited. 
They could only be expected to provide effective deterrence 
against a relatively small category of pressures and threats. 
For instance, they would not constitute a credible deterrent, 
nor an effective response or defensive capacity, against a 
wide range of pressures of peace, international crises and 
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some of the less demanding pressures of international 
. 1 
aggression.. Even in the context of the more demanding 
1 It is important to note at this stage in the argument 
that, in evaluating various strategy and structural 
options, the requirements of optimising deterrence 
capacity may be of a quite different nature to those 
which would optimise defensive capacity. This point 
is elaborated and illustrated clearly by Desmond Ball: 
... it is an axiom in the strategic 
literature that the criteria for deterrence 
and for defence are not only different but could even 
be quite incompatible. The objective of military 
deterrence is to reduce the probability of enemy 
military attacks, by posing for the enemy a 
sufficiently likely prospect that he will 
suffer· a net loss as a result of the attack, or 
at least a higher net loss or lower net gain than 
would follow from his not attacking. Deterrence 
in this sense is a process of influencing the 
enemy's intentions. The strategic policy and 
associated force structure required for this 
process may be quite unsuited for the conduct 
of military operations in the event that 
deterrence fails. ' 
It is much more difficult to illustrate this 
defence/deterrence dichotomy at the tactical 
level than at the strategic level, but one example 
relating to the use of strike aircraft will be 
outlined here. Equipping the Australian F-lllC 
strike force with nuclear weapons could, at least 
perhaps under some circumstances, provide a quite 
formidable deterrent force. But that same force 
would have many inadequacies for actual defence 
operations. It would, for example, lack 
credibility in situations of relatively low level 
threats, probably even up to the point of rather 
extensive lodgements on Australian territory. Even 
for larger scale threats it would lack credibility 
if the notional adversary also possessed a nuclear 
strike force; in this situation a nuclear stalemate 
would pertain and conventional airpower would be 
required in actual force engagements. 
Desmond J. Ball, 'Australia's Tactical Air Requirements 
and the Criteria for Evaluating Tactical Aircraft for 
Australian Procurement' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The 
Future of Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia 
(Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies Centres, The 
Australian National University, 1977), p. 66. 
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pressures of international aggression, the value of such a 
deterrence capacity would be limited severely if Australia's 
potential opponents already possessed a similar force with 
a retaliatory capability. 
A second potential reason for Australia acquiring 
nuclear weapons might be to gain international prestige and 
bargaining power. Certainly Australia's diplomatic actions 
are likely to be given more attention if the country 
possesses nuclear weapons. Yet the international value of 
this attention could not be expected to be very pronounced, 
for even the major powers have found it difficult to translate 
their nuclear capabilities into concrete political gains. 
Moreover, if Australia's acquisition of a nuclear weapon 
capability spurs a regional power to follow suit, the net 
result might be a reduction in the country's overall security 
because of Australia's high levels of population concentration 
and its consequential vulnerability to nuclear attack. 
A third possible motive for developing nuclear weapons 
would be to acquire greatly increased tactical battlefield 
firepower. Certainly the area blast effects of most nuclear 
explosives are of an order of magnitude greater than any 
conventional munition. However, there are limits to the 
utility of firepower per se. For instance, even if it 
were politically feasible to do so, it would not be appropriate 
or cost-effective in military terms to employ nuclear 
weapons against terrorist groups or small-scale raiding 
parties. .Furthermore, as is discussed later in this chapter, 
their military utility in even the more conventional large-
scale battlefield situations is limited. 
All nuclear weapons options are also constrained 
heavily by a broad range of cost factors. Because of their 
technical complexity, nuclear weapons and their associated 
delivery systems are not procured readily. Their development 
in Australia would not only be expensive financially but it 
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2 
would also impose a heavy drain upon skilled manpower. 
In additio~, because of their highly controversial nature, 
the diversion of scarce natural resources to their 
procurement would, in most circumstances, by a highly 
sensitive and potentially divisive political issue. 3 
In practice, there are three distinct categories of 
nuclear weapons options available to Australia. The first 
is to attempt to develop a global strategic deterrence 
capacity. This would be 
'to tear a limb off' or 
4 
superpower aggressor. 
designed, in De Gaulle's phrase, 
cause unacceptable damage to even a 
The acquisition of this type of 
development of an extremely system would entail the 
sophisticated launch-on-warning or survivable second strike 
capacity. Even if it is assumed that this would only 
·require the development of comparatively simple plutonium 
warheads, these would have to be miniaturised and fitted 
to a highly survivable and reliable delivery system. 5 
There are several alternative modes of delivery potentially 
available. An intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) 
or sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) system, even of a 
2 
3 
4 
5 
A detailed analysis of the costs to the Australian 
community of a series of nuclear weapon/delivery 
system options appears in United Service Institution 
of the Australian Capital Territor~ An Australian 
Nuclear Weapons Capabilit~ (The published reports of 
syndicate deliberations on this subject). (Canberra, 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, 1975), pp. 3-11. (The author participated 
as a syndicate member in the preparation of the first 
of these reports.) 
Ibid., pp. 2, 3. 
Exactly what level of damage might be viewed as unacceptable 
by a superpower is discussed at length by Geoffrey Kemp in 
Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers, Parts I, II and III 
(London, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Papers 106 and 107, 1974). 
The problems of warhead miniaturisation for the purposes 
of satisfying the space and weight constraints of military 
delivery systems are highly complex and not amenable to 
ready solution without extensive testing. See this 
discussed by Ted Greenwood, George w. Rathjens- and Jack 
Ruina in Nuclear Power and Weapons Proliferation (London, 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi 
Paper 130, 1976), p. 4. 
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comparatively crude nature, would cost billions of dollars 
6 
and take many years to develop. The range of Australia~s 
strike aircraft, even with multiple refuelling from aerial 
tankers based in Australia, would be insufficient to 
provide a credible deterrent against a superpower opponent. 
By far the most attractive option would appear to be a 
submarine- and/or air-launched cruise missile system. The 
most advanced cruise missiles currently under development 
7 have a range of approximately 3,200 kms. In order for 
multiple, high value targets to be reached by such a system, 
either the range capability would need to be extended or the 
launching platforms would need to release the missiles from 
vuln~rable positions close to the opponent's borders. In 
addition, the type of highly accurate cruise missile guidance 
system needed would be difficult to develop domestically, 
even if it were only required to be sufficiently precise for 
counter~city strikes. It would probably need to be assumed 
that the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) System would not 
be always available in crisis situations. 8 TERCOM, MAGCOM 
and MICRAD systems and operational data might also be 
difficult to obtain. However, if all of the above options 
are foreclosed, it is possible that the new types of gyros 
currently becoming available may be sufficiently accurate 
6 
7 
8 
The costs of these options and the relative potential 
of an array of similar options is discussed in United 
Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, An Australian Nuclear Weapons Capability, p. 8. 
For details of recent developments in cruise missile 
systems see Chapter 2. 
In a crisis situation, the United States would have the 
option of closing down the non-secure navigation signals 
of the GPS system. It, is also possible that, in a world 
crisis, the Soviet Union might attack and effectively 
destroy many of the United States satellite systems 
which have global strategic functions. For details of 
their developing capability in this field see Clarence 
A. Robinson, 'Soviets Push for Beam Weapon' in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 106, No. 18, 2 May 1977, 
pp. 16-23; and also 'Soviets Launch Another Killer 
Satellite Test' in Aviation Week and Space Technology, 
Vol. 106, No. 26, 27 June 1977, p. 18. 
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9 to perform cruise missile guidance for counter-city attacks. 
In short, it is conceivable that Australia could develop 
a marginal global strategic nuclear deterrent but only after 
the investment of vast national resources over an extended 
period and at the expense of a considerable disturbance to 
international, and possibly also internal, political 
relationships. 
A second and more frequently discussed nuclear option 
would be the development of a regional strategic deterrent. 10 
For this type of system, a plutonium warhead mounted on a 
sea- or air-launched cruise missile would again appear to 
provide the most cost-effective solution. However, 
because the requirements for range, survivability, early 
warning and quantity would be relaxed considerably from 
those required for the global deterrent option, the overall 
expense and drain on resources could be expected to be of 
an order of magnitude lower. These considerations could 
not, in most circumstances, be expected to moderate 
significantly the strength of the international and domestic 
political reaction. 
The final nuclear option for Australia would be the 
development of a weapon system for purely tactical battle-
field firepower purposes. The most likely delivery 
candidates for this task would be air-, sea- or ground-
launched short or medium range cruise missiles. However, 
it is important to note that the battlefield utility of 
tactical nuclear weapons would be limited. Despite their 
enormous firepower potential, nuclear weapons do not reduce 
greatly the requirements for precise target acquisition and 
delivery accuracy in most tactical situations. For instance, 
in the maritime environment, a twenty kiloton warhead must 
be delivered to within 13;8 kms of a ship if it is to be 
9 
10 
For details of these cruise missile navigation and 
guidance systems see Chapter 2. 
This option is discussed at length in the report of the 
first syndicate in United Service Institution of the 
Australian Capital Territory, An Australian Nuclear 
Weapons Capability, pp. 1-12. 
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destroyed, and a 200 kiloton bomb within 4 kms. 11 In land 
warfare, in most types of terrain, nuclear attacks against 
armoured formations require an even greater degree of 
accuracy to be effective. 12 Thus, for tactical battlefield 
purposes, nuclear explosives really substitute for the new 
forms of highly accurate terminal guidance. The destruction 
of multiple targets with one warhead is likely to occur only 
if the targets are highly concentrated. Yet even in this 
type of situation, cheaper and less politically sensitive 
conventional weapon options are likely to be available. 
In the ground environment, terminally guided sub-munition 
dispenser weapons can destroy or disable large vehicle 
formations. At sea, relatively inexpensive terminally 
guided anti-ship missiles have proved to be extremely 
effective. In fact, as was discussed in Chapter 2, a range 
of other developments in weapons technologies are already 
encouraging a high level of force dispersal and hence 
reducing the prospects of destroying multiple targets with 
a single nuclear strike. 
There is a final major difficulty in Australia acquiring 
nuclear weapons for tactical purposes. If an opponent also 
possesses nuclear weapons, he may be tempted to respond to 
their use by retaliating against Australia's small number 
of highly concentrated and very vulnerable population 
centres. The realisation of this danger may effectively 
deter Australian governments from exercising the tactical 
nuclear option. 
11 
12 
These figures are given by Ian Bellany in Australia 
in the Nuclear Age: National Defence and National 
Development (Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1972), 
p. 9 6. 
This is partly because of the masking effect of 
undulating terrain and vegetation cover and also 
because of the relatively good protection provided 
by armoured vehicles themselves. 
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Theme 2: Adapted Conventional Military Systems 
For Australia this is essentially a status quo option. 
In the absence of an international or domestic political 
crisis which·might reveal its fundamental inadequacies, the 
present conventional military concept represents a very 
attractive political and bureaucratic option. It basically 
permits a continuance of Australia's inherited force 
structure with slight modifications to.accommodate the more 
obvious requirements of continental defence. In general 
terms, the Army would probably retain its conventional 
division structure and the Navy would still be dominated by 
destroyers, frigates, a few submarines and an appropriate 
number of support ships. The Air Force would be equipped 
with basically the same types of strike, fighter, transport, 
maritime and trainer aircraft as at present, although 
there may be scope for rationalising the number of airframe 
types operated. 
13 . 
The greatest advantage of an adapted conventional 
military structure is that in most respects it already 
exists. Many of the equipments and doctrines are familiar 
to the Australian armed forces and most of the skills and 
personnel are already held. Thus, in terms of political 
and bureaucratic realities, its relatively undemanding 
nature makes it realistically achievable. This is important 
because,while the civilian and military personnel in 
Australia's national security stru~ture have learned to 
accept change over the years, this has been limited primarily 
to that which has been designed to improve their performance 
of traditional functions. Thus there has, for instance, 
been a general acceptance of a degree of integrated defence 
management and the level of change associated with the 
introduction of new types of equipment. The scale and 
type of change required for the adapted conventional force 
13 For details of the current Australian order of battle 
see Department of Defence, Defence Report 1976 
(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1976)' pp. 40 ff. 
330 
option would be 6£ a comparable nature to that required in 
the past and, hence, would be unlikely to cause excessive 
disturbance to entrenched vested interests and lifestyles. 
Conventional military structures are also relatively 
easy for the public to understand and accept. During the 
course of this century, a large proportion of the Australian 
population has served actively in these types of military 
units. This basic familiarity is reinforced by the 
readiness with which mass publics can comprehend the 
relatively simple concepts by which conventional operations 
can be explained. Units are frequently deployed in 
concentrations and, on the ground, the progress of linear 
fronts is relatively easy to plot and understand. 
Another factor which further reinforces public 
acceptance of conventional military forces is the fact that 
they are possessed by most advanced western states with whom 
Australia normally compares herself. In reality, this 
represents another practical advantage of some significance 
because it means that conventional force options automatically 
possess a high degree of equipment and conceptual operational 
compatibility with Australia's major allies. 
The adapted conventional military force option possesses 
yet other significant advantages. For instance, the major 
equipment components of the concept - large surface ships, 
tactical aircraft and conventional army formations - are, by 
their very nature, highly visible. If these equipments 
possess a credible operational capacity in crisis situations, 
they are likely to be well-suited to perform the deterrence 
f . 14 unction. 
Another great advantage of conventional military forces 
is their operational flexibility. They are generally 
14 A major consequence of the discussion in Chapter 2 
is that the credibility of the major equipment components 
of the adapted conventional option is falling, especially 
when they are confronted by a sophisticated, well-
. equipped and -trained opposing force. In the future this 
is likely to impact in an adverse manner upon the 
deterrence capacity of this type of force. 
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adaptable to nearly any type of terrain, climate and 
vegetation.and they are capable of effectively performing 
both offensive and defensive tasks against a wide range of 
enemy forces. 
However, for Australia's continental defence requirement, 
it is doubtful whether an adapted conventional military 
structure can provide an appropriate solution on its own. 
It suffers from a series of important practical and conceptual 
difficulties. 
Firstly, for a large number of reasons, it is a very 
expensive option. It requires high levels of technical and 
conceptual skill to be effective both on the micro (platoon, 
squadron and vessel) level as well as at the macro 
(operational command) level. High levels of skill imply 
not only high performance manpower, mostly operating full-
time, but also extensive training time and complex training 
facilities. 
Conventional military options also require complex and 
expensive capital equipment items at or close to the 'state 
of the art'. Bearing in mind Australia's limited budgetary 
resources, this factor causes major problems. As is 
discussed in Chapter 2, large surface ships, conventional 
tactical aircraft and main battle tanks now require a host 
of supporting units and equipments if they are to. be 
survivable and effective on the modern battlefield. However, 
for a country with Australia's resources, the procurement of 
all of these mutually supporting battlefield elements means 
that only very small quantities of each type of equipment 
can be bought. This may provide a capacity for small 
numbers of people to maintain contact with the current 
'state of the art' but it limits heavily effective operational 
capacity. For this to be developed to a level which would 
be appropriate to meet any serious pressure of national 
aggression, an elaborate process of rapid force expansion 
would be required. Yet, as is discussed in Chapters 4 and 9, 
while manpower may be difficult to raise and train rapidly, 
the types of complex conventional equipments required - ships, 
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tactical aircraft and armoured vehicles - may be even more 
difficult, if not impossible, to obtain at short notice. 
Thus, for countries with national security problems and 
budgetary allocations of a comparable size to Australia, 
the adapted conventional military concept raises a very 
serious dilemma. For conventional units to be effective on 
the modern battlefield, a large n·umber of mutually supporting 
equipments and technologies are required .. However, in order 
to maintain expertise in them all, the total structure's 
capacity to meet meaningful pressures and threats 
independently is very limited. 
There are several other important difficulties with 
adapted conventional forces. For instance,because such 
forces are composed of relatively small numbers of high 
technology units which are frequently employed in 
concentrations, they are particularly vulnerable to 
I 
technological obsolescence in the face of an innovative 
opponent. As was discussed in Chapter 2, most of the 
important equipments held by conventional 'military forces -
tactical aircraft, surface ships, armoured vehicles, etc. -
are all becoming increasingly vulnerable to new generations 
of relatively inexpensive but highly effective counter-
systems. Thus, it is conceivable tha~ in some environments 
at least, conventional unit equipments may, in the future, 
be rendered completely obsolete by the introduction of new 
weapons technologies. But even further than this, these 
high technology concentrations of defence capital are also 
vulnerable to an opponent's imaginative employment or 
exploitation of the new technologies through the introduction 
of new strategic concepts, tactical doctrines or 
15 
operational procedures. Conventional military forces 
15 This theme was raised in his congressional testimony 
by the former US Director of Defense Research and 
Engineering, Dr Malcolm Currie: 
I note that the acceleration of technological change 
has increased the danger of technological surprise. 
I am less concerned about the appearance of new 
weapons, per se, than with innovative uses of 
technology based on a superior understanding of 
technology's ultimate significance to future warfare. 
are thus particularly vulnerable to rapid obsolescence and 
decisive defeat at the hands of a technically advanced, 
innovative opponent. 
A further practical difficulty arises from the fact 
that the possession of small numbers of highly capable 
conventional units effectively limits deployment options 
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when enemy intentions are unclear. For example, in the 
circumstances of major raids by a regional power or a 
multiple battalion attack by a major power on Australia's 
northern coasts, it may be very difficult to commit 
immediately the bulk of Australia's conventional defence 
force to that area for fear of a secondary, more serious 
attack in the populous and strategically important south-
east or south-west of the continent. The possession of small 
numbers of high technology conventional forces tends to 
complicate deployment options seriously. 
The commitment of only token conventional forces to 
resist these types of remote attacks would be of restricted 
utility because of another major limitation on conventional 
force capability - their relatively high vulnerability to 
adverse force ratios. Certainly, a very large number of 
factors determine success on the conventional military 
battlefield - terrain, vegetation, weather, morale, equipment 
and leadership, to name just a few. Yet conventional military 
units, because of their relatively concentrated battlefield 
formations and large and relatively obvious support structures 
and facilities, are frequently susceptible to rapid defeat by 
conventional forces of comparable expertise but larger 
dimensions. For Australia, the most important implication 
is that, while conventional forces may be appropriate to meet 
lower and medium pressures of national aggression, if 
confronted by numerically superior conventional forces they 
may be susceptible to rapid defeat. 
15 cont'd 
See 'Currie Urges Vigo~ous R and D Program' in Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, Vol. 104, No. 7, 16 February 
. 19 7 6 I PP • 3 8 I 3 9 • 
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Theme 3: Territorial Defence 
Territorial defence structures are designed specifically 
to provide nations with an independent means of defending 
their own territory in depth. The primary aim is to raise 
an opponent's costs and risks, not only of entering, but 
. 16 
also of residing in, the host country. This is done by 
refusing to fight a superior enemy on his own terms, 
depriving him of rapid victory and forcing him to conduct a 
protracted and expensive campaign. As a group of Rand 
Corporation analysts described it: 
The intent is not to hold territory in 
the initial stages of an invasion but 
ultimately to bog down an invader by 
making continued occupation of the 
country too costly to be worth while.17 
Territorial defence is not simply another term for 
guerrilla warfare. Although territorial defence in some 
environments may involve a substantial element of reliance 
upon guerrilla techniques and variants of them, it may also 
involve some reliance upon heavy weapons (eg. tactical 
aircraft, small offensive surface ships, submarines, 
armoured vehicles, etc.), which are not normally regarded as 
being part of the guerrilla's armoury. In essence, 
territorial systems usually possess a guerrilla-type capacity 
to survive and to strike almost continuously from multiple 
directions and in multiple dimensions. Territorial units 
have a capacity to disperse and operate for long periods in 
small 'packets' in such a way that for the enemy they 
represent an intangible target which is very difficult to 
16 
17 
The relative ease with which the costs of entry and 
residence can be raised in particular national 
environments is discussed by Major-General Nils 
Sk6ld in Defence Policy for the 1970's and BO's 
(Stockholm, The Secretariat for National Security 
Policy and Long~Range Defence Planning, Ministry of 
Defence, 1974), pp. 10 ff. 
Guy J. Pauker, Steven Canby, A. Ross Johnson and 
William B. Quandt, In Search of Self-Reliance: US 
Security Assistance to the Third World Under the Nixon 
Doctrine (Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, R~l092, 
1973)' p. v. 
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acquire and destroy. However, territorial defence forces 
may also haye a capacity to perform 'frontal' defensive 
operations for short periods. This normally involves 
activities more akin to those of conventional forces at 
state frontiers or along clearly defined military fronts, 
whether they be static or mobile, thin or deep. The 
coexistence of the more irregular aspects of territorial 
defence doctrine with those of frontal defence can be seen 
most clearly in the military structures of Sweden, Finland 
d 1 . 18 an Yugos av1a. 
The most important component of territorial defence 
forces is the large numbers of well- trained, dispersed but 
coordinated small units. As was discussed in Chapter 2, 
the operational capacity of this type of unit is being 
enhanced greatly by developments in conventional military 
technology. But there are other important advantages 
which can be derived from this type of structure. The 
nature of the manpower required means that the vast 
majority can be supplied in the form of locally based part-
time forces. This tends to be not only a very economic 
means of providing large military forces but it also means 
that units can be mobilised rapidly to operate in familiar 
terrain and hence are not readily susceptible to either 
18 The coexistence of regular and irregular defence 
concepts is discussed in Adam Roberts, Nations in 
Arms: The Theory and Practice of Terr~torial Defence 
(London, Chatto and Windus for The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 115, 116. 
See also Lieutenant-General Otto Ylirisku in 'The 
Frontier Guards' in The Defence Forces of Finland (A 
supplement produced by the Army Quarterly and Defence 
Journal in 1974), p. 37. The Yugoslav def~nce fbrces 
have developed a concept of force transformation from 
regular to irregular operations and vice-versa. See 
Colonel-General Pavle Jaksic (Retired), 'On Mutual 
Transformations Between Frontal and Partisan Warfare' 
in Olga Mladenovic (ed.), The Yugoslav Concept of 
General People's Defense (Belgrade, Review of Inter-
national Affairs, 1970), pp. 220 ff, and also 
Colonel-General Stane Potocar, 'On the Strategy of 
Armed Struggle' in Blagoje Svorcan (ed.), Total 
National Defense in Theory and Practice (Belgrade, 
Norodna Armija,1975), pp. 170 ff. · 
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19' 
regional or nation-wide surprise attacks. 
Because of the nature of the Australian land mass, its 
status as an island, its continental time and space, its 
variations of terrain, vegetation and climate and its small 
but generally nationalistic population and their relatively 
limited financial resources, it can be argued that the 
territorial defence option is particularly well-suited to 
. 2·0 Australia's national security requirements. It would 
appear to provide the basis for developing a very formidable 
deterrence capacity which was both regionally and globally 
inoffensive. However, for Australia in 'the 1980s, there 
are a series bf factors which serve to undermine heavily the 
concept's political, military and s6cial acceptability. 
The most serious difficulty in employing the territorial 
defence concept is that it would require the mass involvement 
of civil society. If the public commitment required was 
limited simply to an acceptance of conscription for service 
within Australia or even increased financial expenditure, 
it can be deduced from the poll results displayed in 
Chapter 5 that these measures might conceivably be accepted 
by the community. But adoption of territorial defence would 
necessitate public acceptance of a concept which requires 
active mass preparations for war fighting within the nation's 
21 borders. The implications for mass public involvement 
and probably great suffering in wartime situations tends to 
deter governments from the ready adoption of territorial 
defence strategies. The human and social costs of such a 
19 
20 
21 
The relative costs of territorial defence forces are 
discussed by Horst Mendershausen in Territorial Defense 
in NATO and Non-NATO Europe (Santa Monica, Rand 
Corporation,R-1184, 1973), p. VII. 
See this case made in a tentative fashion in my 
'Strategic Options for the Defence of Australia', United 
Service, Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, pp. 15-27. 
The political difficulties of accepting the prospect 
of combat on a country's own territory is discussed at 
length in the West German context by Horst Mendershausen 
in Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO Europe, 
pp. 12 ff. 
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struggle would be far more bearable if a firm prospect of 
achieving early victory could be promised. But it is implicit 
in the nature of a territorial defence struggle that the 
issue is not decided in a single battle, or even by a single 
criterion. In fact, the true complexity of such a defence 
posture is difficult for many mass publics to comprehend 
fully. It is perhaps not surprising then that the territorial 
defence concept appears to be most readily accepted and 
entrenched in those countries which have suffered the ravages 
of invasion and have a history of mounting protracted partisan 
resistance. Certainly, the prerequisites for the successful 
adoption of a territorial defence concept include a high 
level of social cohesion and a very deep and almost universal 
national commitment to the country's defence. It is possible 
that these conditions might be satisfied in Australia if the 
country wereconfronted by a serious threat which was readily 
apparent to the entire community. In these circumstances, 
domestic political constraints might conceivably be over-
ridden by the cohesive forces of nationalism and ideology. 
There are, however, several further problems with the 
territorial defence concept. One major difficulty is that 
large urban populations appear to be particularly vulnerable 
because of their ready accessibility and vulnerability to 
terror campaigns and repris·a1s. As Adam Roberts po in ts out: 
Despite all such possibilities the 
urbanization of societies undeniably adds to 
the problems of territorial defence, and 
inevitably modifies its character. This is 
particularly true in countries such as 
Switzerland and Sweden [and Australia], whose 
cities are near land or sea frontiers and 
hence immediately vulnerable. The Swiss in 
the Second World War, when they envisaged 
the possibility of abandoning their towns and 
villages to the enemy and continuing the 
struggle from mountain strongholds, knew they 
would be running the risk of vicious and 
extensive retaliation. The situation in Finland 
in the Second World War was different and much 
.more favourable to protracted struggle. As an 
eye-witness observer of the war in Finland wrote 
at the time: 'A nation which is concentrated 
in towns is most vulnerable from the air; 83 
per cent of Finland's population was rural ... ' 
There is an obvious significance in the fact 
that the three European countries which proved 
most adept at conducting defence in depth 
in the Second World War - Yugoslavia, 
Albania and Finland - were relatively 
underdeveloped, not heavily urbanized, and 
covered with large expanses of forest.22 
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Although Australia has a strong rural tradition, the 
reality of the situation is that nearly 86 per cent of the 
23 population is now concentrated in urban areas. Its 
vulnerability to an opponent's countermeasures may serve 
to weaken seriously the utility of territorial defence 
strategy in Australia's environment. 
Another potential difficulty for the territorial defence 
concept is that its flexibility in the face of a wide range 
·of scenarios is limited. Certainly it can provide a 
formidable deterrent and defensive capacity against the 
threat of a major assault. It can also provide a localised 
ready reaction capacity to meet a large number of minor 
pressures and threats. However, because of its inherently 
defensive character, territorial defence structures are not 
normally well-equipped to rapidly mount conventional ground 
force counter-offensives against limited assaults or 
lodgements, particularly at remote locations. The air and 
naval components of such a structure might be able to 
respond quickly with a concentration of defensive firepower 
but, in a country the size of Australia, territorial defence 
forces are unlikely to possess the ground force mobility 
required to confront an opponent quickly with major forces 
in areas remote. from the primary centres of population. 
This relative absence of strategic mobility and concentration 
also means that territorial defence forces are not readily 
adaptable to contingencies requiring their deployment 
overseas. 
The final major conceptual difficulty of territorial 
defence strategy is the requirement to rationalise the need 
22 
23 
Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 237. 
This is detailed in Population and Australia: A 
Demographic Analysis and Projection (The Borrie Report), 
Vol. 1, (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1975), p. 6. 
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for tactical ground force mobility with the necessity of 
maintaining and protecting aircraft and ship support and 
'maintenance facilities which are inherently fixed in character. 
Air and naval facilities can, to some degree, be duplicated, 
dispersed, camouflaged and protected but, in the final 
analysis, if continued air and naval activity is to be 
regarded as central to the struggle, the defence9 surrounding 
air and naval bases and support facilities must necessarily 
become somewhat more frontal and conventional in character. 24 
In summary, the territorial defence concept represents 
a specialised means of independently maximising a country's 
technological, economic and political deterrence capacity 
in the face of extreme threats. However, primarily because 
of its limited capacity to provide an effective response to 
the full range of potential pressures and threats, it is 
unlikely to satisfy Australia's security requirements on its 
own. 
Theme 4: Civilian Resistance 
The civilian resistance concept is a non-violent means 
of undermining an opponent's willpower. It is not a 
camouflaged form of defeatism. On the contrary, civilian 
resistance strategists argue that the invasion and 
occupation of a country represent merely the beginning of 
25 
an extended struggle. Far from signifying defeat, they 
point out that the presence of large numbers of occupation 
forces provides an ideal environment within which the 
24 
25 
'I'his prob],em is discussed by Adam Roberts in Total 
Defence and Civil Resistance: Problems of Sweden's 
Security Policy (Stockholm, The Research Institute of 
Swedish National Defence, 1972), p. 75. 
See this case made by Adam Roberts in 'Civilian Defence 
Strategy' in Adam Roberts (ed.), Civilian Resistance as 
a National Defence (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd, 
1969), pp. 278 ff. and also by Anders Boserup and 
Andrew Mack, War Without Weapons: Non-Violence in 
National Defence (London, Frances Pinter Ltd, 1974), 
pp. 37 ff. 
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opponent's willpower can be undermined. By employing a 
wide variety of means, civil rE~sistors aim to demonstrate to 
an oppone~t that his view of the issue at stake is unrealistic 
and that the forces of repression brought to bear are not 
only ineffective but also counter-productive. 
Civilian resistance strategy can be viewed as having 
two distinct dimensions. On the one hand, it involves 
non-cooperation and active non-violent resistance to the 
opponent's activities. In practice this may mean a refusal 
to ob~y directions and laws, a refusal to pay taxes, a refusal to 
accept changed work directions and perhaps, at least for 
short periods, a refusal to work at all. Civilian resistance 
can also involve a wide range of disruptive activities which 
go beyond simple non-cooperation. Attempts may be made 
actively to interfere with the opponent's activities by 
occupying administrative centres, staging sit-downs to 
prevent vehicular movements, disrupting transportation centres, 
etc. In perhaps its most extreme form, civilian resistance 
can involve the organised demolition of major infrastructure 
items- bridges, factories, mines, tunnels, etc.- before 
they can be brought under an invader's control. 
The second dimension of civilian resistance activity 
involves a deep and probing moral and intellectual appeal 
to the opponent's representatives in the country, the 
members of his armed forces, administrative services, etc. 
Through mass public involvement, continuous attempts can 
be made to persuade individuals to defect from the opponent's 
regime, either overtly or passively. Over time, the many 
components of this strategy can produce an environment of 
defiant resistance and subversion which, in many circumstances, 
can effectively deny an opponent many of the fruits which 
would otherwise be available to a military victor. 
The concept of civilian resistance should not be 
confused with the principle of pacifism. Attachment to 
pacifist principles is only one of many possible reasons for 
rejecting violent means of applying pressure to an opponent. 
Legal considerations, attachment to particular beliefs or an 
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objective and practical assessment of the crisis situation 
at hand can. all be appropriate and reasonable motivations 
for adopting non-violent methods in a given environment. 
However, it should not be implied that the adoption of a 
non-violent stance needs necessarily to be absolute. In 
many situations, civilian resistance techniques can and have 
been combined effectively with more violent activities carried 
out either in other regions o~ alternatively, undertaken 
within the same region but by different sectors of the 
. t 26 cornrnun1 y. 
During the course of this century, there have been many 
civilian resistance campaigns which have reduced significantly 
the control which an invading state has managed to establish 
over a subject country. Perhaps the most notable instances 
emerged from the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 and 
26 Magne Skodvin, an authority on Norwegian resistance 
during the German occupation, has emphasised the inter-
action of violent and non-viplent acitivities in that 
struggle: 
My own view, based mainly on the experience 
of the German occupation of Norway, is that 
violent and non-violent resistance need to 
co-exist and supplement each other. 
See Magne Skodvin, 'Norwegian Non-Violent Resistance 
During the German Occupation' in Adam Roberts (ed.), 
Civilian Resistance as a National Defence, p. 181. 
Jeremy Bennett illustrates the same point when 
discussing the effectiveness of the Danish resistance 
movements: 
Sabotage precipitated the crisis and caused the 
fall of ·the Government. It provided encouragement 
to the civilian population which was already seething 
with unrest but needed a spark to set it off. The 
fact that the resistance groups were in touch with 
the strike leaders meant that the disturbances were 
to a certain extent controlled and the Germans were 
faced with a united front employing both violent and 
non-violent means of resistance simultaneously. 
A member of the staff of General von Hanneken, the 
German Commander in Chief, wrote at this time that, 
with the outbreak of strikes and sabotage, 'the 
reputation of the German Army sank and, in a menacing 
way reached rock bottom'. 
Jeremy Bennett, 'The Resistance Against the German 
Occupation of Denmark 1940-45' in Adam Roberts (ed.), 
Civilian Resistance as a National Defence, p. 193. 
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the many forms of civil resistance which were organised 
in countri~s occupied by the Axis powers in the Second World 
War. 27 Th~ well-executed evacuation of most of Denmark's 
Jews and the non-cooperation which the Norwegian teachers 
displayed to prevent the introduction of Nazi ideology into 
.Norwegian schools are perhaps the best known examples from 
28 the latter struggle. However, one must be realistic in 
evaluating the effectiveness of civil resistance techniques 
in pressuring invading powers to withdraw. While in several 
instances such activities have undoubtedly contributed in a 
significant way to the invader's problems, in no historical 
case have they alone been responsible for the expulsion of 
an invading force. This can be explained, at least partially, 
by th~ faGt that,in the past, civilian resistance techniques 
have been grasped in desperate situations as a final 'last 
ditch' means of continuing organised opposition. It might 
be expected that with the development of proper planning, 
organisation and training prior to the onset of hostilities, 
the effectiveness of civilian resistance techniques could be 
enhanced greatly. 
However, the concept of civilian resistance also 
suffers from several other fundamental problems. Firstly, 
by its very nature, it is most effective where and when the 
enemy requires extensive local contact and cooperation to 
achieve his objectives. While these conditions would apply 
if an opponent wished to occupy and exploit Australia's 
extensive urban environments, they most certainly would not 
apply in the strategically valuable but remote and sparsely 
occupied regions adjacent to Australia's north and north-
west coasts. In these areas, civil non-cooperation, even if 
it took the extreme form of destroying local facilities before 
27 
28 
For details see Wolfgang Sternstein, 'The Ruhrkampf of 
1923: Economic Problems of Civilian Defence', and other 
papers in the same volume, ibid., p. 128. 
For details of these non-violent actions see Jeremy 
Bennett, ''11he Resistance Against German Occupation of 
Denmark 1940-45' and Magne Skodvin 'Norwegian Non-
violent Resistance During German Occupation', ibid., 
pp . 16 2 - 2 0 3 . 
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an enemy could arrive, would be effective for only a 
limited per.iod. Thus, if it were an opponent's intention 
not to invade the whole country but merely to occupy a 
valuable but sparsely inhabited portion, ci~ilian 
resistance techniques, on their own, could not be expected 
to provide a credible deterrent or response capacity. 
In reality, civilian resistance techniques can be 
effectively applied only in the most defensive situation, 
when a nation's major population centres are occupied by 
enemy forces. In these circumstances, an enemy can be 
inconvenienced seriously and possibly, over time, even 
threatene9 by this activity. Thus, it follows that, if 
it is possible to demonstrate an effective civil resistance 
capability before hostilities begin, the deterrence potential 
of such a stance could be considerable. Adam Roberts has 
expressed this view in the following terms: 
An important element in military deterrence 
is making it clear to an enemy not simply 
that he cannot gain by aggression, but also 
that he will positively lose. Civilian 
defence might involve such a threat - that 
the enemy will, if he attacks the civilian 
defence country, run the risk of losing 
control over his own troops and officials, 
or over his allies or dependent nations, 
or possibly even have to face an organized 
revolt in his own country.29 
In practice, there can be expected to be major 
difficulties in developing and exercising, during a period 
of peace, the type of highly efficient civilian resistance 
structure which could conceivably hold some deterrence 
value. To do this, a government would need to admit publicly 
that more conventional security options might be inadequate 
on their own to prevent occupation of large parts of the 
country. The expression of this type of governmental 
realism is rarely viewed as being politically palatable, even 
in the most threatening of international environments. 
29 Adam Roberts,· 'Civilian Defence Strategy' in Adam 
Roberts (ed.), Civilian Resistance as a National 
Defence, p. 253. 
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Theme 5: Economic Defence 
Increasing global economic interdependence implies 
increasing national vulnerability to interruptions in world 
trade. As a consequence of this realisation, the United 
States, Britain, France, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, South 
Africa and a number of other states have instituted a 
variety of economic defence measures to safeguard national 
economic capacity, both in periods of international crisis 
d . h f f f . 1 . 30 an in t e ace o pressures o nationa aggression. 
Comprehensive economic defence strategies have three 
major components; a reduction of import dependence,· detailed 
planning to f~cilitate the transformation of the national 
economy to meet the demands of international crises and the 
contribution of economic defence considerations to the 
processes of planning and evaluating new industry and 
infrastructure developments. 
As was discussed briefly in Chapter 3, Australia's 
dependence on imports is limited to relatively few commodity 
areas. Australia produces more than its own requirements in 
foods and basic metallic minerals. However, in the fields 
of liquid fuels, an array of chemical materials and several 
30 For details of foreign developments in this field see 
Peter Cross, 'US Wants Our Minerals; Stockpile Idea to 
Foil Third World Bans' in The Australian, 31 December 1976; 
Warren Beeby, 'US Looking to Coal for Energy' in The 
Austral1:an, 10 October 1974; Malcolm Colless, 'Japan 
May Join In Study on Oil From Coal' in The Australian, 
15 October 1974. For details of the Swiss economic defence 
programme see Jerry Wilson Ralston, The Defense of Small 
States in the Nuclear Age (A thesis published by the 
Department of Political Science in the University of 
Geneva, Geneva, 1969), pp. 160 ff. For details of South 
African, French and British developments see a report in 
New Scientist, Vol. 57, No. 835, 1 March 1973, p. 485. 
For a brief summary of the Swedish Economic Defence 
System see Sven Hellman, 'The Concept of Total Defence' 
in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1977), 
pp. 28, 36. For a more detailed account and discussion 
see Ruth Link, 'The Best Defence is a Good Defence' in 
Sweden Now, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1977, pp. 18-22. 
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high technology manufactured goods, Australia is currently 
dependent to a large degree upon foreign sources of supply. 
In some of these instances, external dependence may not be 
permanent. For example, it is quite possible that new 
import substituting natural resource deposits will be 
discovered. In the case of some raw materials which are 
currently imported, Australia does possess significant 
d . t b t h . 1 . 31 epos1 s ut at presen t ey are uneconomic to exp 01t. 
It is conceivable that, in the case of some of these materials, 
fluctuations in world prices could make their exploitation 
economically feasible during the coming decade. 
Economic defence planners can encourage a higher 
degree of material self-reliance through a number of policy 
initiatives. Firstly, in those instances where Australia 
possesses limited but fast diminishing supplies of readily 
accessible materials of strategic importance, active measures 
32 
can be instituted to conserve remaining stocks. Secondly, 
in many industries it is feasible to encourage the 
substitution of readily available domestic resources for 
some imported materials. The scope here is particularly 
notable in the substitution of natural gas, coal, solar 
and wind energy for imported oil in many industrial and 
domestic heating and some transport applications. A third 
31 
32 
For example, there are large quantities of low grade 
phosphate at Duchess in North Queensland, which are 
currently marginally economic. Feasibility studies 
into their possible exploitation have been undertaken 
in recent years. For details see A.J. Driessen, 
'Fertilizer Materials' in Bureau of Mineral Resources, 
Geology and Geophysics, Australian Mineral Industry 
19?3 Review (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publiihing Service, 1975), p. 141. (This review 
includes information to June 19 7 4.) 
By far the simplest and least expensive means of 
ensuring a future supply of scarce strategic materials 
is to leave a proportion of those resources which 
are currently exploited in convenient locations in 
the ground. The conservation of a proportion of the 
remaining Bass Strait oil stocks might be justified 
on these grounds. 
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category of economic defence policy initiatives is the 
development. and exploitation of new domestic resources to 
expand even further the processes of import substitution. 
Oil from coal processes, ethanol from plants, the 
reprocessing of industrial wastes to derive hitherto imported 
chemicals and the development of marginally economic import 
substituting mines and chemical processes might all play an 
. t 1 . h 33 in egra part in sue a programme. 
Despite extensive processes of import substitution, 
there are still likely to be some resources of strategic 
importance which Australia lacks - fuel oil, some chemical 
raw materials (sulphur, mercury, esters, amino compounds, 
etc.) and some specialised high technology manufactured 
goods. 34 With little prospect of domestic supplies becoming 
available in quantities sufficient to satisfy national demands 
in crisis situations, there may be little choice but to 
stockpile. With many of the commodities involved, the 
quantities used are very small. In these instances, 
stockpiling using conventional facilities is unlikely to 
cause serious difficulties. However, in the case of some 
chemical raw materials and fuel oil, specialised storage 
programmes are likely to be required. 
Most solid chemical materials can be stored safely in 
above-ground stockpiles. Where large quantities are required 
for long periods, abandoned open cut mines or quarries might 
be filled, with the final surface being revegetated or sealed. 
33 
34 
The prospects of supplying Australia's domestic 
requirements for fuels and energy in national security 
crises are discussed at length in a series of papers 
appearing in Proceedings of the Institute of Defence 
Science, No. 53,August 1974. See also Lieutenant 
Colonel M.J. Ball, 'Oil Supply and National Security' 
in Army Journal, No. 328, September 1976, pp. 5-26. 
These materials are itemised in an unpublished appendix 
to Brigadier P.J. Greville, 'Infrastructure Requirements 
for a Self-Reliant Defence Policy', United Service, 
Vol. 28, No. 2, October 1974, pp. 69 ff. For more 
detailed accounts of currently known mineral deposits, 
see Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics, 
Australian Mineral Industry 1973 Review. 
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By far the largest storage problem likely to confront 
Australia would be that of fuel oil. Fortunately, many 
other countries have an even more extreme problem in this 
regard and the technology of bulk storage is now highly 
35 developed. Although above-ground metal and rubber tanks 
can be employed, by far the most economic and environmentally 
safe technique is bulk storage in underground excavations 
or abandoned mines. 36 As Australia is well supplied with 
the latter, it would appear that the prime physical means of 
undertaking such a programme are already available. 37 
The second major component of economic defence strategy 
involves detailed planning for the transformation of the 
national economy to meet the demands of particular types of 
international crises. Basically, this involves the 
development of a range of highly detailed contingency plans 
so that all components of the national economy can be 
mobilised quickly and efficiently. Means of rapidly trans-
forming industrial production were discussed in Chapter 4. 
In addition, the details of national resource reallocation 
for both military and civil purposes would need to be derived 
in advance. Manpower, transport, fuel and power, communications, 
construction, food and water would all need to be incorporated 
35 
36 
37 
The relative costs and utility of various oil storage 
techniques in Australia is discussed by Alex Hunter in 
'Oil and Defence' in H.G. Gelber (ed.), Problems of 
Australian Defence (Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 
1970)' pp. 178-180. 
See this technology described and discussed at length by 
John G. Trotter and Michel Pachet in 'Underground Storage' 
in Petroleum Review, November 1974, pp. 727 ff. See 'also 
an article entitled '21 Million Barrel Underground 
Storage Capacity Planned for Sullom Voe' in Petroleum 
Times, 1 November 1974, pp. 9, 10. For details of the 
US strategic oil reserve programme, which involves the 
underground storage of 500 million barrels of crude oil 
by 1980, see S. Terry Atlas and William J. Cook, 'Energy: 
Salt Domes' in Newsweek, Vol. XC, No. 5, 1 August 1977, 
p. 55. 
One fringe benefit provided by stockpiling programmes 
is a capacity to hedge against fluctuations in the 
international prices of strategically important 
commodities. This factor could be expected to facilitate 
long range industry development planning. 
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into the economic defence planning system. These processes 
of detaile~ planning would not only identify potential 
problem areas and permit their solution in advance but 
would also provide a basis for informing the general public 
of economic defence priorities. 
There is a third element in comprehensive economic 
defence planning. This involves the evolution and expression 
of economic defence considerations and constraints in the 
processes of industry and governmental economic and 
infrastructure planning. It would be desirable for economic 
defence considerations to be evaluated seriously in the 
planning, design, siting and construction of new facilities, 
plants and projects of all kinds. Economic defence 
considerations might not be overriding in many instances but 
deliberations on their significance could be expected to 
impact in a major way upon the form of the national economic 
infrastructure in the long term. 
Economic defence programmes are not without their costs. 
By their very nature they represent an additional constraint 
upon the free flow of market forces in the international 
economy. Developing a capacity to satisfy a higher 
proportion of demands from domestic resources involves 
additional economic expense because of its contravention 
of the economic laws of comparative advantage. Meaningful 
economic defence measures also incur a diplomatic cost 
because of the unfavourable reception which such a policy is 
likely to receive from those countries which have traditionally 
exported strategic materials and goods to Australia. 
In addition, economic defence programmes require a 
significant budgetary allocation from the national security 
vote to cover the costs of administration and detailed 
planning, the development and management of resource stock-
piles and the subsidy of conservation and other measures 
in private industry. In Australia's current situation, the 
structural and bureaucratic constraints upon the development 
of an economic defence structure are unlikely to be surmounted 
in the absence of any strong political lobby p~rceiving such 
a programme to be in its interests. 
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Theme 6: Civil Defence 
'There are four major developments in Australia's 
national security environment which serve to heighten the 
requirement for an effective civil defence structure. 
Firstly, in the absence of a comprehensive programme for 
international nuclear disarmament, it is difficult to dismiss 
the long term potential for either a regional or global 
nuclear war. In the history of warfare, very few weapons, 
once they have been developed, deployed and actually used in 
combat, have then been reserved permanently from further use 
in international conflicts. 
A second and related development is that the 
conventional destructive potential and long range delivery 
capacities which are becoming available to both the super-
powers and to regional states are of an order of magnitude 
38 greater than those of the past. 
T.hese first two factors impact directly upon the third. 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, Australia's strategic 
reorientation towards meeting the pressures of international 
crises and international aggression independently requires 
that the Australian Defence Force direct its resources 
primarily towards operations on and from the Australian 
continent. One major consequence of this development is 
that service installations and centres of population and 
production capacity within Australia are likely to be 
involved far more directly in future national security 
crises. The significance of' this factor is further compounded 
by the fact that Australia's population is extremely vulnerable 
because of it~ very high levels of geographic concentration. 
In other words, international capacities to direct 
destructive firepower over long ranges are increasing 
markedly. In this environment, if Australia participates 
in future conflicts, it is not only likely to be more 
intimately involved but it will also be more vulnerable to 
enemy counteraction. Active population protection and 
38 This matter is discussed at length in Chapter 2. 
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damage limitation measures would appear to be of increasing 
importance to Australia's overall national security. 
The civil defence concept is not new to Australi~. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, a small group of civil defence 
and state emergency service specialists formulated 
operational procedures and doctrines specifically to fulfil 
Australia's requirements. 39 Moreover, active state emergency 
service organisations were developed in each state and 
territory. But despite the initiative of the experts and the 
40 dedication of a large number of volunteers, these 
organisations have experienced extreme difficulties in 
developing any more than the most basic of frameworks. 
The most significant problems have arisen directly as a 
result of a notable absence of political and bureaucratic 
interest. This has been manifested most obviously in the 
1 1 f f d 1 t d 1 1 f d . 41 eve s o e era , s ate an oca government un ing. The 
overall neglect is reflected clearly in nearly every aspect 
of Australian civil defence activity; full-time and part-
time personnel strengths, training activities, local 
facilities, equipment holdings, civil defence research, etc. 
The levels of current equipment holdings have been discussed 
in detail by the Director-General of the Natural Disasters 
Organization, Major-General Stretton. He has pointed out 
that 'it is estimated that of the 618 local units ... over 
39 
40 
41 
The civil defence planning which was undertaken in this 
period is summarised by Air Vice-Marshal W.E. Townsend, 
Director of State Emergency Services in New South Wales, 
in Overseas Developments in Civil Defence· (An unpublished 
paper delivered at the National Emergency Services 
College, Mount Macedon on 24 May 1977), pp. 30, 31. 
There are currently over 30,000 active members of state 
and territory emergency service units. For details of the 
current membership see a paper prepared by the Director-
General of the Natural Disasters Organization, Major-
General A.B. Stretton, The Role of the Natural Disasters 
Organization (An unpublished paper delivered to the 1977 
Industrial Mobilisation Course), p. 10. 
Major-General Stretton has also discussed the financial 
status of civil defence programmes in Australia, ibid., 
pp. 10-25. 
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half have only 10% or less of their equipment requirements•. 42 
Regarding urban area evacuation programmes, very little applied 
work and detailed planning has been done, although some 
conceptual studies have been undertaken. 43 The blast and 
fallout shelter programme has been limited almost completely 
to studies, the dissemination of information to interested 
parties and planning the emergency conversion of .selected city 
sites for shelter purposes. 44 
The current state of Australia's civil defence system 
compares most unfavourably with the majority of advanced 
45 
and many underdeveloped states. In these circumstances, 
it is worth considering the potential of a comprehensive 
civil defence programme in Australia. 
In well-integrated civil defence systems overseas, there 
are usually four categories of mutually supporting activity -
evacuation, shelter, rescue and relief and warning. 
One of the simplest, most effective and least expensive 
civil defence measures is to provide facilities for the 
controlled dispersal of concentrated urban populations across 
the expanses of sparsely occupied, but readily accessible, 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Ibid., p. 14. 
The inadequate condit~on of Australia's evacuation 
planning is detailed in the Summary of Discussions and 
Conclusions (An unpublished paper produced following a 
Seminar on Civil Defence held at the National Emergency 
Services College, Mount Macedon on 3-6 August 1975), 
pp. 2' 3' 6. 
The limited scope of Australia's shelter programme is 
cited ibid., p. 1, but see also a paper written by a member 
of the Natural Disasters Organization's National Fallout 
Survey Team, L.W. Wynn, Fallout Shelters (An unpublished 
paper delivered to the 1977 Inqustrial Mobilisation 
Course). Especially see pp. 14-20~ 
Australia's relatively poor state of development in civil 
defence programmes is illustrated most clearly in Air 
Vice-Marshall W.E. Townsend, Overseas Developments in 
Civil Defence, but also by reference to Kurt Ek, Civil 
Defence to Protect and Save Lives (Stockholm, The Swedish 
Civil Defence Administration, 1970), and also Civil 
Emergency Planning in Norway (An unpublished paper 
prepared by the Directorate of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Planning, Oslo, 1975). 
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rural and underdeveloped regions. Evacuation systems are 
normally structured so that, in the circumstances of a 
worsening international situation, the precautionary 
evacuation of non-working people - children, elderly, 
incapacitated, etc. - can be undertaken first. Facilities 
for satisfying the physical needs of the dispersed civilian 
population - food, shelter materials, clothing and other 
.supplies - need to be stockpiled in advance in the dispersal 
regions. Although all of the available mass media are used 
to inform the public of these preparations, it is common in 
Europe for precise plans, maps and personal instructions to 
b bl . h d . 1 h d . . 4 6 e pu is e in te ep one irectories. 
The second element of most integrated civil defence 
systems is a shelter progranune. Frequently two separate 
categories of shelter are constructed: those which are 
adjacent to or under residential buildings and larger 
sfructures which are constructed within cities or close to 
places of work. In Sweden, for instance, residential 
shelter construction is compulsory for every building which 
houses two or more families .and is positioned either in a 
vulnerable area or in a town with more than five thousand 
inhabitants. 47 That programme is estimated to add 
approximately two per cent to new residential building 
48 
costs. The public is encouraged to utilise the space 
provided by the shelters for a variety of peacetime 
activities. The smaller residential shelters are frequently 
used as storage areas, libraries, activity or local community 
centres. The larger shelters in cities or at workplaces are 
used as parking stations, theatres, recreation areas and 
gymnasiums and, over time, largely pay for their own 
construction. 
46 
47 
48 
This was noted during my field trip in Europe in 
October-November 1975. It is also mentioned in Air 
Vice-Marshal W.E. Townsend, Overseas Developments in 
Civil Defence, p. 20. 
For details see Kurt Ek, Civil Defence to Protect and 
Save Lives, pp. 29 ff. 
This point was made in the 'Special Survey on Sweden', 
The Australian, June 1972, p. 2. 
35 3 
The third element of most integrated civil defence 
structures is a trained relief or rescue force. The actual 
methods of force formation employed overseas vary widely 
but in most countries large numbers of people are trained 
in a part-time manner to perform rescue, fire fighting and 
basic medical tasks. For operations within large towns and 
cities, specialised equipment and advanced training are 
required for effective function performance. While civil 
fire, rescue and medical facilities can be integrated into 
this relief system, the scale of the requirement which 
must be anticipated in wartime situations is of a magnitude 
which makes the training and equipping of large part-time 
forces essential. 
The fourth and final civil defence element is a warning 
mechanism to detect the approach of potential threats and to 
initiate appropriate local, regional and nation-wide response 
measures. Because of its geographic isolation, Australia is 
confronted by peculiar difficulties in this regard. In many 
circumstances, it seems probable that a heightening of 
regional or global tensions would provide sufficient notice 
to trigger precautionary civil defence measures. However, 
if Australia is to be assured of preliminary warning of a 
bomber 1 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine 
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) or long range cruise 
missile attack, a much more advanced detection system would 
be required. The over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar 
which Australia is developing for long range surveillance 
purposes ·should be capable of detecting and tracking the 
approach of long range bombers and large cruise missiles. 49 
However, the detection of ICBMs, SLBMs and probably long 
range cruise missiles of small dimensions may require the 
purchase of a surveillance satellite capability. 50 As 
49 
50 
The capabilities of this system are discussed in Chapter 2. 
For a satellite to be capable of performing cruise missile 
detection as well as ICBM and SLBM detection tasks, it 
would probably need to incorporate advanced high-altitude 
large-optics (HALO) technology. For details see Barry 
Miller, 'Advances in Missile Surveillance Pushed' in 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 105, No. 2, 
12 July 1976, pp. 17, 18. 
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Australia already possesses numerous ground stations with 
a capacity .to monitor such a system, the major costs involved 
would be those of the satellite itself and its positioning. 
This might cost between $50 million and $i5o million. 51 
However, as one satellite could be expected to operate 
effectively for at least ten years, and it might also perform 
secondary military and/br civil functions, an annual cost of 
52 between $7 million and $20 million might be acceptable. 
A satellite surveillance system could be expected to provide 
an effective 30 minute warning of incoming ICBMs and a 
5 minute plus warning of SLBMs and sea-launched cruise 
53 
missiles fired from platforms close offshore. Under most 
circumstances this would be sufficient to permit widespread 
shelter occupation. 
Australia already possesses the basic organisational 
framework and much of the manpower and technical expertise 
required for an integrated and highly effective civil defence 
network. However, a great deal remains to be done if the 
conceptual potential of civil defence is to be approached in 
Australia. As a bureaucratic problem, such an effort would 
51 
52 
53 
Thes~ cost figures should be viewed only as generalised 
approximations. They are derived from 'more detailed 
calculations undertaken in 1973 based on the costs of the 
US 949 and 647 satellite programmes. See Ross E. Babbage, 
A Strategy for the Continental Defence of Australia ' 
(Unpublished M.Ec. thesis, University of Sydney, Sydney, 
1974), p. 127. Costs would obviously vary according to 
the type of satellite actually procured. However, it 
should be noted that with the SPACE SHUTTLE becoming 
operational in the early 1980s, the costs of orbital 
placement are likely to be reduced significantly. A total 
system cost of $150 million has been quoted by the Vice-
President of Hughes Corporation for a combined communications 
and regional surveillance capability. For details see 
Ken McGregor, 'Australia May Again Look at a Domestic 
Satellite System' in Australian Financial Review, 19 August 
1977, p. 17. 
These figures are calculated to include annual operating 
costs. 
ICBM and SLBM warning times of these magnitudes are 
cited in 'Satellites Provide Early Warning of ICBMs' in 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 95, No. 17, 
25 October 1971, p. 14. 
involve the diversion of resources away from already 
established_ programmes and priorities. As a political 
issue, the apparent remoteness of the scenarios for which 
it is designed makes it easy to neglect in the absence of 
a widespread public demand for protection. 
Theme 7: Psychol6gical Defence 
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The primary objectives of psychological defence 
structures are to inform the public in periods of peace of 
what they are expected to do in crisis situations and to 
ensure an adequate flow of accurate news and information 
during the actual course of a crisis or conflict. In those 
countries employing this concept, the existing civil media 
are employed extensively in the performance of both of these 
f . 54 unctions. 
In preparing for their special tasks in crisis situations, 
the peacetime facilities of the media are usually analysed 
carefully to determine their survivability and effectiveness 
in a range of hostile environments. Decisions can then be 
made to restructure or back up existing arrangements by 
duplicating or protecting facilities. In a cr~sis situation, 
a properly structured psychological defence system can provide 
a capability to largely eliminate rumours, defeat enemy 
propaganda and strengthen national resolve. 
Conclusion 
Primarily because the national security function has 
been tied intimately to the activities of major power allies 
for so long, the consideration of alternative force structures 
in Australia has been limited almost completely to relatively 
minor variations c:if the conventional, major power-derived 
54 For details of Swedish psychological defence preparations 
see Jerry Wilson Ralston, The Defense of Small States in 
the NucleaP Age, pp. 90, 91. 
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order of battle. Force structure debates have tended to 
centre alma.st entirely on numbers and types of aircraft, . 
destroyers, aircraft carriers, infantry battalions, armoured 
vehicles, etc. But now, with the changes in Australia's 
security environment stimulating a requirement to deter, 
defer and, if necessary, defend against a much wider range of 
potential pressures and threats independently, the scope of 
the force structure debate in Australia needs to be 
broadened considerably. 
All of the strategy themes which have been discussed in 
this chapter suffer from major weaknesses and problems when 
viewed in isolation. Yet by drawing selectively upon the 
positive elements of a number of themes, it is possible to 
construct strategy and structure conglomerates which possess 
an efficient capacity to meet a wide range of pressures and 
threats. 
For instance, the following strategy themes could be 
combined in various ways to produce several alternate 
conceptual solutions. Adapted conventional units might be 
used for peacetime surveillance and policing duties as well 
as to provide an immediate counter-attack capacity in more 
serious scenarios. Territorial defence forces might be 
employed to provide a highly survivable attrition capacity 
in the circumstances of major assaults as well as a local 
rapid-reaction force in the context of a wide range of less 
demanding contingencies. Civilian resistance forces might 
be available to organise resistance should major population 
centres fall into enemy hands. Economic, civil and 
psychological defence measures might be employed, in addition, 
to provide the total community with a degree of protection 
from the broad array o~ economic pressures and direct physical 
and propaganda assaults. 
Combinations of these strategy themes could serve to 
optimise Australia's response capacities to particular types 
of threat or pressure. The precise character of the 
individual strategy themes and the emphasis given to particular 
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elements would not be a simple matter to determine. 
Consequently, as was discussed in Chapter 9, it would be 
necessary to generate and test in concept alternative mixes 
of strategy themes for their effectiveness in meeting a 
wide range of contingencies. Only through such a detailed 
evaluative process could a combination of themes be chosen 
which would optimise, in a demonstrable fashion, deterrence, 
deferment and defensive capacity for a given resource input. 
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CHAPTER 11 
NEW MANPOWER OPTIONS 
The Problems of the Status Quo 
As with most aspects of its national security structure, 
Australia's military manpower system is a function of past 
requirements. Since the Second World War, Australia has 
relied almost completely upon small, highly trained, 
professional forces in all three services. This has made it 
possible to maintain a conventional armed force structure 
which has been highly compatible with those of Australia's 
major power allies. Standing professional forces readily 
absorb high technology systems and their inherent flexibility 
makes them very well suited to overseas commitments at 
relatively short notice. 1 
However, Australia's changed strategic environment 
effectively generates force structure requirements which are 
quite different to those of the past. In this new 
s~tuation, Australia's small standing military forces suffer 
from several important deficiencies. 
Firstly, as was discussed in Chapter 4, Australia now 
requires a much greater surge capacity. In the first thirty 
days following an order to mobilise (M+30) , 2 Australia 
requires fully equipped and trained armed forces of a 
magnitude substantially greater than is curre~tly possible. 
1 
2 
Australia does possess small supplementary reserve 
The strengths and weaknesses of standing professional 
forces are discussed at length by Erwin Hackel in 
Military Manpower and Political Purpose (London, The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi 
Paper 72, 1970), pp. 3 ff. 
The choice of this period as a target for force structure 
design is, of course, open· to debate. Its selection is 
intended merely to provide clearer perspective to the 
discussion in Chapter 4 concerning the lengths of active 
defence preparation time likely to be received prior to 
the onset of a wide range of threats. 
6 
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forces in all three services but in total these number only 
22,6QO and the efficiency and overall military utility of 
these units leaves a great deal to be desired. 3 As the 
Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces 
reported: 
We have seen a progressive deterioration 
in ... [the] reserve component.to its 
present state, which, despite the best efforts 
of its members, must be regarded as 
unsatisfactory and in urgent need of 
reorganization and rehabilitation.4 
The length and nature of the Army Reserve training cycle 
(normally al4 day annual camp and 12 days weekend or evening 
training) effectively restricts its peacetime efficiency as 
well as its potential for wartime service. 5 It has been 
estimated officially that in a crisis situation the current 
reserves could not be ready for combat duty before M+l80 to 
300. 6 This is too slow to be of significant assistance in 
meeting a wide range of scenarios which are characterised by 
short defence preparation times. But even if the existing 
reserve forces could be deployed in time to meet the 
contingency at hand, their very limited numbers would 
restrict their battlefield potential severely. 
Because of these obvious weaknesses, a possible 
alternative function for.the current reserves in crisis 
situations might be to serve as a basis for further force 
expansion. However, even in this cadre role, a study 
3 
4 
5 
For details of Australia's current reserve force strengths 
see Department of Defence, Defence Report 1976 (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), p. 57. 
Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces 
Report (The Millar Report) (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1974), p. 43. 
The time obligations for some specialised units, such as 
the 'Bushmen's Rifles' and Commando Uni ts do differ fro·m 
those given in the text. Full details are provided in 
the chapter entitled 'Conditions of Service, Pay and 
Administration' in the Millar Report, ibid., pp. 101-116. 
Ibid., p. 51. 
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conunissioned by the Millar Inquiry concluded that, from a 
level of 20,000.enlisted personnel, it would take three years 
to expand to 55,000, and even that would be possible only 
if a considerable imbalance in the rank structure was 
7 
accepted. 
Australia's armed forces as they currently stand have 
not been designed to optimise surge capacity. However, in 
the new strategic environment, many pressures and threats 
may arise quickly and Australia requires a capacity to meet 
them with a much higher degree of independence than has been 
necessary in the past. As a consequence, there is now a 
clear and urgent need for alternative manpower systems to be 
examined for their capacity to provide the greater levels 
of force expansion capacity which are necessary. 
The second major weakness of Australia's current small 
professional military forces is that, as was discussed in 
Chapter 4, the costs of servicing and maintaining forces of 
this type are rising dramatically. The trends in Australia's 
defence budgetary allocation from 1965-66 to 1975-76 can 
be seen in Figure 1. As the costs of full-time manpower and 
its maintenance have risen, the proportion of the budget 
remaining for new capital equipment, the construction of 
new defence facilities, the maintenance and development of 
defence industrial support and other important national 
security functions has fallen dramatically. 8 
7 
8 
Ibid., p. 50. 
The full impact of these developments on the overall 
force structure is not fully conveyed by this diagram. 
For not only have manpower and maintenance costs risen 
dramatically during this period but so have equipment 
costs. See this discussed by Desmond J. Ball in 
'Australia's Tactical Air Requirements and the Criteria 
for Evaluating Tactical Aircraft for Australian 
Procurement' in Desmond Ball (ed.), The Future of 
Tactical Airpower in the Defence of Australia (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), pp. 61-65. The end result 
has been that not only has a smaller proportion of the 
total defence budget been allocated to capital equipment 
but, in addition, the equipment buying capacity of a 
given number of fixed-year dollars has also fallen. 
361 
FIGURE i. CATEGORIES OF EXPENDITURE AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF THE TOTAL DEFENCE BUDGETARY VOTE 
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The statistics for this figure were derived from 
tables appearing in Department of Defence, 
Defence Reports for the years 1967, 1968, 1970, 
1975 and 1976 (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service) . 
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This type of standing manpower cost-squeeze phenomenon 
is not confined to the Australian military structure. It 
has been the subject of extensive inquiry in a number of 
advanced western countries during the past decade. In 
West Germany, for example, the capital expenditure share of 
the defence budget fell from 41.1 per cent in 1968 to 30.6 
per cent in 1972. 9 The German Government realised tha~ if 
this trend was allowed to continue unchecked and if the 
manpower structure as it then existed was retained unaltered, 
the proportion of the defence budget which would be available 
for capital expenditure in 1981 would be reduced to an 
unacceptable 7.3 per cent. As a consequence, a Force 
Structure Commission was established in July 1970 to examine 
alternative military structures. One of its prime directives 
was to derive force structure alternatives so th~t within 
the postulated budgetary allocations for the late 1970s and 
1980s, the proportion of the defence vote allocated to 
capital expenditure would not fall below the minimum 
10 
acceptable level of 30 per cent. 
A number of similar investigations and measure~ have 
been undertaken in other countries to ensure that capital 
expenditure as a proportion of defence budgets has remained 
11 in the 25-35 per cent category. This high level of concern 
9 
10 
11 
These German figures and the nature of the problem 
throughout Europe are discussed by Kenneth Hunt in The 
Alliance and Europ~ Part II: Defence with Fewer Men 
(London, The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, Adelphi Paper 98, 1973), p. 9. 
The full rationale for the West German Force Structure 
Commission is given in a section entitled 'The Task' in 
Force Structure Commission of the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, The Force Structure in the 
Federal Republic of Germany: Analysis and Options 
(Published in 1972/1973 by the Force Structure Commission 
in concurrence with the Federal Government), pp. 3-6. 
See, for example, Committee on Defence, Summary of the 
First Part of Report of Government Committee on Defence 
Presenting General Outlines of the Future Development of 
Sweden's Total Defence and Security Policy (Stockholm, 
1976), pp. 10 ff.; Major-General Nils Skold, Defence 
Policy for the 1970's and BO's (Stockholm, The Secretariat 
for National Security Policy and Long-Rang.e Defence 
Planning, Ministry of Defence, 1974), pp. 75 ff. and Charles 
and remedial activity contrasts markedly with Australia's 
recent expe!ience. Even allowing for international 
differences in the methods of calculating manpower and 
capital expenditures, it seems clear that the proportion 
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of Australia's defence budget now allocated to capital 
expenditure is much lower than that of comparable countries 
and insufficient for the long term sustenance of· 'state of 
the art' conventional forces. As Desmond Ball has remarked, 
' ... most developed defence establishments seem to have a 
ratio of equipment spending to the total defence vote which 
is 2-3 times better than Australia 1s 1• 12 The major 
implications of permitting manpower and maintenance expend-
itures to continue to dominate Australia's defence budgets 
will be to restrain heavily the processes of structural 
adaption to the new strategic requirements and to limit 
severely the operational capacity, flexibility and endurance 
of the total defence system. A thorough examination of 
alternative means of overcoming the standing force cost-
squeeze problem is overdue in Australia. 
The third and final major weakness of the present 
professional force structure is that its dimensions are 
restrained by the number of recruits which can be attracted 
as volunteers. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the absolute 
size of the manpower pool available in Australia during the 
1980s will be limited and relatively stable in size. When 
this is combined with the inelastic supply function for 
military manpower, it becomes clear that in normal economic 
11 cont'd 
12 
Grossenbacher, 'Procurement and Deployment of Armaments' 
in The Defence Forces of Switzerland (A supplementary 
booklet published by The Army Quarterly and Defence 
Journal, 1974), p. 35. The efforts of the Belgians, 
Dutch and Danes in this field are discussed in Horst 
Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO 
Europe (Santa Monica, Rand Corporatio~ R-1184, 1973), p. 7. 
Desmond J. Ball, 'Equipment Policy in the Defence of 
Australia' in Robert O'Neill (ed.), The Defence of 
Australi~: Fundamental New Aspects (Canberra, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian 
National University, 1977), p. 104. 
circumstances, it will be very difficult and expensive 
to expand the professional standing forces significantly 
beyond their current levels. This imposes a very severe 
constraint upon the nation's capacity to react to changes 
in the strategic environment. As was discussed in 
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Chapter 4, a resort to conscription in crisis situations 
does not provide a satisfactory means of supplementing 
existing force levels within the time constraints of a wide· 
range of scenarios. 
It can be concluded from this discussion that there are 
three important new criteria to be considered when evaluating 
alternative types of manpower systems for Australia's future 
national security requirements. 
1. It is of central importance to boost the dimensions 
of the defence force which can be mobilised within a short 
period, such as four to six weeks. 
2. Because, in the past, defence budgets have not been 
compensated fully for the rising support costs of professional 
personnel, and it appears unlikely that this will be done 
in the future, it is imperative that the proportion of the 
total defence budget allocated to personnel be expended in 
such a manner that it can produce a larger and more effective 
mobilised force. In practice, this implies a requirement to 
reduce significantly the total force's costs per mobilised 
man. 
3. It is important to recognise the inelastic supply 
constraints on Australia's voluntary full-time manpower pool 
and develop alternative ways of raising forces. 
The Potential of Latent Manpower Options in Australia 
The three new criteria for Australia's national security 
manpower system effectively raise a requirement for part-time, 
mobilisation-dependent or latent forces. 13 The former 
13 The nature of a series of latent force options is 
discussed at some length in Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance 
and Europe, pp. 10, 11. 
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United States Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, explained 
the ration~le for such forces clearly in his Congressional 
statement on the 1972 defense budget: 
Lower sustaining costs of non-active 
duty forces, as compared to the cost 
of maintaining larger active duty 
forces ... allows more force units 
to be provided for the same cost as an 
all-active force structure, or the 
same number of force units to be 
maintained at a lower cost.14 
The costs of latent or non-active forces are lower than 
those of comparable standing forces primarily for three 
reasons. Firstly, as latent personnel perform national 
security duties for only a relatively small proportion of 
the year, they are only paid for that time. Secondly, the 
rates of equipment usage (rounds fired, miles travelled, 
hours steamed or flown, etc.), tend to be somewhat less per 
year than for standing units and thus, lower operations and 
maintenance costs are incurred. In addition, the capital 
equipment holdings of latent forces.normally have a lower 
rate of natural attrition. The third reason why latent 
forces tend to be less expensive than standing forces is 
that, in most countries, latent force personnel are not 
entitled to most of the fringe benefits enjoyed by full-time 
personnel, except when they are on active duty. The 
peacetime requirement for full-time medical, dental, travel, 
recreational and other support services is thus usually 
much reduced. As a consequence of these factors, Martin 
Binkin asserts that the average per capita personnel costs 
of reserve forces in all four US armed services are approx-
imately one fifth of those for otherwise comparable active 
d . . 15 · 1 · h stan ing units. In some European mi itary structures t e 
t . k d 16 con rast is even more mar e . 
14 
15 
16 
Cited in Martin Binkin, US Reserve Forces: The Problem 
of the Weekend Warrior (Washington D.C., The Brookings 
Institution, 1974), p. 1. 
Ib id . , p . 14 . 
The relative costs of a number of latent manpower 
systems are discussed in Erwin H§ckel, Military Manpower 
and Political Purpose, pp. 18-22 and also in Horst 
Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in NATO and Non-NATO 
Europe, p. vi. 
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However, in order to compare the total annual costs of 
latent with standing force units, an allocation for 
operations and maintenance (fuel, repairs, etc.), for 
the construction of facilities and for the procurement of 
capital equipment must be added to the personnel costs of 
each type of force. It is here that an important 
difference between various types of latent military units 
emerges. Obviously the capital equipment, facilities and 
operations and maintenance c-osts of a fighter-bomber or 
destroyer unit are much greater per man than those of a 
light infantry unit, regardless of whether it is manned by 
full-time or part-time personnel. Thus, in highly capital 
intensive units, especially those operating complex ships 
and combat aircraft, the large size of capital equipment, 
facilities and operations and maintenance costs tends to 
reduce the overall significance of the savings which can be 
made by operating such units with part-time personnel. 
Herman Boland illustrates the point by referring to US Navy 
selected reserve ships. In their case, initial acquisition 
accounts for more than 60 per cent of the costs of operating 
th 1 t l 'f 1 17 h h · ese vesse s over a en year i e eye e. T us, t e 
potential savings which can be made by substituting part-
time forces for full-time professionals are much lower in 
specialised high technology and skill areas than in units 
employing low and medium technologies and relatively 
unsophisticated skills. In fact, in the .United States' 
.case, the total annual costs of a reserve destroyer unit 
have been cited in Congressional hearings as 60 per cent of 
an active destroyer unit, those of a reserve air defence 
squadron between 40-46 per cent of an active squadron and 
those of an infantry battalion 21 per cent of those of an 
act~ve unit. 18 The higher the proportion of total unit costs 
17 
18 
See this discussed in Herman Boland, 'Reserve Forces' 
in Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an 
AZZ-VoZunteer Armed Force (The Gates Commission), Volume 
II, November 1970, p. IV-3-32. 
See the Statement of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs, Reserve Authorization 
Hearings Before Subcommittee Two~ House Armed Services 
Committee, (US House of Representatives), 14 July 1973, 
p. 10. 
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taken up by personnel and maintenance expenditure, the 
greater the. potential for gain by latent force substitution. 
However, in practice, there are a variety of factors 
which effectively limit the scope for adopting latent force 
options in Australia. Firstly, latent forces of most types 
tend to be generally less capable on the battlefield than 
similarly equipped standing units. Yet this weakness of 
latent forces should not be overemphasised. As might be 
expected, the capacity of part-time units varies greatly 
according to a large number of factors, but particularly 
the amount of effective training they receive. As Horst 
Mendershausen points out: 
19 
A latent force can, of course, be 
a thing of many different hues and colors. 
The fact that it is not standing, ie. not 
made up of men living permanently in 
barracks next to their equipment, may mean 
that it is no fo:rce at all. Its members may 
be reservists with some previous but largely 
forgotten military training, spread out over 
civilian society, unassigned to specific 
units or functions, practically unrecallable 
and, if recalled, not immediately (if ever) · 
usable. Its units may be paper organizations; 
its equipment primitive, in bad condition, 
or nonexistent; its leaders, superannuated. 
'Forces' exist which have several if not all 
of these characteristics. Yet to assert that 
these are the necessary characteristics of a 
latent force, as some partisans of standing 
forces sometimes do, merely invites a similar 
caricature of standing forces as barracks full 
of time-serving, crime-prone, soldier-playing, 
and in time of real challenge, hapless ruffians. 
Latent forces can also be.well-trained and 
retrained soldiers, familiar with their tasks 
and equipment, quickly recallable and smoothly 
assignable, capably officered, and well-equipped. 
They can, moreover, be intertwined with standing 
elements, permanent cadres or specialists in 
m~ny, including highly efficient, ways. 19 
Horst Mendershausen,TerritoriaZ Defense in NATO and 
Non-NATO Europe, p. 20. 
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There have certainly been a large number of instances 
where part~time forces have acquitted themselves very well 
in combat. For example, the performance of the Israeli 
tank crews in recent wars has been acclaimed almost 
universally as being first class. 20 In some respects an 
even more notable case is cited by Adam Roberts: 
During the battle of France in 1940, 
groups of Me 109 fighter aircraft 
frequently flew over Swiss territory. 
They were regularly intercepted by 
Swiss citizen pilots flying exactly 
the same aircraft - Me 109s. The 
rate of scoring was 7 to 1 in favour 
of the Swiss; not figures to be 
shrugged off as quite insignificant.21 
The proven combat capacity of well-trained,-equipped 
and -led latent force units has encouraged a large number 
of countries to attempt to exploit their full potential. A 
notable example is the United States. In the US Army, for 
instance, 43 per cent of total manpower, 38 per cent of 
division increments, 66 per cent of support increments and 
56 per cent of air defence batteries are provided by reserve 
forces. In the US Navy, 34 per cent of anti-submarine 
warfare squadrons are operated by reserves. 25 per cent of 
the US Marine Corps divisions and air wings are provided by 
22 
reserve forces. For the US Air Force, 50 per cent of 
airlift crews, 50 per cent of fighter air defence strength 
and 50 per cent of tactical reconnaissance capacity will be 
provided by Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units by 
fiscal year 1979. In that year, reserve units will also 
20 
21 
22 
For details of the combat performance of Israeli latent 
force units see Captain Roy. A. Werner, 'The Other 
Military: Are US Reserve Forces Viable?' in Military 
Review, Vol. 57, No. 4, April 1977, p. 20. 
H. Guisan, Berich~ an die Bundesversammlung llber den 
Aktivdienst 1939-1945, Vol. III, p. 47, cited by Adam 
Roberts in Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice 
of Territorial Defence (London, Chatto and Windus for 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1976)' p. 107. 
For details see Martin Binkin, US Reserve Forces, 
p. 10. 
369 
provide 33 per cent of US tactical fighter strength and 
20 per cent of the Air Force's strategic air refuelling 
b . 1 . t '2 3 h . 1 1 d b 1 capa l l y. T e important ro e p aye y atent forces 
in the military structures of the United States, most 
European NATO and neutral countries is difficult to dispute 
seriously. Although on a direct unit comparison basis most 
European and US latent force units are marginally less 
capable than their comparable full-time equivalents, their 
lower overall costs and the natural process of post-
mobilisation capability equalisation reinforce their cost-
effectiveness in most environments. 
The second major constraint on the widespread adoption 
of latent force options is tha~ because of their part-time 
nature, they tend to be slower to mobilise than standing 
full-time forces. In practice, well-trained and -organised 
latent units are limited in their mobilisation only by the 
simple administrative task of gathering personnel from their 
normal civilian activities. In fact, in some countries, 
latent force mobilisation times rival those for standing 
24 forces. The biggest constraint on latent force mobilisation 
occurs only when part-time units are insufficiently prepared 
23 
24 
These figures are drawn from the testimony of General 
D.C. Jones, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, 
before a Subcornrni ttee of the Cammi ttee on Appropriations, 
US House of Representatives, Department of Defense 
Appropriations 19??, Part 1, 2 February 1976, p. 68. 
Martin Binkin states that some US Air Force Reserve 
tactical units have met deployment standards surpassing 
those set for active units. See Martin Binkin, US 
Reserve Forces, p. 9. The Swedes claim to be able to 
mobilise their complete structure within 72 hours. 
See Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms, p. 98. The Swiss 
claim a capability to be fully mobilised within 48 hours. 
See 'A Look at the Swiss Army' (An official translated 
digest of D. Borel, 'Aper9u de l'armee suisse' in 
Revue Militaire Suisse, September 1972), p. 1. The 
Israelis claim a mobilisation time of 36 hours, but 
during an exercise in August 1974, 90 per cent of 
Israeli combat units were mobilised in a record 22 hours. 
For details see 'Israeli Military Manpower Raised to 
400,000' in International Defense Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, 
April 1977, p. 205. . 
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for immediate commitment to combat. 25 Post-mobilisu.tion 
training c~n effectively delay the processes of total force 
d 1 f 1 . 26 ep oyment or very ong periods. 
A further constraint on the employment of latent force 
units is that there are some military functions which are 
not well suited to part-time personnel operation because 
they require round-the-clock duty, even in peri6ds of peace. 
Regional surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence and 
basic command functions all fall into this category. It is 
notable in this context that those components of the 
Australian Defence Force which may require full-time 
operational status in the new strategic environment may 
not be the same as those judged to require it in the past. 
Another constraint upon the development of latent 
forces is that many of the people who might normally 
volunteer for part-time service in periods of peace occupy 
full-time posts in the civil community of a 'reserved' 
nature from which they could not easily be removed in a time 
of crisis. 27 This factor tends to reduce the size of the 
manpower pool which is eligible for latent force recruitment 
and, if personnel in organisations of a marginally 'reserved' 
character are permitted to join the forces, it may also 
serve to complicate the actual processes of mobilisation. 
25 
26 
27 
It is notable that in the absence of large, well-
equipped and easily mobilised latent army units at 
the commencement of the Second World War, the first 
Australian division to be deployed (the 6th Division, 
Second AIF) was ready for combat only after eight 
months intensive training. For details see Gavin 
Long, To Benghazi (Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 
19 5 2) , pp. 6 8 , 12 6. 
Where post-mobilisation training is necessary, the 
smaller the unit to be deployed, the shorter the 
period of post-mobilisation training which is generally 
required. In other words, it is normally much simpler 
and quicker to deploy post-mobilised trained latent 
forces as army companies, aircraft squadrons or 
individual ships than as divisions, wings or ship 
squadrons. 
For details of the difficulties caused by the presence 
of personnel with 'reserved' occupational skills in the 
Second World War, see S.J. Butlin, War Economy 1939~1942 
(Canberra, Australian War Memorial, 1955), pp. 228-234. 
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A fifth major constraint on the substitution of 
part-time for full-time personnel is that a large proportion 
of defence manpower in Australia, as in all western states, 
consists of civilians who perform admini~trative and 
support functions. Because of the continuous nature of 
their work requirement, there is no financial incentive to 
replace these individuals by larger numbers of part-time 
personnel operating in rotation. 
As can be seen from Table 1, despite t~e problems of 
international comparison~ the size of Australia's civilian 
'tail' does not appear to be out of proportion to those of 
comparable western countries. Moreover, a detailed 
breakdown of the distribution of civilian manpower within 
the Australian defence structure reveals that this sector 
performs many functions which are of central importance to 
the overall capacity of the national security system. For 
instance, civilian personnel provide direct support to combat 
and training units and~ in so doing, free military personnel 
from many purely administrative tasks. Civilians also 
provide much of the repair, maintenance, production and supply 
which is vital to the defence structure's operational 
28 
capacity and endurance. 
This is not to suggest that economies could not be 
made in Australia's civilian support structure. If, for 
instance, Australia follows the general trends dictated by 
modern technological developments and reduces the number of 
large surface naval ships in the fleet, 29 it may also be 
possible to reduce gradually the size of the civil workforce 
engaged in naval dockyards. In the defence factories, where 
' 
surplus capacity and underemployment are perennial problems 
28 
29 
A case can be made, on economic grounds, for the 
replacement of military personnel by civilians in an 
even wider range of defence tasks. See this case made 
briefly by R.E. Babbage, D.J. Ball, J.O. Langtry and 
R.J. O'Neill, The Fu~ure Operational Requirement and 
Officer Development (Canberra, Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1977), 
PP• 3 I 4 • 
This trend is discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Table 1 
A Compa-rative Tabulation of Civilian Personnel 
Strengths irt Defence Establishments 
Country 
Numbers of 
civilians 
(in thousands) 
Civilians as a 
percentage of all 
full-time defence 
personnel 
Britain 330 91 
Canada 39 43 
Australia 39 36 
West Germany 168 35 
United States 1,122 34 
Denmark 14 32 
France 131 27 
Italy 82 20 
Austria 8 17 
Sweden 30 37 (5) 
Switzerland 21 43 ( 3) 
Sources: The figures for. all countries except Australia are 
drawn from Erwin H~ckel, Military Manpower and 
Political Purpose, p. 17. H~ckel emphasises that 
his figures are approximations only and they relate 
to 1969-70. Those for Australia are drawn from 
Department of Defence, Defence Report 19 76 (Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), 
p. 59 and from D.J. O'Connor, 'The Contribution by 
the Defence Factories to Australia's Defence 
Capability' in The United Service Institution of 
the Australian Capital Territory, The Defence 
Capability of Australian Industry (Canberra, The 
United Service Institution of the Australian Capital 
Territory, 1977), p. 3. Note that the figures for 
Australia relate to 1976-77. The figures for 
Sweden and Switzerland ~re the percentages of 
average peacetime armed force strength. The 
percentage figures in brackets are calculated on 
the basis of full mobilisation strengths. 
It is difficult to draw detailed conclusions from this 
table. Some countries employ civilians for a much 
wider range of tasks than others. A large civilian 
'tail' may not necessarily be a symptom of civilian 
bureaucratic inefficiency but rather an indication 
of high levels of military specialisation and 
efficiency. In fact, there appears to be a close 
correlation between the size of the volunteer element 
in the armed forces and the size of the civilian 
defence administration. 
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Table 2 
Functional Distributioh of Full-Time Defence Manpower 
Service Civilian Total 
Combat Forces 23,600 23,600 
Direct Logistic Support to 
Combat Forces 6,400 
Specialist Support 
(eg. Medical Services, 
Communications) 5,300 
Stores and Supply 3,200 
Workshops and Repair Facilities 2,900 
Quality Assurance, Inspection 100 
Naval Dockyards -
Construction and refit program 100 
· Training Staff, 
Direct Support and 
900 
1,000 
5,000 
900 
1,300 
5,300 
7,300 
6,300 
8,200 
3,800 
1,400 
5,400 
Servicemen in Training 17,700 1,800 19,500 
Support to Reserves and 
Cadets 1,600 
Research and Development 400 
Central and Departmental 
Functions and Specialist 
Administrative Services 2,300 
Defence Regional Off ices -
provide financial, audit, 
civil personnel and 
management support to 
the Services and the 
Department 
Service Command and, District 
HQs and Administrative Units -
provide administrative support 
to Service Units and · 
Establishments 
Defence factories 
5,200 
100 
5,700 
3,700 
1,900 
2,900 
7,961 
1,700 
6,100 
6,000 
1,900 
8,100 
7,961 
TOTALS 68,800 38,461 107,261 
Sources: Department of Defence, Defence Report 19?6 
(Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1976), p. 19. The figures relating 
to defence factories were gained during a 
conversation with a spokesman for the 
Department of Productivity and were correct 
as at September, 1977. (The Department of 
Productivity controls the defence factories.) 
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in times of peace, the central national security objective 
should be the preservation of skills and capacities rather 
than simpl~ employment. 30 In this type of ~ituation, it may 
be preferable to reallocate funding so that highly 
efficient capital equipment and plant may be installed, but 
only operated in periods of peace by fully-trained personnel 
operating on a part-time basis. The wage and salary savings 
derived might be invested in expanded emergency production 
capacities or, alternatively, reallocated to other, more 
pressing national security priorities. There may be additional 
potential for savings by reducing the level of civilian 
support provided to a large number of components of the 
national security structure. 
Overall, it must be concluded that the scope for 
substituting latent for full-time service and civilian 
manpower in the Australian national security structure is 
limited. The large number of civilians and the substantial 
proportion of servicemen whose functional tasks do not render 
them easily replaced by part-time personnel effectively 
provides a relatively large and stable (in real terms) 
fixed manpower cost_ factor in the national security system. 
Those functions which remain most amenable to latent forces 
do not require round-the-clock p~acetime duty~ can be 
performed by exploiting skills already held in the civil 
community and/or involve skills which are mastered readily 
by significant sections of the civilian population. However, 
in addition, the potential scope for employing part-time 
forces in the Australian national security structure also 
varies greatly according to the type of latent force systems 
considered. 
30 The problems of operating the defence factories in 
periods of peace are discussed at length in the Interim 
Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence, Industrial Support for Defence 
Needs and Allied Matters (Canberra, Parliament of 
Australia, June 1977). 
375 
Alternative Latent Force Systems 
There are three broad categories of latent manpower 
systems - those involving universal conscription, selective 
conscription and voluntary service. The possibilities and 
problems of each of these options, as they might be applied 
in the Australian environment, are discussed in turn. 
1. Universal Conscription 
A large number of western countries employ universal 
conscription systems to train young men for a period of 
31 between 9 and 36 months. As well as being very common in 
an international sense, universal conscription also appears 
to be by far the most popular type of military manpower 
system with the Australian population. During a series of 
public opinion polls more than 60 per cent of the respondents 
have consistently expressed their preference for a programme 
of compulsory military service of between 3 and 12 months. 32 
31 
32 
Those western countries operating universal conscription 
systems include France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Denmark, Austria, Finland, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Israel. 
The general preferences of Australians in this regard were 
displayed in the poll results reproduced in Chapter 5. 
However, in addition, Australian Gallup Polls sampled the 
opinion of the public with greater precision on two occasions 
in 1972. On the first occasion, people were asked ~hich 
proposal 'came closest to their ideas about compulsory 
military training'. (Note that this question is highly 
ambiguous.) The results were as follows: 
All young men to camp for 6 months 
All young men to camp for 3 months 
Total of those in favour of training 'all young men' 
42% 
21% 
63% 
1 in 12 for 18 months, as now 11% 
Only full-time volunteers 19% 
No military training 4% 
No opinion 3% 
On the second occasion the question remained the same_and, 
despite a different set of alternatives, the results 
were comparable: 
All young men should go to camp for about 12 months 38% 
All young men should go to camp for about 3 months 28% 
1 in 12 should be called up for 18 months, as now 7% 
We should have only full-time volunteers 20% 
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Yet despite its apparent popularity, a syst~m of universal 
conscriptio.n wo_uld be extremely difficult to implement 
satisfactorily in practice and would not necessarily provide 
a basis for meeting Australia's national security requirements. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a reasonably constant 
130,000-140,000 young men will reach the age of 18 each year 
and under a system of universal conscription they would all 
be liable for call-up. Even if 40 per cent or 50 per cent 
of these were rejected on medical, educational, conscientious 
objection or some other grounds, universal conscription 
would still provide 70,000-85,000 young men to be trained 
33 
and equipped annually. The cost of equipping the numbers 
involved with even the most basic infantry weaponry would, 
in itself, impose a significant strain on the defence 
budget. Yet in addition to equipment costs, the expense 
of feeding, training and paying a force of this size would 
32 cont'd 
33 
There should be no military training in Australia 
No opinion 
4% 
3% 
See Australian Gallup Polls, April/June 1972, Release 
Number 2338 and Australian Gallup Polls, November 1972, 
Release Numbers 2362-2365. 
It is conceivable that the rejection rate for conscripts 
might be even greater than this. In the selective 
conscription system, which operated in Australia between 
1964 and 1972, approximately 70 per cent of those 
balloted into the scheme did not actually serve. A 
large proportion were rejected on educational, medical 
or conscientious objection grounds. But, in addition, 
those who were married and those undertaking religious 
training to become ministers of religion or priests 
were also excluded. A further number had their service 
obligation deferred because of their involvement in 
trade or professional courses of education. For 
details see Roy Forward, 'Conscription 1964-1968' in 
Roy Forward and Bob Reece (eds.), Conscription in 
Australia (St. Lucia, University of Queensland Press, 
1968), pp. 120-122. It is notable that, in most 
foreign countries employing systems of universal 
conscription, the proportion of each age group which 
actually serves is, in several instances, over 85%. 
See Erwin Hackel, Military Manpower and Political 
Purpose, pp. 4-9. 
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have to be met. Moreover, the capacity of the regular 
forces to train effectively the large number of conscripts 
which would be involved in such a scheme must be the 
subject of considerable doubt. It is notable that the 
Army experienced extreme difficulty in providing even the 
most basic training to the 28, 0·00 youths who were enlisted 
annually under the National Service Training Scheme between 
1951 and 1957. 34 It is thus reasonable to anticipate that, 
in the absence of a very major restructuring of the regular 
forces, the conscription of even larger numbers of young 
people in the late 1970s or 1980s would encounter similar 
difficulties. 
Clearly the running costs of such a scheme would vary 
according to the length of conscript training. It is here 
that one of the major dilemmas of the universal conscription 
option becomes apparent. A conscription period 3-6 months 
long might be sufficient to train recruits in the absolute 
basics of territorial defence, civil defence or civilian 
resistance, if these alternative strategies were to be 
adopted. However, it would be extremely difficult to teach 
the s~ills required for the effective performance of 
conventional military operations in this period. 35 Hence, 
in order to train conscripts to perform efficiently the 
military functions required of them, at least 6 months is 
likely to be necessary for those trained in territorial 
defence, civil defence and civilian resistance units and a 
minimum of 9-12 months for those destined for conventional 
units. Because of the numbers involved, this type of training 
effort would fully occupy almost the entire regular forces 
34 
35 
For details of the National Service Training Scheme, 
which in a modified form continued until 1959, see Neville 
T. Shields, 'National Service Training, 1950-1959' in 
Roy Forward and Bob Reece (eds.), Conscription in 
Australia, pp. 66-78. 
The length of the initial training period in the Swiss 
Army is only 4 months. The Swiss freely admit that this 
restricts severely the efficiency of their personnel in 
conventional units until they have successfully completed 
a series of supplementary training periods. See Erwin 
Hackel, Military Manpower and Political (?urpose, p. 11. 
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and the budgetary costs would undoubtedly be high. 
Moreover, the national security utility of such a 
training system would be highly dependent upon a range of 
supporting measures. It is important to realise that a 
simple system of conscripting young men for several months' 
military service would, on its own, be very wasteful of 
civil manpower and military resources. The majority of 
conscripts returning to civil employment would rapidly 
lose their acquired military s~ills. In order to avoid the 
natural wastage of training and equipping large numbers of 
personnel and then permitting a natural attrition of their 
operational capacity, it would be important to retain 
conscripts in formed units and to institute a system of 
compulsory supplementary training periods. Without the 
reinforcement of acquired skills and knowledge and the 
subsequent development of additional expertise which such a 
system would permit, the national security value of a 
universally conscripted force would be very limited unless 
the period of initial full-time training was of extended 
duration. 
There are many other complications and problems which 
have been experienced by countries employing systems of 
universal conscription. For instance, although it is rarely 
des~ribed as such, conscription is a tax in kind and, as a 
consequence, many of the real costs are hidden. Regardless 
of an individual's personal preferences or productivity in 
another occupation, universal conscription provides no legal 
option but to undertake training for the period required. 
In this sense, universal conscription represents an inefficient 
and unreasoned use of labour resources. Many of the 
frictional cos~s expressed in terms of disrupted production 
and education systems, although hidden and difficult to 
quantify in a simple budgetary sense, are no less. real. 36 
36 This argument is made in greater length and detail by 
Ross Parish and Mendel Weisser in 'Paying the Soldier 
his Hire ... the Economics of Abolishing Conscription', 
Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 46, No. 3, 27 July 1970, 
pp. 72-74. 
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A related problem arises as a result of the significant 
proportion of each age group which is inevitably excluded 
from the call-up on medical, educational, conscientious 
objection or other grounds. In most countries employing 
universal conscription, it is a continuing political and 
social question whether such individuals should be required 
to pay a compensation tax or suffer some other type of 
penalty in lieu of their labour tax in kind. 37 This same 
question could be expected to be the source of debate and 
potentially of political disagreement if such a system were 
to be introduced in Australia. 
The final major difficulty of a system of universal 
conscription is that, in a period of peace with no clear and 
obvious external threat to the nation, it is doubtful 
whether Australians as a whole would consider national 
security preparations of such a socially disruptive nature 
to be warranted. Despite the fact that well over 60 per cent 
of the population have consistently expressed their support 
for universal conscription for at least 3 months service, 
approximately 25 per cent of the sample has also expressed 
consistent opposition to any form of compulsory military 
training. If only a small proportion of the young men 
conscripted proved to be unwilling or recalcitrant recruits, 
the costs in terms of political and military turbulence and 
social discord may be sufficient, over a period, to outweigh 
any possible benefits. 
2. Selective Conscription 
Under a system of selective conscription, it is possible 
to limit the intake of recruits specifically to match national 
security requirements. It also means that those recruits who 
37 The Swiss, for example, levy a special military tax or 
Milit~rpflichter~atz on all Swiss males who for medical 
or other reasons do not serve in the Army. For details 
see Erwin Hackel, Military Manpower and Political Purpose, 
p. 21. A wide range of equalisation methods is also 
discussed in Force Structure Commission of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, The Force Structure in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, pp. 158-167. 
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are called up can be trained for much longer periods of 
time without imposing severe strains on the national economy. 
Full-time training for a period of between 9 and 18 months 
is sufficient to impart a high level of skill in either 
conventional, territorial, civil defence, or civilian 
resistance techniques and thus selective conscription 
potentially provides much greater scope for the application 
of the full range of alternative strategic concepts. 
As with universal conscription, if a selective system's 
cost-effectiveness is to be maximised, it is necessary to 
retain trained people in mobilisable units for several years 
following their initial call-up. This requires the 
institution of a system of supplementary training at regular 
intervals. 
Another feature shared by universal and selective 
conscription systems is that much of the total cost to the 
economy and society is expressed in terms of overridden 
preferences, disrupted careers, interrupted courses of 
education,etc. and as such is largely concealed from 
quantifiable assessment or easy public scrutiny. However, 
in addition, the budgetary ~osts of such an option could be 
expected to be substantial, particularly if compensatory 
taxes are not levied on those who avoid the call-up. In 
this situation, the requirements of Australian political and 
social equity would require, in normal peacetime circumstances, 
that those who are conscripted be well paid and provided with 
a wide range of post-conscription support services. The 
level of financial generosity which such a policy would 
38 imply could amount to a substantial budgetary burden. 
It is clear from the opinion poll results displayed in 
this chapter and in Chapter 5 that the Australian public 
favours either a form of universal conscription or a totally 
voluntary military structure. These preferences have most 
probably been reinforced by the experiences of the Vietnam 
38 For details of the support measures provided to 
Australian conscripts in the scheme initiated in 1964, 
see Roy Forward, 'Conscription 1964-1968', in Roy 
Forward and Bob Reece, (eds.), Conscription in Australia~ 
pp. 123-126. . 
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era and by the changing nature of the social values held 
by the Australian public. As a consequence, despite its 
relative attractiveness in purely military terms, the 
political problems of the selective conscription option are 
likely to thwart any serious attempt to seek its 
reintroduction in peacetime. 
3. Voluntary Latent Forces 
The primary emphasis in voluntary latent force systems 
is the selective employment of civilians who possess skills 
which can be further developed for national security 
purposes. Because recruitment is voluntary, there is little 
political or social difficuLty in acquiring appropriate 
numbers of each type of recruit which is required so long as 
the market price for part-time skilled labour can be met or 
exceeded. 
The most efficient type of voluntary system is one 
where the length of full-time service and the frequency and 
duration of supplementary training periods are varied 
according to the technical skills, the rank and responsibility 
of individual recruits. 39 For instance, a high school 
graduate who desires to be trained as a sergeant in a 
territorial defence unit may require 9 months full-time 
training with 4 weeks full-time supplementary activity every 
second year. A similar high school graduate who desires to 
become the driver of an armoured personnel carrier in a 
conventional armoured cavalry unit may require 12 months 
full-time training and 3 weeks supplementary duty annually. 
A fully qualified civil truck driver may require only three 
months full-time duty to be trained as a truck driver in-an 
army logistics unit. Supplementary training periods in his 
case might be limited_. to three weeks full-time duty every 
second year. A fully qualified pilot of a civil jet 
airliner might require 6 months full-time training to :teach 
39 A similar categorised system is used to train Swedish 
conscripts. For details see The Swedish Army (An 
official booklet produced by the Press Department of the 
Swedish Army Staff, no date), pp. 7-11. 
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the standards required of Air Force fighter-bomber pilots 
or 2 month~ to reach those required of a military transport 
pilot. Supplementary training for these individuals might 
average three days per month for a part-time fighter-bomber 
pilot and one day per month for the pilot of a military 
. f 40 transport aircra t. 
Voluntary latent manpower systems provide the potential 
to draw heavily upon a wide range of skills already existing 
in the civil community. For the individuals employed in such 
a system, the skills learnt in both the civil and military 
. spheres would tend to be mutually reinforcing. Both 
civil and military employers, as well as the individuals 
concerned, would stand to gain. In addition, the system 
would effectively provide strategic planners with a great 
deal of flexibility. Over time, force structures could be 
tailored precisely by controlling closely the numbers of 
particular types of skilled individuals recruited. 
The overall costs of such a system would be expressed 
in quite different terms to those of the conscript options. 
The training and manpower costs per hour would most 
probably be higher than those for comparable standing units. 
This would particularly be the case if it were decided to 
pay the full market price for the services of the individuals 
concerned. In these circumstances, it would be necessary to 
award what would, in effect, be overtime rates and, because 
many of those involved would possess high levels of skill 
in ·their civilian employment, their part-time service would 
command high rates of pay. 41 An additional factor would be 
40 
41 
The training times cited in this section, although 
intended to be merely illustrative, are comparable with 
those employed in other countries. 
The high hourly rates of pay awarded to voluntary latent 
forces might be resisted strenuously by full-time military 
personnel. This objection might be overcome, at least 
partially, if the latent force rates of pay were reduced 
below civilian overtime levels but made non-taxable. 
This could be expected to provide a strong incentive to 
a wide range of skilled civilians whose normal incomes 
are subject to high rates of progressive income tax. 
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that the periods of training for these individual~ although 
relatively short, could be expected to be very intensive 
and thus incur high maintenance, support and capital 
attritiort costs. Yet despite these relatively high hourly 
costs, the price per fully trained and equipped mobilised 
man could be expected to be substantially lower than those 
for comparable full-time standing personnel. 
So, in summary, this type of voluntary latent force 
system is adaptable to a wide range of strategic concepts. 
Although it may involve higher budgetary costs per mobilised 
man than either type of conscription system, voluntary 
latent forces do appear to be much less politically sen~itive 
and socially and economically disruptive. As a consequence, 
this option, or some variant of it, would appear to provide 
the most desirable form of latent military manpower in the 
absence of a serious and obvious national security threat. 
The Interaction.of Strategy and Manpower Options 
The potential for employing latent force options in 
Australia varies greatly according to the types of strategy 
options ·considered. If Australia continues to rely heavily 
upon conventional military strategies and structures, the 
potential for latent force substitution is limited to the 
selected introduction of 'hybrid' and 'cadre' units of the 
same general mobilised nature as present standing units. 
Hybrid units contain a mix of full-time and part-time 
elements within a full-time professional command and control 
structure. Cadre units, on the other hand, maintain only a 
skeleton of full-time personnel (normally under 35 per cent) 
to assist in peacetime organisation, administration and the 
maintenance of equipment and facilities. The vast majority 
of cadre unit positions are filled by part-time individuals 
b · 1 · . 42 on mo i isation. 
42 Cadre and hybrid units are discussed at length in Force 
Structure Commission of the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, The Force Structure in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, pp. 100-191, and also by Kenneth 
Hunt in The Alliance and Europe, pp. 29-34. 
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The potential savings which a mix of standing and latent 
conventionq_l units can provide are evidenced by the increasing 
popularity of such options, particularly in Western Europe. 
As Kenneth Hunt points out, this is the type of system 
which the West German Force Structure Commission concluded 
would best suit their needs: 
•.. the German Force Structure Commission 
... has proposed that the existing 33 
brigades (which are substantially under-
strength) be reduced to 24 at full-strength 
and 12 in cadre, to be brought up to full 
size by the mobilization of reservists 
within three days. (It will be noted 
that the recommendation produces three 
extra brigades, thus involving more 
equipment.) Costing is, of course, 
difficult to estimate, since it will vary 
with countries, depending on how much 
reservists are paid when they are called up 
for training or in crisis. It will vary, 
too, with the size of the regular cadres, 
the length of training that reservists get 
each year and the arrangements for looking 
after their equipment. All that can be 
said here is that manpower costs, which are 
forming an increasing part of defence 
budgets, should be markedly lower.43 
Steven Canby, a senior United States defence analyst, 
has argued the case for an even more extensive substitution 
of West Germany's standing divisions for hybrid and cadre 
units: 
43 
German ground forces total 340,000 in 
peacetime, of which 35,000 are in the 
territorial forces and 28,000 in the 
various defence agencies. Assuming 
wartime division slices of 20,000, 
the German field army of 277,000 could 
produce a 25 division structure, say 
7 Category I division slices at near 
full strength; 8 Category II at 50 
per cent strength; and 10 Category III 
at 25 per cent strength. With a similar 
cadre ratio and assigned strength in the 
defence agencies, France could support 
23 divisions, the Netherlands 6~ and 
Belgium 5~. Another combination to 
increase immediate front-line readiness 
and overall structure, while reducing 
Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance and Europe, p. 31. 
German visibility, would be to lower the 
German contribution to 17 higher, 
readiness divisions (10 Category I and 
7 Category II) , and lower the French and 
Benelux cadre ratio, increasing their 
division structure from the 35 above to 
51 divisions, to correspond with their 
more rearward geographical position in 
peacetime. Personnel in the defence 
agencies can also be used to enrich the 
active force content of the cadre units upon 
mobilization as is done·in Israel.44 
It is difficult to translate these concepts into the 
Australian environment with any precision without a much 
more thorough examination of the proportion of the total 
defence force which is required full-time and the means 
385 
which might be available to raise and train latent personnel. 
However, it might be concluded from the thrust of this 
discussion and also from the nature of Australia's military 
traditions that standing latent force mixes could provide a 
basis for resolving at least partially two of ~he three 
fundamental new difficulties confronting Australia's military 
manpower planners. For instance, it would be possible to 
ease significantly the constraints on Australia's force 
expansion capacity, caused by the limited absolute members 
0£ available full-time personnel, by adopting latent manpower 
options. This same action also holds potential for reducing 
the percentage of the budget allocated to manpower and its 
maintenance. If the financial savings made as a result of 
the processes of latent force substitution were to be 
expended on capital equipment, facilities, defence industries, 
etc., the current funding constraints in these areas could 
be greatly relieved. 
The surge capacity problem is much more complex and its 
solution is heavily dependent upon the degree of flexibility 
44 Steven Canby, The Alliance and Europe, Part IV: Military 
Doctrine and Technology' (London, The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 109, 1975), 
pp. 2 0' 21 . 
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which is acceptable in selecting operational strategic 
concepts. '(\s can be seen from the hypothetical substitution 
function FL, depicted in Figure 2(a), a partial replacement 
of full-time conventional forces by latent conventional 
units would expand the total mobilised capacity available 
at M+30 quite significantly. 45 From position F in this 
illustration, if ten full-time units ~ere phased out in 
favour of comparably equipped and trained latent units (at X), 
46 the total mobilised force could be increased by 100 per cent. 
However, when the limited overall scope for latent force 
substitution in the existing Australian national security 
structure is considered, it is doubtful, within the current 
budgetary parameters, whether this type of action would be 
sufficient to satisfy the surge capacity requirements of a 
wide range of potential pressures and threats. 
One means of producing an even greater surge capacity 
would be to substitute not only latent conventional forces 
but also latent territorial defence, civil defence and 
civilian resistance units. Because of their relatively 
simple training, equipments and, to some extent,operating 
procedures, even larger numbers of these units could be 
procured for the price of a standing conventional unit. 
However, for Australia's national security purposes, the 
simple production of large numbers of trained personnel is 
not the only criterion of importance. Those units which are 
trained must be capable of substituting for conventional forces 
in the types of contingencies in which maximum surge capacity 
is likely to be required. Both civil defence and civilian 
resistance personnel would be incapable of performing this 
function. The primary role of civil defence forces 
45 
46 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) have been drawn on the assumption 
that the latent/full-time personnel substitution functions 
are linear in character. It is doubtful that this would 
be the case in practice. They may be convex, concave or 
a combination of both. However, as is pointed out in 
footnotes 40 and 42, the general nature of the rates of 
substitution is soundly based. 
The central assumption of Figure 2(a) is that a mix of 
well~trainedand -equipped latent air, sea and ground con-
ventional forces can be procured for one third of the cost 
of a comparable mix .of full-time conventional forces. 
This is consistent with the evidence provided earlier in 
the chapter. 
FIGURE 2(a}. AN APPROXIMATE COST SUBSTITUTION FUNCTION 
BETWEEN FULL-TIME CONVENTIONAL FORCE 
PERSONNEL AND LATENT CONVENTIONAL FORCE 
PERSONNEL 
Numbers of 
Full-Time Conventional 
Force Personnel 
50 
40 
. 30 
20 F 
10 
L 
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FIGURE 2(b). AN APPROXIMATE COST SUBSTITUTION FUNCTION 
BETWEEN FULL-TIME CONVENTIONAL FORCE 
PERSONNEL AND LATENT TERRITORIAL 
Numbers of 
Full-Time Conventional 
Force Personnel 
50 
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10 
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is to prevent damage to the total community and to mitigate 
the effects of conflict and natural disasters. Civilian 
resistance is designed to raise an enemy's costs of residence, 
particularly in areas of high population concentration. 
Clearly the deterrence, deferment and defensive role of 
·expanded civil defence and civilian resistance forces could 
not effectively substitute for reduced numbers of conventional 
units in primary military conflicts. In this context, the 
only conceptual strategic alternative to full-time and 
latent conventional units is territorial defence forces. 47 
As can be seen from Figure 2(b), a much larger increase 
in surge capacity can be procured by substituting full-time 
personnel with individuals trained and equipped in latent 
territorial units rather than the latent conventional forces 
alternative. 48 In the hypothetical instance displayed in 
the figure, the phasing out of 10 units of full-time 
personnel would permit a 400 per cent increase in total M+30 
strength. This is not to suggest that a mix of 70 latent 
territorial defence units and 10 full-time conventional 
units (or alternatively a mix of 5 full-time 
47 
48 
In order for territorial defence forces to substitute 
substantially for conventional units, action would need 
to be taken to compensate for these forces' iimited 
strategic mobility. In Australia's case, the most effect-
ive means of overcoming this problem would be to raise a 
disproportionate number of territorial defence units in 
the more vulnerable, exposed and isolated parts of the 
country. This would effectively provide these regions 
with a readily mobilised local defensive capacity and 
free the conventional force components for more direct 
counter-offensive activities. 
The major assumption underlying Figure 2{b) is that 
seven well-trained and equipped latent territorial units 
can be procured for the price of one full-time conventional 
unit. This may, in reality, be an over-conservative 
estimate. Using 1971 statistics, Horst Mendershausen has 
argued that West Germany's mixed conscript and standing 
professional forces were seven times more expensive per 
mobilised man than Switzerland's latent conventional 
units. See Horst Mendershausen, Territorial Defense in 
NATO and Non-NATO Europe, p. 23. It is reasonable to 
anticipate that Swiss territorial defence units, if they 
existed, would be even less expensive. 
389 
conventional, 15 latent conventional and 70 latent 
territoriai units) would possess four times the deterrence, 
deferment and defensive capacity of 20 full-time conventional 
units on their own. In Australia's continental defence 
environment, latent territorial defence units would rarely 
provide an absolute substitute for the high mobility, 
flexibility and firepower of conventional units on a one-on-
one basis. However, in a large number of contingencies, 
when the strength of surge capacity would be critical to the 
outcome of the conflict, the utility of territorial defence 
units is likely to be much nigher than their marginal rate 
of cost substitution. In other words, it may be possible to 
procure 7 latent territorial units for the price of every 
full-time conventional unit. But in many continental defence 
scenarios, conventional units are not likely to be 7 times 
as effective as those trained and equipped for territorial 
defence. In force-on-force, rather than unit-on-unit 
comparisons, standing/latent - conventional/territorial force 
mixes are likely to provide a more effective capacity to meet 
a wide range of scenarios than simple and traditional 
standing conventional force options. 49 This represents a 
marked contrast to the situation which applied in the forward 
defence era when latent force options, and particularly 
non-conventional latent force options, were of far lower 
'l' 50 uti ity. 
49 
50 
The utility of large numbers of latent territorial units 
would be at a premium in those scenarios where the 
requirements for surge capacity are most pressing. See 
the discussion of this matter in Chapter 4~ 
Erwin H~ckel described those situations for which latent 
medium-technology forces are most suited in the following 
terms: 
... all-militia forces provide an economically 
and psychologically attractive method of 
mobilizing a nation to the defence of its own 
territory by relatively primitive military 
means, at the cost of strictly limited mobility 
and flexibility within the national territory 
and none whatever outside it. They are thus 
more appropriate to nations whose military 
commitment is exclusively limited to their own 
defence than they are to those with any wider 
involvement. 
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There is, in addition, a secondary category of factors 
which furthe.r supports the potential significance of 
territorial defence forces in meeting Australia's surge 
capacity requirements. In a time of international crisis 
and severe threat, it should be possible to mobilise rapidly 
those standing and latent conventional forces, as well as any 
latent territorial forces, as then exist. However~ if the 
Government injects a large increase in funding in an attempt 
to further expand mobilisable capacity rapidly, it is clear· 
from the discussion in this chapter that a much stronger 
manpower and effective battlefield response could be gained 
from a territorial defence-heavy expansion than from a 
primary expansion of conventional forces. This is partly a 
consequence of the moderate level of technological and 
operational complexity of territorial defence forces and the 
resultant relative simplicity of their training. 
A second and possibly more important factor may apply 
if external sources of supply, particularly of heavy capital 
equipment, are restricted severely. In this type of 
situation, Australia's force expansion capacity may be 
limited effectively not so much by manpower shortages as by 
the military equipment production capacity of Australia's 
domestic industry. To a large extent, this was the case 
during the Second World War and there is little reason to 
believe that Australia's industrial support capacity in the 
late 1970s is stronger, in a relative sense, than that of the 
1930s. 51 As a consequence, the character of any future 
50 cont'd 
51 
Erwin H~ckel,Military Manpower and PoZi~icaZ Purpose, p. 30. 
The nature of Australia's strategic reorientation renders 
this type of force far more appropriate than it was in the 
forward defence era. However, because of the size of 
Australia's continental expanses, such forces are likely to 
require a greater level of mobility than that which is 
mentioned by Hltckel. 
The constraining influence of Australia's industrial support 
structure during the Second World War was demonstrated most 
clearly in October 1943, when the War Cabinet ordered the 
Army to release 20,000 men to strengthen industrial 
production. For details see Gavin Long, The Six Years War: 
A Concise History df Australia in the 1939-45 War (Canberra, 
Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1973), p. 317. 
mobilisatLon should be planned within the context of the 
limitations of domestic support industry. This is of 
particular significance because, as was discussed in 
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Chapter 5, it is unlikely that Australia will, in the 
future, possess an indigenous capacity to produce the major 
hardware requirements of conventional units. However, by 
contrast, it is quite possible that Australian industry will 
possess a capability to provide most, if not all, of the 
equipment and supply requirements of territorial units. 
Hence, in a crisis situation, it would appear that territorial 
units could be raised and trained faster, less expensively 
and in larger numbers than conventional units. They may 
provide a very valuable security option in situations when 
the requirements of self-sufficiency are at a premium. 
Conclusion 
Australia's standing conventional force structure has 
been derived to meet the requirements of successive foreign 
commitments, primarily in support of those made by major 
power allies. In retrospect, it has proved to be eminently 
suitable for the performance of most of the functions related 
to this task. But now that Australia's security environment 
demands that a much greater priority be given to operations 
on the continent itself and in its immediate surroundings, 
the country's historically derived military structure appears 
to be much less appropriate. Erwin Hackel summarises this 
general argument in the following terms: 
From the national point of view, 
all-volunteer forces offer mobility, 
flexibility and firepower at the cost 
not only of heavy per capita financial 
expenditure but also of a shortage of 
reserves and a partially consequent 
weakness in combat endurance and 
'ground-holding' potential. They are 
thus more appropriate to nations with 
diverse or widely-scattered commitments, 
which may involve limited operations by 
highly trained task forces or which can 
back up their conventional capability 
by a credibLe threat of escalation to 
a nuclear level, than they are to nations 
whose primary concern is the conventional 
defence of continental territory against 
threats which may enforce prolonged combat.52 
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Australia's prime national security concerns are now 
much more closely related to the type of continental defence 
for which Hackel argues full-time conventional forces are 
unsuitable. In Australia's case, the military structure 
inherited from the past is particularly limited in its very 
high costs per mobilised man and in its restricted immediate 
response and surge potential. 
In seeking means of overcoming the weaknesses of the 
current structure, it is clear from the analysis in this 
chapter that a wide range of latent force options offer 
considerable potential. However, in the context of Australia 1 s 
national security environment and structure as they exist 
in the late 1970s, the scope for actually employing these 
concepts would appear, in practice,to be limited. Systems 
of universal and selective conscription, in particular, 
suffer from a wide range of political, social and economic 
difficulties in normal periods of peace. Voluntary latent 
force options can be very effective and are less politically 
sensitive and socially disruptive. Howeve~ they do tend t6 
impose a more severe drain upon defence budgets. 
The adoption of latent force options is also frustrated 
by the fact that many national security functions cannot be 
performed cost-effectively by part-time forces. Some tasks 
require round-the-clock operational activity, some involve 
very specialised high technology equipment and others are 
currently performed by civilians. Hence, within the national 
sedurity budgetary parameters of a relatively undisturbed 
inter~ational environment, the scope for exploiting the 
manpower cost-saving capacity and the surge potential of 
latent force options is heavily restricted. However, despite 
these difficulties, if it were possible to replace a significant 
proportion of current full-time defence manpower with well-
52 Erwin Hackel, Military Manpower and Political Purpose, 
p. 30. 
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trained and -equipped latent forces, Australia's manpower 
and cost-squeeze and surge capacity problems could be 
53 
alleviated to a substantial degree. The greatest scope 
53 As is obvious from the examples cited earlier in this 
chapter, the concept of a mix of full-time professional 
forces and much larger, well-trained and-equipped, latent 
forces is not a new one. However, it is also clear, in 
an international sense, that such force mixes are coming 
to be seen as a useful and appropriate means of over-
coming the problems of manpower and equipment cost-
squeezes and surge capacity erosion. Thus, Kenneth 
Hunt writes: 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
smaller active forces and more reliance upon 
reserves is .likely to be the way in which 
European nations will try to keep defence 
budgets in check while maintaining a defence 
structure on the ground on a militarily and 
politically acceptable scale. If this is 
to be the case the concept will have to be 
taken seriously. 
Kenneth Hunt, The Alliance and Europe, p. 41. c. Douglas-
Home comes to a similar conclusion at the end of his 
extensive review of Britain's reserve forces: 
The answer obviously lies in extremely short 
engagements - possibly lasting no longer than 
the time spent in basic military and technical 
training ... The concept of small regular 
standing forces partially organized for an 
operational role but mostly involved in the 
training of large, volunteer reserves, who 
spend only as long in uniform as it takes to 
give them a skilled or semi-skilled trade 
qualification, is a wholly different one from 
the guiding philosophy of the defence forces 
today. 
C. Douglas-Home, Britain's Reserve Forces (London, Royal 
Uni.ted Services Institute, 1971), pp. 56, 57. 
Erwin H~ckel concludes part of his major study with an 
even more explicit description of the developing trend 
as .he perceives·it: 
To conclude this chapter on problems of 
manpower policy, it appears that several of the 
parameters that were discussed seem to point 
towards one particular model which may avoid a 
maximum number of disadvantages inherent in 
different manpower systems while combining a 
maximum number of possible advantages. Such a 
model has been discussed independently in 
several countries in recent years, yet with a 
significant similarity of considerations and 
conclusions, particularly in France, West Germany 
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for standing force substitution would appear to be in two 
categories .of service personnel employment: first, in those 
areas involving low and medium skills and technologies which 
are readily acquired by civilians; and second,in those 
areas involving high levels of skill and technology which 
are already t'amiliar to significant sections of the civil 
population. 
So, in summary, Australia's current national security 
manpower system is clearly inappropriate for the new strategic 
environment. Over time, its maintenance can be expected to 
become more difficult and expensive. But even more 
importantly, its continued retention will imply the acceptance 
of unnecessary dangers and risks because of its non-optimisation 
of available resources. There thus appears to be a clear 
requirement for the full range of manpower and strategy 
options to be examined thoroughly within the context of 
Australia's new strategic situation. This would require 
governmental action at a senior level. Moreover, because 
53 cont'd 
and Belgium; the Austrian and Yugoslav 
Governmentshave armed forces according to 
this model. 
The model consists, briefly of a 
relatively small professional force, made up of 
volunteers on medium-term and long-term engagements 
and equipped with the most advanced and powerful 
weapons, and a complementary and much larger force 
of conscripts, serving no more than a total of 
12.months in several instalments of militia-style 
refresher courses, trained largely by its own 
militia training cadre and equipped with light 
and relatively simple weapons sui'table for home-
defence tasks. Such a model, which is clearly 
designed to combine the capabilities of a highly 
mobile and proficient volunteer force with the 
massive manpower supply of a large reserve force, 
may well be on the way to become the dominant 
form of military manpower systems in Europe. 
Erwin Hackel, Military Manpower and Political Purpose, 
p. 18. The applicability to Australia of much of the 
detail raised by these scholars is, of course, highly 
debatable. However, the underlying trend towards the 
increased use of well-equipped and-trained latent forces, 
frequently in partial substitution for full-time standing 
forces, is very difficult to dispute. 
such an undertaking would involve the serious questioning 
of highly ipstitutionalised systems of employment, the 
bureaucratic resistance would inevitably be intense. The 
·political resolve of the initiating actors would need to 
be strong and their sense of direction clear. However, a 
significant.proportion of the opposition likely to be 
aroused could most probably be pre-empted and 1 to a large 
degree, dispelled if it were made clear, from the outset, 
that the potential of alternative manpower and strategy 
concepts was being examined solely in the interests of 
greater national security, not less. 
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CHAPTER 12 
CONCLUSION: THE CHALLENGE OF APPROPRIATE 
RESPONSE 
39 6 
The central argument of this thesis is based upon the 
proposition that Australia's strategic environment has 
altered substantially during the past decade. The generalised 
nature of this change has been recognised publicly by the 
Government, the Opposition and by significant elements of 
both the military and civilian bureaucratic structures. 
However, the full implications and consequences of the 
changing environment do not appear to have been delineated 
in any comprehensive or integrated form. Thus, although 
individual elements of the defence structure have perceived 
the general need to change, their perceptions of the detailed 
nature of the new requirements· based on their particular 
interests, values and experiences, have varied greatly. 
As a consequence, the processes of adaptation have tended 
to be piecemeal. 
The discussion in this thesis represents only a limited 
initial approach to the problems of adapting to the changed 
strategic environment. No attempt has been made to derive 
the precise form of an optimal Australian security response 
structure. Nor has a definitive means of determining such a 
structure been prescribed. Rather, attention has been 
focussed primarily on the nature of the new requirements 
and the introduction of some of the broader conceptual 
options. 
During the course of the discussion in this thesis, two 
major themes have emerged which are deserving of brief 
comment in conclusion. 
1. The Increased Scale of Australia's Security 
Requirements 
The first theme is that the task of securing the 
Australian continent and its immediate interests in the late 
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1970s and into the 1980s is of a much more demanding 
nature than that of .making single-service commitments overseas 
to support the foreign deployments of major power allies. 
This is partly because of the greatly increased requirements 
for independence in national security capacity. It is now 
clear that the traditional and highly institutionalised 
limited liability approach, involving a presumption that 
foreign sources of support would be available in crisis 
situations, can no longer be justified. But the increase 
in the scale of the new requirements is also due to the fact 
that the strategic environment of the 1980s will be 
characterised by a much more expansive range of pressures 
and threats, some of which will be capable of developing at 
short notice. 
In combination, these factors are the cause of a major 
problem. The resources required to develop an indigenous 
capacity sufficient to deter or, if necessary, defer and 
defend against the new range of potential pressures and 
threats are of a magnitude substantially greater than those 
currently allocated to the task. However, it is unlikely 
that the proportion of total national resources devoted to 
the security function on a full-time basis will be increased 
substantially in the absence of a serious and obvious threat. 
As a consequence, Australia's security planners are confronted 
by a wide gap between the ends desired and the means 
available. 
In these circumstances, the only way of satisfying 
indigenously the demanding requirements of the new strategic 
environment is to draw more extensively upon the latent 
capacities already existing in the civil community. This 
is not to advocate the mass militarisation of the total 
society. In practice, this type of proposal would involve a 
relatively inconspicuous process of planning and low 
level preparation to facilitate the transfer of a wide range 
of civil capacities to perform national security functions 
398 
h . 1 at s ort notice. The potential for employing latent 
manpower an.d manufacturing .capacities has been discussed 
in earlier parts of this thesis. However, preparations 
could be made to exploit fully a much wider range of civil 
resources: primary industry; air, road, rail and sea 
transport; communications; fuels and power; food and 
water; medical facilities and services; police forces; 
etc. 
Planning national security responses on the assumption 
that a significant proportion of civil resources would be 
available in emergency situations could be expected to 
impact upon the priorities of the total community and most 
particularly upon those of the established security system. 
In an overall sense, it would encourage the concept of the 
nation at large generating and maintaining its own security. 
To some extent it would also facilitate the design and 
development of civil resources with long term national 
security requirements as a significant, although not 
necessarily dominant, consideration. But perhaps most 
importantly, the acceptance of this type of concept would 
make it possible for full-time national security resources 
to be allocated primarily to supplement and enhance the 
1 The concept of security planning in normal periods of 
peace, on the assumption that in serious crisis situations 
large sections of civil society can be redirected to 
perform national· security functions, is by no means new. 
It is employed by a number of small and medium-sized 
states which are confronted by large and potentially 
overwhelming security problems and require a means of 
managing them independently. It has variously been 
termed Total Defence, All Nation Defence or General 
People's Defence. 
For details of the concepts employed in Sweden and 
Yugoslavia see Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory 
and Practice of Territorial Defence (London, Chatto and 
Windus for The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, 1976), pp. 84-123, 172-217. For further 
details on Sweden's Total Defence concept together with 
a detailed discussion of its Swiss equivalent, see Jerry Wilson 
Ralston, The Defense of Small States in the Nuclear Age 
(Geneva, University of Geneva, 1969) . 
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much greater latent potential of the civil community. 2 
This type of approach would prevent duplication of service 
and civilian capacities and encourage the integration and 
rationalisation of the total society's national security 
resources. 
The full ramifications of this concept are far reaching. 
It essentially provides a means by which Australia's 
security capacity can be extended far beyond that which the 
country can afford to devote to the task on a full-time 
basis. It possesses the potential to multiply Australia's 
independent response capacity very substantially. 
2. The Changed Character of Australia's Security 
Requirements 
If means may be found to eliminate, or at least alleviate, 
the national security resources gap, there remains the 
2 For instance, it if were appreciated that several thousand 
heavy road transports could be made available at short 
notice in crisis situations, the armed services would most 
probably refrain from purchasing such equipment. Moreover, 
they could plan in advance and in detail to employ this 
enormous resource in the most efficient manner possible. 
There might even be a case for managing the civil road 
transport fleet, perhaps by limiting alternative brands of 
equipment, so as to rationalise peacetime and crisis 
support, maintenance and servicing requirements. 
Similar potential exists in the air transport industry. 
If it were taken for granted that, in a crisis situation, 
most of the resources of Qantas and the domestic airlines 
would be available for national security tasks, the 
efficent utilisation of this very extensive resource could 
be prepared in detail in advance. Acceptance of this 
concept might also encourage a rationalisation of 
equipment types not only among the commercial airlines 
themselves, but also between the airlines and the three 
armed services. Preparations for the employment of civil 
air resources in security crises have been undertaken in 
mariy countries. For example, see details of the United 
States Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program in General William 
G. Moore, Jr, USAF, 'Airlifts Contribution to Mobility 
Planning' and in Robley L. Mangold, 'Airlines 
Contributions to the Nation's Strategic Mobility', in 
Proceedings of the 19?? Worldwide Strategic Mobility 
Conference (A conference sponsored by the Organization of 
the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Logistics Directorate, Los 
Angeles, 2-4 May 1977), pp. II-B-8, II-B-9 and II-I-1 ff. 
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challenge represented by the, second major theme of this 
thesis - th.at of adapting the character of the established 
security system. The nature of the national security task 
now confronting Australia is fundamentally different to that 
of the 1960s and early 1970s in several important respects. 
First, it is clear that the environment of future operations 
will be characterised by quite different technology, terrain, 
climate, ground cover, population and infrastructure features 
to those of the past. The unique nature of the Australian 
continent and its immediate surrounds increases greatly the 
desirability of developing original solutions to satisfy 
the local requirements .. 
The second new characteristic of Australia's security 
task is that the threat environment is of a substantially 
different nature to that of the past. In the future, many 
potential threats may be primarily economic, political, 
social and pyschological in character. In these circumstances, 
a response capacity which is limited to diplomatic and 
military means will be inappropriate and ineffective. In 
the face of such a variety of potential pressures and threats, 
it will be necessary to be able to draw upon a wide range of 
diplomatic, economic, civil, psychological and military 
defence resources at short notice. Thus, in the new 
strategic environment, Australia needs a multiple-component 
national security policy and system rather than simply 
separate, but coordinated, foreign and defence policies. 
The fundamentally altered nature of these requirements 
imposes new demands and pressures upon the processes of 
Australian security policy formulation. It is now necessary 
to develop indigenously a strategy and structure which 
optimises Australia's independent national security capacity. 
This Gannot be expected to be a simple task as there are no 
comprehensive solutions to the new security requirements 
which are immediately obvious. As a consequence, a very 
major effort is required to develop an efficient evaluation 
system within which a wide range of strategy options can be 
tested in concept for their capacity to contribute to an 
optimal solution. The model which is derived from such a 
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process could be structured into a long range planning 
system to provide coherent and consistent direction for the 
security structure's development. 
However, before any fundamental changes can be planned, 
it is essential that the need for change be acknowledged. 
Because of the wide range of bureaucratic influences which 
constrain meaningful adaptation, such acknowledgement will 
be difficult to achieve. Even if it is achieved, effective 
changes will only be instituted if complementary measures 
are taken to moderate significantly the highly institutionalised 
pressures for conformity with out-dated ideas, the 
unquestioning adherence to precedent and the processes of 
protecting established vested interests. The functional 
performance of existing structures will need to be reviewed, 
the knowledge and experience held by civilian and service 
policy-makers broadened, many of the processes of security 
policy formulation opened to public scrutiny and personnel 
incentive patterns restructured to encourage a much higher 
level of experimentation and innovation. 
Certainly these processes of fundamental reassessment 
and adaptation would be demanding and difficult to implement 
successfully. They would require a major and concerted 
effort by a large number of people over an extended period 
of time. Strong and clear leadership would be required of 
both the Government and senior advisors. Largely because 
of these factors, the prospects for substantial progress in 
the immediate future are not favourable. In the absence of 
any generally perceived serious and immediate threat to 
Australia's security, it has been possible for the stimulus 
for major change largely to be ignored. In recent years, it 
has almost always been easier for individuals and political 
and bureaucratic structures to concentrate on repeating 
well-established routines and to postpone meaningful 
investigation of the basic issues at stake. As Dr T.B. 
Millar described the situation: 
Australians ... are groping self-consciously 
for their own identity while blandly deferring 
the problem of security - not because of 
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economic restraints but because of a habit 
of hedonism, procrastination and dependence.3 
Yet although it may not be universally appreciated in 
the present environment, the perils of constantly deferring 
a thorough investigation of these problems are very real. 
Australia is in danger of perpetuating many strategic 
concepts which were derived during the forward defence era 
into a new strategic environment in which they are patently 
inappropriate. Although the penalties of this type of 
intransigence may be barely apparent in the short term, in 
the long term they may be extremely severe. As J.K. Galbraith 
has emphasised, the influence of a dynamic external 
environment cannot be resisted indefinitely: 
The enemy of conventional wisdom is not 
ideas but the march of events ... the 
conventional wisdom accommodates itself 
not to the world that it is meant to 
interpret but to the audience's view of 
the world. Since the latter remains with 
the comfortable and familiar, while the world 
moves on, the conventional wisdom is always 
in danger of obsolescence. This is not 
immediately fatal. The fatal blow comes 
when the conventional ideas fail signally 
to deal with some contingency to which 
obsolescence has made them palpably 
inapplicable. This sooner or later, must 
be the fate of ideas which have lost their 
relation to the world.4 
Thus, the most fundamental and urgent challenge to 
Australia's security system in the late 1970s is that of 
appropriate adaption to the requirements of the changing 
strategic environment. Australia can no longer afford to 
refrain from acknowledging the importance of the problem 
and from instituting a comprehensive process of policy 
review. 
3 
4 
T.B. Millar, 'From Whitlam to Fraser', Foreign Affairs,_ 
Vol. 53, No. 4, July 1977, p. 871. 
J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (New York, Hamish 
Hamilton, 1958), p. 10. 
APPENDIX 
Additional Information Concerning the Character 
of the Australian Continental Environment 
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The prime purpose of this appendix is to provide 
additional information to support the discussion throughout 
the thesis, especially that in Chapter 3. The information 
which is presented in the maps which appear on the following 
pages is not intended to provide a comprehensive survey of 
Australia's geographical environment. Rather, that which is 
contained herein has been selected because of its capacity 
to supplement in a useful way the material which is 
obtainable from any comprehensive atlas. Amongst the most 
helpful sources of more general reference are: 
The Times in association with John Bartholemew and 
Son, Edinburgh, The Times Atlas of the World (London, The 
Times Newspapers Ltd, 1967) and Melville Bell Grosvenor 
(ed.), National Geographic Atlas of the World (Washington, 
D.C., National Geographic Society, 1963). 
Maps 1-7 have been reproduced with minor 
amendments from Australian Bureau of Statistics, Official 
Yearbook of Australia 19?4 (Canberra, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1975), pp. 41, 61, 48, 53, 37, 34, 59. 
Map 8 is a redrafted black and white version of a 
detailed map which appears on page 14 of an appendix entitled 
'The Bases of Landscape' bound in as the central pages of 
Nancy and Andrew Learmonth, Regional Landscapes of Australia: 
Form, Function and Change (Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1971). 
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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
Gathering the information required for this thesis 
has not been easy. This is primarily because the processes 
of security policy-mp.king in Australia are unusually 
'closed'. In marked contrast to most western countries, 
senior service and civilian officers rarely express their 
views publicly and in any detail on the broader issues of 
national security concern. No senior serving officer in the 
defence bureaucracy (military or civilian) has chosen or, 
perhaps, been permitted to express his personal opinions on 
defence policy issues in a major study of book length. Nor 
does the Parliament hold regular or detailed committee 
hearings on the central issues of security policy. As a 
consequence, the number of people who are actively engaged 
in public debate on national security issues in Australia is 
relatively limited. Nearly all of those who are available 
to comment regularly and in depth do so from a vantage point 
outside the formal decision-making structure and many are 
motivated to plead the cause of particular interest groups. 
The problems which this situation presents to serious 
researchers are formidable. However, in this thesis, it has 
proved possible to overcome many of the difficulties caused 
by this paucity of authoritative information by drawing 
extensively upon the accounts and opinions of those who 
have been intimately involved in the processes of security 
decision-making in the recent past, those who have studied 
the existing system closely and those who have monitored 
the progression of Australian defence policy over an extended 
period. Excessive reliance upon any particular individual 
would make one vulnerable to the dangers of subjectivity. 
However, it has been found that, although the diverse group 
of informed external observers differ widely in their levels 
of experience, their political beliefs and means of earning 
a living, they do largely agree on a wide range of important 
matters. As a consequence, it has been possible to base a 
significant proportion of the argument and some of the 
conclusions in this thesis upon their evidence. 
No classified documents or materials have been 
employed in. the construction of this thesis. However, 
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it has been possible to gain a significant amount of 
information on a wide range of matters which are veiled by 
secrecy within Australia by referring to overseas journals 
and the documentation produced by foreign governments. 
United States Congressional hearings deserve particular 
mention in this regard. The researcher who is prepared to 
sift through thousands of pages of nearly unreadable and 
often irrelevent testimony is frequently rewarded by 
insights and facts which do not appear in Australian 
Government press releases, the daily newspapers or trade 
journals. 
The limited number of Australian Government publications 
which are available have been of some assistance. Various 
Parliamentary Papers,· Hansard, committee reports and 
departmental annual reports have been consulted extensively. 
In some sections of the thesis, it has been necessary to 
rely primarily upon newspaper accounts of particular issues 
or events. In those instances where the bases of these 
reports have been the subject of doubt, extensive efforts 
have been made to corroborate the information from other 
sources. Of the daily Australian press, the two newspapers 
employing defence correspondents, The Canberra Times and 
The Australian, have been most helpful. 
Of special value in this area of research are the many 
professional and trade journals which monitor military affairs 
and defence industry. For this study, the most important 
of these have been International Defense Review and Aviation 
Week and Space Technology. Although individual authors and, 
in some cases, particular journals consistently favour those 
strategies or weapon systems which conform most closely to 
well-established service or industry beliefs and interests, 
these publications do cover most security and, particularly, 
mO$t technical issues more systematically and in far more 
detail than the general press. Consequently their 
contribution to this thesis has been indispensable. 
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The great bulk of the information gathered for this 
thesis orig~nated from published sources. Nevertheless, a 
significant debt is owed to a large number of senior 
civilian and military personnel in Australia and overseas 
who granted interviews, provided material and freely 
offered opinions. Although many of these meetings were 
conducted on an off-the-record and/or not-for-attribution 
ba:sis, the information gained proved to be invaluable in 
guiding the selection of material from other sources and in 
providing original emphases and perspectives. 
Finally, reference should be made to the great deal of 
information and the many important perspectives which have 
been derived from debate and discussion within the academic 
and broader national security communities in Canberra. In 
this respect, the day-to-day contact with the membership of 
the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and the Department 
of International Relations has been particularly helpful. 
In addition, the United Service Institution of the Australian 
Capital Territory has provided valuable opportunities to 
mix informally with a wide range of civilian and service 
officers. These three bodies have organised numerous 
lectures, seminars and conferences on national and international 
security issues. Such occasions have provided ideal 
opportunities to share the insights of others and to subject 
my own views to informed and critical review. 
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